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Abstract 
Written from within a donor organisation, this thesis questions the professional myth 
of eCapacity Development. It uses the unique geographical and political access of a 
practitioner to dissect the notion of capacity development as well as question 
agendas of ICT promotion in Ethiopia and Egypt. Over the past decades, the notion 
of capacity development has gained the imagination of many researchers and 
practitioners alike. Both circles pursued an intuition that this notion could provide a 
practical lynchpin for reinventing development practice. However, there is a dearth of 
critical research with regard to the normative role capacity development has 
achieved within the field of development. Through careful examination of the 
evolution and contemporary practice of this concept, this thesis uncovers the 
persistent ambiguity and the latent power-claiming encased within capacity 
development. It also questions the ongoing attempt to re-legitimise the idea of 
development through the appropriation and subsequent depletion of concepts such 
as capacity development. On the other hand, it analyses state-owned and 
participatory agendas of ICT promotion in Ethiopia and Egypt. While states often 
follow populist accounts that celebrate ICTs as the harbinger of a new age, this 
thesis shows the delicate ways in which the notion of ICTs is carefully domesticated 
to the agendas of the Ethiopian developmental state.  It illustrates the inner workings 
of hegemonic state power in Ethiopia, but also shows the boundaries it is capable of 
setting against the influence of transnational capitalism. This is then held against the 
rise of surrogate communities enabled by ICTs in Ethiopia and Egypt. The brief 
genealogy of these communities seeks to verify the raison d’etre for dissent in the 
age of transnational capitalism. Nevertheless, it also cautions about their liability to 
the appropriative practices of transnational capitalism. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This is a practice-led thesis written from the perspective of an insider action 
researcher. It is concerned with the nature of development practice, as 
exemplified by the notions of capacity development and the promotion of ICTs. Its 
primary focus is to advance knowledge about these practices, as well as advance 
knowledge within them. As such it primarily targets practitioners, besides an 
academic audience. It provides a fundamental critique of the contemporary capacity 
development discourse by establishing an archaeological account (on my use of the 
term archaeology see Section 2.1). Through this it illustrates the process of theory-
building that escorted capacity development into mainstream development over the 
last two and a half decades. The theory of capacity development is than conflated 
with empirical accounts from the field that demonstrate the gradual hollowing-out of a 
once participatory notion. In the second part it draws up a contrast between the 
normative and autocratic intentions of state actors with regard to promoting 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and the creative technological 
constructionism of new, renegade urban elites (technologists) in Ethiopia and Egypt. 
By doing so it adds new facets to the understanding of the neo-patrimonial 
technological determinism of the Ethiopian state, as well as points out some 
limitations to the influence of transnational informational capitalism. It also illustrates 
the ways in which online surrogate communities empower individual and group 
agencies in distinct ways, but gradually become exposed to appropriation by 
transnational corporates.  
 
1.1 Research origins 
1.1.1 Being a practitioner – the confines of the workplace 
The research underpinning this thesis was born in the Ethiopian Ministry of Capacity 
Building (MOCB). As a junior professional at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in 2008, I was assigned to the eCapacity 







Engineering Capacity Building Programme (ECBP). Upon my arrival, I was 
presented with a powerful narrative about an approach that my German and 
Ethiopian colleagues called eCapacity Development.  
 
However, the notion of eCapacity Development was only a “way of doing 
things” and had no theoretical or conceptual pillars at the time of my arrival. In 
hindsight, one could say that it was loosely defined along the parameters of what 
was considered as the developmental en vogue in the MOCB and GTZ in the mid- to 
late 2000s. Two major policy frameworks dominated both the Ethiopian and German 
development discourse: the notion of capacity development and the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). In the earliest stage of my research, I 
agreed with and readily followed this pre-set logic within GTZ. Central to this 
framework were three key aspects that were generally accepted and cultivated in my 
professional environment: 
 
1. Capacity development signifies a new era in development co-operation. 
2. Capacity development is a systemic approach to development that alleviates 
previous uncertainties and didactical ailments of earlier development work. 
3. The pillars of capacity development are laid out in the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness (2005). 
  
The very labelling of this department – eCapacity Development – unequivocally 
demonstrated the credulous endorsement of capacity development by the Ethiopian 
as well as German governments. The use of the term capacity development pro 
forma mandated the activities of the department. Even though the concept of 
eCapacity Development was a solely practice-based notion, it intelligently tapped 
into this mandate and amplified certain aspects of it. There was a particular 
insistence among my colleagues that eCapacity Development constitutes a radical 
departure from other information and communication technology for 
development (ICT4D) measures. In the eyes of my colleagues, the following key 








1. Faith in ICTs: Anything we “touch” should be faster, better, smarter or cheaper 
through ICTs. 
2. Bias to action: Implement first, contemplate later. 
3. No ideology: Under no circumstances are we to engage in ideological debate 
with Ethiopian or German counterparts. 
4. People over technology: ICTs are only a small part of the solution that we 






Figure 1.1 further illustrates the thoroughly constructionist and participatory claim of 
eCapacity Development as articulated in formal ECBP documents. Its three 
signature elements (an ICT solution – cf. ICT4D & e-Innovation –, content & 
information, and capacity development) celebrated a constructionist take on ICT 
promotion by emphasising the adaptability of ICTs as well as the mixture of human 
(capacity building, content & information) and technological elements. eCapacity 
Development was, however, an essentially pragmatic management notion defined 







predominantly by its agility. Its ability to respond quickly and implement was what 
secured the necessary buy-in from the Ethiopian political class, which was 
preoccupied with the implementation of its 5-year plan, the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP 2005-10). eCapacity 
Development, however, intentionally existed on the peripheries of the political and 
economic discourse invested in the ECBP programme in order to prevent friction 
with the joint Ethiopian-German leadership. 
 
Implementing these new, eCapacity Development projects was an 
overwhelming and intoxicating experience. Encouraged by my colleagues, I set out 
to do this research with the original intention to create a conceptual underpinning for 
eCapacity Development in order to make it replicable and scalable in other 
development environments. During the intellectual journey of producing this thesis, 
however, my research evolved into a firm critique of the notion of eCapacity 
Development. The apparent chasm between the field realities of capacity 
development and its theoretical frameworks initiated a radical rethinking of what is at 
stake. 
 
1.1.2 What is at stake? 
This thesis is rooted in a participatory, practitioner’s perspective and is therefore 
concerned with issues that arose from encounters with people in the field – various 
types of elites – who embodied alternative versions of ideas and institutions with 
regard to capacity development and the promotion of ICTs.  As a practice-led 
research this thesis provides an empirically informed reading of the emergence, 
trajectories and interpretations of the notion of capacity development and rejects its 
developmental orthodoxies. Besides presenting a critical genealogy of capacity 
development, it also questions the inherent intentionalities within the promotion of 
ICTs. Being a practice-led research it is primarily concerned with the inner-lives of 
these practices and those forces – primarily transnational elites – that shape and 








 However, of course I am also aware of the limitations of this practitioner 
perspective that colour the texture of my critique. First, the thesis is tied to two 
particular field scenarios: that of the late 2000s in Ethiopia, and the post-
revolutionary Egypt. Particularly, the first one formed and informed my understanding 
of development work. In the late 2000s, the socialist revolutionary legacy of the 
Ethiopian party state was questioned by an emerging renegade, urban elite and the 
state was consequently transformed into a transnational developmental state 
(Abbink 2009; Hagmann and Abbink 2011; De Waal 2013; Hess-Nielsen 2013; Aalen 
2014 – on my use of the term renegade see Subsection 3.1.2) Through my work at 
ECBP I was privileged – but psychologically and professionally not sufficiently 
prepared – to observe and participate in many of the ideological absurdities and 
bureaucratic obscurities of an authoritarian state apparatus. As I moved up in the 
ranks within GTZ, I worked with high-level decision makers in various Ethiopian 
ministries (Ministry of Capacity Building, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science 
and Technology), which made me increasingly aware of the intricacies and the 
harsh, often oppressive reality of the neopatrimonial party state. This unparalleled 
access allowed me to observe the internal mechanisms of power within a 
contemporary autocratic state. The constant negotiation of conflictive environments 
fundamentally shaped my opinion and elicited a certain distaste for the 
misappropriation of developmental constructs – for example capacity development – 
to suppress or tame large portions of the population. This further instigated my 
scepticism towards capacity development. Section 1.5 will introduce issues of 
positionality and the associated ethics that my work raised, which will then be 
explored more fully in my methodological outline (Chapter 3). 
 
 While being stationed in Ethiopia ensured that the thesis was grounded and of 
practical use, the location also had negative impacts. Due to the technical limitations 
in Ethiopia (e.g. the inability to access academic journals because of deliberately 
blocked DNS ports), I had limited access to academic literature and was unable to 
explore detailed, empirical accounts of capacity development or ICTs in other 







access to more critical accounts that dealt with the histories and ethnographies of 
development as a discourse.  
 
1.1.3 Theoretical influences 
There are two main theoretical sources that influenced my conceptual critique. First, 
the historical as well as socio-economic understanding that the contemporary 
development discourse is an artefact of and embedded within the European project 
of Enlightenment (Arndt 1989; Leys 1996; McMichael 2004; Unwin 2009; Rist 2009) 
helped me develop new perspectives that transcended and questioned some – if not 
most – of the integral truisms of my immediate professional environment. Particularly 
Rist (2009) fundamental critique of the development discourse influenced my 
thinking. His thorough analysis and historical dissection of contemporary notions 
development, as well as his assertion of a perpetually repetitive discourse that seeks 
continuous re-legitimation, influenced my critique. Even though some of Rist’s 
predicaments are certainly examples of simplistic post-developmental scholarship 
(Nederveen Pieterse 1998, 2001, 2009; Brigg 2002; Ziai 2007, 2015), they decisively 
shaped my awareness of how grassroots development practices with originally 
positive connotations are often (mis-)appropriated and hollowed out. 
 
          Second, Bauman’s theses (Bauman 2000a, 2000b, 2005) on contemporary 
globalisation and the ensuing liquid stage of modernity further forced me to engage 
with and critique experiences of elite re-appropriations, the globalisation and 
cosmopolitanism of social hierarchies, as well as nationalist politics within my 
immediate environment (Bach 2011; Hagmann and Abbink 2011). Even though in 
the course of my research – for clarity's sake – I abandoned the notion of liquid 
modernity, Bauman’s influence made me disaffiliate my thinking from transnational 
and celebratory accounts of globalisation (Scholte 2008). Most importantly, it created 
a sensitivity in me for a Zeitgeist in which insecurity and inability – the very antonyms 
of capacity – are powerful rhetorical mints through which global elites exert and 








 This thesis was thus formed and grounded by the constant presence in the 
field. In my work, I aimed to bridge the sometimes absurd paradoxes of the 
authoritarian Ethiopian and Egyptian states, the corporate rigidities of GTZ/GIZ, and 
the continuous immersion among renegade urban elites (technologists). 
  
1.2 Theoretical grounding for a practice-led research 
 
The original intention of this thesis was – as explained above – to conceptually 
analyse and endorse the notion of eCapacity Development.  My original strategy was 
twofold: On the one hand, I wanted to distil and structure the apparently disjointed 
discourse of capacity development by meticulously cataloguing its instruments. On 
the other hand, I intended to advocate for the agile technological constructionism 
embodied in the practice of eCapacity Development.   
 
 However, the experiences in the field during the early days of my research led 
to the conceptual demolition of my originally benign and gullible of capacity 
development. My encounters with the powerful elites of the Ethiopian state 
punctured the original intention of this thesis, which was to underwrite and endorse 
eCapacity Development. As an action researcher-to-be – rather by circumstance 
than by choice – I abandoned this track in favour of an attempt to fill two apparent 
gaps in the literature: the lack of critical accounts of capacity development, and the 
absence of theoretical models that encompass both top-down and participatory 
perspectives with regard to the promotion of ICTs. These are briefly introduced in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
1.2.1 Capacity development 
The notion of capacity development was squeezed through the narrowest filters of 
developmental essentialism for years. It was presented as a remedy for the previous 







sophisticated method of ‘doing development’ (Eade 1997; Lusthaus et al. 1999). The 
excessive overuse and inflationary practice of capacity development in Ethiopian 
development politics directed me to a clear hiatus in the academic literature: the 
complete lack of critical accounts of capacity development.  
 
 Neither development practitioners nor academic researchers question or 
critique the notion of capacity development. Attempts to confront its amorphousness 
(Lusthaus et al. 1999) mostly resulted in admittedly more sophisticated, but also 
increasingly unintelligible and quixotic models (Morgan and Baser 1993; Baser 1994; 
Baser and Bolger 1996). Conceptual frameworks within both academic (Berg 1993; 
Blagescu and Young 2006; Faye 2006; Boesen 2007; Boyd 2009) and grey 
literatures (CIDA 1996; World Bank 2005; 2006; Brinkerhoff 2005; DFID 2006; De 
Grauwe 2009) continue to depict capacity development as a concise methodology. 
Moreover, it is also framed as a remedy to previous development failures, in 
particular that of technical assistance (Berg 1993; Morgan and Baser 1993; Cohen 
1994; Baser and Bolger 1996; Bulloch et al. 2011), and conveys the promise of more 
impactful and sustainable development co-operation in the future (World Bank 1991). 
In the logic of Gilbert Rist (Rist 2009), this very pre-occupation with issues of 
legitimacy is symptomatic for the appropriation and the slow hollowing out of 
developmental notions. 
   
1.2.2 Promotion of ICTs in development 
My experience in Ethiopia and later in Egypt constantly exposed the paradoxes 
between the state’s and its citizens’ interests with regard to promoting ICTs. The 
technological determinism of the former and the existing or fledgling constructionist 
agendas among the latter were hard to reconcile within one theoretical model. The 
original notion and practice of eCapacity Development endorsed constructionist 
approaches, which were, however, theoretically incompatible with the technological 
determinism of ICT promotion agendas. The paradoxical situation between the 
state’s ICT capacity development policies and participatory-constructionist 







about capacity development, most of the literature indulges in technocratic 
explorations of how to best use ICTs for training. However, these do not question 
issues of power between the state and its citizens or the appropriation of discourse. 
To address this gap, I followed a more discourse-led exploration (cf. research 
questions 2 and 3).  
 
 My analysis of the top-down and bottom-up perspectives relies on two bodies 
of literature: transnational informationalism (Castells 2000, 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 
2013) and social constructionism (Feenberg 1995, 2002; 2011; Bijker 1997; Bijker et 
al. 2012; Fuchs 2011; Fuchs and Sandoval 2013; Fuchs and Trottier 2013). The 
former is used to interrogate deterministic notions of ICTs within normative national 
discourses. The latter helps question these normative discourses and allows to 
explore counter-narratives among Ethiopian and Egyptian technology communities; 
narratives that discount and/or circumvent the normative discourses.  
  
 This thesis thus aims to create a critical account of the notion of capacity 
development. By providing an archaeological account of capacity development, it 
develops a critique of the inherent power mechanisms embodied by this notion. This 
critique enables the disentanglement and interrogation of ICT capacity development 
agendas promoted by the Ethiopian and Egyptian establishments. Moreover, it 
attempts to locate and analyse participatory narratives of ICTs that exist beyond 
state-led agendas of ICT capacity development and might be able to restore 
individual agency. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
As usual for a practice-led research the research questions evolved in two phases. 
In the first phase (2009-10), I constructed a first set of questions that originated from 
the literature review done with field observations in parallel. The former helped me to 
break through the parochialism of my direct environment. Critical accounts, such as 







the self-evident nature of GTZ/GIZ’s own assumptions about the role and character 
of development aid. This led to the rejection of a single ICT capacity development 
portfolio, as represented in eCapacity Development, and to rethink my original 
intention, which was to provide new methodological inputs for GTZ/GIZ’s capacity 
development and ICT promotion portfolio. Critical accounts of development aid 
paired with my observations in the field prompted the following ideas that guided the 
first phase of my research (2009-10): 
 
1) Capacity development is a hollow practice that is used for different ends by 
donors depending on their own political interest. 
2) Recipient countries are enchanted by the symbolic powers of ICTs, however, 
are prone to misappropriate ICTs in order to increase their control over their 
citizens. 
3) I observed the empowering impact that participatory ICTs, such as social 
media had on young users in Ethiopia. Their agility and agency considerably 
influenced my research.  
 
I used these assumptions to develop a set of meta-questions to further guide and 
focus my observations as well as to develop my other research instruments: 
 
1) Why did donors adapt capacity development? Can donors and recipients use 
capacity development as a method of suppression? Why do they do so?  
2) Why do recipient countries promote ICTs and can ICTs become a tool of 
suppression? There is considerably little research on these issues. 
3) Why do new participatory ICT practices, such as social media, perform better 
at restoring or increasing the agency of people? 
 
In the second phase (2011-2013), I developed further questions that drew upon the 
rationale above and guided my data collection. The empirical work of this thesis aims 








1) Why does capacity development play such a central role in the agendas of 
donors and recipient countries? 
2) Why are ICTs a critical item for the Ethiopian and Egyptian development 
agendas? 
3) Do ICTs enable individual agency in Ethiopia and Egypt, and if yes, how do 
they accomplish this? 
 
 The essential contribution of this thesis is, on the one hand, the establishment 
of a conceptual and empirical archaeology of capacity development. On the other 
hand, it interrogates critically the embedded technological determinism of ICT 
capacity development within the structures of the Ethiopian and Egyptian 
establishment. Moreover, by tracing boundaries of agency it empirically deconstructs 
claims of locality and indigenousness in the age of transnational capitalism. By doing 
so, it exposes the ambiguities as well as the inherent inaccuracies of the traditional 
divide between technological determinism and constructionism. It shows how 
ideology-driven mechanisms appropriate both deterministic as well as constructionist 
practices of ICT capacity development. 
 
1.4 Participatory ethics – between convoluted positionality and 
evolving ethics 
 
Similar to the conceptual interplay and mutual influence between practice and theory 
that dominated my research from its very beginning, ethical considerations evolved 
along the same fault-line. Here I only provide a brief outline of the key challenges 
that formed my practice as a researcher and development professional. Section 3.5 
explores these issues in more detail.  
 
 The convoluted reality of constantly having to negotiate practice (development 
professional) and theory (researcher), as well as several layers of intertwined 
positionality, forced me into the ethical dilemma of continuous role switching. De 







experiences conflict, especially conflict that cannot clearly be addressed by one’s 
own moral principles, or the establishment of ethical codes”. According to Hill et al. 
(1998, p. 102), ethical dilemmas are “situations in which there is no ‘right’ decision, 
only a decision that is thoughtfully made and perhaps ‘more right’ than the 
alternatives”.  
 
 From early on in my research, I struggled with the vast amount of access I 
gained into otherwise hidden territories – the inner realms of political power – 
through loyalty to GTZ/GIZ as well as to the Ethiopian establishment. Without the 
use of intelligent role-switching techniques and proxy-identities, the elusive attempt 
to protect my ethical and moral integrity would have been only an illusion. In order to 
be able to make thoughtful decisions in the field, I developed an ethical code that 
enabled the continuous weighing of two axes against each other: the vertical axis of 
loyalty towards the establishment and the horizontal axis of friendship with locals in 
opposition to, or at least critical of, the establishment.  
 
 While simultaneous access to the two territories was theoretically impossible 
my role-switching technique and the constant risk-awareness allowed me to work 
with both. However, with time I realised the limitations and potential dangers of the 
constant back-and-forth between mutually exclusive and antagonistic territories. The 
more loyalty I showed towards the Ethiopian or Egyptian establishments, the more 
my friendships with the technology communities became at risk and vice-versa. This 
constant negotiation jeopardised and slowly eroded the trust I enjoyed with the 
Ethiopian establishment. This has become apparent by late 2010 when two high-
ranking MOCB officials questioned me about my loyalty towards the Ethiopian 
establishment. 
 
 While the Kafkaesque nature of the Ethiopian bureaucracy was evident from 
the moment I set foot in Ethiopia, I was largely unaware of GTZ/GIZ’s own obscure 
bureaucratic practices. As a Hungarian, I admittedly felt privileged to be part of and 
work for a presumably influential organisation. Without the present research I would 







its power struggles, the precarious work conditions it creates or the continuation of 
morally racialised hierarchies. Therefore, in this thesis, I also attempt to recast this 
vast development bureaucracy through the ethnographic tracing of politically and 
ethically loaded words such as capacity development and ICTs. Laura Baer points 
out that in doing anthropological research within a bureaucracy – in my case within 
multiple, overlapping bureaucracies – “it becomes particularly important to pay 
attention to the common language that is being deployed in public discourse and the 
new words that are gaining prominence” (Baer 2015, no pagination). This idea 
played a key role in building my archaeological practice (cf. Section 2.2) that 
excavates the roots of terminologies that were en vogue within GTZ/GIZ during my 
stays in Ethiopia and Egypt. 
 
 Girgis’ (2007) concept of friendship-work was of tremendous importance for 
my early dealings with such rigidities and bureaucratic boundaries and helped me 
build authentic relationships beyond them. Her work is also deeply rooted in the 
original, participatory notion of capacity development. I consciously used friendship-
work as a conceptual crutch to develop trust and engage in collaborative activities 
with various informants. Even though hardly anyone among my informants asked me 
to keep his/her identity anonymous, it was apparent that some of the information I 
gained was sensitive and I was able to access it only because of my status as “a 
(foreign) friend”. I uniformly made all accounts in this thesis anonymous in order to 
protect such links of friendship (or acquaintances). 
 
 
 A further tool to engage with renegade urban elites was the development of 
proxy-identities (cf. Section 3.5). My two roles as a PhD student and as a GTZ/GIZ 
employee were confusing for informants. The former suggested a rigid survey set-
up, while the latter – in my experience – automatically raised expectations in terms of 
future co-operation with GTZ/GIZ, or occasionally of direct financial benefits (e.g. per 
diems). Therefore, I opted for a strategy that had already proved successful in my 







create exchanges on an equal footing with local NGOs, I often used my identity as 
the co-founder of the ice (innovation, collaboration, entrepreneurship) network.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
The structure of the thesis directly follows the objectives outlined above. Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively outline the conceptual background, the 
proposed methodology to interrogate the notion of capacity development in general, 
and ICT capacity development, in particular. 
 
 The conceptual framework (Chapter 2) provides space for the two essential 
conceptual and theoretical considerations of the thesis. On the one hand, it outlines 
a critique of the notion of capacity development by historically grounding it within the 
contemporary aid discourse. By highlighting signs of appropriation as well as 
demonstrating the elasticity and amorphousness of the term, this critical account 
attempts to dismantle the mechanism of power that surrounds the use of capacity 
development.   
 
 The proposed dissection of the notion of capacity development will have 
radical implications with regard to the understanding of ICT capacity development. 
Chapter 2 therefore also sets the background for a critical understanding of the 
promotion of ICT capacity development. It outlines a framework based on 
transnational informational capitalism and its critique to analyse questions of power-
claiming that occur through the promotion of ICTs. The determinism of contemporary 
informationalist scholarship is contrasted with constructionist-participatory as well as 
anti-capitalist notions of ICTs.  
 
 Chapter 3 situates the research within a participatory action research 
framework and outlines its tools for the empirical work. This implies that my 
methodology follows an interpretative and participatory way of doing things (when 







methodological outline, it provides insights into questions of positionality as well as 
the ethical considerations of participatory action research that result from my often 
pro-active border-crossing between establishment and participatory politics. It also 
draws the attention to the nuances of role switching and proxy-identities. 
 
 The conceptual and methodological questions raised in the previous two 
chapters are deeply interwoven with and situated within contemporary political and 
economic discourses of power in Ethiopia and Egypt. Besides the key socio-
economic factors, Chapter 4 will describe some of the more minute intricacies of the 
Ethiopian party-state. It will also provide insights into the course of the revolutionary 
events in Egypt (2011-13). Moreover, it will describe the two programmes of the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and its successor 
organisation from 2011, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) with which I worked during my research. 
 
 The following four empirical chapters proceed to answer the research 
questions posed above. Chapter 5 continues to demonstrate the distinctness of the 
aid effectiveness discourse exemplified in the Paris Declaration from the evolution of 
the notion of capacity development. Even though I pointed out that the amalgamation 
of the Paris Declaration and capacity development – as suggested by the 
professional belief system in my immediate work environment – is an analytical -de-
sac, this chapter briefly presents empirical accounts from the field about the Paris 
Declaration. In particular, the analysis will interrogate accounts with regard to 
ownership and alignment from the field. Chapter 6 then sets out to continue the 
archaeology of capacity development through the analysis of capacity development 
literature as well as by presenting accounts from the field. The former will 
deconstruct capacity development and explore how power claims from both donors 
and recipient countries are continuously moulded into the notion of capacity 
development. The latter will trace the ideological genealogies of how representatives 








 Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 are antipodes that will illustrate the dichotomies as 
well as the ambiguities of state-driven, deterministic ICT capacity development and 
constructionist-participatory agendas of ICTs. Chapter 7 will explore the ways in 
which both the Ethiopian and the Egyptian establishments enforce their own 
discourses of transnational capitalism through the promotion of ICTs. By engaging 
informationalist bodies of literature, Chapter 7 will furthermore demonstrate the 
inherent technological determinism within these dominant and normative ICT 
capacity development agendas. Due to the Arab Spring, my empirical material is 
considerably smaller with regard to state-driven ICT capacity development agendas.  
 
  Chapter 8 will then question these normative discourses by following a 
thoroughly critical track with regard to both informational capitalism and its 
constructionist-participatory alternatives. It will explore grassroots notions of ICTs 
among Ethiopian and Egyptian technologists by interrogating the genealogy of 
grassroots technology communities (technologists). These critical insights will then 
be used to understand whether grassroots notions of ICTs can support individual 
agency to resist the dominant and hegemonic socioeconomic discourses. This 
chapter will also trace the boundaries between dissent and loyalty within online 
communities of technologists. Eventually, Chapter 9 summarises the main findings 
by showing how this research has responded to the research questions and has 
added to knowledge. It concludes by pointing to future research areas. 
  
 36 
Chapter 2 – Conceptual framework 
 
 
2.1 Introduction – the paradox of neutrality 
This thesis engages critically with the notions of capacity development and 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) within the context of 
development. Both discourses are influential in their own right and embody 
many promises and aspirations with regard to socio-economic development in 
the South. This chapter explains the conceptual framework for the thesis, and 
especially focuses on the construction of the distinctive features that 
constitute the developmental contributions of these notions. Chapter 1 
explained the origins, the unique situatedness, as well as the main aim of this 
thesis. By acknowledging the ambiguities and inherent biases encased within 
the original, rather technocratic objective for this thesis, this chapter sets out 
to engage critically with theories of capacity development and ICTs.  
 This conceptual framework is written from the perspective of practice-
led research (see Section 1.4) which makes certain aspects of the thesis 
different from those that develop a relatively balanced assessment of the 
existing literature in order to weigh the empirical evidence against various 
theoretical perspectives. As practice-led research, this thesis is concerned 
primarily with the nature of practice and leads to new knowledge that has 
significance for both theory and practice. The key aim is to advance 
knowledge about practice, as well as to advance knowledge within this 
particular practice (development work). Evidently, such research includes 
practice as an integral part of its method and often falls within the general 
area of action research (cf. Chapter 3.1). 
 Some of the narratives, particularly with regard to the review of the 
literature, are therefore somewhat less balanced or neutral than would have 
been the case had this thesis originated on a university campus as a purely 
academic study. This chapter combines earlier approaches to empirical 
analysis, which oscillated between academic objectivity and personal 
reflexivity, by providing a contextual framework for the practice, and 
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commentary on the practice concerned respectively (Hamilton and Jaaniste 
2010). This model allows me both to situate my practice within a trajectory of 
research and various conceptual framings, and also to do justice to critical 
self-reflection as a way of generating new knowledge (Hamilton and Jaaniste 
2010). A practice-led approach also permits the research to be built partially 
on exploration and accident rather than solely on hypotheses and pre-
negotiated approaches (Webb and Brien 2008). Accordingly, conceptual 
frameworks in practice-led research act as a tool that helps gradually sharpen 
and rephrase research questions, instead of these questions deriving from a 
balanced literature review. It links the issues I address into a conceptual 
framing and gives me the vocabulary and a voice to discuss them and engage 
in an argument. 
 As briefly illustrated in Chapter 1, this research grew out of the field 
reality that exposed me to the everyday controversies of capacity 
development and ICT promotion. These various obscurities and antagonisms 
unfolded right in front of my eyes and required a theoretical and 
methodological approach that permitted accelerated learning and changing of 
theoretical perspectives at the interplay of theory and practice. The number of 
rapidly emerging issues and ideas in the field cannot be situated, let alone be 
derived, from a balanced literature review. Moreover, such balanced reviews – 
that perform according to the orthodoxies of both academia as well as 
development practice – have been produced previously (Lusthaus et al. 1999; 
Blagescu and Young 2006; Faye 2006; Boyd 2009). However, these failed to 
challenge and criticise the status quo. Therefore, I slowly sharpened my focus 
on how to question the neutrality and positive intentionality of these notions by 
using my privileged access to the field in order to create a critical narrative.  
 There is a degree of agnosticism in such an approach, but it is 
necessary to keep up with the velocity and fluidity of continuously being based 
in the field. The constant exposure to and deep emersion into the field did not 
allow me to develop abstract theoretical claims and than test them empirically. 
It necessitates an interpretive process that permits informal problem-solving, 
intuitive leaps, rules of thumb and educated guesses (Webb and Brien 2008). 
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Hence the goal of this conceptual framework is to provide a theoretical 
framing which links the issues of this thesis to an operational vocabulary in 
which to discuss and engage in argument with the emerging issues. Therefore 
it uses an archaeological approach for interrogating the notion of capacity 
development, while gradually developing an understanding of what is actually 
at stake with regard to ICT promotion in Ethiopia and Egypt. This allows me to 
question the otherwise indistinguishable assumptions of power, the 
omniscient practice of narrative creation and institutional intentionalities 
quintessentially characteristic for the discourse of development. The charting 
of archaeological layers supports the challenging of complex individual and 
institutional functionalities embodied by the promotion of capacity 
development and ICTs.  
 I use the term archaeology in its Foucauldian sense, that “is about 
examining the discursive traces and orders left by the past in order to write a 
'history of the present'” (O’Farrell 2005, p. 64). This archaeology is thus about 
looking at particular histories of artefacts or terminologies as a way of 
understanding the processes that have led to what they are today. By this I 
aim to develop new views on received wisdoms that are otherwise treated 
largely uncritically in primary or secondary literatures. In choosing the right 
terminology, I admittedly struggled between the Foucauldian terms of 
genealogy and archaeology. The distinction between archaeology and 
genealogy is not clear in Foucault’s work; both are political projects that – to 
various extents – engage with issues of power and power struggle. I 
consequently use archaeology, since I intend to uncover layers of meaning 
that are not necessarily connected in a stricter, genealogical sense. My 
analysis thus does not trace the institutional interrelations of the term capacity 
development, but dissects layers of ideas that influenced its evolution within 
donor agencies. 
 
 This conceptual framework outlines questions that arise from the 
juxtaposition of political and economic discourse within the archaeology of 
capacity development. It also assesses potential ways of understanding 
technology, and ICTs in particular, within the framework of development. This 
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is done in two steps: first, it offers a brief archaeology of capacity and capacity 
development (Section 2.2),  narrating the genesis of capacity and capacity 
development, and consecutively positioning it within the contemporary 
discourse of aid effectiveness; second, it discusses different representations 
of technology and its role in constituting ideas of progress (Section 2.3). This 
allows the reader better to understand and question theories that extol and 




2.2 The re-legitimisation of aid and the discourse of 
capacity development 
 
In Chapter 1, I hinted at the enormous influence that my professional 
environment and its belief system in Ethiopia had on my research journey. 
The role of the Paris Declaration, the importance of capacity development and 
the use of technology has been often told and retold to all employees, and I 
have to admit my liability for failing to question it early enough. It took me 
considerable time and analytical effort to shed this professional belief system 
and acknowledge that it was rooted in the institutional history of ECBP as 
interpreted by GTZ/GIZ, but not in academic rigour. This institutional history 
constituted three main elements in the informal ECBP parlance, which I keep 
here for originality's sake:  
1. Capacity development is the right thing to do, because local capacities 
need to be built up in Ethiopia. The importance of capacity 
development for ECBP’s work is also made clear by the name of the 
programme. 
2. The Paris Declaration endorses capacity development and ECBP is 
built on the very foundation of the Paris Declaration 
3. The ECBP is an extremely important, if not the most important, 
programme of GTZ/GIZ, since Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (Ethiopia) 
and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Germany) agreed about its launch 
in 2005.   
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 That these assumptions were only beliefs instead of facts is also 
illustrated by the entire lack to these issues in ECBP documents. Despite the 
informality of this knowledge, the entire idea of eCapacity Development (cf. 
Chapter 1) was built on these pillars. The influence of this belief system was 
apparent in my early accounts on capacity development and the Paris 
Declaration:  
 
Capacity development and the aid effectiveness discourse are tightly 
interconnected, and both played a central role in the re-legitimisation of 
aid. Even though capacity development attained a central position 
within the neoliberal aid narrative of the early 1990s, it lacked a concise 
theory that would align it with the policies of international aid 
organisations. It also had to be integrated into the legal fabric that 
governs international aid (cf. codification). The Paris Declaration cast 
capacity development into the neoliberal institutionalist framework 
provided by OECD and was included into the fabric of neoliberal 
institutional international relations. 
(Conceptual framework, status April 2010) 
 
 The goal of this section is to challenge this premise and separate the 
discourse of capacity development from aid effectiveness. Moreover it also 
provides a critical account of the evolution of capacity development in order to 
surpass its hitherto formalistic and essentialist analysis (Faye 2006; Boyd 
2009). Through analysing its historical embeddedness in the project of 
modernity, this section tracks its conceptual evolution as well as political 
constitution within contemporary development. It situates the history and 
theory of capacity development within the aid effectiveness discourse of the 
last three decades (1980s to late 2000s). Moreover, it identifies key points of 
interaction between the issue of aid effectiveness and capacity development.  
 This archaeology not only plots a history of capacity development but 
also suggests a complex interrelatedness with issues of modernity, 
globalisation and the ongoing legitimisation of development. First, it locates 
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early notions of capacity development and their theoretical and practical 
situatedness (2.2.2). Subsequently, it suggests a history of capacity 
development and plots its early notions before the crisis of development in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (2.2.3). Then I follow the OECD-led political 
process on aid effectiveness to demonstrate its distinctness from notions of 
capacity development (2.2.4 and 2.2.5). 
 An important note on terminology is also necessary here. Capacity 
development and capacity building are often used interchangeably. 
Throughout my research, I did not locate a body of literature or theoretical 
framework that clearly elaborated the difference between these two terms, 
and this thesis therefore handles the two terms as equals and synonyms. This 
section does not concern itself with assumed connotational differences 
between the two terms (OECD 2006; FAO 2008), but argues that capacity 
building and capacity development are used interchangeably and are 
synonymous (Teskey 2005). As this chapter demonstrates, in spite of the fact 
that “there has been globally a shift in terminology towards capacity 
development,” (FAO 2008, p. 15) capacity building and capacity development 
are built by using the same conceptual frameworks. 
 Besides academic accounts, this section mainly draws on sources from 
the following bilateral donors with large capacity development portfolios: 
DFID, CIDA, JICA, USAID and BMZ (Taylor and Clarke 2007). Multilateral 
donors such as the World Bank, the UNDP and OECD are also included in 
this scope. 
 
2.2.1 A brief archaeology of capacity development 
The contemporary notion of capacity is a product of modernity itself. It carries 
various layers of sedimented meaning from industrialised modernity into the 
contemporary post-industrial society. I argue that the notion of capacity is 
inextricably linked to the modernist development project from an ontological 
and epistemological point of view. The succinct philosophical outlook 
established and cultivated during the conception of industrial modernity 
produced a catalogue of skills that define our current understanding of 
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capacity (Bauman 2000b; Thomas 2004). Thomas’ (2004) seminal work on 
the archaeology of modernity suggest that historically, three key elements 
constitute the contemporary notion of capacity (further reading and additional 
references in brackets): 
1. The notion of human agency that was liberated from the omnipotence 
of Church and religion during the Renaissance and Reformation (Boff 
1998; Bleiker 2000; Alexander 2005). 
2. The coming of age of positive science as a driver for economic 
progress as well as the establishment of the cornerstones of the 
modern, democratic state and its institutions through the codification of 
individual liberties during the period of classical liberalism (Withers 
1995; Adorno and Horkheimer 1997; Burns and Rayment-Pickard 
2000). 
3. The notion of productivity in the wake of capitalist industrial modernity 
(Goldstone 2002; Crafts 2004).  
 
The elasticity of the term capacity is illustrated by the paradox that the 
same term that released human agency from religious co-dependencies over 
two centuries also helped to subvert it to the urge of productivity and 
efficiency inherent to industrial capitalism. As Thomas (2004) suggests, at 
every major turn in modern history, the term ‘capacity’ received new meaning 
that was indicative of the evolving socio-economic frameworks. Therefore I 
suggest that the contemporary capacity development discourse in 
development is symptomatic of tectonic changes that have taken place in the 
global political and economic framework since the late 1980s. In order better 
to understand the correlation between the term and what it represents, this 
subsection briefly traces the emergence of capacity development within the 
field of development.  
 Some histories of development trace the emergence of capacity 
development as far back as the 1960s (Lusthaus et al. 1999), but as a 
separate term it can only be recognised clearly in the donor literature since 
the 1980s (Eade and Ireland 1997; Lavergne and Saxby 2001; Morgan and 
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Carlan 1994). Its significance during the 1980s is also unclear because of its 
diversified use and the lack of a single coherent ideological or theoretical 
foundation (Smillie 2001). Girgis (2007) as well as Eade and Ireland (1997) 
locate the ideological origins of capacity development within progressive and 
participatory ideologies, while (Lusthaus et al. 1999) relate its development to 
institutional and management traditions within technical assistance. This 
section argues that both approaches are valid; however, Moore’s and 
Lusthaus et al.’s accounts lack historical rigour and are influenced by notions 
of capacity development of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Both accounts 
also overlooked the highly participatory nature of the institutional uses of 
capacity development (see, for example G. Honadle 1979, 1982; B. W. 
Honadle 1981). 
Progressive scholars of development produced various conceptual 
frameworks for capacity development in the 1980s (Chambers 1980, 1986; G. 
Honadle 1982). The notion was, however, particularly important within 
participatory and human-centred narratives of development. As (Eade and 
Ireland 1997) suggest, the ideological roots of capacity development can be 
traced back to the South American Liberation Theology movement (1950-
80s), particularly to Paolo Freire’s pedagogy of the poor (cf. Shor and Freire 
1987; Freire 1998; Freire 2000) and the South American Catholic feminist 
movements. (Girgis 2007) further situates capacity development within new, 
participatory rural development approaches that arose in the 1980s. However, 
there is an apparent lack of primary sources from the 1980s – from bi- or 
multilateral donors or international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) – 
that discuss capacity development.  
(Eade and Ireland 1997) explain that it was in “the post-modern 
intellectual climate that stresses diversity, difference, and ‘freedom of choice’, 
and rejects notions of universality” (p. 16.), where a multitude of new methods 
that challenged mainstream notions of development, were tested and 
deployed. Many of these methods incorporated participatory “capacity 
assessment” tools – such as the capacities and vulnerabilities assessment 
(CVA) (Cannon et al. 2003), rapid reconnaissance (G. Honadle 1979, 1982), 
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or participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (Chambers 1980, 1986). During this 
“decade of participation” (Botes and Van Rensburg 2000), organised 
community involvement emerged in aid recipient countries. Particularly CVA 
and PRA offered methods to look at development benefits in a systemic way 
and, moreover, to address its unintended, negative effects. Even though in 
the wake of anti-development scholarship during the early 1990s these 
methods have earned criticism for their lack of contextualisation (Bebbington 
1993) or awareness of power relations within communities (Waring 2004), 
they constituted a counter-narrative to hegemonic measures of development 
such as structural adjustment or the basic needs approach.   
 Even though capacity and capacity development became integral parts 
of various scholars’ and practitioners’ work, it was not cast into a single and 
coherent approach. Capacity development was neither a methodology nor a 
set of principles (e.g. structural adjustment), but was used loosely and 
represented a variety of participatory and human-centred methods (Girgis 
2007; Eade 2007). The common denominator of these approaches was their 
inclination to community participation, attention to complexity and resilience 
building, as well as their preference for agility. Furthermore they also 
advocated using “complex skills or methods that adapt to changing local 
environments, and invite the incorporation of local knowledge” (Girgis 2007, p. 
364.). 
 During the 1980s, neither a concise capacity development approach 
nor a unified definition can be observed. It was an amorphous term that 
collected various approaches that highlighted  
1. the utilisation of local knowledge (Chambers 1980, 1986; G. Honadle 
1979; Belshaw 1981; Richards 1981; Eade and Ireland 1997; Girgis 
2007), 
2. the creation of local competences to solve local problems and 
(Chambers 1980, 1986; Girgis 2007),  
3. generally a lean and agile approach to achieving development goals 
(G. Honadle 1982). 
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It was a critique against the ubiquitous practice of hegemonic top-down 
development narratives such the extensive use of outsider knowledge, the 
gap-filling function of expatriate experts (G. Honadle and Cooper 1989) and 
institutional reform practices . 
 Despite the widespread use of the term by both progressive and 
neoliberal scholars and practitioners alike by the early 1990s, no unified 
conceptual framework for capacity development emerged. It is important to 
emphasise, however, that academic theory and field practice mutually 
influenced and stimulated each other during the 1980s despite Edwards’ claim 
that development geography and ethnography remained distant from 
influencing practices in the field (Edwards 1993; Edwards 1994). 
 
2.2.2 The legitimacy crisis of development 
The evolution of the notion of capacity development beyond the 1980s is 
deeply interwoven with the crisis of development (Schuurman 1993; 
Nederveen Pieterse 1998) and the subsequent discourse of aid effectiveness 
that arose in the early 1990s (Boone 1996; Radelet 2006; Bourguignon and 
Sundberg 2007; Eyben 2010). In order to demonstrate how the notion of 
capacity development was then gradually woven into the discourse of aid 
effectiveness, this section first identifies the causes that led to the crisis of 
hegemonic agendas of development, and subsequently follows the process 
that re-legitimised neoliberal notions of development (Rist 2009). 
Two main bodies of thought engage with the crisis of development in 
the second half of the 1980s. The first one builds a case against technical 
assistance as the main culprit for the lack of development impact and is 
mainly informed by the internal discourses of donor organisations or affiliated 
consultants (Jaycox 1993; Morgan 1993, 1998; CIDA 1996; OECD 1996; JICA 
2003, 2004; Otoo et al. 2009). The second situates the crisis of development 
within the changing global political and economic framework of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (Schuurman 1993; Nederveen Pieterse 1998; Easterly 
2002b). The crisis of technical assistance that culminated in the early 1990s 
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was, however, only a symptom of a larger disillusionment with development. 
While donors and also certain of academics such as Arndt (1989), and 
Pieterse (1998) emphasised the failure of technical assistance, other scholars 
focused on the effects of this failure, which led to a growing disillusionment 
with donors (Schuurman 1993; Easterly 2002b). In these narratives, the failure 
of technical assistance became a technocratic effigy of an ideological as well 
as political impasse (Schuurman 1993; Ziai 2007, 2015).  
 Birdsall (2004, p. 3) suggests that “the donor community may look back 
on the 1990s as a watershed” where its legitimacy was questioned due to the 
fact that countries with limited exposure to aid and relative independence from 
structural adjustment policies took off (Gereffi 1989; Stiglitz and Squire 1998), 
while others “seemed stuck” (Birdsall 2004, p. 3). Scholars particularly 
emphasised the problem with overgrown aid bureaucracies (Easterly 2002b; 
Pronk 2009; Edgren 2002), the extensive lending policies of the IMF and the 
World Bank and, accordingly, the rapid growth of debt in recipient countries 
(Gereffi 1989; Nederveen Pieterse 2005; Moyo 2009, 2011). The changing 
global political and economic landscape made recipient countries realise that 
state- level policies have little substantial effect on economic growth and 
social welfare (Portes and Kincaid 1989; Schuurman 1993; Morgan and 
Carlan 1994; Närman 1997; Hart 2001; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001). Due to 
these factors, “liberal political and economic ideals lost support in the poor 
countries” (Easterly 2002b, p. 247). However, the collapse of the Eastern 
Block also showed that socialism was no longer a viable alternative, and 
suggested the triumph of neoliberal democracy (Guha and Spivak 1988; 
Latour 1993; Fukuyama 2006; Derrida 2006). 
 The growing criticism of the development industry in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, due to the lack of impact, the high inefficiency of donor 
bureaucracies, the growing gap between rich and poor countries became 
known as the impasse in development theory (Schuurman 1993).  The 
ensuing crisis of the entire development industry (Simon 2006b; Ziai 2007, 
2015) necessitated the re-legitimisation of the idea of development. In this 
thesis I focus on re-legitimisation attempts that were born out of the new, 
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seemingly unipolar and neoliberal governance structures of the 1990s and 
2000s (Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Craig and Porter 2006). The following 
paragraphs in particular follow the recurring attempts to find a scapegoat for 
the apparent failings of development. Evidently this thesis cannot, and does 
not attempt to, provide a holistic description of the manifold re-legitimisation 
processes that ensued after the impasse. Instead it tracks one particular 
attempt that identified technical assistance as the main reason for the failure 
of development and then consequently tried to install a new paradigm, namely 
capacity development. 
 Even though the rapidly changing world of international co-operation, 
technical assistance or technical co-operation is still the second main form of 
delivering aid to developing countries next to financial assistance (Tisch  and 
Wallace 1994). It consists of various tools, including the secondment of 
expatriate personnel, advisory services, training and infrastructure building 
(Kaul et al. 1999). Since the late 1970s and especially from the early 1980s, 
the pressure on donor organisations to deliver the promised development 
outcomes was increasingly mounting (Bauer 1986; Boone 1996; Easterly 
2002b; Shleifer 2009). The lack of economic and social impact was often 
attributed to donors’ inefficiency in managing development contributions and 
transparently accounting for their impact (Bauer 1986, 1991; G. Honadle and 
Cooper 1989). 
 Analysts such as Boone (1994) also established that there was a 
negative correlation between aid and opportunities for sustainable 
development in a country. Donor policies, particularly the structural 
adjustment programmes, were scrutinised by recipient countries as well as by 
many development scholars (G. Honadle and Cooper 1989). The focus of 
attention was especially on South America and Africa, where adjustment 
programmes stalled (Commander 1989; Herbst 1990; Widner 1994; Smith et 
al. 1994; Simon et al. 1995; Morley et al. 1995).  A concise overview of the 
technicalities of this criticism is provided by UNDP (1989, pp.11-12): 
“A major part of technical co-operation expertise is allocated to filling 
operating positions [...] and not giving adequate attention to the longer 
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term tasks of building African institutional and individual capacities. 
Counterpart development is not working. Training activities are 
slighted. The demands on expatriate operating personnel [...] to get the 
work done divert attention from the longer term tasks of developing 
individual and institutional capabilities. 
A second concern is one of quality in technical cooperation 
personnel. Technical cooperation technicians are used for a variety of 
tasks for which they may not be equipped [...] mixing policy, institution 
building, and technical and operating responsibilities. [...] Often specific 
work objectives are not spelled out. Problems of quality (of technical 
assistance personnel) are also evident in [... their] lack of knowledge of 
local conditions and insensitivity to local cultures. [...] 
Technical cooperation project objectives are not well defined, 
too diffuse, overambitious and not linked to government programming 
and budget processes. 
The definition of technical cooperation projects and technical 
services is supply driven and determined by donors rather than guided 
by well defined priority demands. The volume of technical cooperation, 
the number and diversity of projects and donor procedures, is 
overwhelming African government abilities to coordinate and manage. 
Efforts to coordinate aid in general are sporadic and of uneven 
efficacy”. 
Whereas early donor reports admitted some failures, they often 
remained favourable to technical assistance (Cassen 1986). However, the 
tone of reports grew more critical (Forss et al. 1988; World Bank 1991) and 
their authors started to blame technical assistance for past failures in aid 
delivery. The main critique of technical assistance was that: 
1. Developing countries were not able to address their own development 
priorities, but were made to follow donor instructions (Lethem et al. 
1983; Buyck and Mundial 1991; Berg 1993; Baser 1994; Brinkerhoff 
2005);  
 49 
2. The tendency to place foreign experts in order to expedite change 
processes (gap-filling) depleted the local skills base and resulted in 
parallel institutional structures (G. Honadle et al. 1983; Berg 1993; 
Brinkerhoff 1996); 
3. Insufficient institution building or its entire failure in the recipient 
countries (Jaycox 1993; Grindle and Hilderbrand 1995);  
4. The overheads of large donor bureaucracies responsible for the 
inefficient use of development resources (Friedman 1995; Easterly 
2002b; Radelet 2006). 
 
By the early 1990s, mainstream development discourse was in need of 
a concept that could re-establish its legitimacy (Rist 2009; Escobar 2011). 
During the 1990s, donor organisations wrapped capacity development into a 
rhetoric of self-criticism and presented it as a remedy to the shortcomings of 
technical assistance (Baser 1994; Baser and Bolger 1996; Morgan 1998). 
Indicative of this rhetoric are the titles of donor publications such as Capacity 
development: the missing link (Jaycox 1993) or  From Technical Cooperation 
to Capacity Development (Baser and Bolger 1996) both of which presented 
capacity development as an alternative to technical assistance. 
By the end of the 1990s, capacity development was understood as an 
element of technical assistance (Easterly 2002b), which suggests that the 
initially novel narrative had by then been co-opted by donors providing 
technical assistance. An intense theory-building process ensued within the 
donor community beyond the 1990s for further developing the notion of 
capacity development (Lopes 2002; JICA 2006; Lavergne and Wood 2006). A 
review of donor literature on capacity development, however also shows the 
revival of criticism against technical assistance in the early 2000s (UNDP 
2002a; JICA 2003; 2004a; Teskey 2005). However, this time it was directed 
against the shortcomings of the flourishing project of capacity development. 
Chapter 6 will offer a detailed account of these various processes that 
continuously reshaped the theory of capacity development. The next 
subsection, however, briefly follows the discourse of aid effectiveness that 
among others led to the endorsement of the Paris Declaration. This is 
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instrumental for my analysis since the professional belief system at GTZ 
suggested that the notion of capacity development and the Paris Declaration 
are closely interrelated.  
 
2.2.3 The OECD-led agenda on aid effectiveness 
The aid effectiveness discourse is hardly a substantialist, let alone a 
monolithic, narrative (Eyben 2010), but is rather a diverse discourse that in its 
current form evolved from the early 1990s. There are also multiple ways to 
approach it, which is one of the reasons for its imperviousness. One can look 
at it from the point of view what Lee (2013) describes as the agency problem. 
His account suggests that “as with a principal and agent contract, a donor and 
recipient relationship produces conflicting views on the objective of aid 
(desirability of poverty reduction)” that result in “divergent interests, and 
asymmetric information” (ibid, p. 6). On the contrary Alesina and Dollar (2000) 
attribute aid ineffectiveness to the prevalence of donor’s constraints that result 
from donors’ need to pursue economic or commercial interests in the recipient 
countries. Other studies attribute aid ineffectiveness to the failure of aid 
bureaucracy (Easterly 2002b, 2008). In this thesis I mainly follow Rist's (2009) 
approach that suggests that aid effectiveness agendas are donors’ reflexes of 
self-defence. These aim to maintain the legitimacy of the instruments and 
institutions installed along Northern notions of development. In this thesis, I 
mainly follow this Ristian approach due to its methodical usefulness in 
embedding the discourse of aid effectiveness into the wider context of the 
impasse of development (Schuurman 1993). 
 As a reaction to the apparent crisis of development, the 1990s saw the 
rise of different discourse of aid effectiveness that set out to reform 
development practices (Boone 1996; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007; 
Angeles and Neanidis 2009). Whereas the induction of capacity development 
was part of the reformist rhetoric of the donors, which juxtaposed it with the 
apparently troubled practice of technical assistance, its diverse notions cannot 
be attributed to the aid effectiveness agenda of one particular donor.  
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 Historically, two phases of the aid effectiveness discourse can be 
distinguished. The first phase lasted from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, 
and the second phase from the early 2000s up to today. The crisis of 
development in the early 1990s made donors act on the concerns of 
effectiveness and national ownership. By the late 1990s, it evolved into a 
discourse that increasingly addressed the issue of emerging donors (Woods 
2005, 2008; Six 2009; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2011; Tierney et al. 
2011). The goal of the political process was to demonstrate donors’ 
commitment to the effective delivery of nationally owned aid and was 
accompanied by a high-level political process championed by the OECD:  
The formulation of these principles [of aid effectiveness] grew out of a 
need to understand why aid was not producing the development results 
everyone wanted to see as well as to step up efforts to meet the 
ambitious targets set by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(OECD 2015). 
 Four high-level fora (Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan) from 2003 to 
2015 outlined the principles for aid effectiveness. The first forum in Rome 
(2003) laid out the basic principles for ownership. Country-led development 
was to be aligned with the following principles: 
1. Donors ought to follow the development priorities set by recipient 
countries. Both actors should orient their efforts on a common 
development vision outlined in their national development strategies 
(that could include Poverty Reduction Papers [PRSPs]); 
2. Recipient countries should exercise leadership in the delivery of 
donors’ programmes. 
 
In the interpretation of the Rome Declaration, ownership was limited to the 
harmonisation between recipients and donors. However, it also suggested 
that country leadership should be strengthened through ceding executive 
powers within development programmes to the recipients. 
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The “2nd High Level Forum on Joint Progress toward Enhanced Aid 
Effectiveness (Harmonisation, Alignment, and Results)” took place in Paris 
(2005). 138 countries and 28 international aid organisations signed the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. It codified the use of aid modalities that 
were to enhance aid effectiveness. Capacity development as a crosscutting 
measure was also codified and became a recommended practice (Ohno and 
Niiya 2004; Hyden 2008). 
 The Accra Agenda for Action signed at 3rd High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Accra (2008) “takes stock of progress and sets the agenda 
for accelerated advancement towards the Paris targets” (OECD 2015, p. 9). 
The Accra Agenda marks a shift in the discourse of aid effectiveness and 
continues the gradual shift in responsibilities between donors and recipients. 
The 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011, in Busan) consolidated 
the influence of bi- and multilateral donors over emerging donors. The three 
years between the High Level Fora in Accra and Busan gave additional focus 
to capacity development. The Bonn and Cairo workshops produced a 
consensus between international civil society actors and donors on the 
modalities of capacity development. Both the Bonn Consensus and the Cairo 
Consensus complied with the notion of ownership as put forward by the Paris 
Declaration (harmonisation + alignment = ownership).  
 The final regulatory framework for aid effectiveness also includes the 
Bogota Statement (principles of effective aid in South-South co-operation, 
2010), the Istanbul Principles (guidelines for the role of civil society actors 
within the global aid effectiveness framework, 2010) and the Dili Declaration 
(approaches to aid effectiveness in fragile contexts, 2010). These agreements 
have led to the introduction of a number of new aid modalities (e.g. Program 
Based Approaches, Sector-Wide Approaches, Technical Assistance Pooling), 
that are meant to ensure the effective delivery of aid (Ohno and Niiya 2004; 
Lavergne and Wood 2006; Boesen and Dietvorst 2007). Even though Hulme 
(2007), Booth (2008) and Glennie (2011) argue that OECD’s aid effectiveness 
agenda initiated the development agenda that was later consolidated in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), this claim cannot be validated 
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empirically. Therefore I suggest that both processes should be regarded as 
each other’s organisational counterpart (Hulme 2007; Vandemoortele 2011) 
that were both geared towards re-legitimising development aid as an 
influential discourse of international relations (Edgren 2002; Vandemoortele 
2011). 
 
2.2.4 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
As explained above the professional belief system that I encountered at GTZ 
suggested that the Paris Declaration represents a turning point in the history 
of aid. Some scholars endorse this view and consider the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness as the culmination of OECD’s aid effectiveness agenda 
(Hyden 2008; Dabelstein 2012). Its prominence is based on two factors. On 
the one hand, it gathered broad support from donors and recipients alike for a 
unified aid effectiveness agenda (Wood et al.  2008; Wood et al. 2011; 
Nunnenkamp et al. 2013). On the other hand, it incorporated a new set of aid 
modalities into the international legal fabric of development aid. It created a 
set of internationally binding criteria for the deployment of aid resources. 
However, even though donors and recipients alike celebrated this codification, 
scarce attention has been dedicated to the fact that the Paris Declaration de 
facto re-legitimised development aid and its institutions. Moreover, it created a 
legal basis for donors to negotiate aid modalities and regain influence in 
country affairs (Easterly 2002b; Edgren 2002).  
 The Paris Declaration was the outcome of the Second High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in 2005. It conceptualised this complex 
matter by implying  
1) Recipient governments own their development agenda, which is 
followed by the donors;  
2) Donors align their effort and support to the recipient’s national 
development strategy without imposing their procedures;  
3) Donors avoid overloading the recipient country system with competing 
or overlapping requests; 
4) Aid relies on sound monitoring and evaluation frameworks to assess 
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progress; 
5) Recipients and donors hold each other accountable for the results of 
the process.  
 
 The re-legitimisation imposed a neoliberal institutionalist framework 
and re-installed a top-down power structure. The five principles of the Paris 
Declaration (see Table 2.1) codified aid modalities that were to increase aid 
effectiveness and consolidate the notion of ownership (alignment + 
harmonisation). 
 
 However, the Paris Declaration remains controversial. Here, I highlight 
only two major areas relevant to my thesis. First, it continues to reproduce 
some of the paradoxes it intended to solve, such as recipient country 
ownership. Even though the Paris Declaration intended to restore and 
safeguard the sovereignty of recipient states, it imposed a new set of aid 
conditionalities and reinforced the primacy of Northern donors. Whereas it 
obliges donors to follow and align with the national development strategies of 
the recipient states, it also imposes formal conditionalities for the latter party. 
National development strategies need to have clear strategic priorities linked 
to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets. 
Moreover, these development strategies have to “adhere to broadly accepted 
good practices” (see Indicator 2, 5a and 5b of the Paris Declaration, Annex 9). 
These demands are indicative of the paradox idiosyncratic to the entire aid 
effectiveness debate, since it demands recipient states: 
1. To adhere to appropriate macroeconomic policies as well as 








 Principle What 
1. Ownership Developing countries set their own strategies for  
poverty reduction, improve their institutions and  
tackle corruption. 
2. Alignment Donor countries align behind these objectives and  
use local systems. 
3. Harmonisation Donor countries co-ordinate, simplify procedures and  
share information to avoid duplication. 
4. Results Developing countries and donors shift focus to  
development results and results get measured. 
5. Mutual accountability Donors and partners are accountable for  
development results. 
Table 2.1 – Key principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Source: Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005) 
  
 The issue of tied aid is a central element within the discourse of aid 
effectiveness (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Tingley 2010). Even though 
one of the main intentions of this OECD-led political process was to untie aid 
from its political and economic conditionalities (Alesina and Dollar 2000; 
Berthélemy 2006; Hoeffler and Outram 2011), the Paris Declaration focused 
on aid effectiveness, from a “markedly DAC bureaucratic perspective” 
(Brunello 2015, p. 51). It put aid conditionalities into place, which demand the 
replication of institutions of Northern democracies; notably their governance 
structure, as well as ideals of accountability and transparency. However, 
enforcing such conditionalities further enhance the already convoluted 
accounting processes and adds new layers of formal procedures that may 
overburden administrative staff and infrastructure in the recipient country 
 56 
(Booth 2012). The convoluted nature of OECD's “ventriloquism” (Easterly 
2007, p. 146) is well expressed by Robert Chambers’ ironic construct which 
he made up of the most recurrent words in the Paris Declaration:  “To monitor 
indicators for effective performance for Aid Donors and Partners need the 
capacity to manage the mutual harmonisation of programmes to assess, 
measure and report on results" (cited by Brunello 2015, p. 51). 
 
 Second, even though the Paris Declaration promotes the idea that “all 
[states] depend on the same mechanism of functional institutional efficiency in 
order to account for social change” (Sterling-Folker 2000, p. 1), this approach 
sidelines other forms of development that do not involve state actors; for 
example international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). In the 
tradition of neoliberal institutionalism it suggests that states are the main 
actors in international relations, which co-operate in rational self-interest, or 
are faced with anarchy as an obstacle to their co-operation (Schmitz 2008). In 
the absence of the Cold War dualism and amidst the rise of new donors 
(Marcussen 2001) the Paris Declaration testifies to OECD`s shrinking 
influence in the international community. Therefore, the intelligibility of forms 
of governance were of key importance to maintain OECD’s influence in the 
international community. The emergence of new bilateral donors also 
endangered OECD’s mandate, and countries such as China, India and Iran 
do not adhere to OECD criteria that define good development practice 
(Woods 2005, 2008). The conditionalities they impose on recipient countries 
are not rooted in Northern premises, but mainly serve the enlargement of 
spheres of influence (Rowlands 2008; Sato et al. 2010; Kondoh et al. 2010). 
By codifying “good” development practice, the Paris Declaration also 
attempted to cement OECD’s fading influence.  
 These two paradoxes heavily influenced the implementation of the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Chapter 5 will provide empirical evidence of the 
manifestation of these issues. I argue that the primary goal of the aid 
effectiveness debate was to re-legitimise aid and retain its role as an 
influential discourse within international relations. The aid effectiveness 
discourse addressed the lack of ownership and harmonisation, as well as the 
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lack of use of local capacities in development aid. From the early 2000s, the 
aid effectiveness discourse was increasingly framed by the emergence of new 
donors.  
 There is an important distinction to be made between the notion of 
capacity development and the discourse of aid effectiveness. Even though the 
professional belief system at GTZ/GIZ in Ethiopia suggested the close 
interrelatedness of capacity development and the OECD-led aid effectiveness 
agenda, they are historically as well as institutionally disconnected. As 
demonstrated above, notions of capacity development originated from a 
participatory and bottom-up tradition of development. I suggest, however, that 
the impasse in the discourse of aid (Schuurman 1993), amplified the 
disintegration of progressive development narratives and the ensuing hubris 
of post-development (Simon 2006b; Ziai 2007), allowed for the co-optation of 
capacity development. Chapter 6 is going to demonstrate the subsequent co-
optation of capacity development by the emerging neoliberal institutionalist aid 
discourse. Whereas issues of aid effectiveness are also closely related to the 
impasse of aid, the OECD-led agenda emerged in the early 2000s and did not 
bear any particular reference to or bring any preference for capacity 
development. Accordingly, this thesis regards these issues as separate and 
will discuss the relevant empirical evidence separately (respectively in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). The next section, however, outlines the theoretical 
underpinnings for this thesis with regard to issues of technology. 
 
2.3 Technology, ICTs and the idea of progress 
 
The first half of this chapter provided a short archaeology of the term capacity 
within the context of modernity and traced the similarities and differences 
between the notion of capacity development and discourses of aid 
effectiveness. It highlighted the tensions between early notions of capacity 
development and its gradual co-option by the neoliberal development 
discourse. Capacity development became a neoliberal and institutionalist 
political discourse that promotes transnational capitalism and governance. It 
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recreates and embeds the developmental tradition of progress and its ideal of 
productivity. I have defined capacity development above as the development 
of capacities that are deemed necessary to navigate the contemporary 
Zeitgeist. The notion of capacity development played an important role in re-
legitimising the modernist and neoliberal discourse of development. 
Eventually, it became a mould into which developmental goals could be cast, 
transmitted and amplified. 
 This section situates the interrelatedness between the idea of progress 
and notions of technology. It explores the situatedness of technology within 
the contemporary political and economic discourse through three steps: 
1. First, it reviews the philosophical and historical embeddedness of 
technology within industrial modernity and its relation to the notion of 
progress (2.3.1); 
2. Second, it draws out a few of the limitations that arise from the binarity 
of technological determinism and constructionsm from a practitioner’s 
point of view (2.3.2); and 
3. Third, subsection 2.3.3 relates issues of power inherent to technology 
and political  discourse making (techno-politics). 
 
2.3.1 Technology, the idea of progress and development 
The idea that technology will bring about a better world for everyone can be 
traced back to the Enlightenment. The notion that technology or industrial 
modernisation as well as scientific positivism are the premises of progress 
were reconfirmed by the first and second industrial revolutions in the North 
(Deane 1979; Adas 1990; Goldstone 2002; Crafts 2004). The direct causality 
between technological progress and economic growth is one of the key 
principles that inform theories of industrial modernity. It infers that 
technological progress leads to the rationalisation of production, creates 
efficiency and increases levels of productivity (Smith et al. 1994; Beck 1997). 
Modern accounts on technology’s role originate from the classical figures of 
sociology (Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim).  However, they never 
used the term ‘technology’, simply because sociology as a discipline was 
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constituted at around the same time when ”mechanic arts” diffused into a 
broader concept of technology (Smith and Marx 1994). Karl Marx’s role in 
conceptualising technology within the socio-economic texture of industrial 
modernity is central to understanding industrial modernity. According to 
Feenberg (2003), ”the writings of Karl Marx are surely the single most 
influential source of theories of modernity” (p. 75) that perpetuate a strong 
belief in progress. 
 Marx’s and later Weber’s analysis of industrial rationalisation laid the 
conceptual foundations for deterministic philosophies of technology. Early 
pragmatist technological determinism (Feenberg 1992, 1995; Dusek 2009; 
Olsen et al. 2009; Kaplan 2009) is deeply rooted in the modernist belief of 
progress and suggests that technology operates as a ”key governing force in 
society” (Smith and Marx 1994, p. 2). Paradoxically, even though pragmatist 
determinism attributes a liberating force to technology (Smith and Marx 1994), 
it also perceives it “as being outside of society” (Green 2001, p. 3.). The 
euphoria that characterised two consecutive industrial revolutions in the North 
elevated technology to a semi-transcendental, autonomous force that shapes 
society. The independent character of technology further solidifies axiomatic 
claims that technology equals progress (Misa et al. 2004; Vermaas et al. 
2011). Furthermore, it neutralises questions of power with regard to efficiency 
and productivity. Technology’s transcendence, which lends it political 
neutrality, however, short-circuits moral or ethical reflections on its social 
consequences (Gianella 2015). Technological determinism interprets the 
social effects of technology within a one-directional causality dictated by the 
meta-narrative of progress (Feenberg 1992; Murphie and Potts 2003). The 
declared eminence of science and technology in bringing about socio-
economic growth extolled the notion that technology itself tends to be a force 
for good (Adas 1990; Gianella 2015). 
 However, the subsequent unfolding of economic rationalisation, the 
quest for productivity and efficiency, only served the interest of capital 
(Foucault 1982). The technological determinism that has pervaded the social 
and economic theory of industrial modernity subverts social institutions to the 
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'imperatives' of modern industrial organisation (Turner 1992; Gane 2002; Misa 
et al. 2004).  
 The notion of technology is inherently connected to the idea of 
development (Escobar 1995; Kothari and Minogue 2001; Kothari 2005). The 
evident triumph of technology and positive science during the 19th and early 
20th century was moulded into the foundation of development theory (Arndt 
1989; Kothari 2005; Rist 2009). The complex ideology of development “exalts 
the Western model of production and consumption as the destiny of all 
humanity” (Benoist 2008, p. 10). These implicit and explicit narratives of 
progress wired into development theory uncritically suggest that technological 
change equals human betterment (Adas 1990; Gianella 2015) and provide a 
raison d'être for global capitalism. 
 Deterministic analysis and practice of development perpetuates models 
and ideologies of global capitalist agendas. The conservative and 
depoliticising accounts of technology lack the critical engagement with issues 
of power within complex social and economic structures. Technological 
progress appears to follow a unilinear course, a fixed track, from less to more 
advanced configurations. Although this conclusion seems obvious from a 
backward glance at the development of any familiar technical object, it is in 
fact based on two claims of unequal plausibility: ”First, that technical progress 
proceeds from lower to higher levels of development; and second, that 
development follows a single sequence of necessary stages” (Feenberg 1992, 
p. 304). 
 The radical essentialism of accounts of contemporary technological 
determinism preserves the rigid cubicle of technology and leaves global 
capitalism unquestioned. Moreover, by ignoring the power embodied in 
technology, deterministic accounts neutralise and depoliticise agendas of 
development. The rigid autonomy ascribed to technology assumes that 
progress is inevitably good for human betterment.  
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2.3.2 Participatory philosophies of technology 
As the facades of the omnipotent narrative of industrial modernisation began 
to crack in the 1970s and 1980s, social and economic theory challenged this 
isolated, autonomous and politically neutralised notion of technology (Beck et 
al. 1994; Beck 1997; Benoist 2008). The evident social and environmental 
pathologies inflicted by industrial modernisation questioned the rigid and 
eschatological techno-social hegemony established within modern social and 
economic theory. This period saw the emergence of the sociological study of 
science and technology that applied analytical tools from Foucauldian 
constructionism and critical theory (Kellner 1989; Feenberg 1992, 1995; 
Munck and O’Hearn 1999). These progressive accounts of social and 
economic theory surpassed the essentialism and linear notions of 
technological determinism and rejected the pre-eminent role of technology 
within socio-economic progress. Non-deterministic approaches to technology 
claim that linear and hegemonic representations of socio-technical realities 
exclude and alienate individual or group agency (Sismondo 1993; Bijker 
1997). Instead, non-deterministic scholarship emphasises the situatedness of 
socio-economic actors in the definition, production and policing of socio-
technical realities (Feenberg 2002; Dusek 2009; Olsen et al. 2009). Two 
major types of non-deterministic critique emerged in the 1980s: social 
constructionism and post-humanism.  
 Constructionist approaches to science and technology regard both 
fields as socially constructed, with properties which are neither intrinsic nor 
autonomous from social agency (Bijker et al. 2012). Social constructionism 
highlights the malleability and negotiability of technology by suggesting that 
technology is not a fixed entity but the outcome of phases of negotiations in 
the social and political spheres (Pinch and Bijker 1987; Bijker et al. 2012; 
Bijker and Law 1994; Williams and Edge 1996; MacKenzie and Wajcman 
1999). Constructivist accounts of “technology show that different 
configurations of resources can yield alternative versions of the same basic 
device capable of efficiently fulfilling its function” (Feenberg et al. 2010, p. 67).  
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 The notion that different social groups produce different meanings for 
the same technological artefacts (Bijker et al. 2009) comes in forms of mild 
and radical social constructionism (Sismondo 1993). The former only points 
out the importance of the social context in the analysis of technological 
artefacts, while the latter attributes the entire content of science and 
technology to social construction. Radical technological constructionism 
situates technology within sociotechnical genealogies that are exclusively 
responsible for the definition of technologies. Constructionist scholarship 
deploys a wide variety of terminologies (negotiate, mutually constitute, 
interpenetrate, entangle) that restore individual and group agency within the 
fabric of society. Even though social constructionist accounts criticise the 
hegemonic and deterministic nature of previous phenomenologies of 
technology, they are optimistic about the outcomes of technological progress 
(Schech 2002). 
The idealisation of social agency within the early constructionist 
tradition, however, denied that the number of choices that society has in 
influencing the construction of technologies is limited due to inherent power 
inequalities and politics (Winner 1983; Kallinikos 2002, 2011). A merely 
genealogical approach to technology also disregards social groups that do not 
appear relevant in the creation of a certain technology. This exacerbates 
inbuilt inequalities in social and political representation (Winner 1983). More 
contemporary accounts of constructionist scholarship recognise that the 
production of technologies is a politicised act that can be appropriated by 
political entities. In particular, the research by Winner (1993), Woolgar and 
Cooper (1999) and Joerges (1999) revolves around questions of political 
power. These scholars attribute an important role to the sphere of politics that 
authorises the production and implementation of technologies (Joerges 1999). 
These scholars broke with the early naiveté of the participatory and egalitarian 
understanding of social constructionism and acknowledged that political 
discourse appropriates and re-legitimises the construction of technologies. 
 The positive influence of social constructionism within contemporary 
technology studies as well as development is undeniable. However, “social 
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constructivism has now achieved a state of dominance that betrays those 
unmistakable characteristics of paradigm consolidation, i.e., indifference to 
other ideas, arrogance, and a certain inability to accommodate alternative 
viewpoints” (Kallinikos 2002, p. 287). Scholarship that ignores the malleability 
and negotiability of technology or denies its local reshaping frequently 
becomes an outcast. Moreover, social constructionist scholarship refuses to 
reflect on its inability to grapple with power structures that transcend locality. 
Its overwhelming preoccupation with single artefacts amplifies its inability to 
provide an overarching synthesis of technology’s embeddedness in 
contemporary global capitalism. The overemphasis of the local negotiation of 
technology in social constructionist accounts often omits the influence of 
global narratives (Bijker and Law 1994; Bijker et al. 2012). 
 This relative ignorance of politics that would extend its scope beyond 
narrowly defined localities as well as its lack of systemic criticism of 
contemporary global capitalism disqualifies social constructionist claims to 
challenge determinist social theory. Social constructionism falls considerably 
short of providing a progressive and emancipatory exegesis that would 
challenge predominant social grand theories that extol technological 
determinism and celebrate global capitalism. 
 Constructionist approaches had marginal influence on contemporary 
social, political and economic grand theories in the 1980s. Post-humanism, 
however, offers a radical altenrative and challenges the optimism with regard 
to technological progress held by both deterministic and constructionist 
scholars. Post-humanism exposes the unprecedented degradation caused by 
industrial modernisation and raises ethical as well as existential concerns with 
regard to the impact of technology on human nature (Haraway 1987, 1991; 
Escobar et al. 1994; Turkle 2005). Post-humanist scholars argue that, due to 
technological progress, the boundaries between man and machine become 
imprecise and gradually dissolve (Selinger 2009). Morphologies between 
humans and machines are considered a historically coherent output of 
technological development, but notions of technological progress are 
ambiguous and ambivalent. Posthumanist understandings of technology are 
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inherently pessimistic about the nature of technological progress but 
supplement constructionism by weaving notions of negotiability and 
malleability into social theory (Haraway 1987; Turkle 2005). 
 
2.3.3 Theoretical limitations – binarity of ICT4D from a practitioner 
perspective  
 
The theoretical frameworks that I have explored in the previous subsection 
and which accompanied the first phase of my research, however, has several 
shortcomings. It was essential to understand the spectrum of philosophies of 
technology in order to refine my research questions, but it did not allow me to 
explore the entire spectrum of data to which I had access.  
 
 First, even though constructionism would have given me the necessary 
vocabulary and analytical depth to engage with the practicalities – the actual 
implementation – of ICT4D projects, it would entirely blend out the political 
sphere. Social constructionism would have been a useful theoretical basis on 
which to build a theory for eCapacity Development, since the original notion 
and practice of eCapacity Development as practiced at GIZ endorsed 
constructionist approaches. However, these were theoretically incompatible 
with or even outright contradictory to the technological determinism of state-
owned ICT promotion agendas in Ethiopia. I abandoned this project for the 
lack of a coherent social theory in constructions, which would also account for 
political agendas in promoting technology. My observations in the field 
gradually but also distinctly exposed the paradoxes between the interest of 
the state and its citizens with regard to promoting ICTs. The technological 
determinism of the former and the existing or fledgling constructionist 
agendas among the latter were hard to reconcile within a single theoretical 
model. Neither technological determinism nor constructionism provided a 
framework in which to analyse and compare the two perspectives.  
 
 Second, both deterministic and constructionist philosophies of 
technology operate within the modernist tradition by perpetuating the notion of 
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technological progress and by doing so, to varying degrees, endorse 
capitalism. Section 2.3.1 demonstrated that the notion of technology is 
inherently entwined with the idea of progress. Deterministic accounts of 
industrial modernity emphasize the decisive influence of technological 
artefacts on economic progress. In donors’ agendas, ICTs are considered 
vital for fighting poverty, improving healthcare, providing better education, 
fostering gender equality and extend global partnerships for development in 
developing countries (Thapa and Saebø 2014). However, this very quest to 
reduce the ‘digital divide’ (West 2007; Bwalya 2004; Kelly 2005) uncritically 
accepts the premise that the diffusion of ICT is necessarily good and 
promotes socio-economic development. The symbolic and pervasive power of 
ICTs has significant influence on the design of development programmes 
(Unwin 2009; Hayes and Westrup 2012). ICT4D research continues to deploy 
ICTs as a contemporary global economic narrative and create the promise of 
global competitiveness and compatibility. As Fuchs (2009, p. 399) suggests, 
recipient countries “construct the changes connected to new media as radical 
novelties and ignore the continuing dominance of capitalist structures”. 
 
 Third, the predilection in deterministic scholarship that denotes 
episodes of industrial progress by means of their dominant piece of 
technology (Adas 1990), negates the quintessentially pervasive and disruptive 
character of ICTs that surpasses industrial ontologies (Castells 2000, 2011a, 
2011b, 2013; Jenkins 2006; Jenkins and Deuze 2008). Both deterministic and 
constructionist scholars herald ICTs as the latest quantum leap in 
technology’s ongoing progress. This very lack of critical perspectives 
regarding the underlying rationale for spreading technology ignores the core 
characteristics of the digitalisation of the global economy (Silva and Westrup 
2009).  
 Overcoming these theoretical difficulties meant that I had to introduce a 
set of concepts that could satisfactorily help me interrogate the paradoxical 
relationships between state-driven and participatory ICT promotion agendas, 
as well as surpass industrial ontologies of technological development. The 
latter, in particular, meant the necessity of a finding a comprehensive social 
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theory that can frame and adequately account for top-down and bottom-up 
agendas of ICT promotion. The introduction of two key concepts – techo-
politics and informationalism – and their critiques provide me with a set of 
conceptual vessels that allow me to overcome the binarity of deterministic and 
social constructionist thinking. In the next sections I briefly introduce these 
concepts as well as use them to further refine my research questions. 
 
2.3.4 Techno-politics 
Twentieth century political economy is defined by a certain rhetorical 
subservience to technology. Economic development and politics relate to 
technology in multiple forms, as the organizational basis of society, as a 
production system, as a mode of temporisation or more recently as a vehicle 
for communication. Historically, and in very broad terms, techno-politics 
describes the influence of social, governmental, economic and cultural factors 
on a form of industrial development, and vice-versa. However, it entered the 
complex political terrain of the 21st century as a polemic device on the 
intersection of politics and technology.  
 
 There is, however, a certain uneasiness in the use of the term, since 
scholars often carelessly inject it in the hope of overcoming the binarity and 
paradigm consolidation of determinism and social constructionism (Kurban et 
al. 2016). However, this attempt reproduces a disguise of neutrality for 
technological artefacts, which automatically defeats its purpose. Evidently, 
technology and the political have long been intertwined and their relationship 
can never produce a singular meaning.  Mutual constitution or co-production 
of politics and material forms such as technology are truisms in current 
technology studies (Jasanoff 2004). In his critique on the lack of historical 
contextualisation in ICT4D research, Gagliardone (2014, p. 3) suggests that 
techno-politics “emerged in the history of technology tradition to account for 
the ability of competing actors to envision and enact political goals through the 
support of technical artefacts”. Techno-politics is not, though, a monolithic 
term, and its interpretations range over the entire political spectrum from 
progressive to autocratic. It presumes the use of a technology for political 
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purposes, which evidently involves a multiplicity of positions.  
   
 Winner’s (1980) critique of social constructionism suggested that 
artefacts possess inherent politics. However, given the multiplicity of 
positions, techno-politics as a term is both used to describe technology as an 
actor that can empower political actors in various degrees, and that can 
empower a single political actor against others. Accordingly, the body of 
literature that deploys techno-politics carries a wide range of interpretations 
and contesting claims as to its meaning.  
 
 Thomas Hughes’ (1983) work on electrification in the UK and Germany 
illustrated how, through political pressure systems and agendas, the same 
technology can take on different shapes in different locations. He described 
this phenomenon by building on social constructionism and expanding it into 
the realm of the political economy. Hughes’ interpretation of techno-politics 
emphasises the design process involved in the innovation and implementation 
of new technologies. 
 Gabrielle Hecht’s research on the relationship between nuclear power 
and national identity in France (Hecht 1998; 2001) further developed Hughes’ 
notion. Hecht (Edwards and Hecht 2010, p. 15) defines techno-politics as 
“hybrids of technical systems and political practices that produce new forms of 
power and agency”. Hecht also emphasised the co-constitutive process 
between technology and politics by suggesting that “technologies are not in 
and of themselves techno-political. Rather, the practice of using them in 
political processes and/or toward political aims constitutes techno-politics” 
(Edwards and Hecht 2010, p. 256-7). Hecht treats technology as an 
independent agent that can be strategically appropriated for different political 
purposes by conflicting actors. Inherent in her writing is a normative and 
strategic stance towards the appropriation of ICTs.  
 Other, more progressive and participatory interpretations also exist 
(Kellner 2001; Rasmussen 2007). However, these often preclude subversive 
action against an autocratic political power. Since it is these very mechanisms 
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of subversion that I investigate in my thesis, the parallel use of two 
antagonistic versions of techno-politics would cloud the lucidity of my analysis. 
Techno-politics provides an important vocabulary for my research, since it 
moves beyond the binarity of the local vs global as well as acknowledging the 
relation between politics and technological artefacts. Scrutinising ICTs as 
components of techno-political regimes, involves taking into consideration 
how technology can become an instrument of authoritarian and 
developmental politics. It forces my analysis to question technological 
determinism while moving beyond the study of a particular technical artefact 
and avoiding the excesses of social constructivism. 
 The next section further tightens the conceptual focus on the role that 
ICTs play in the reproduction of agendas of progress. In particular, it engages 
with notions of informationalism and transnational informational capitalism, to 
which notions developing countries often latch on. 
 
2.4 Informationalism and a brief critique of informational 
capitalism 
 
The goal of this section is to embed the notion of ICTs into contemporary 
social and economic grand narratives in order to allow my research to engage 
with issues of power that is vested in ICTs. Of particular interest for my 
research is the way in which the ideology of progress is recreated for 
countries in the global South. This section thus provides a brief introduction 
into various conceptual interpretations about the role of ICTs in the 
contemporary socio-economic order (2.4.1), than deals with one of these 
frameworks in detail, namely informationalism (2.4.2), and eventually 
proceeds to provide a brief critique of informationalism. 
 
2.4.1 Informationalism – ICTs as the steam engine of our epoch 
Numerous theories engage with the visible transition from socio-economic 
structures defined along the mechanics of machinery to an age construed by 
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digitisation. The significance of ICTs within the contemporary socio-economic 
structures is debated through a wide spectrum of narratives. Fuchs (2009) 
argues that the only common denominator of these notions is rather nebulous, 
namely “that networked forms of organization, digital networked information, 
communication technologies, and knowledge labour have become more 
important” (p. 388). There are also various ways to categorise these theories 
(Fuchs 2009; Duff 2012; Webster 2014). In a historical – but not chronological 
– classification, two main categories exist: 
1. New era narratives – these accounts consider modernity as a closed 
epoch that preceded the current era, as well as highlight that ICTs are 
the central organising power of the contemporary era; 
2. Continuity narratives – these narratives assume that there is no 
discontinuity between modernity and the current era and thus we still 
live in modernity. While these acknowledge the role of ICTs as a 
central organisational element for the contemporary economy and 
society, they are analysed within the narrative of modernity. 
 
 A concise overview of the main theories is adopted from Webster’s 
(2014) taxonomy (Table 2.2). In this overview, I omit the Habermasian and 
Hayekian theories that concern themselves with contemporary socio-political 










 New era narratives Continuity narratives 
11. post-industrialism (Daniel Bell) neo-Marxism (e.g. Herbert Schiller) 
  2. postmodernism (e.g. Jean  
Baudrillard, Mark Poster, Paul  
Virilio) 
Regulation School theory (e.g. Michel  
Aglietta, Alain Lipietz) 
  3. flexible specialization (e.g. Michael  
Piore and Charles Sabel, Larry  
Hirschhorn) 
flexible accumulation (David Harvey) 
  4. the informational mode of  
development (Manuel Castells) 
reflexive modernisation (Anthony  
Giddens) 
  5.   liquid modernity (Zygmunt Bauman) 
Table 2.2 – An overview of social theories that attribute a central role to ICTs (adopted from 
Webster 2014) 
 
 ICTs possess great symbolic powers as the representatives of a new 
economic era (Souter 2004; Waldburger 2004; Beardon 2004; Sciadas 2005; 
Rye 2009). The disruption caused by ICTs revamps previously held linear 
assumptions of progress and development. ICTs become the main 
constituting element within contemporary narratives of economic 
development. The phenomenon of ICTs, however, is not limited to the 
physical boundaries of industrial production and transgresses traditional limits 
of geography and time. 
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 Even though they have an image of being the harbinger of post-
industrial society, ICTs are also part of a powerful global capitalist narrative. 
That narrative restores capitalist notions of productivity and profitability and 
amplifies these promises by suggesting that the digital economy allows for 
fast scaling and comparatively high returns on investment. The emergence of 
ICTs as the superordinate technology that conducts global economic 
development creates an illusion of high-technology industrialisation (Said et 
al. 1995; Lefort 2012) and reinstates a modernist socio-technical hegemony 
(Van Dijk 1999; Jessop 2003; Stalder 2006). 
 
2.4.2 The informational mode of development  
Informationalist philosophies of technology build on earlier notions of Bell 
(1976; 1979) and Touraine (Touraine and Mayhew 1974; Touraine 1995), and 
deduces a “new social and technical division of labour” (Fuchs 2009, p. 100) 
that originates from the singularity and pervasiveness of ICTs. This ontology, 
however, continues to legitimise claims reminiscent of industrial modernity. 
The most important theorist of informationalism, Manuell Castells, suggests 
that “technology is the only driving force of society” (Castells 2000, p. 392) 
and derives liberating and empowering characteristics from ICTs (Madsen 
2002; Stalder 2006; Webster 2014). The misrepresentation of ICTs as value-
neutral and self-regulating amplifies hopes of economic progress (Van Dijk 
1999). Informationalist literature alludes to a plethora of new opportunities, 
which result from the disaggregation of industrial modernity. The idea that 
“information generation, processing, and transmission become the 
fundamental sources of productivity and power” (Castells 2000, p. 21) 
suggests the reconfiguration of rules of productivity and competition. 
 Castells constructs his narrative of a network society out of three 
independent processes as they appeared from the end of the 1960s: “the 
information technology revolution; the economic crisis of capitalism and 
statism (communism); and the blooming of new social movements like 
environmentalism and feminism” (van Dijk 1999, p. 129). While 
acknowledging that “the networking form of social organisation has existed in 
 72 
other times and spaces” (Castells 2000a., p. 469), he stresses that, through 
the ICT revolution, networks become the main form of organisation in each 
social and economic sphere and build the framework of a) new social 
structure (network society), b) new economy (global informational economy), 
and c) new culture (real virtuality). 
 
 Networks thus become the form of organisation and define the 
morphology of society. The central notion of networks reflects Castells’ 
intention to exchange his analytical focus from conflicts, as defined by 
Marxism, for forms. His awareness of the limitations of grand theories gives 
the impetus to establish a narrative, which allows a holistic and multicultural 
understanding of the emerging global world (Stalder 2006). The search for a 
holistic social theory which would encompass an increasingly fractured world, 
makes Castells engage with communication theory; hence the network 
architecture for social and economic action. His account of networks assumes 
a value neutral and self-regulating character, which is powered by the energy 
of the masses liberated by ICTs. 
 
 Castells’ theory raises two core issues relevant to the notion of ICTs: 
the permanence and pervasiveness of the network logic and the 
establishment of technology as a neutral force. The network logic is based on 
the self-expanding nature of the networks. Informational networks ”can 
expand indefinitely incorporating any new node by simply reconfiguring 
themselves on the condition that these new nodes do not represent an 
obstacle to fulfilling key instructions in their program” (Castells 2000a, p. 695). 
Castells’ euphoria about the network logic and the ”pre-eminence of social 
morphology over social action” (Castells 2000a, p. 469), though, takes little 
account of the genesis of the informational networks. As Madsen (2002) 
points out, Castells attempts to create and define a new age in human history 
(the information age), but fails to acknowledge that this too is capitalist in 
nature. Castells suggests empirically that ICTs have led to the diffusion of 
power and to the rise of grassroots movements, which dismantle the statist-
bureaucratic powers of the modern nation state.  
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 While assuming that technology is neutral, Castells points out that 
networks are essentially binary (Madsen 2002). ”By definition, a network has 
no centre. It works on a binary logic: inclusion/exclusion. All there is in the 
network is useful and necessary for the existence of the network. What is not 
in the network does not exist from the network’s perspective [...]” (Castells 
2000b, 15-16). This binarity influences Castells’ thinking about empowerment 
through ICTs. While acknowledging that ”networks based on alternative 
values also exist and their social morphology is similar to that of dominant 
networks,” (Castells 2000a, p.  695) suggests that the remnants of the old 
society will be sooner or later terminated and included in the dominant 
networks  
 
 Castells’ deployment of these notions eliminates the sense of any 
meaningful dissent or conflict as well. Madsen (2002) and Webster (2006) 
argue that Castells, while invoking a Marxist tradition, is not concerned by 
those left out of the benefits of a globalised world.  He notes that Castells 
actually remains within the realm of the discourse he intends to study and 
implies that among the numerous discourses which intend to understand 
globalisation network society is ”very powerful and backed by equally powerful 
interests, having an interest in a value-neutral appearance backed by science” 
(Madsen 2002, p. 15). The next subsection engages with critical accounts of 
Castells’ informationalist paradigm-building. This is informative in order to 
understand Castells’ inclination to justify the contemporary form of capitalism 
as a mode of development that has no alternatives.  
  
2.4.3 A brief critique of informational capitalism  
The new frontier of progress proposed by informationalist accounts tends to 
dissect physical space and creates the illusion of a level playing field 
(Friedman 2007; Kobayashi-Hillary and Sykes 2007; Trimi 2008). However, 
the outsourced back-office accounting, telemarketing or programming only 
increases the competitiveness of individual transnational companies. The 
notion of a level playing field neglects key issues of power and economic 
emancipation (Diefenbach and By 2012). Concepts of outsourcing and the 
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geographic disintegration of corporate value chains only allow power elites to 
sustain centralised strategic control and justify rationalisation.  
 
 The attempts of informationalism to establish the existence of a new 
age in human history, however, often fail to acknowledge or ignore outright 
the capitalist nature of this new era. Madsen (2002) and Webster (2014) also 
argue that informationalist notions overlook those marginalised and rejected 
by informational capitalism. While invoking a promise of a new era and 
celebrating technology’s emancipatory effects, informationalist accounts 
remain within the discourse of modernity (Schech 2002; Fuchs 2009, 2011). 
In essence, they present “a value-neutral appearance backed by science” 
(Madsen 2002, p. 15) and continue to extol and legitimise global capitalism.  
 The notion of informational capitalism is permeated by the promise of 
higher productivity and economic growth (Steinmueller 2001; Indjikian and 
Siegel 2005; Chinn and Fairlie 2006; Basant et al. 2006; Heeks 2010). 
Moreover, the promise of profitability as the main driver of economic 
development is re-animated (Pilat 2005; Draca et al. 2006). There is little 
academic critique concerned with questioning notions of productivity that 
permeate ICT narratives. Competitive advantages are redistributed along 
new, digital geographies of ICT literacy and infrastructure density (Zook et al. 
2004). Economic development becomes dependent on the availability of skills 
and infrastructural factors. 
 
In essence, the mechanisms of transnational informational capitalism 
enforce an even more radical pace of global competitiveness (Steinmueller 
2001). Moreover, the new vulgarity of competition coerces states and 
individuals alike to submit themselves to the compliance dictates of 
informational capitalism. These newly imposed structures of power that 
prescribe compatibility also enforce the subsequent rationalisation and 
standardisation of the labour force (Holtgrewe and Scholten 2005; Wagenaar 
and Boersma 2008; Comor 2010). Maintaining compatibility becomes an 
elusive image that leads to the covert disintegration of national economic 
sovereignty (Harris 1999, 2008; Mann 1997; Overbeek 2002). State structures 
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consecutively cede their power to influence the socio-economic development 
of their citizens to a transnational corporate elite (Sklair 2001; Carroll and 
Fennema 2002; Carroll et al. 2010). Critical accounts of informational 
capitalism emphasise the transnational character of this new economic era 
(Fuchs 2011a; Fuchs 2012b; Fuchs 2012c). 
The economic exploitation and exclusion that take place in the name of 
informational capitalism on the global peripheries are unaccounted for in 
informational scholarship (Fuchs 2009). Parayil's (2005) empirical criticism 
suggests that the “distribution of income and wealth both between countries 
and individuals has sharply skewed” and that “knowledge production [...] 
tends to disproportionately reward some and exclude others” (p. 41). 
Productivity hikes resulting from the advance of ICTs only benefit the central 
nodes (Souter 2004) and grind down the resources in the old and new 
economic peripheries. The assumed equalising effects of ICTs create an 
empirically unsound new mirage of economic progress. This new rigour of 
globally imposed rationalisation enhances the volatility and vulnerability of 
global labour markets and further erodes structures of financial and social 
security (Bauman 2000b, 2005; Fraser 2010; Standing 2012). The 
consequential global diffusion of precarious work conditions in fact eliminates 
hopes for emancipation and socio-economic development.   
 In essence the informationalist body of thought eliminates the sense of 
meaningful dissent (Castells 2000, 2007, 2013; Redden 2001; Hands 2004). 
The networks of informational capitalism that control the flows of ”capital, 
information, technology, organizational interaction, images, sounds and 
symbols” dictate a new binary hegemony. The logic of inclusion vs exclusion 
empowers only those who have a “sense of the game” (Madsen 2002, p. 13). 
“All there is in the network is useful and necessary for the existence of the 
network. What is not in the network does not exist from the network’s 
perspective” (Castells 2000, p. 15-16).  
 The proclamation of the dominant flows of ICTs as a force of good 
(Madsen 2002) and the conscious neglect of the power vested in 
transnational corporate elites create a semblance of decentralisation and 
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participation. The claims of diffusion of power, transparency, the rise of 
grassroots movements, and the dismantling of the statist-bureaucratic 
structures of the modern nation state are deceptive (Mann 1997; Derrida 
2006). They exclusively serve the interests of a transnational capitalist elite. 
The intoxicating ideology of progress and economic developments deceives 
states to favour corporate interests above the socio-economic welfare of their 
citizens (Schmidt 1995; Bohle and Greskovits 2007).  
The magnetism of ICTs for achieving fast economic development is 
further amplified by the aspirational models of South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore (Low 1996; Castells 2011) . The reassurance of rapid economic 
development (Wee 2007; Lee and Ku 2007), however, also expands new 
forms of non-democratic, anti-participatory and hegemonic power. They 
promote standardisation and a one-dimensional society (Van Dijk 1999). The 
economic pressure created by transnational informational capitalism allows 
the emergence of a new form of developmentalism in the South.  
ICTs can exert a constituting role for dissent as well as lead to network-
based struggles (Komito 1998; Haythornthwaite and Kendall 2010; Castells 
2011). Castells (2000) acknowledges that “networks based on alternative 
values also exist” and that “their social morphology is similar to that of 
dominant networks” (p. 695). The use of ICTs constitutes new communities 
that are characterised by a participatory culture (Jenkins 2006; Jenkins and 
Deuze 2008) and occupy online spaces (Castells 2007, 2013). They are 
organized around specific sets of values, the meaning and sharing of which 
are marked by specific codes of self-identification (Castells 2000, 2007, 
2011). These communities appear as reactions to prevailing social trends, 
which are resisted on behalf of autonomous sources of meaning. However, at 
the outset, these communities cultivate defensive identities that function as 
refuge and solidarity, to protect against a hostile, outside world. 
 The informational body of thought remains within the long tradition of 
modernity and perpetuates technological determinism (Jessop 2003; 
Garnham 2004; Stalder 2006). It extols capitalist structures and neutralises 
voices of dissent by expanding the boundaries of transnational capitalism. 
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Spaces of agency are subverted to the larger logic of global compatibility, the 
standardisation of skills and the anti-emancipatory effects of digital production 
(Mansell 2001; Gapski 2007; Karakas 2009). The acceptance of these 
productivity and compliance narratives drives the creation of new, hegemonic 
agendas of economic development and enforce novel mechanisms of control. 
There is an apparent lack of attempts in the literature to explore ways to 
restore the agency of the individual and the society as a whole within 
transnational informational capitalism. 
 The pressures created by transnational informational capitalism on 
emerging or developing countries and their economies raises a host of further 
questions. The most important from the perspective of this thesis is the forms 
of interaction between transnational informational capitalism and developing 
economies. The type of pressures as well as opportunities that 
informationalist economic regimes create in developmental settings is a 
central issue of my analytical goals. However, a further discussion on 
questions of neoliberal and transnational political economy, globalisation, 
developmentalism and neo-patrimonialism, which I did explore excessively 
during the creation of this thesis, would only burden this conceptual 
framework. Moreover, from a conceptual point of view, embedding 
informationalism or technology into a wider framework of political economy 
carries the inherent risk, as Verbeek (2005) suggests, of reducing 
technological artifacts to non–technological elements such as social 
organisation, trade, the will to power, or policing. This would automatically 
defeat the purpose of this thesis. In order to answer these questions as well 
as produce a more nuanced and systematic account on these issues, I will 
contextualise them in Chapter 4. Here, I will undertake a systematic analysis 
of the relationship between technology policies of the Ethiopian and Egyptian 
governments and their embeddedness in transnational informational 
capitalism – and its developmental, neoliberal or neo-patrimonial 
idiosyncrasies – power structures, which continually shape everyday life. 
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2.5 Conclusion and research questions 
 
This chapter has provided a theoretical framing for the thesis that establishes 
a set of conceptual categories and introduces an operational vocabulary 
through which my research can engage with the emerging issues I 
encountered in the field. Its main aim was to deploy conceptual frameworks 
for tightening the focus of my research questions. To this end, it has explored 
the discourse of capacity development as well as the linkages between the 
idea of progress and technology, in particular ICTs. Section 2.2 embedded 
capacity development within the discourse of aid effectiveness, and 
demonstrated that capacity development is deeply interwoven with this 
discourse and was exploited for the re-legitimisation of aid beyond the 
development impasse. The codification of capacity development into the legal 
fabric of development created an entry for bi- and multilateral donors into the 
entire society of the recipient countries. Moreover, the codification created a 
set of mechanisms to control emerging donors, particularly from civil society.  
 This chapter has also interrogated the embedded technological 
determinism of ICT promotion within the context of development, and has 
argued that the promotion of ICTs is deeply entwined with global capitalism. 
Informationalist notions replicate the inherent technological determinism of 
modernity and suggest that the introduction of ICTs is necessarily beneficial. 
Furthermore, ICTs promise accelerated economic development and a level 
playing field. These illusions of technological progress negate the subsequent 
emergence of new regimes of enforced global competition and compatibility.  
 The ICT4D literature has a difficulty to engage critically and question 
the expansion of transnational informational capitalism. Analytical models 
rooted in the technological constructionism of industrial modernity lack the 
tools to analyse issues of dissent amidst the erosion of the binaries of global 
vs local. Therefore, boundaries of agency need to be traced in order to 
empirically deconstruct claims of locality and indigenousness in the age of 
transnational capitalism.  
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 My archaeological approach towards the emergence of capacity 
development within the discourse of development produces a host of 
questions. Critical accounts of development aid paired with my observations 
in the field prompted the following ideas that guided the first phase of my 
research (2009-10): 
 
1. Capacity development is a hollow practice that is used for different 
ends by donors depending on their own political interest. 
2. Recipient countries are enchanted by the symbolic powers of ICTs, 
but are prone to misappropriate ICTs in order to increase their 
control over their citizens. 
3. I observed the empowering impact that participatory ICTs, such as 
social media, had on young users in Ethiopia. Their agility and 
agency considerably influenced my research.  
 
I used these assumptions to develop a set of meta-questions to further guide 
and focus my observations as well as to develop my other research 
instruments: 
 
1. Why did donors adopt capacity development? Can donors and 
recipients use capacity development as a method of suppression? If 
yes, why do they do so?  
2. Why do recipient countries promote ICTs, and can ICTs become a 
tool of suppression? There is little research yet on these issues. 
3. Why do new participatory ICT practices, such as social media, 
perform better at restoring or increasing the agency of people? 
 
In the second phase (2011-2013), I developed further questions that drew 
upon the rationale above and guided my data collection. The empirical work of 
this thesis thus aims to answer three key research questions: 
 
1. Why does capacity development play such a central role in the 
agendas of both donors and recipient countries? 
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2. Why are ICTs of such importance for the Ethiopian and Egyptian 
development agendas? 
3. How do ICTs enable technologists’ individual agency in Ethiopia 
and Egypt, and how do they accomplish this? 
 
 This thesis sets out to verify empirically as well as to add further detail 
to the archaeology of capacity development. This builds on the historical 
deconstruction of capacity development and allows the exploration of power 
claims that donors moulded into the notion of capacity development. In 
particular, the field reality with regard to the core issues of ownership and 
alignment needs to be interrogated. Moreover, the tracing of ideological 
genealogies and the theory-building of capacity development among donor 
agencies will present new empirical insights. 
 Furthermore this thesis also aims to illustrate the inherent dichotomies 
as well as ambiguities of state-driven, deterministic ICT capacity development 
and constructionist-participatory agendas of ICTs. Questions of state-driven 
and enforced ICT capacity development agendas need to be empirically 
interrogated to demonstrate the new hierarchies of power installed along with 
the promotion of ICTs. The extrusion and crowding out of participative 
alternatives by top-down, normative discourses of ICTs further eliminate 
individual agency. By interrogating the mechanisms of participatory ICTs, this 
thesis aims to trace alternative narratives that resist the dominant socio-
economic agendas can be identified. Before doing so the following chapter 
outlines the methodological approach as well as the different data collection 




Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction – the research design 
Two main factors influenced the research design of this thesis: first, its 
theoretical focus on capacity development, which is historically inclined 
towards participatory and bottom-up methodologies; and second, my initial 
work environment at GTZ/GIZ in Ethiopia that expected agility and flexibility 
(cf. Section 1.1). Chapter 2 has provided an account of some of these notions 
as well as their inherent paradoxes. My research questions revolve around 
issues of power as well as their representation in and through the discourse of 
ICT4D. As this was practice-led research, I did not go into the field with a 
clear theoretical framework. Rather, I used the conceptual framework 
discussed in the previous chapter to assist in tightening the focus of my 
research questions and instigate the critical questioning of what I observed in 
the field. In Chapter 2 I have alluded to this specific genesis of my thesis and 
how the conceptual frameworks has evolved. This chapter outlines the 
methodological considerations as well as providing an account of the gradual 
evolution of the methodology of this thesis. However, before attempting to 
answer my research questions, it was crucial to decide how to steer my 
expectations concerning the output of the research. In particular, I needed to 
take care of the implications that my dual roles as a practitioner and 
researcher had on conducting this research (Section 3.5).  
 
3.1.1 Survey outline 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, my original goal was to provide an elaborate 
description of the unique methodology that eCapacity Development 
supposedly represented. My assumption was that the two terms – capacity 
development and ICTs – have neither been researched together sufficiently in 
the academic literature, nor have they been used together in a cogent and 
coherent manner in development practice. Initially, I reasoned that by 
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identifying practices at the intersection of these two terms I would produce a 
conceptual underpinning as well as a concise methodology for eCapacity 
Development. To extract these aspects, my research instruments aimed at 
gathering narrated accounts – mainly based on interviews and focus group 
discussions – which would be assisted by a research diary to record the flow 
and occasional interferences during the research. However, these original 
aspirations became less easy to maintain as I grew to realise that both terms 
carry heavy ideological and practical burdens. Accordingly, a positivist and 
technocratic approach would only disguise their ambiguity and endorse these 
concepts. For a critical inquiry, that is rooted in field practice and adjustable to 
the velocity and fluidity of this practice, I had to replace such a rigid 
methodological approach.  
 Chapter 2 described the implications of the practice-led research 
approach for the conceptual framing of this thesis, and how the interplay 
between the observational knowledge generated in the field and the 
conceptual helped me to deduce and sharpen my research questions. My 
deep emersion in the field did not allow the development of abstract 
theoretical claims, which could than be tested with a set of methods in the 
field.  
 The gradual transition of this thesis into a practice-led research project 
necessitated the rethinking and the weighing-up of the methodological 
choices I was making. In order to deal with, as well as optimally use my 
convoluted positionality, I attempted to develop a set of tools that could 
mediate the interplay between theory and practice. This also greatly increased 
personal fulfilment since it allowed me to improve and not only to observe 
practice (Whitehead and McNiff 2006; Greenwood and Levin 2006; Koshy 
2005). 
In the development of a coherent research methodology, I focused on three 
major objectives:  
1. to be able to make the best out of my privileged access in the field; 
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2. to deploy methods that answer to my desire to provoke change in the 
structures I was working in (instead of just generating knowledge); and 
3. to implement both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to 
bridge the traditional disciplinary divides between the seemingly 
different worlds of theory and practice (Desai and Potter 2006). 
Delivering on these three objectives was not a linear process, but a rather 
long-winded road. In this process of assembly, I borrowed from a set of 
methodological approaches that provided a type of contextual framework for 
my research practice as well as allowing for personal reflexivity (Hamilton and 
Jaaniste 2010). As a conceptual underpinning I chose practice-led research, 
which originated from the art, design and media studies in the 1990s 
(Hamilton and Jaaniste 2010). Practice-led research is primarily concerned 
with the nature of practice and leads to new knowledge that has significance 
for theory and practice alike. The key aim is to advance knowledge about 
practice, which corresponds well to one of the key audiences of this thesis: 
practitioners in development work. The most important aspect of practice-led 
research was that it permitted the research to be built on exploration and 
accident rather than on hypotheses and pre-negotiated approaches (Webb 
and Brien 2008).  
 
There is, though. a degree of agnosticism to practice-led research, 
which practitioners tend to sometimes (over-)emphasise. Nevertheless, 
agnosticism is not to be misinterpreted as mysticism or subversiveness. The 
type of agnosticism at play here derives its meaning from artifical intelligence 
research (Webb and Brien 2010), which is dominated by the notions of 
emergence and agnostic systems. The latter is based on the assumption that 
it is not possible to anticipate all the permutations likely to emerge in the 
course of machine learning. Therefore machines should not depend on a 
single model, but should be interoperable with a number of places and ways. 
The main benefit of establishing agnostic designs systems is the ability 
consistently to collect and produce data across locations and roles. The term 
is used similarly in economics, architecture and design, history and social 
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theory (Webb and Brien 2010). Idiosyncratic to agnostic designs is the pre-
eminence of tolerance for complexity and confusion, and also a willingness 
and a capacity to be led by the data rather than by a predetermined point of 
view. Agnostic research heavily relies on systems design and design thinking.  
 
 During the development of my survey instruments, design thinking 
(Rowe 1991; R. Buchanan 1992; Cross 2001) as well as rapid prototyping 
(Long et al. 1996) provided valuable inputs. These frameworks allowed me to 
translate the somewhat abstract framing of practice-led research into practical 
tools and co-operative action with the target groups. Both approaches are 
rooted in the engineering sciences and their use has been rather common in 
the field of ICTs since the early 1990s. Seery et al. (2011) and Wells (2012), 
for example, argue that participatory and inclusive methods are essential if 
technologies are to be used for complex challenges. Instruments such as 
peer-review and inquiry are used to co-design socio-technological solutions. 
 
 My goal was to establish a methodology that enables “the co-
generation of solutions that take account of uncertainty and multiple forms of 
knowledge” (Blackstock et al. 2007, p. 1). Design thinking explicitly challenges 
the positivist doctrine and offers instead a constructivist paradigm, which was 
important given my conceptual interests in constructivism (Chapter 2). Design 
thinking proposes an epistemology of practice that is implicit in intuitive 
processes that practitioners can bring to situations of uncertainty, instability 
and uniqueness, as well as value conflict (Schön 1983). The reflective 
practice and preparedness of design thinking to put trust in the abilities of 
practitioners (i.e. informants) in order to try to explicate their competences 
rather than to supplant them, made design thinking-based approaches 
suitable for reaching my objective of enacting change in the lives of my 
respondents. More specifically, I have adapted one of my main research tools, 
appreciative inquiry, from design thinking (Section 3.3), and this replaced the 
interviews that I had been planning as the primary form of data collection.  
 
 However, while appreciative inquiry certainly enabled the co-creation of 
solutions together with my informants and helped build a more creative data 
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generation process, it was somewhat cumbersome. Also it was not possible to 
bridge the enormous social and power distances between informants such as 
high-level officials and technologists. Moreover, appreciative inquiry has great 
self-reflection capabilities for the informants, but can leave researchers to 
their own devices. The reflection on this challenge with other doctoral 
students led me to upgrade my research diary as another of my primary data 
collection tools (Section 3.2). This allowed me to document and reflect my 
own research journey as a participatory action researcher in high resolution. 
The distinction between participatory action research and participatory 
research is important. Taylor et al. (2004) emphasise that the output of 
participatory action research is concrete social action or systemic and social 
change, while participatory research can result merely in learning. This 
implies that with my research diary, and later with media and social media 
analysis, I followed an interpretative and participatory track in order to unearth 
aspects of the inherent power dynamics of ICT promotion. The following 





Research method Goal Notes 




formalised accounts on 
capacity development 
and ICT promotion 
 
Ongoing for 5 consecutive  
years (September 2009 – 
February 2014) 
2)  Appreciative inquiry 
session 
To collect accounts on 
grassroots technology 
activism in Ethiopia 
and Egypt 
4 sessions 
3)  Interview To collect accounts of 
capacity development 
and ICT promotion 
from donor and 
recipient 
representatives, as 
well as from ICT4D 
practitioners 
50 interviews 
4)  Media monitoring To collect accounts of 
capacity development 
and ICT promotion in 
the public discourse 
In Ethiopia: Ethiopian News 
Agency, Walta Information 
Center, Addis Zemen, 
Ethiopian Herald, Daily 
Monitor, Capital, Fortune 
In Egypt: Daily News Egypt, 
Ahram Online, Madamasr 
Additionally international 
sources such as: Guardian, 
Trouw (Dutch), NRC (Dutch), 
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Die Zeit (German), 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(German) 
5)  Social media 
analysis 




motivation in the local 
technology 
communities in 
Ethiopia and Egypt  
See Table 3.2 to 3.5 
6)  Internal documents 
(GTZ/GIZ, ECBP) 
To collect written 
evidence about the 
changes in 
understanding capacity 
development as well 
as to reflect on the 
internal power 
struggles related to the 
term 
2587 e-mails, 61 Minutes of 
Meetings from ECBP 
Management Team 
Meetings, 421 further 
documents and presentations 
from ECBP 
Evidence from this group will 
be only cited with great care 
in this thesis, due to the high 
sensibility of the information 
Table 3.3.1 – Overview of methodologies used during the research 
 
3.1.2 Participants and sampling 
Semi-structured interviews with 50 ICT4D practitioners still formed an 
important part of my research methodology. This group was divided into four 
subgroups: 1) representatives of donor agencies, 2) representatives of 
recipient governments, 3) independent ICT4D practitioners and 4) 
technologists. With some of them, two interviews within an interval of 6 
months were also possible. For a complete overview of the interviewees’ 
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profile see Annexes 1, 2 and 3. I categorised the interview participants into 
four main groups: 
 1) Donor representatives 
Donor representatives are crucial to understand donors’ perspectives on 
capacity development as well as on how ICTs contribute to their overall 
capacity development plans. I interviewed high level representatives at each 
fieldwork location, supposing that their narratives reflect the goals as well as 
policies of their organisations with regard to capacity development and ICTs. 
It is not the technical implementation of ICT4D that I am concerned about, but 
the settings and motivations, which frame these. The aim is to interrogate 
donors’ motivation and goals to promote capacity development and ICTs.   
 The best way to achieve this goal is to create sampling criteria, which 
assure that the interview participants have enough experience and 
organisational track record in the investigated field. This makes the 
construction of more solid narratives possible. It means that the answers are 
more likely to express organisational opinions and interests and are less 
influenced by unknown or uncontrollable human factors. To do so, I set the 
following criteria: donor representatives were chosen from organisations 
which have at least a 10-year track record of ICT4D activity in the respective 
countries. Furthermore, only organisations were considered which show 
current engagement in the ICT policy dialogues of the respective partner 
countries. Participants were selected from higher ranks (e.g. department 
heads, project directors), who yield executive power over the ICT4D activities 
of their organisation. 
  Conducting interviews with donor agency representatives posed a set 
of methodological challenges, such as logistical factors, political sensibilities, 
the boundaries of political correctness as well as diplomacy, internal 
communication guidelines and political struggles. The intention to save face 
also influenced the interviews, an issue which was further exacerbated in 
some cases due to my status as a GIZ employee. I wasn't able to have more 
than one interview with all my interviewees.  
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 2) Recipient governments’ representatives 
The sample for this group was selected from meso- or macro-level 
organisations, which are either ICT4D implementers on behalf of their 
governments or ICT policy makers. No regional bodies or outlets were 
considered; participants were selected only from the middle and higher 
management ranks at main offices of the respective institutions. The reason 
for this decision is similar to the one with the donor representatives. 
 Interviewing this group of participants in many respects posed a similar 
methodological challenge to that with the donors. Their tight time schedules, 
as well as political sensitivities, had to be taken into account. Issues related to 
the latter have been widely explored by Temple and Young (2004) and Bujra 
(2006). On the other hand, their organisational language sometimes differed 
from that of the donors, with which I was more familiar. Wording and certain 
dimensions of the interviews needed to be adapted in order to match the 
organisational lingo. 
 From an ethical perspective, it was important to also be aware of some 
additional aspects during the sampling and the interviews themselves. 
Particularly, political/internal struggles within the establishment might have 
been less dampened than within donor organisations, especially since here 
party affiliations or ethnic backgrounds might have been more in the 
foreground. Such political struggles were, for example, visible in the current 
public service in Egypt, due to the change from a secular, NDP-led 
establishment to an increasingly Islamising and radicalising political system. 
In Ethiopia, the death of Meles Zenawi in late August 2012 could have led to 
more open political struggles within the ruling party (EPRDF). In Ethiopia the 
long domination of one political party, as well as prospective changes in 
leadership, initiated a range of political struggles, which I explore in more 
detail in Chapters 4, 6 and 7.  
 3) Independent ICT4D practitioners 
This group is composed of ICT4D practitioners who are neither affiliated with 
donor agencies nor with recipient governments. It was a mixed group, which 
consisted of academic practitioners as well as ICT4D practitioners. Key to the 
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selection of the participants was their experience with the selected survey 
locations. Participants were both local (indigenous) and international 
practitioners who had sufficient experience with the fieldwork locations, 
understood their internal logics and were able to critically assess and locate 
statements within their own contexts. In total, I interviewed five ICT4D 
practitioners in total. 
 
 The function of this group was to act as a control group, and as such to 
provide a politically independent outsider view on the capacity development 
discourse as well as on the role of ICTs in international development. 
 4) Technologists – renegade young elites in Ethiopia and Egypt 
A particular challenge with regard to technologists was finding an appropriate 
name for them. Over the course of my research, I experimented with various 
titles, such as technology enthusiasts, technologists, geeks and techies. I 
wanted to avoid the name ‘techies’ for the reason that it sounded too informal. 
Eventually, I settled on the term technologists since it is the most widely used 
self-description within these communities. Sometimes it is used as a synonym 
with ‘techies’, however, during the course of my research, the latter gradually 
faded from everyday use. Especially, as these communities matured in both 
Egypt and Ethiopia they sought identification with their Silicon Valley 
counterparts and adopted their term (technologist). Despite the engineered 
sound of the term it still denotes a young, informal and certainly elite niche in 
both societies. 
 Moreover, I consciously chose to describe this particular group of 
informants as a renegade elite. However, I do not deploy the term renegade in 
its most widely used meaning as “a person who deserts and betrays an 
organization, country, or set of principles” (New Oxford American Dictionary 
2010). I struggled considerably with the question how to describe the anti-
establishment character of this otherwise evidently elite group. I am aware of 
the ambiguity of the adjective itself. However, other potential alternative 
descriptions, such as rebellious elite or mutinous elite, would have blown out 
of proportion the readiness of these groups to rebel. Although most of my 
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informants in Egypt participated in the events of 21st January, 2011, they were 
not among its initiators. Those in Ethiopia might have dreamt of a revolution, 
but either lacked the means or the motivation. None of my informants would 
qualify to be regarded either as treasonous or untrustworthy, even though two 
of my informants were charged in absentia by the Ethiopian and Egyptian 
judicial systems respectively during the time of my research.  
 
 A technically more appropriate term would have been the subversive 
elite; however, this term has already been deployed by Adler (1987) and 
describes a type of elite that is loyal to the establishment: “their ideology 
about the nature of politics and economics differs from that of the established 
elite, nevertheless, because they have some access to the decision-making 
channels and structures, they succeed in getting their ideas through to the 
decision makers. This ability to influence policy and action, either overtly or 
indirectly, is what makes them an ‘elite’” (p. 90.). This term, however, falls 
short in portraying the vivid anti-establishment logic among my informants, as 
well as their informal, subcultural and non-conventional character. The 
second, less often used meaning of the term “renegade” describes these 
latter characteristics quite precisely as persons who behave “in a rebelliously 
unconventional manner” (New Oxford American Dictionary 2010).  
  
 The main challenge in creating a sample of technologists for my survey 
was that people from this group could not be affiliated with any given 
institutional form or type of work. Therefore, I interpreted them as a subculture 
whose identity is framed around the use of up-to-date and state-of-the-art 
technologies. In the creation of the identifiers for this group, I therefore relied 
on my field notes as well as conversations with ICT4D specialists. I was 
targeting the ‘digital natives’ who – despite the differences in the level of 
exposure and access – have grown up with digital technologies. The most 
important common denominator for this group is, however, their age. They all 
come from a segment that has been lately denoted as Generation Y or 
Millenials, and are aged between 20 and 35 years. Their technology use 
patterns are very similar to mainstream Northern models and they also often 
mimic Northern consumerism, behaviour and cultural norms. They are 
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globally oriented and hold various, often cosmopolitan identities (Singerman 
and Amar 2006). The technologists I worked with fit the conventional 
description of their Northern counterparts as a rebellious, somewhat entitled 
and career-minded youngster, whose pragmatic idealism (Burstein 2014) 
despises corporate ladder climbing, values flexibility over anything else and 
seeks  self-employed lifestyles (Draves and Coates 2007). Nevertheless, only 
some of my informants were in fact self-employed. Most of them earned a 
living in the non-governmental sector. 
 
 The participatory and egalitarian logic of these technology communities 
prompted me to label them grassroots. Even though the term ‘grassroots’ is 
reserved for the marginalised, rural or urban poor, in development literature, it 
is important to note that my informants consequently labelled themselves as 
grassroots. In clear contrast to their apparent urban and upper middle class 
background, technologists in both Ethiopia and Egypt claimed to represent 
grassroots agendas of change. I will explore some of these issues of identity 
and representation in Chapter 8. 
 
3.1.3 Potential methodological biases  
I have already touched upon the biases caused by my dual roles and 
positionality that influenced my research work. Here I reflect on some of the 
more general and not identity-related biases. Chambers (1980, 1986, 2008) 
has usefully identified a number of factors that bias the outcome of fieldwork, 
particularly with regard to researching poor or disadvantaged communities 
(Chambers 1980, 1986, 2008). Relying on his work, I have identified four main 
sets of biases that are relevant for my research.  
 1) The spatial bias 
In the empirical practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal, this bias shows to 
what extent fieldwork has unintentionally become attached to infrastructure - 
in other words, to the availability of good roads and facilities, which can 
accommodate Northern researchers. Well-built roads, however, also attract 
investment: "Factories, offices shops and official markets all tend to be at the 
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sides of main roads. Even agricultural development has a roadside bias" 
(Chambers 2008, p. 31). My experience as a technical co-operation advisor in 
Ethiopia and Egypt confirms this assumption. Most of the non-urban projects I 
have been working on followed a similar logic and have been based at major 
roads, allowing for back and forth transport to urban areas within a day. 
Through such "elite roadside ecologies" (cited from Ssennyonga 1976 in 
Chambers 2008, p. 32; original work not found), the rural becomes falsely 
represented and bans access to the poorest and most disadvantaged. 
Chambers (2008) also argues that such spatial bias is often not just road-
bound, but locked to the fast availability of airports (airport bias).  
 The awareness of spatial biases instigated a careful delimitation of my 
claims. The claims developed in this thesis are not representative in any way 
of the experiences and perceptions of the rural poor, for example. The 
decision to exclusively focus on strictly urban areas and restrict my fieldwork 
to the capitals, however, was not just a choice of convenience, but more of 
feasibility and relevance. My previous experience in managing ICT4D projects 
in rural Ethiopia (2008-10) made me realise that significant change in the 
agency of users does not happen within top-down hierarchies of pocketed 
ICT4D measures that are airdropped into rural settings. Hansen et al. (2012) 
show that the change in factors, which contribute to effective agency, is 
statistically not significant. While I do not contest the possibility for successful 
ICT4D actions in rural settings, analysing such cases is not the intention of 
this thesis. 
 2) The project bias 
Through the nature of management in development co-operation, everything 
revolves around projects, which than easily become self-referential equally for 
in- and outsiders. Chambers' criticism of project-based research is that 
knowledge is generated at "tiny atypical islands of activity, which attract 
repeated and mutually reinforcing attention" (2008, p. 34). Many projects are 
also appropriated by the political interests of donors and/or local 
governments. Accordingly activities, but also meaning and knowledge, 
become misrepresented. Messages about the project are often fine-tuned to 
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the expectations of the visitor, be it a political representative or a researcher. 
Socially or politically expected statements are repeated and become, step by 
step, perceived as reality.  
 3) The diplomatic bias 
Limited time budgets as well as cultural barriers and hierarchies construct a 
set of practices and language which is determined by respect towards the 
outsider. Real or assumed hierarchies and cultural norms of respect produce 
a eulogy among the less advantaged or lower down in a hierarchy. Its effect is 
further accentuated by those roadside ecologies and the project-orientation of 
development aid as well as research. In my research, I didn't expect this bias 
to be particularly strong, since I was planning to address stakeholder groups 
which either have a sufficiently high hierarchical status (high-level 
stakeholders) or possess globalised cultural identities, which can 
counterbalance cultural norms to embellish reality. In the case of the former, 
however, biases of elite status or political role can be at play.  
 This type of bias produces narratives which fit the political agendas of 
their governments – be it on the recipient's or donor's side - or their elite 
status. Still, the purpose of my research was exactly to extract these 
narratives. Through the deployment of a set of interviews and more regular 
interaction (workshop, visits of events) with local technologists, my goal was 
to diminish this bias. I was not aiming for an insider role, since that would 
have been idealistic, given my roles as a researcher as well as donor 
representative. Additionally, the interviews and a regular exchange with key 
informants (anthropologists, international consultants) helped to counteract 
this bias. 
 4) The security bias              
It is rather telling that Chambers only added this bias to his list in the 2008 
edition of Revolutions in Development Inquiry. It resonates well with the 
neoliberal discourse on capacity development, which is, among others, rooted 
in the concern that the world is becoming less secure and more risk prone. 
This is not to de-emphasise insecurity as a risk, but rather to show that risks 
attached to personal security and health have become perceived separately 
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by both aid agency staff and researchers. Important to note is, besides the 
possibility of actual risk, the validity of data extracted from locals under such 
circumstances. While Chambers argues that officials might use security 
threats to keep visitors away from certain areas, they might also want to play 
down the actual security risk. For example, during the student protests at the 
Arba Minch University in Southern Ethiopia (June 2011), officials, including 
the vice-president of the university, repeatedly assured me that there was no 
security risk on the campus and that there was absolutely no reason to cancel 
the visit of the German ambassador planned for the early afternoon. I was told 
this while the riot police sealed off the campus and students were shot at just 
a few hundred metres away. This shows that, to save face, a pretence of 
normality is often kept up even in severe situations. Admittedly, I developed 
certain emotional immunity to similar events during my stay in Egypt. Tear gas 
attacks or burning cars in the close vicinity of my fieldwork or the repeated 
evacuation of my office eventually became side notes to everyday life (Figure 
3.1). In 2013 tensions also rose in Maadi, the Cairo suburb where I lived. One 
of the most serious attacks by Islamist radicals appeared here during late 
October 2013 when rocket propelled grenades were fired at a satellite uplink 
station (Figure 3.2). 
 Even though the likelihood of extreme security problems was rather 
limited during my research, it needs to be mentioned that I had to face the 
possibility that some of my participants were under security surveillance. 
Despite the fact that I gradually acquired skills to avoid the presence of 
security personnel or their ability to follow and/or record conversations I had 
with my informants, surveillance could not be eliminated completely. This was 
particularly true for the more elaborate mechanisms of the Egyptian security 
forces.  The very lack of security guarantees – for my personal safety or that 
of my informants – had a tremendous effect on this research and also led me 
to anonymise all accounts in this thesis that included personal information. 




Figure 3.1 – Navigating crisis: security information sent to GIZ employees via SMS in Cairo 
(Source: author 2013) 
 
 Conspiracy theories about foreign influence and particularly about the 
presence of foreign agents in Egypt flourished during the 25th of January 
uprising that represented a further personal security problem I had to deal 
with. The probability of being considered a spy added difficulty to explain my 
double roles in the field as a GIZ employee and researcher. The accusations 
against and the subsequent arrest of 21 employees of USAID and two of the 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in November 2011 illustrated the fine line between 
legal and illegal in Egypt. Eventually the growing maze of political and 
religious conspiracy theories in which foreign individuals played a role 
reached a level of absurdity by late 2012. A big number of new conspiracy 
theories entered the public ranging from “spy storks” to accusing the Egyptian 
Muppet Show of relaying coded messages (Figure 3.3).  Nevertheless, being 
arrested on assumptions of spying remained a real threat to foreigners. 
Subsection 5.2.1 will return to the questions of foreign influence and 
conspiracy theories in more detail.  
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Figure 3.2 – Navigating crisis: just-in-time security information via Twitter (Source: author 2013) 
 








3.2 Observations, media and social media analysis 
 
The gradual evolution of a better understanding about my positionality as well as 
how to employ it for the benefit of my research led to the upgrading of three other 
methods that in the beginning of my research had only been intended to play an 
auxiliary role. My research diary has been of crucial value for contextualising as well 
as reflecting critically on my work and private environment in Ethiopia and Egypt. 
Media and from 2010 social media analysis increasingly helped me to weigh my own 
observations about both capacity development and ICTs against that of the public.  
Figure 3.4 – The schedule of a Barcamp event in Addis Ababa, July 2011, co-created by the participants 
(Source: author, 2011) 
3.2.1 Research diary 
I used a research diary from as early as October 2009. In the beginning I thought 
about using Brunello’s (2015) application of ethnosnapshots from his research work 
in order to monitor my changing perception of capacity development and ICTs. 
However, it soon turned out that while ethnosnapshots are a great reflexive practice 
and brilliantly captures change in the researcher’s perspective, it does not track the 
evolution of these changes. Most importantly, the triggers that lead to a change in 
the researcher’s perception remain in the background or are left unmentioned 
 99 
entirely. A simple research diary was much better suited track the evolving story of 
my research and record the interlinkages between theoretical and empirical work.  
Figure 3.5 – Observing a Barcamp event in Cairo, February 2013 (Source: author 2013) 
 
 From 2010, when I took over the management of the eCapacity Development 
Department at ECBP, the research diary has grown in importance. Since in this new 
position I had much better access to decision-making levels in both ECBP and in the 
ministries, such as the MOCB or MOE, I gradually transformed the research diary 
into a central tool of my research. I used the research diary also for observing events 
of the local technology communities (Figure 3.4 and 3.5), which, however, raised 
questions about safety.  
 
 My goal was to record and expose issues that out of fear for repercussions 
would hardly be reflected in my other data sets. Therefore, I made detailed accounts 
of many of the political processes and decision-making that flanked projects in 
ECBP. The diary thus includes sensitive observations as well as statements I have 
picked up during the day while navigating between the German and Ethiopian 
managements of the programme. Up until September 2010 I made my records in 
notebooks, which I carried with me all the time. This was less for the reason that I 
could record information during the day, but rather to avoid it being stolen or copied. 
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I neither considered my office nor my home as safe, since small burglaries happened 
in both places. Moreover, due to my housemate’s status within ECBP, our apartment 
and cars were searched a couple of times as well. Between January and July 2010, I 
wrote my notes in Hungarian as a form of encryption. Starting from September 2010, 
however, I transferred the entire research diary to Evernote, a note taking software 
that offered both encryption and password protection for my notes.  
Figure 3.6 – Excerpt of tags used in Evernote for the analysis of research diary entries and related 
information clipped from the web (Source: author) 
 
 In total I created 230 research diary records in Ethiopia (2009-11) and 115 in 
Egypt (2011-14). There were two reasons why the importance of my research diary 
declined in Egypt. On the one hand my direct work environment was less connected 
to the issues raised in my research. On the other hand, the recording of Egyptian 
social media accounts offered better insights into the use and proliferation of ICTs in 
Egypt than recording them into my research diary would have been (Subsection 
3.4.3). Through Evernote I was also able to tag my notes and clippings from social 
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media (Figure 3.6). Moreover, through the steady betterment of Evernote’s 
functionalities, I was able to connect my research diary with social media data as 
well (Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7 – Using Evernote for organising information directly clipped from social media or other web 
sources (Source: author) 
 
 In order to safeguard the anonymity of people mentioned in my research 
diary, I removed all names in the research diary quotes throughout this thesis. 
Names are replaced with an X or Y in all quotes and followed by a brief description 
of their position in brackets. 
 
3.2.2 Media analysis 
The gradually increasing importance of my research diary, and, in particular, the 
recording of highly politicised situations, demanded the better embedding of these 
events.  In order to build context for my observations I started to collect clippings 




 In both countries I attempted to balance accounts from press sources close to 
the government with articles from government critical newspapers. In Ethiopia the 
following newspapers and news sources belong to the former: Ethiopian News 
Agency, Walta Information Center, Addis Zemen. The Ethiopian Herald, Capital, and 
Fortune newspapers are privately owned and provide more critical analysis with 
regard to the social and economic development of the country. However, their 
criticism is limited by the restrictive and often oppressive censure imposed by the 
Ethiopian establishment. The revival as well as official establishment of development 
journalism as journalistic standard by the establishment (Skjerdal 2010) forced 
media outlets into the unequivocal endorsement of the EPRDF’s development 
narrative. The interventionist practice of development journalism force both print and 
electronic media into following the establishment’s agenda-setting. The favouring of 
the governing elite as well as the manifold of fundamental flaws with regard to 
framing democratic practices Ethiopian media outlets amplify the official rhetoric of 
the EPRDF’s developmentalism (Skjerdal and Hallelujah 2009; Skjerdal 2011a). 
Accordingly, for my research newspapers brought forward a condensed version of 
government agendas. The press analysis I did helped me to pinpoint the underlying 
priorities that drove EPRDF’s agenda.  
 
 Unlike in Ethiopia, by the time of my arrival in Egypt the relevance of print 
media declined heavily in the aftermath of the 25th of January uprising (Lynch 2011; 
Iskander 2011). Due to their false reporting during the seventeen days of protests 
that led to the ousting of President Mubarak, Egyptians massively turned away from 
newspapers and adopted new sources of information (Chapter 8). I still followed one 
state-owned newspaper (El Ahram) in order to understand to keep track of official 
endorsements. Nevertheless, more valuable for my research are the new, critical 
online newspapers that appeared between 2011 and 2013 (The Daily News Egypt, 
Madamasr), which I also followed and collected clippings from. 
 
 Additionally, international sources such as The Guardian (UK), Trouw (The 
Netherlands), NRC (The Netherlands), Die Zeit (Germany), Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(Germany) have been also used to complement the information on Ethiopia and 
Egypt. This latter group was particularly important to counter the growing bias 
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towards both countries during my stay. All clippings were tagged in order to facilitate 
the analysis. The same tags were used as for the social media analysis. During the 
data collection period I employed 56 tags. 
 
3.2.3 Social media analysis 
Social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, Ning, LinkedIn), blogs, microblogs (Twitter) 
and augmented reality applications (Foursquare, Geoloqi) provide insights into the 
evolvement of, as well as into the scope of agency of participatory technology 
communities (Hanna et al. 2011). Through the analysis of such online communities 
my particular purpose was to understand the opportunities as well as the limitations 
of individual agency though ICTs. Of particular interests are the terminological 
specifications (insider language) and cross-border networks of these communities. 
These two aspects assisted my analysis with regard to the evolution of participatory 
technology communities, their forms of expression, specific identity-building, as well 
as their global embeddedness.  
 
 





2. Mobile Monday 
Addis 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/221599964543194/ 
3. Addis All Around https://www.facebook.com/groups/addisallaround/ 
4. Barcamp Ethiopia https://www.facebook.com/groups/140783585944111/ 
5. ice-ethiopia https://www.facebook.com/groups/iceethiopia/?ref=group_br
owse_new 
6. Ethio Info Desk https://www.facebook.com/groups/546086215445038/ 
7. ETC sucks https://www.facebook.com/groups/112900380991/ 




 Group name Profile/URL 
1. Harrasmap http://www.harassmap.org 




3. Flat6Labs http://www.flat6labs.com 
4. Injaz Alexandria http://www.injaz-egypt.org 
 Egypreneur https://www.facebook.com/groups/egypreneur/?ref=group_
browse_new 
5. Mobile Monday 
Egypt 
http://www.mobilemondayegypt.net/ 
Table 3.3 – Overview of observed technology communities in Egypt 
 
 I followed and analysed the digital presence of a set of online groups operated 
by technologists in Ethiopia (Table 3.2) and in Egypt (Table 3.3). These groups were 
selected along the following criteria: 
1. Relevance: reflecting the views of local technology communities and their 
experiences, preferably with a focus on ICTs 
2. Size: the number of actors as well as their affiliation is representative for local 
technology communities (e.g. in Facebook based upon the number of 
members, number of Likes; for Twitter on the number of followers or re-
postings/RTs) 
3. Neutrality: it does not promote extreme political or religious views 
 
 Moreover, I followed the blogs of several technologists in Ethiopia (Table 3.4) 
and Egypt (Table 3.5) alike. The blogs provided an excellent access to the 
aspirations as well as specific language of technologists in both countries. From the 
blogs I often received contextual information about the use of specific terminologies 
within these technology communities. By using this knowledge I gained better 
access to the events of these communities as well. Context specific information and 
a good  knowledge of the main actors within these groups helped building trust with 




 Blog Profile/URL 
1. Abel Asrat http://freedombloggersdotcom.wordpress.com/ 
2. Markos Lemma http://eweket.wordpress.com/ 
3. Billene Seyoum http://africanfeminism.com/ 
4. Sarah Suker http://sukersays.com/ 
5. Endalkachew Hailemichael http://endalk.wordpress.com/ 
Table 3.4 – Overview of blogs followed in Ethiopia 
  
 Blog Profile/URL 
1. Egypt Tech Talk http://blogs.msdn.com/b/egtechtalk/ 
2. Tech Egypt http://www.techegypt.com 
3. Sarah Abdelrahman 
(videoblog) 
http://www.youtube.com/sarrahsworld 
4. Sandmonkey (pseudonym) http://www.sandmonkey.org 
5. Zeinobia (pseudonym) http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com/ 
Table 3.5 – Overview of blogs followed in Egypt 
 
 
3.3 Appreciative inquiry 
 
In order to interview my second target group, local technology activists, as noted in 
Section 3.1, I decided to use a more participatory and interactive method. Focus 
group discussions would have been the obvious choice, since they provide for an 
environment, which actively promotes the idea of ownership as well as 
empowerment. However, based on my experience with focus groups in Ethiopia and 
Egypt, the term itself, as well as the underlying methodology have become 
corrupted. They are so widely applied by donor agencies that focus groups are in 
fact trademarks of these agencies. Therefore, using the term might unintentionally 
suggest an affiliation of my research with a development agency and accordingly 
create either expectations (e.g. of financial benefits in the form of per diems) or 
refusal on the part of the participants.  
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 Another reason for avoiding the term was that in my experience, focus group 
discussions are rarely used in a constructive manner (often due to poor co-ordination 
and moderation) and only act as mouthpieces of public discontent. Without willing to 
discredit the validity of such accounts, in my survey I aimed to unearth narratives 
that invest both ICTs and capacity development with new meanings. These 
considerations led me to the decision not to use the term focus group. Nevertheless, 
I tried to find a survey method through which I could access and analyse positive 
meanings around the use of ICTs and capacity development. 
 Unlike in the interviews with high-level stakeholders, my aim here was not to 
acquire a dataset on how ICTs are interpreted as well as used to reinforce top-down 
power relations, but rather to identify opportunities for empowerment and human 
agency through the use of ICTs. The goal was therefore to analyse existing cases 
which successfully promote agency through ICTs, as well as to improve these 
practices. In sharp contrast to my initial idea, which assumed that by deriving the 
success factors of such practices and experiences, a quasi-universally valid model 
could be created, I rather aimed at incremental improvements. 
 For this reason I decided to turn this around and use participatory inquiry 
methods in order to obtain data on how agency is practised in these communities. 
For this mediating step, I chose appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider and Pasmore 
1991; Cooperrider and Whitney 2005) as a method, which allowed me to engage 
with these communities and act on some of their challenges, but in a more reflective 
and less ambitious manner. The two latter aspects were crucial for my sense-making 
process, since I wanted to avoid directly imposing my intellectual models, particularly 
those identified in the conceptual framework, on the participants. The goal was 
rather to find a process of co-production of ideas with these communities and to 
"work toward a solution through a collaborative process, appreciating multiple 
perspectives on issues, learning about strengths, and finding shared values [...]" 
(Stratton-Berkessel 2010, p. 51). The inherent focus on co-production (Figure 3.8) by 
appreciative inquiry was a particularly important aspect in my decision to use this 
method. It also offered a coherent and gradual process to "co-construct what can be 
done to build capacity (practically) and what should be done (morally)" (ibid, p. 32). 
Its emergence is inherently rooted in facets of the postmodern: globalisation and the 
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information revolution, which linked well into my conceptual framework (Lewis et al. 
2008). 
Figure 3.8 – The four principles of appreciative inquiry (Source: www.360facilitated.com) 
 
3.3.1 Participants and sampling 
Appreciative inquiry sessions were specifically designed for technologists (cf. 
Section 3.2.1). Each appreciative inquiry session consisted of at least 8 and at most 
12 participants. Due to the interview method deployed, the number of participants 
had to be an even number (8, 10 or 12). The aim was to reach 12 participants at 
every location, but often fewer people attend workshops than confirm. I had to devise 
a strategy for situations where the number of participants was uneven at the 
beginning of the workshop. Two sessions were conducted at each survey location, 
with at least 16 and at most 24 participants at each location. In the case of 
appreciative inquiry sessions, only one group of participants was targeted, namely 
technologists. However, sometimes government or development agency officials 
participated in the sessions as well.  
 As mentioned, these people often have multiple forms of engagement when it 
comes to ICTs. Many of the ICT bloggers are also members in informal networks for 
the promotion of ICTs in their respective environments. Participants for my survey 
were chosen either through their personal interfaces (e.g. blogs) or through their 
group affiliation (e.g. active member in Mobile Monday Cairo). Initially I considered 
choosing participants through the former; that is, by sampling ICT-blogs at the 
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survey locations. The advantage of this would have been that the selection of 
participants would have relied on statistical facts, such as the Google-rating of their 
blogs or the number of visitors to their blogs. Nevertheless, in the process of doing 
so I realised that such statistics are misleading. For example, high ratings with 
Google have more to do with good SEO (Search Engine Optimisation) than with the 
quality of the content or actual popularity. This, in turn, also impacts upon the 
number of visitors, without reflecting anything about the quality of a certain blog. 
More importantly, not everyone blogs, let alone does it in English. The dependency 
on the availability of a blog, as well as a high Google rating, would have 
automatically restricted my access to the target group. 
 Reaching out to the informal networks also posed challenges, but it certainly 
eliminated the “online presence” bias. By relying on such self-organised, though 
informal, networks, my access to people also took a more participatory form, where 
these networks acted as my local partners. Such networks can facilitate not just the 
sampling process itself, but also much of the logistics related to organising survey 
sessions. From the methodological point of view, even more important was that such 
networks provide for a basic level of trust and familiarity among the participants.  
Trust is key to the success of such sessions and cannot automatically be generated 
when participants are selected individually. To eliminate a lengthy and not 
necessarily representative sampling process and to get around the lack of trust and 
differences in communication codes, I decided to work through the informal 
technology networks in order to create the sample. Key to my work with the networks 
were the contact persons. I conducted the entire participant selection process in 
close co-operation with my contact persons.  
 An important aspect to the co-operation with local, informal networks is the 
way it is framed. Introducing myself and framing my research either around my role 
as a PhD student or that as a GIZ employee might have been misleading. The 
former would have suggested a rigid survey set-up, which could easily have been 
questioned by the networks with whom I was going to co-operate. The latter 
automatically raises expectations, in my experience, in terms of a future co-operation 
with GIZ and/or direct financial benefits (e.g. per diems). Therefore, I decided to opt 
for a strategy which had already proved successful in my professional activities with 
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GIZ. In order to keep expectations low and to create a co-operation on an equal 
footing with local NGOs, I often used my identity as a co-founder of the ice 
(innovation, collaboration, entrepreneurship) network. This network has been funded 
and partially managed by GIZ, but it operates as a networking platform for 
technological innovation in Ethiopia and Egypt.  
 Nevertheless, I am aware of that this practice is questionable from an ethical 
point of view, since it might be seen as misusing a proxy organisation to cover my 
professional or academic identities. However, unintentionally raising participants’ 
expectations and not being able to deliver on these, or creating a “researcher and 
researched” setting are no less problematic in ethical terms. At the time, using an 
identity which made an equal partnership with the local networks possible appeared 
more important. Nevertheless, in the conversations with local partners, my roles at 
GIZ or my research were also openly discussed. 
 Following this approach also gave me the opportunity to frame my survey 
sessions as a co-operation between two grassroots networks. The sessions should 
become part of the official programme of the networks and be marketed accordingly. 
This would also make them transparent to other network members. 
   
3.3.2 The survey instrument 
Both in Ethiopia and Egypt I conducted two appreciative inquiry sessions, amounting 
to a total of six sessions. For the sessions I adapted Stratton-Berkessel's (2010) 
formats for the exploration of ICTs as well as some capacity development issues. 
The usual size of appreciative inquiry groups varied between 14 and 17 participants. 
Since the selection of the participants was conducted through non-formal, grassroots 
communities of practice, the level of familiarity between as well as the organisational 
affiliations of the participants varied greatly.  
 Appreciative inquiry workshops use a four-stage model, also called the 4Ds 
(Discovery, Dream, Design, Destiny), which guide participants through a process of 
collaborative and affirmative sense making and storytelling (Lewis et al. 2008; 
Schensul et al. 1999; Stratton-Berkessel 2010). Participants reflected on their 
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previous experiences, whereby the focus was on positive forms of knowing. This 
created an opportunity to collect and analyse experiences of how people produce 
capacities through the use of ICTs. For the elaboration of key aspects concerning 
the emergence and functioning of agency, appreciative inquiry offers three possible 
prefabricated scripts (collaboration, technology, global interconnection). In my 
workshop design, I merged and weighed these scripts as my research evolved. In 
order to explore different aspects of individuality and agency, I designed an iterative 
process which took participants from the role and value of technology to questions of 
individuality and collaboration, as well as their global embeddedness. People began 
to make sense of complex issues, and together they created new knowledge. 
 Along the 4D cycle, appreciative inquiry sessions also make use of various 
approaches to collect personal experiences as well as produce new perspectives. In 
the discovery phase, I used peer-interviews as a tool to create interaction as well as 
trust among the participants. Furthermore, this strengthened my role as a facilitator, 
rather than an interviewer. In contrast to focus groups, this allowed me also to 
promote and explain to the participants that the process creates value for them, 
instead of just for the researcher, as is often criticised by action researchers (see for 
example (Whitehead and McNiff 2006; Drake and Heath 2011; Costley et al. 2010). 
Later, visual and verbal methods were used to create shared visions for future 
action, as well as to plan activities. 
 Developing a conversational practice stands in the middle, whereby, as Lewis 
et al. (2008, p. 112) suggest, “moments of clarity” are created. The conversational 
practice that evolves helps participants interpret their own stories, as well as those of 
others. For my data collection, these stories provided important insights into how 
technologists view the role of technology in their lives and their own roles in society. 
Stories which evolved from this reflective practice helped me and the participants 
test our hypotheses concerning the value that ICTs create, the role of technological 
thought leaders in their local communities as well as their global connectivity. 
 The appreciative inquiry sessions consisted of four phases, called “Focuses,” 
and were conducted sequentially from Focus 1. to Focus 4. Except for Focus 2, all 
phases consisted of guiding questions for the participants. In total, 18 questions 
were listed on the participants’ worksheet. Each phase focuses on a single issues: 
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Focus 1: Best contribution of ICTs (10 questions), Focus 2: Technology that serves 
(no specific questions), Focus 3: Future possibilities (3 questions), and Focus 4: 
Immediate Enhancements (6 questions). 
 
3.3.3 Conducting the appreciative inquiry sessions 
Each workshop took approximately 2 hours and 45 minutes. I moderated the 
sessions, but also engaged co-moderators for all four sessions. Open-mindedness 
as well as respect for the opinions of others was necessary for the sessions; these 
factors were hard to check for during a phone conversation, and therefore 
recommendations played an important role. The phone conversations also served to 
clarify the availability of the co-moderators during the planned dates, as well as their 
financial expectations. Non-availability or extravagant financial claims were 
automatically an elimination criterion. Only the selected co-moderator was called 
back.  
 Once the co-moderator for the survey location was selected, he/she was 
briefed on the aim of the session as well as the method. The briefing took place by 
telephone or Skype at least a month before the session. Co-moderators received the 
Co-moderator’s Worksheet (Annex 6), the Participants’ Worksheet (Annex 7) via 
email. In order to ensure the most neutral context possible, co-moderators received 
only general points with regard to my survey and were not informed about the exact 
aims or the research questions. I collected some personal data about each 
participant at the end of the session on a separate sheet that was filled in by the 
participants themselves (Annex 8). 
 With respect to the location of the sessions, I aimed to use spaces that were 
also regularly used by the respective tehnologist communities. This strengthened the 
framing as an event of the community, and had the advantage that the location was 
well-known among the participants (Figure 3.9). Besides creating a sense of 
familiarity, this also eased concerns around the logistics of the event (for example, 
no need for tedious descriptions of how to find the location).  
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Figure 3.9 – Conducting an appreciative inquiry session at the ICEADDIS tech hub in Addis Ababa, 
August 2013 (Source: author 2013) 
 
3.3.4 The method in reflection 
Even though I spent a considerable amount of time on developing this methodology, 
the data gathered were not as useful as I had hoped. The main challenge was how 
to weave in the data from the appreciative inquiry sessions into the actual analysis. 
There were two problems. First, the part focusing on the present conditions was 
intended to collect information in a rather positivist fashion. While that part provided 
me with a very detailed account of the ICT usage patterns of technologists in 
Ethiopia and in Egypt, the data merely quantified what I already knew through my 
observations, namely the globally minded, freethinker attitude and practice among 
technologists. Second, the part that focused on the future again reconfirmed that 
technologists are connected way beyond the borders of Ethiopia and Egypt. Their 
identities are complex and formed in online, transnational spaces, that transgresses 
the ardent nationalism present in both Ethiopia and Egypt during my research (cf. 
Chapter 4).  
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 In summary, this method was above all an outcome of my attempt to identify 
practices for ICT capacity development and, in particular, to find participatory 
practices that could enrich the otherwise technocratic, top-down and sometimes out 
of touch instruments of GTZ/GIZ. Nevertheless, the method also had two main 
positive contributions for my research. First, it was widely appreciated by 
participants. They often pointed out that the workshop helped them to understand 
the necessity of looking beyond the status quo around them. I have received several 
invitations after the workshop to design participatory processes with technologists. 
Second, the positive feedback as well as the direct interaction forged new, more 




3.4 Interview, but how? Engaging with key informants. 
 
To interrogate and understand the perspectives of international agencies or 
institutions that promote ICT4D in the recipients' countries, I considered two possible 
methodologies: stakeholder dialogues (focus group discussions) and individual 
interviews. The former would represent a participatory trait, which would have let 
various perspectives, particularly elite and subaltern, converse with each other and 
create separate authorities of knowledge. Conversely, individual interviews provide 
more details about one perspective, while also exploring the interviewee's 
motivations and personal narratives.  
 Bloor et al. (2001) and Elliott (2005) suggest that it is rather premature to 
introduce data acquisition strategies at the beginning of a fieldwork assignment 
which explicitly aim at interrogating a set of different meanings represented through 
a number of various stakeholders. Such dialogue formats have the inherent risk to 
become dominated by those in power and re-establish top-down and centre-outside 
communication strategies (Chambers 2008). These settings only further exacerbate 
existing differences in power as well as reinforce established and officially endorsed 
development paradigms.  
 In some cases (e.g. government representatives and blogger groups), an 
early confrontation between different stakeholders might provoke conflict. This would 
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have a serious negative impact on the trust relationships, which need to be 
established with all stakeholders. Based on my experience with facilitating 
stakeholder dialogues in Ethiopia, I concluded that an early attempt to facilitate a 
multi-stakeholder dialogue would only have a harmful effect on reaching my research 
objectives. 
3.4.1 The survey instrument 
Many publications in the social sciences explore methods pf interviewing and locate 
it in qualitative, quantitative and participatory scholarship (Mayoux 2006, Eliott 2005, 
Schostak 2006, Hollway and Jefferson 2000). As indicated by Schostak (2006), it is 
an appropriate tool to gain insights at the beginning of the fieldwork into how people 
in different positions and with different power status construct their meanings and 
experiences. Seidman (2006, p. 9) for example argues that “the purpose of in-depth 
interviewing is not to get answers to questions, nor to test hypotheses, and not to 
‘evaluate’ as the term is normally used. At the root of in-depth interviewing is an 
interest in understanding the lived experience of other people and the meaning they 
make of that experience”. The analytical purpose of my research – to uncover power 
relations within ICT-driven capacity development as well as to let different 
perspectives on ICT4D converse with each other – is best served when it is built 
upon a catalogue of meaning.  
 Similarly to the catalogue I had built around the mainly academic and donor-
dominated discourse on capacity development, I needed to create a catalogue that 
reproduces locally negotiated meanings of capacity development. To explore 
meaning on the widest possible scale, I chose to conduct semi-structured or guided 
interviews (Simon 2006a; Seidman 2006; Chambers 2008) with my target groups.  
 By using open-ended questions, the goal was to explore the participants’ own 
sense-making processes and to let them reconstruct their experience concerning the 
promotion and the use of ICTs (Seidman 2006). However, as meaning is contextual, 
I was faced with the challenge of how to engage with the participants in their own 
contexts. As Silverman et al. (2004) suggest, a one-off interview approach did not 
allow for rigorous contextualisation of the interviewees' perspectives, but at the same 
time, I had to deal with rather complex logistics as well. Schuman (1982) and 
Seidman (2006), for example, suggest a set of three interviews with each participant, 
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which allows for establishing his or her life history, details of experience and 
reflection on meaning.  
 The same instrument was used for each of the three groups described above 
(cf. Annex 4). The interview contained 31 main questions, focusing on the following 
objects: Part 1: capacity development (9 main questions), Part 2: alignment (5 main 
questions); Part 3: ownership (4 main questions); Part 4: ICTs (5 main questions) 
and Part 5: social media (8 main questions). The interview contained both open-
ended and closed-ended questions, part of the latter with yes/no answers, part of 
them with Likert-scales. After each numbered part, there was opportunity for the 
interviewees to address any additional issues they considered relevant concerning 
the given subjects but not covered by the interview. 
 As participation was voluntary and interviews could be interrupted at any time, 
subjects were not forced into unwanted situations. In addition, the interruption of the 
interview was not followed by any negative discrimination. A sample of the data 
collection sheet used at the end of the interviews is attached in Annex 5. 
 Through the pilot interviews I realised that allowing only 1.5 hours for an 
interview was too optimistic. The complete interviews took at least 2 hours at a 
normal, conversational speed and avoiding a test-like atmosphere, which might have 
stressed the participants. The format of the interview was well suited to note-taking 
during the interview. 
 Additionally, the pilot interview showed that some of the questions, which 
related to the organisational background of the practitioners, were not relevant or 
could not be answered. In some cases, practitioners related back to their 
experiences when working with a development organisation or an institution of a 
recipient government. I deleted questions of this type, decreasing the number of 
questions from 59 to 43 questions in total.  
 In both interviews, definitions (of terms like alignment and ownership), which I 
had planned to use to help orient the participants, were also deleted so as not to 
prompt any possible answers. This left the option open that the participants might be 
unaware of these terms. 
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3.4.2 Conducting the interviews 
Participation in the interview was voluntarily and could be discontinued by the 
interviewed person at any time. Names were not collected and stored. Personal data 
were used only for research purposes. Personal data and the interviews were 
identified by a personal identifier, which was chosen by the interview participants. 
This provided an opportunity for me to collect further information from the 
participants after the interview as well. In case of a discontinuation, the participant 
was asked to indicate his or her reason to discontinue the interview.  
 The reason for collecting the personal data at the end of the interview was so 
as not to provoke opposition from survey participants right at the beginning of the 
interview. According to my experience, asking for personal information might have 
caused dismissive reflexes in certain settings. After the interview, it was more likely 
to get this information due to the fact that the questions were already known to the 
participants. In addition, the positive atmosphere of the interview was often enough 
to reassure them about the safety of their personal data. 
 During the interviews, I took notes. Voice recording, if agreed with the 
respondents, only supported the data collection and helped to verify the statements 
of the participants. I did not exclude anybody from the sample because they did not 
agree to have the interview voice recorded, however, eventually only two participants 
declined (a high-raking public servant in Ethiopia and a junior public servant in 
Egypt). The results would, however, have been even more negatively influenced if 
these interviews had not taken place at all. Personality-related factors (e.g. a 
disposition of being more anxious or suspicious) would have had a less negative 
influence on the results than the loss of critical opinions (which might not have 
wanted to be recorded). Besides the data collection aspect, taking notes was also 
essential for creating a trustful and cooperative interview climate. It signalled to the 
interview participant that I was listening to what he/she was saying and that his/her 
opinion was valuable for my survey. By doing so, I also avoided a test-like 
atmosphere, which could have created stress for the participant and by this bias the 
outcome. Additionally, it also helped me to control the flow and the speed of the 
interview.  
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Considering the host of factors that can potentially influence the selection of 
the appropriate time and place for the interview, I decided to leave the final decision 
to the interviewees. In the end, they were the ones who knew best when and where 
they feel comfortable and at ease. The time and location was thus discussed with the 
participants once I received a positive response to my interview enquiry via email. 
 The security situation in Cairo during 2013 nevertheless severely affected my 
attempts to continue my interviews. Security concerns greately increased the 
logistical difficulties. Particularly during the months of February, March, June and 
July in 2013, when I had to resort to safe interview locations as well as to using 
alternative travel routes.  For example, after the events of 30th of June I wasn’t able 
to reach my interview locations in Downtown Cairo by road, since military 
checkpoints were established and several bridges over the Nile were blocked. In 
order reach Downtown Cairo on several occasions, I chartered a speedboat (Figure 
3.5). This gave my interview days a secretive, almost James-Bond-like touch, since 
the speedboat often dropped me at the safely guarded jetties of the exclusive 
Downtown yacht clubs of the upper class.  
Figure 3.10 – Entering Downtown Cairo on a chartered speedboat to conduct interviews in July 2013 




3.5 Positionality and the evolving ethics of practice 
 
In Chapter 1 (cf. Section 1.4) I have briefly pointed out some of the major difficulties 
that arose from my convoluted positionality on the field. There is a vast body of 
literature on issues of positionality, however, most of these accounts reflect on the 
relationship between the researcher and the researched as an intersubjective 
process (Jackson 2001; Ley and Mountz 2001; Mohammad 2001). Even though 
these accounts informed my data collection, they did not address issues of 
organisational embededdness and inherent biases. Moreover, my positionality was 
not only framed by my institutional embeddednes at GTZ/GIZ, but by the 
considerable pressure I experienced with the Ethiopian establishment. Questions 
about my loyalty towards the EPRDF establishment as well as issues of security 
significantly affected my data collection. Therefore, this section reflects on these 
issues and their consequences with regard to the evolutions of my private and 
professional identities.  
 
3.5.1 Dual roles and the question of positionality 
Since I was employed by GTZ/GIZ throughout my research, I was continually 
confronted with apparent contradictions between theory and practice. Whilst 
developing my conceptual framework, it became clear that this provided a rare 
opportunity to enhance an exchange between theory and practice (Supervisory 
records May 2010). Many of the new perspectives I have come to engage with 
through the academic literature on development have greatly contributed to my 
sense-making process, as well as to my successes (and conflicts) as a junior GIZ 
officer in Ethiopia.  
 Successively, I came to realise that the term ‘exchange’ is insufficient to 
construe the challenging dynamics between notions of theory and experiences of 
practice. Exchange requires two separate identities, of which only one can be 
practised at a time. Practically, this meant that in certain situations, I identified myself 
as a researcher, while in others, I was a practitioner. The uneasiness of making 
choices between multiple roles for insider researchers has been the topic of very 
considerable academic scrutiny (see for example Levin 2012; Lavis 2010; Coghlan 
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and Holian 2007), to which I will return in the following paragraphs. However, early 
attempts to negotiate between my various identities (Ravitch and Wirth 2007) has 
been fragmented and therefore more frustrating than fruitful. In this regard, my 
thinking has been rather bound to a certain polarizing instrumentalism, suggesting 
that ''practical knowledge (such as management or negotiation skills) can only be 
used to improve practice, whereas research [is] aimed at the construction of theory,'' 
implying that it ''is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake'' (Elliot 2004, p. 13).  
 During the process of reflection, I developed questions with the explicit aim to 
overcome my bias: 
1) Why did I fail in negotiating between my different identities until now, and 
how can I improve this? 
2) Have there been any ethical implications of my complex positionality in the 
field and have I consciously engaged with these? 
3) How should I mediate between my different identities (and their political 
dimensions) and the various power relations in which they are embedded, or 
which they traverse or transgress? 
 The following paragraph takes on each of these questions in turn to begin to 
develop my methodological apparatus. First, l discuss the issue of negotiating 
between my roles in theory as well as in practice. This also begins to develop a 
framework in which such negotiation processes can be embedded. I then reflect on 
the ethical implications of moving between a variety of roles, be these in the field or 
between realms of practice and theory. 
 
3.5.2 Negotiating between theory and practice 
Zuber-Skerritt and Perry (2002, p. 171.) point out, ''most students [part-time students 
in full-time employment] find it difficult to distinguish between the collaborative 
project work with their colleagues, and their thesis work which has to constitute their 
individual, original contribution to knowledge in the field''. This dilemma has also 
characterized my research since its beginnings. One possible reason for this could 
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be the fact that the link between the two was initially taken for granted. Since I was 
working in the field of ICT4D in Ethiopia, the linkages between my work and my 
research were insufficiently critically assessed. For example, in the process of 
developing my conceptual framework, I often experienced the relationship between 
my different identities as a tension. Humphrey (2007) suggests that employment 
roles and research roles can be explicitly in conflict. In my case, this meant that as 
an ''employee with operative tasks'' (using the official GIZ term), I sometimes had to 
act contrary to what I had become convinced of through engaging with various 
bodies of development literature. I tried to decrease this tension through a number of 
attempts to ''come out''.  
 There were pointers to two apparent problems in this relationship: first, the 
influence that non-neoliberal development scholarship had on my thinking was in 
conflict with my employer's self-image; and second, while my research informed my 
thinking and initiated reflection, I did not have any opportunity to share or discuss the 
emerging tensions between what I had to do and what I thought was right. 
 Eventually, in retrospect, my research played a crucial role in my institutional 
coming of age. Through my dual roles, I have developed a semi-outsider identity and 
gradually have become an ''irreverent inmate'' (Cooklin 2000). Even though I have 
not reflected on this role in academic terms, I came to nurture this identity within GIZ. 
Admittedly, the fact of being less bounded by GIZ's organisational thinking, has also 
played a great role in the acceptance that I initially enjoyed by the Ethiopian 
government until mid-2010. Moreover, this role negotiation process also helped to 
increase the relevance and impact of ICT4D activities I was responsible for within 
ECBP. Through direct engagement with the various target groups and a continuous 
learning effort by my team, we managed to provide blended learning courses to 
approximately 10,000 Ethiopian students. While the numbers impressed our 
Ethiopian partners, the increased relevance of e-learning to the overall programme 
was widely appreciated in GIZ, too (GIZ annual employee assessment, March 15, 
2011). 
 Problems such as dual roles in organisational settings, role negotiation 
(Ravitch and Wirth 2007) or pre-understanding (Coghlan and Holian 2007) have 
been discussed in various bodies of action research literature, and particularly in the 
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emerging field of Insider Action Research. Brannick and Coghlan (2007, p. 6.) 
suggest that insider action research ''can be seen to involve managing three 
interlocking challenges'', namely that of pre-understanding - the ability to step in and 
out of roles and reflecting on them critically; that of dual roles - role confusion, role 
conflict, and role overload - and that of managing organizational politics. Coghlan 
and Holian (2007) also add the aspect of change to this catalogue and suggest that 
since action research is dynamic and iterative (Coghlan and Holian 2007, p. 6), the 
relation between these aspects will shift over time.  
 Also important for my own reflection process was the understanding that the 
high level of personal involvement and identification goes hand in hand with ''high 
hassle and high vulnerability'' (Buchanan and Boddy 1992, p. 41). Thus, much of 
what I have experienced as hectic over the years was in fact normal for such 
research situations. My non-conscious behaviour (or in hindsight sometimes outright 
cavalier attitude) with regard to my continuous shifting between insider and outsider 
roles has, among other factors, also contributed to eventual conflicts with the 
Ethiopian partner. The fact that the ICT tools, which were introduced to Ethiopian 
universities by our team, spurred extracurricular discussion and collaboration 
crossed into the forbidden territories of the Ethiopian state. At the same time, it was 
increasingly appreciated by GIZ (GIZ annual employee assessment, March 15, 
2011).  
 (Drake and Heath 2011, p. 36) suggest that many ''insider researchers are 
often attracted by three specific methodologies: grounded theory, action research 
and case study''. In my case, it was the other way around. I had been involved in 
non-mediated quasi-action research since the beginning of my research without 
having reflected sufficiently on the ensuing challenges. Some of the symptoms of 
this non-mediated nature of the research (during 2009-2011) were: 
a) The exchange between theory and practice was only unidirectional; I did 
not have a framework for pre-understanding; 
b) The role negotiation was not conscious or mediated, which led to multiple 
role conflicts and eventually role overload; 
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c) The outputs of my research were not a sufficiently integral part of my work 
at GIZ, which made successful organisational politics impossible. 
 Throughout this thesis I will engage with the specific challenges that derived 
from my convoluted positionality. Admittedly, finding the right way to negotiate my 
identity in the turbulent and often hectic everyday life in Ethiopia and Egypt posed 
serious challenges. Nevertheless, my unique access to the diagonally opposite sides 
of the political and social spectrum in both countries allowed me to continuously 




This chapter has outlined the methodological approach applied during my research. 
It has also reflected on the challenges thaht each method posed and highlighted 
some of their benefits and potential disadvantages of each approach. An important 
aspect of my methodology is that it gradually evolved into participatory action 
research, instead of being defined as such from the beginning. In hindsight it would 
have been beneficial to set up the necessary strategies for participatory action 
research from the very beginning. However, I am also aware that I could not foresee 
the opportunities that would arise for contributing to the practice of capacity 
development and ICT4D at the very beginning of my research. Even though the 
difficulties that arose from my promotions and reassignments at GTZ/GIZ during my 
research created momentary confusions and often seemed not surmountable, these 
constantly increased my access to valuable information. As I learned to appreciate 
these new opportunities, I gradually reframed my methodological approach into an 
action research framework. With time, I also developed a better grasp for 
methodologies with which I can positively influence practice as well as impact my 
research setting in Ethiopia and Egypt. The next chapter will describe the research 








Chapter 4 – The research context 
 
 
This Chapter provides an outline of the socio-economic and political context 
pertinent to my research. During the entire course of my research I struggled with the 
question of the comparability of Ethiopia and Egypt: can developments in two 
countries so similar and at the same time so different be compared at all? During my 
empirical work, I often had the impression that I was observing two countries whose 
contemporary socio-econmic and political evolution resembled each other. While 
certain phenomena I was interested in started to arise in Ethiopia, they were already 
in full bloom or had begun to vanish in Egypt. This effect of “similar but different” was 
amplified by the events of 25thJanuary in Egypt and the rising ethnic and political 
tensions in Ethiopia after the death of PM Meles Zenawi (2012). Although it is not my 
objective directly to compare the two countries, this asynchronous development of 
phenomena informed and guided my observations and analysis. 
 
 Historical accounts of contemporary Ethiopia and Egypt are dominated by 
political history. This is particularly true in the case of Ethiopia, where the Derg 
regime’s ideological puritanism left a remarkably dire landscape of simplistic 
historiography embedded into a rigid dialectic of political struggle. The tendency of 
the dominant political discourses to exploit the long existence of both countries – 
whose political proto-identities stretch back to pre-historic times – often produce 
romantic historical narratives. Unfortunately, these blurred timelines and historical 
parallels that travel back to Axumite Ethiopia or Pharaonic Egypt find their ways into 
ethnographic research. While these accounts replicate discourses of fictitious 
legitimacy, they pay little attention to economic forces, socio-economic segregation 
or the emergence and demise of elites.  
 
 This chapter focuses on the evolution of the contemporary political economies 
of Ethiopia and Egypt. It pays special attention to the ways in which contesting 
ideologies such as socialism and transnational capitalism have found their ways into 
policy making. These developments are informative with regard to the production of 
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development narratives and their controversies in these countries. Moreover, these 
histories also inform us about the genesis of the urban upper middle classes that, 
along with the political and donor elites, are at the centre of my research. This 
chapter also provides an introduction to the status of ICTs in Ethiopia and Egypt in 
order to describe the infrastructural frameworks in which issues of techno-politics, 
informational capitalism and dissent through ICTS can be analysed. This introduction 
to the two countries is provided in two separate sections (4.1 and 4.2) that 
summarise the socio-political issues, the rise of urban elites and describe the level of 
ICT penetration. 
 
 Thereafter, I also describe my work settings at the GIZ in Ethiopia and Egypt 
in order to provide a organisational genesis for my thesis (Section 4.3). This will 




In Northern public perception, Ethiopia is still synonymous with acute poverty and 
famine. Despite the country’s economic growth, which has averaged 8% to 10% in 
annual GDP growth since the early 2000s (Hailu 2015), it currently ranks at 174 out 
of 188 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2015) and generally 
suffers from a negative public image. Ethiopia is still frequently associated with the 
series of famines that occurred during the early and mid-1980s (1983-85, cf. Clay 
and Holcomb 1986; Young 2006). This is not to deny that extreme poverty still exists 
in Ethiopia, but rather to point out that recent economic development has changed 
the economic outlooks of the majority of its citizens and has also given birth to an 
upwardly mobile, aspiring middle-class (Subsection 4.1.3). Nevertheless, 
approximately one third of the population still lives below the national poverty line of 
0.60 USD/day (IFAD 2015) and local outbreaks of famine continue to occur. One 
such incident occurred during my field research in Southern Ethiopia in 2011, 
affecting more than 3 million people (Economist 2011; Rice 2011).  
 Contemporary Ethiopia is certainly a country of paradoxes, in which the 
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government attempts to build a balance between its growing economic prosperity 
and political influence in the East African region, and its piecemeal infrastructure and 
social security net. This paradox presents a major challenge to the governing party, 
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which ousted the 
communist Derg regime in 1991, since when it has dominated the political scene and 
established the current political and legislative order.  
 More than 100 different ethnic groups constitute the Ethiopian population. The 
two largest ethnic groups are the Oromo (34.4%) and Amhara (27%) (CSA 2015). 
More than 90 languages and numerous dialects further complicate the country’s 
ethnic diversity. However, the regional distribution of these is unequal. Whereas the 
northern and north-western highland regions are ethnically and linguistically 
homogenous (Amhara, Oromo or Tigray), the southern lowlands are heterogeneous. 
The constitution only recognises Amharic as the official lingua franca of the country; 
however, the federal states are allowed to determine their own working languages.  
Even though the semblance of ethnic sovereignty was established in 1993, inherent 
mechanisms protect the political and economic primacy of the Tigray and Amhara 
ethnicities (Abbink 2009; Hagmann and Abbink 2011). These two ethnicities are the 
governing forces within the EPRDF. The return to a multi-ethnic state after three 
decades of vehement Ethiopianisation under Mengistu, reinstated the century-old 
repression and marginalisation of the Oromo ethnic group, which in fact comprises 
the majority of the country’s population.  
 Recently, besides issues of ethnicity, religion has come to play a role in the 
political identity-building process in Ethiopia. Although the country is often depicted 
as a traditionally Christian (Coptic) country – an image the EPRDF establishment 
attempts to maintain – in recent decades, the country’s Muslim population overtook 
Christians in number and forms a majority (Muslim Population in Africa 2014). At the 
same time, the traditionally animistic tribes in the country’s South turned to various 
Neo-Protestant churches due to intense missionary work since the early 20th century 
(Robert 2000; Bekele 2011). In addition, Neo-Protestant denominations are gaining 
popularity among the aspiring urban middle classes, especially in the capital. The 
constant rise of the Muslim and Neo-Protestant segments of the population 
undermine official accounts with regard to the political legitimacy of the Tigray-
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Amhara and Coptic legitimacy of the EPRDF establishment. That the current Prime 
Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, belongs to a Neo-Protestant denomination is a 




The 1994 constitution championed by the EPRFD introduced ethnic federalism by 
disassembling the centralised Derg state that negated the existence of ethnic 
identities and forced a hollow Ethiopian identity upon the entire society (Levine 1974; 
2011). The armed insurgence that brought the EPRDF to power originated from 
regionally and ethnically defined opposition against the Derg; the party was therefore 
heavily biased against a homogenous Ethiopian identity. Accordingly, the 1994 
constitution reinstalled ethnic self-government and created nine ethnically defined 
states (kililoch) and two major cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) that are granted 
self-governance. However, the ninth federal state, the Southern Nations Nationalities 
and Peoples’ Region, is an exception to the ethnic rule; it is an artificially formed 
container-state for minor ethnicities and tribal groups located outside the highland 
areas. The federal states have the power to raise and spend their own revenues.  
 Ethnic representation is also assured through a bicameral parliament at 
federal level. While the Council of People's Representatives (Yehizbtewekayoch 
Mekir Bet) is elected along party lines, the Council of the Federation (Yefedereshn 
Mekir Bet) assures representation for each officially recognised ethnic group, whose 
representatives are designated by the regional councils. Members of both chambers 
are elected for five-year terms. Even though more than twenty political parties are 
registered with the Ethiopian Electoral Commission, only five of them are 
represented in the Council of People’s Representative. Ethiopian elections are 
regularly wrought with recurring electoral tensions. The controversial parliamentary 
elections in 2005 for example were followed by a massive government crackdown on 
protesters from the opposition in Addis Ababa (Addis Ababa Police Massacre) as 
well as in the regional capital cities. 
 The EPRDF’s course to correct the oppressive tendencies that were inherent 
in the Derg apparatus received much international acclaim as well as denunciation 
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for the EPRDF. While the international community celebrated decentralisation and 
ethnic diversity (Mengisteab 1997), the critics suggested that ethnic governance 
resurrected the centuries-old enmities that have riddled the country’s early modern 
and modern history (Abbink 1995; Aalen 2006). Whereas the constitution grants the 
right of secession to the federal states (Article 39), the EPRDF maintains close 
control over the entire country through its close-knit party and parastatal structures. 
In line with the arguments of the opponents of ethnic governance, Ethiopia has seen 
a return of ethnic segregation (Praeg 2006; Girma 2012; Epple 2014). 
 Critics, such as Young (2006) and Berhe (2009), emphasise that the EPRDF 
maintains the historically rooted supremacy of the Amhara and Tigray ethnicities. 
This is apparent not only in party politics but also on the labour market, which 
favours the Amhara and Tigray nationalities. In order to counteract ethnic 
segregation, the EPRDF launched an extensive nation-building campaign in 2008 
(Aalen 2006; Hagmann and Abbink 2011). A common Ethiopian identity is being 
formed around alleged national symbols such as the Ethiopian flag and historic sites. 
However, these symbols are rooted in and built around the Amhara and Tigray 
heritage (Abbink 1995).  
 Contemporary Ethiopian history books are eager to trace the roots of modern 
Ethiopia to the Amhara and Tigray dominated Ethiopian orthodox highlands. The 
glorification of the Aksumite Kingdom (1st - 10th century), the victory of Adwa (1986) 
and Menelik II’s state building (1889-1913) all celebrate the Amhara-Tigray 
dominance and negate other ethnic histories. However, the country’s economic 
trajectory is central to the EPRDF’s nation building project. The EPRDF requires the 
selfless commitment of every Ethiopian, regardless of their ethnicity or social status, 
to reach the country’s economic goals (Zenawi 2012). 
 
4.1.3 Between command economy and transnationalism 
With a GDP per capita of $1,600 (2014), Ethiopia is among the poorest countries in 
Africa. Numerous factors contribute to the country’s low economic performance: its 
long economic isolation, the legacies of the communist command economy, an 
underdeveloped physical infrastructure and educational system and the low 
productivity and competitiveness of the private sector (GTZ 2008). Its special 
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geographical and political situation as a landlocked country since Eritrea’s 
independence (1993) is further aggravated by its frequent conflicts with neighbours. 
Emperor Haile Selassie’s (1930-74) economic and social reforms were aimed at 
breaking the country’s traditional isolation, but it maintained and strengthened the 
powers of the landed feudal aristocracy.  
 The anti-royalist movement of the 1960s grew out of a very thin bureaucratic 
and military elite that, to varying degree, renounced the apparently feudalistic 
tendencies of the Selassie era. They demanded land and industrial reform. It was a 
small, leftist military group (the Derg) that ousted Selassie and gradually introduced 
radical communist reforms. The Derg regime, while introducing progressive ethnic 
policies that removed the preferential treatment of the Amhara and Tigray tribes that 
was inherent to the modern Ethiopian Kingdom, returned to the economic 
isolationism characteristic of the pre-Selassie times. Even though it maintained 
preferential trading links with Communist allies (Cuba, USSR, GDR), the country was 
economically sealed off even from its East African neighbours. After almost two 
decades of civil conflict between ethnic-based militias, the coalition army of the 
insurgents (EPRDF) ousted the Derg regime in 1991.  
 The EPRDF replaced the Stalinist communist legacy of the Derg by its own 
communist ideology derived from Maoism and Albanian communism (Easterly 
2002a; Dercon et al. 2009). Accordingly, it embarked on an agriculture-led 
industrialisation programme that kept the mechanisms of a command economy intact 
(Kelsall 2011, Oqubay 2015, 2017). The main goal of this policy is to increase 
productivity in the agricultural sector in order to boost agricultural exports (Cramer 
2003; Weis 2014). The intention is that the resultant profits will subsequently be 
invested into industrialisation. However, since more than 90% of the agricultural 
sector is made up of smallholders, its scope for growth is limited. Owing to its 
communist legacy, the EPRDF leadership refuses to commit to reforming land 
ownership in Ethiopia (Chinigò 2015). Currently all land is owned by the state, which 
can be leased on a 90-year tenure. The inability to own land further hampers private 
investment in Ethiopia (Hailu 2015). However, the leasing of large plots of land to 
foreign investors – primarily from the Gulf countries and China – demonstrates the 
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establishment’s willingness to compromise the rights of its political backbone, 
namely small holder farmers (Chinigò 2015; Brautigam et al. 2016). 
Moreover, public investment in the industrial sector prioritises state-owned 
companies or enterprises that belong to the parastatal regional endowment funds 
(Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011). The two most important endowment funds 
(EFFORT and Tiret) are located in the political and economic hinterland of the 
EPRDF, in the Tigray and Amhara Regional States, respectively. Endowment funds 
were accused of participating in the arms trade during and after the armed 
insurgency of the 1980s (Horrocks 2010; Mulugeta 2015).  
 Ethiopia’s economic development efforts were widely recognised 
internationally by the late 2000s. Even though it was considered as a donors’ darling, 
it did not shy away from refusing conditionalities – such as structural adjustment 
policies from the World Bank – that were deemed not to fit with the EPRDF’s own 
intentions (Kelsall 2011). The late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, dominated the 
EPRDF’s economic vision (Weis 2014, Oqubay 2015;). He attempted to strike a 
balance between the communist legacy of the party and the mounting transnational 
capitalist pressure from international organisations. He repeatedly argued against 
the neoliberal global market and advocated for self-guided national economic 
development (Zenawi 2012; De Waal 2013). However, as many analysts have also 
pointed out (Demissie 2008; De Waal 2013), his course has steadily moved towards 
a transnational capitalism over the last decade in order to initiate or sustain 
economic growth. 
 
4.1.4 Economic planning in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia was an early adopter of the International Monetary Fund’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), introducing its first PRSP in 2003/04. The Plan 
for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) was a 
comprehensive instrument to transfer and communicate Ethiopia’s economic reform 
plans both to its own civil servants as well as to international donors. The strategy 
aimed to raise the competitiveness of the Ethiopian economy by enhancing the 
business climate, improving the marketing of agricultural products and promoting 
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private investment. It stipulated a mid-term economic development agenda to which 
all sectors as well as international donors were to subscribe. PASDEP also outlined 
that Ethiopia aspired to attain the MDGs by 2015 as well as to become a middle-
income country by 2025 (Hailu 2015). 
 
 The PASDEP period of economic planning (2005/06–2009/10) was followed 
by the endorsement and implementation of the Growth and Transformation Plan 
(GTP) in 2010. This planning instrument aimed “to sustain [the] rapid and broad-
based growth path witnessed during the past several years and eventually end 
poverty” (GTP 2010, p. 7). In terms of economic growth, it aspired to reach an 
annual GDP growth of 11% in order to balance the rapid population growth. In terms 
of its industrialisation policy, it eventually broke away from the earlier strategy of 
agriculture-led industrialisation and embarked on a visibly more open and neoliberal 
trajectory. By the end of the GTP planning period (2009/10 in Coptic Calendar, 
2015/16 in Gregorian Calendar), the industrial sector was expected to contribute 
27% to the GDP. During the first three years, the sector grew on average at a rate of 
16.7%, but this steep growth already shows signs of slowing down. With the de-
acceleration trend in the industrial sector, the service sector has already overtaken 
agriculture as the main contributor to Ethiopia’s GDP (Hailu 2015). 
 The PASDEP and GTP economic planning cycles reveal the subsequent 
neoliberal turn in the EPRDF’s economic policy making. The policies that achieved 
stability in terms of food security during the 2000s were transformed, step-by-step, 
into a clear orientation towards the global market. At the same time, they preserved 
elements of a command economy approach the EPRDF drew from its communist 
host of instruments. The most apparent of these elements in both policy documents 
was the assignment of growth and export quotas to each industrial sector, which 
were broken down to individual factories (Brautigam et al. 2016; Oqubay 2017). The 
EPRDF, nevertheless, is slowly dismantling its communist heritage and embarking 
on a neoliberal development path exemplified by its quest to embed Ethiopia in the 




4.1.5 The rise of a new urban elite 
The annual population growth rate is 2.89% (Capital 2015), which poses one of the 
major socio-economic challenges for the country. Even though only 19.5% of the 
88.5 million people live in urbanised areas, industrialisation and the emergence of a 
service sector propel urban growth. Lately the capital, Addis Ababa, has become the 
epitome of the economic upswing the country has experienced over the last decade. 
Originally founded by King Menelik II as a military camp (1886), its long-preserved 
social and economic structures have undergone tremendous change. Shack (1973) 
claims that the city’s original military structure facilitated a balanced social order, 
which prevented segregation. The poorer population settled around the military 
compounds of the rich Amhara noblemen. The constant interaction between the 
poorer and richer segments of society safeguarded social security.  
 After the reign of Haile Selassie, the city’s population stagnated in size. It 
barely reached 2 million people when the EPRDF troops gained control of the city on 
28 May 1991. Since the early 1990s, the city has experienced substantial growth and 
has become the symbol of the economic prosperity orchestrated by the EPRDF. The 
growing economic power of the city also intensified migration from the rural areas. 
According to the Ethiopian Statistical Authority, the population of Addis Ababa is 3.4 
million, with an annual growth rate of 3.4% (CSA 2015). Urban planners, however, 
estimate that more than 5 million people live within the city borders (Angélil and 
Hebel 2009; 2010). Many of the people who are unaccounted for live in informal 
areas that are scattered around the city. In an attempt to downplay the growing 
social segregation within the city, the Addis Ababa government fenced in the 
informal areas in 2011.   
 This move by the city government is symbolic of the brewing social and 
economic tensions. The city has invested heavily in urban infrastructure upgrading 
for its middle class citizenry (social housing programmes, public transport), but it has 
only marginally improved the living and working conditions of the poor and partly 
migrant population. There is little academic research on the changing character of 
the Ethiopian urban middle class. In recent years, however, inflation has begun to 
erode the incomes of the bulk of salaried, traditionally white collar and state-
employed middle class (Maula 2014). At the same time a new, financially potent and 
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business-minded niche arose amidst the middle class. The latter increasingly 
redefines the image of the middle class along Western patterns. Private car 
ownership, access to modern housing – heavily subsidised by the state – and a set 
of consumer lifestyle attributes define this new middle class (Beaugé 2013; 
Hailesilasse 2013; Maula 2014). In terms of its size, only estimates exist, but it can 
realistically be put below the 1 million mark. 
 
4.1.6 ICTs in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia ranked 159th out of 166 countries on the ICT Development Index in 2013 
(ITU 2014). Even though between 2003 and 2008, Ethiopia out-performed its African 
counterparts in terms of mobile phone penetration (Geldof 2010), its initial 
continental advantage, faded away as other national mobile phone markets opened 
up for private investment. While mobile subscriptions grew tenfold between 2007 and 
2012, still only a meagre 27.3% of the population use mobile services and those 
cover only 64% of the country (Lishan 2012). Moreover, only 2.9% of the population 
have access to the Internet (2014): fewer than 3 million users in the second most 
populous country in sub-Saharan Africa. The majority, however, access the Internet 
in Internet cafes, since household Internet access remains low, with only 2.3% of the 
households being equipped with a connection to the Internet. 
 
 While the EPRDF establishment has repeatedly emphasised the importance 
of ICTs for its national development strategy, two main factors have impeded the 
efficient delivery of ICT upgrading.  First, the telecommunication monopoly enjoyed 
by the state, which allows only the state-owned Ethiopian Telecom (until 2011 under 
the name Ethiopian Telecommunication Company, ETC) to operate in Ethiopia. 
Second, owing to its socialist legacy, the establishment considered the idea of 
telecommunication services, and in particular Internet access, as a luxury good. 
Accordingly, mobile telephony and Internet prices are among the highest in the world 
and the provision of new technologies remains slow. ADSL, for example was only 
introduced in 2010. Moreover, the Ethiopian Telecommunication Authority as well as 
ETC prioritised the expansion of fixed-line services over mobile telephony.  
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 At the same time, several government-led initiatives created parallel ICT 
infrastructures in order to accelerate the use of ICTs in education and public 
administration. The actual impact of the two vast infrastructural projects, SchoolNet 
and WoredaNet respectively, are hard to assess. SchoolNet’s evaluation, which the 
co-sponsor World Bank conducted in 2010, remains foreclosed from public access. 
There is also little information available about WoredaNet, which connects the 255 
woreda administrations of the country via a satellite web-link. Gagliardone (2014) 
and Beyene et al. (2015) argue that most of the massive infrastructure projects 
served political purposes. There impact on their actual sectors – education, civil 
service, justice system – has been marginal, primarily due to frequent technical 
failure. Until 2010, the Ethiopian Information and Communication Development 
Agency (EICTDA) supervised most of the major ICT infrastructure development 
projects. The agency was then upgraded and became the Ministry of Communication 
and Information Technology (MCIT). 
 The MCIT also inherited the tasks of the Ministry of Information, a powerful 
propaganda ministry led by Debretsion Gebre Michael, a close confidante of the late 
Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. The establishment continues to deploy a strict 
surveillance infrastructure to monitor telecommunication activity (Gagliardone 2011; 
Beyene et al. 2015). Phone tapping and the monitoring of Internet traffic are part of 
everyday normality in Ethiopia. Due to the establishment’s close co-operation with 
China, its companies play an important role in rolling out surveillance infrastructure. 
Even though the main goal of online surveillance is to block foreign content that is 
critical of the EPRDF, recent years have also brought increasing control of local 
online dissent. Symptomatic of this change was the arrest of eight bloggers, known 
as the Zone 9, which received international attention (BBC 2014; Foltyn 2015). 
 Among many reasons due to the establishment’s close monitoring of local 
online content, blogging remains extremely marginal, with there probably being only 
20-25 resident bloggers in 2010. At the same time the use of other social media has 
rapidly grown recently among Ethiopians. Particularly Facebook reached an 
important role among the urban middle class. Currently a little over 900,000 
Ethiopians are registered on Facebook (Internet World Stats 2015); which equates to 




4.2.1 Overview – challenges to stability 
The previous section noted the main factors (religion, population growth, urban 
elites) that pose a challenge to the stability of the EPRDF establishment in Ethiopia. 
The following paragraphs reflect on the similar challenges Egypt has been facing, 
while Subsection 4.2.2 provides a more in-depth genesis of the immanent religious 
conflict that had a major influence on the course of political events during my stay. 
 With 87 million inhabitants, Egypt is the most populous country in the Middle 
East. It ranks 110th out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index (UNDP 
2014). With an annual per-capita income of 6,600 USD (2013), it by outmatches 
Ethiopia by far. Nevertheless, Egypt’s economy has suffered from high 
unemployment and resource consumption over the last two decades. Egypt ranked 
118 of 148 countries in the Global Competitiveness Report 2013/2014 and 108 out of 
142 countries in the Global Innovation Index 2013. Despite its high level of 
industrialisation and a strong service sector, socio-economic indicators merely mirror 
its economic power. About a quarter of the population live below the national poverty 
line and adult literacy is at a meagre 73% (CIA World Factbook 2015).  
 Population growth (1.8% per year) puts considerable pressure on the limited 
resources of the country. 90% of the country’s territory is desert and the only 
inhabitable areas are along the Nile and on the Mediterranean coast (Ask-Aladdin 
2015). The country has experienced rapid urbanisation since the 1970s. Today, 
approximately 43% of its population are city dwellers, with an annual urbanisation 
rate of 1.7% (CIA World Factbook 2015). The three largest cities are Cairo, 
Alexandria and Giza. Only the area of Greater Cairo (comprised of Cairo and Giza 
Governorates) houses more than twenty million people. Population densities of 
almost 2,000 people/sq. km, as well as decaying urban infrastructure, overstrain 
urban centres.  
 Most notably, water supply has become a major issue for which the country is 
heavily reliant on the Nile. While a series of colonial agreements dating back to the 
late 19th and early 20th century safeguard Egypt’s right to the majority of the Nile’s 
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average annual flow, securing the uninterrupted flow of the Nile has repeatedly led to 
disputes with other riparian states, most recently with Ethiopia. Under President 
Mubarak, the Egyptian government successfully disrupted Ethiopian intentions to 
rally international recognition as well as financial support for a hydroelectric dam on 
the Blue Nile (Carlson 2013). Exploiting the recent political turmoil in Egypt, the 
Ethiopian government started the construction of the dam in late 2011. 
 
4.2.2 An economic account – from communism to neoliberalism 
Even though the British Protectorate of Egypt was abolished in 1922, British troops 
remained in the country until 1947 (until 1954 in the Suez Canal area). In 1952, a 
revolutionary group of army officers (the Free Officers) led by Gamal Abdel Nasser 
and Muhammad Naguib overthrew King Farouk and subsequently established the 
Republic of Egypt. Three military officers (Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and 
Hosni Mubarak), who had been groomed within the circles of the Free Officers, ruled 
the country until 2011. Their consecutive presidencies were an experiment in 
modern state economy – it brought dogmatic socialism (Nasser), pragmatic 
capitalism (Sadat) and eventually neoliberal capitalism (Mubarak). 
 Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rule (1956–1970) turned Egypt into the first socialist 
country in the region. He launched an industrialisation campaign and rallied other 
leaders in the region around his notion of Arab socialism. Due to Nasser’s 
industrialisation and social welfare policies, the labour movement still wields 
considerable power in the political sphere. Under Nasser, Egypt became a strong 
ally of the Soviet Union. Anwar Sadat’s rule (1970-1981) brought a major 
reorientation in the country’s economic as well as political aspirations. After the Six 
Day (1967) and the Yom Kippur wars (1973), Egypt re-evaluated its foreign policy 
and oriented itself towards the United States. Since Egypt plays a key role in the 
stability of the North African (Maghreb) and Middle Eastern (Mashreq) regions, it has 
received steady military and economic aid from the United States since the mid-
1970s.  
 Powered by the well-organised labour movement as well as some militant 
student organisations, Sadat’s rule was challenged by leftist dissent (el-Hamalawy 
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2015). Sadat responded with the Open Doors policy (Infitah) that welcomed Western 
investors and encouraged private enterprise. It attempted to break away from the 
Nasserist promise of full employment – that was carried out by overstraining the 
public sector – and aimed to deploy a more plural economic system. While Sadat 
was inspired by free-market liberalism, he also retained certain socialist elements 
(e.g. upholding the state’s ownership of heavy industry). The Infitah, however, mainly 
benefitted a thin, entrepreneurial layer of the Egyptian society, giving way to the rise 
of a new urban middle class. At the same time, it neglected lifting the majority of the 
population out of poverty.  
 President Mubarak’s rule (1981-2011) continued Sadat’s economic 
transformation by further cementing the influence and ownership of the military in the 
country’s economy. He also intensified the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, 
leading to the further influx of Western investors during the 1980s and 1990s. During 
the Mubarak regime, Sadat’s Open Door policy was transformed into neoliberal 
market capitalism (Armbrust 2011; Maher 2011; Roccu 2012). Despite the 
impressive growth figures of the 1990s, the public safety net was demolished and 
the public sector was neglected. Both Sadat and Mubarak aimed at decreasing 
public employment in order to force capitalist structures to develop. Nevertheless, 
due to public dissent that resulted in major strikes starting in the late 1970s, both 
presidents were forced to facilitate the influx of millions of employees into the public 
sector. Eventually, public employment accounted for 30 to 40% of total employment 
between 1980 and 2011 (El-Wassal 2014). By 2011, the costs of public employment 
amounted to 26% of the total government expenditure (with another 30% spent on 
food and fuel subsidies).  
 Under President Mubarak, the Egyptian economy also underwent an 
extensive, IMF-led structural adjustment programme, which aimed at transforming 
Egypt into a liberal market economy and integrating it into global economic networks. 
The successive market liberalisation policies, however, only amplified the effects of 
the Open Door policy (Bromley and Bush 1994). It positively impacted private 
enterprises, but did not alleviate the core problems of un– and underemployment 
(low-wage public sector jobs, informality). Mubarak’s regime subsequently 
emphasised the development of the tourism and ICT sectors in order to create new 
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jobs. While the former added new jobs during the 1990s and 2000s, the latter had 
only limited effects (cf. 4.2.3). Accordingly, the relatively small corporate elite that 
had connections with the upper leadership of the military continued to dominate the 
medium and large enterprises. It held great political sway and was better able to 
safeguard its interests. Mubarak also cemented the military’s influence in the civil 
economy, where the military was and is a major actor, particularly in the 
infrastructure and construction sector. The military also enjoys statutory economic 
privileges (e.g. tax exemption, free access to labour in the form of conscripts) and 
occupies key positions.  
 The 1990s and 2000s were characterised by the increasing fragmentation of 
society along economic and religious fault lines (Singerman and Amar 2006). By the 
early 1990s, a new economic elite crystallised in Egypt’s major cities. Due to its 
Western-oriented lifestyle as well as economic capabilities, this distinct upper middle 
class is often compared to the middle class of Northern societies. In 2011, it 
constituted approximately 10% of the society. Peterson (2011) estimates that 
approximately 4 to 5 million people can afford the consumer lifestyle that is 
celebrated in Cairo’s mall culture (Abaza 2001). This well-off, cosmopolitan class is 
increasingly detached from the reality of the other Egyptians. Symptomatic of its 
detachment is its relocation into the new American-style, gated suburbs that dot the 
desert in the Greater Cairo area (Beverly Hills, Palm Hills, Evergreen or Katameya 
Heights).  
 This urban upper middle class draws massive benefits from the social 
exclusion imposed on the rest of the middle class and the lower class. Through 
family and business ties they became accomplices of the corrupt political elite in 
assisting the transfer of privilege, wealth and political power to businesspeople. Their 
affluent, proto-aristocratic lives perpetually negate, abuse, as well as bizarrely 
tolerate the co-existence of the lower classes. They symbolize a new form of internal 
colonialism – with a touch of cosmopolitan sensibility – that thrives on the newly 
found neoliberal economy of the Mubarak times. 
 
4.2.3 The influence of Islam on Egyptian politics 
The previous subsection outlined the major shifts in economic policy and socio-
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economic priorities since Egypt’s independence from colonial rule. I have also 
pointed to the nexus between the Egyptian military and economic as well as political 
power, which had a major influence on the political events during my stay in Egypt. 
Besides the influence of the military in non-military matters, I need to speak about 
Religious sectarianism had a major influence on the course of events as well as the 
worldviews I encountered during my research. The Open Door policies of Sadat led 
to heavy social fragmentation. However, the severe division between urban middle 
classes provided a breeding ground for religious sectarianism. The revolutionary 
events of 2011-2013 have exposed the extent of religious influence as well as 
fragmentation within Egyptian society. Apart from the flaring up of anti-Coptic 
sentiments in the aftermath of the 25th of January 2011 uprising (Subsection 4.2.4), 
sectarianism among the Muslim population further complicated the political 
landscape.  
 The Egyptian Muslim population (ca. 90% of the entire population) follows the 
Sunni sect of Islam and has traditionally subscribed to rather liberal views 
(Goldschmidt 2008). The co-existence of the Muslim majority and the Coptic minority 
(around 9% of the population) can be described as peaceful for centuries. However, 
Muslim religious organisations have capitalised on the rapid population growth that 
has also resulted in uneven social welfare. Their influence has grown steadily since 
the 1980s. Most important among these organisations is the Society of the Muslim 
Brothers or, in its short form, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Originally founded as a 
religiously inspired, anti-colonial movement in 1928 (cf. Walsh 2003), it was 
suppressed and deemed illegal almost continuously until the 1970s. President Sadat 
released the supreme guide as well as other leading figures of the organisation in 
1978. Sadat’s assassination (1981) was officially linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which resulted in massive anti-Brotherhood campaigns throughout the entire rule of 
President Mubarak. 
 Despite the retaliations, the Muslim Brotherhood successfully continued to 
expand its reach both among the rural population and the urban poor. Campagna 
(1996) points out that the influence of the organisation could not be kept in check by 
force under the Mubarak regime, which made the latter constantly seek and 
negotiate consensus with the Muslim Brotherhood. Even though “the West assumes 
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that debates about the application of Shari'a law and gender control dominate 
Brotherhood politics – and certain populist factions of the Brotherhood do continue to 
obsess about the comportment, morals, and bodies of women and girls” (Singerman 
and Amar 2006, p. 8-9) – the Muslim Brotherhood is practically the first established 
opposition party in contemporary Egyptian history (Avnery 2012). Along with other 
Islamist groups, it began to advocate political party pluralism from the 1990s on, with 
policies that included “the rights of secular parties to exist within a proposed Islamic 
state and full rights of citizenship for Coptic Christians and for women” (ibid, p. 8). 
 
4.2.4 The 25th of January 2011 uprising and its aftermath 
During the two-and-a-half years I worked in Egypt (October 2011 to February 2014), 
I witnessed three presidential and two parliamentary elections, one military coup, two 
civilian and two military governments. To provide a representative yet brief account 
of the political and governance structures in Egypt during this period is almost 
impossible, but it is essential to understand this background to appreciate the 
context of the research and practice environment in which I was working.  
 As shown above, though, the neoliberal Mubarak establishment amplified the 
fragmentation of Egyptian society. It could not effectively handle its main challenge, 
the growing un- and under-employment, particularly among the youth. This led to the 
flaming up of labour conflicts championed by the workers’ unions, the growing 
influence of religious organisations and eventually the creation of new secular 
political movements (Aouragh and Alexander 2011). 
 The first outbursts of the growing social upheaval against the Mubarak regime 
date back to 2005. The kifaya (enough) movement expressed the public discontent 
and the active rejection of the regime’s corrupt, anti-democratic and plutocratic 
practice. This new kind of – mainly urban – claims introduced by kifaya induced a 
public discourse that questioned the legitimacy of a “state run in the interests of an 
elite, state-subsidized ring of Cairo-based capitalists who call themselves liberals or 
globalizers or democratizers because they facilitate foreign investment in the 
economic sphere, even as they insist on repression, the extension of the Emergency 
Law, and police-state practices in the political sphere” (Singerman and Amar 2006, 
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p. 9). The kifaya movement, together with a set of other, minor forms of resistance 
(April 6 Movement, The National Movement for a New Egypt, Egyptians for Free 
Elections), can be seen as the predecessor as well as moderator of the 25th of 
January uprising. 
 The eighteen days of mass protests that started on 25th of January 2011 
unified a broad coalition of Egyptian opposition forces and finally overthrew the 
Mubarak regime. The abdication of President Mubarak (7th February 2011) was 
followed by an intermediary period lasting until the presidential elections. During this 
period, Field Marshall Tantawy’s military government under the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces (SCAF) governed the country. The intermediary period re-
animated and partly further amplified political and religious antagonisms that were 
suppressed during Mubarak’s presidency. The postponement of the elections until 
May 2012 further exacerbated the political conflict and questioned the SCAF’s 
mandate. Due to its role in the violence against protesters, the police force was 
removed from the streets after Mubarak’s fall. The military overtook the protection of 
the public sphere and applied martial law, resulting in a series of tumults that left 
numerous civilians dead (e.g. Maspero Massacre). This further eroded the 
population’s sympathy for the military government and turned it against the military’s 
favourite presidential candidate, Ahmed Shafik.  
 Mohammed Morsi, the candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, became 
the fifth president of Egypt with a low margin and was sworn into office on 30th of 
June 2012. The party is the civilian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. While it could 
rally the support of the poorer segments of the population, it had considerable 
difficulties earning the trust of the affluent urban middle-class. In the beginning of his 
presidency, President Morsi showed signs of a commitment to civil governance and 
to the achievements of the 25th of January uprising. For example, he removed Field 
Marshall Tantawy from his government, where he had held the position of Minister of 
Defence. Even though this move earned him the temporary support of the secular 
citizenry and the unionised workers, the Constitutional Declaration of 22nd November 
2012 was followed by the eruption of anti-Morsi protests. The declaration granted the 
president supra-constitutional powers and was widely regarded as a stepping-stone 
for the "Islamists to hegemonise power in the country" (Charbel 2012, no pagination). 
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 The liberal opposition launched the Tamarod (Rebel) movement in early 2013, 
which vowed to remove President Morsi from office by calling for new elections. It 
claimed to have collected 15 million signatures by June 2013. Even though these 
claims have been contested since the removal of President Morsi, Tamarod 
successfully aligned the fragmented liberal, Nasserist and even Islamist opposition. 
The mass protests organised by Tamarod activists paved the way for the military 
take-over on 3rd July 2013. The military claimed to have intervened on behalf of the 
Egyptian people in removing President Morsi from office. In order to establish control 
over the country, the second military government, under Field Marshall el-Sissi, 
essentially occupied the key sites in Cairo and around the country, and imposed a 
curfew until the end of September 2013. In the presidential election of May 2014, el-
Sissi was elected president of Egypt. His presidency is regarded as the end of the 
intermediary period that started with Mubarak’s abdication and signalled the return to 
a military-led quasi-democratic rule in Egypt. 
 The Muslim Brotherhood called for civil disobedience and rallied against the 
military government. The military eventually forcefully cleared its main protest camp 
at the Raba’a Mosque in Cairo (August 2013), killing more than 600 people. 
 As the above section also demonstrates, the intermediary period between 
2011 and 2014 was permeated with constant political strife. Many of the significant 
events were re-evaluated as political and social change unfolded. Due to the 
frequent changes in political power, most of the terms are biased and reflect only 
one particular perspective on the events. A prominent example of this is the ousting 
of President Morsi. While the Muslim Brotherhood called it a coup, the liberal 
opposition first celebrated these events as the Second Revolution. Later, even 
liberals shifted to denote it as a coup or counter-revolution. 
 This thesis frequently refers to the events that brought down the Mubarak 
regime. For reasons explained above, instead of calling it the “revolution” or the “first 
revolution”, I prefer to adopt Iskander's (2011) term: the 25th of January uprising. The 
legacy of the 25th of January uprising is broadly acknowledged among the Egyptian 
population and is a politically neutral term used to describe the period between the 
first mass protests in Cairo (25/01/2011) and the abdication of President Mubarak 
(07/02/2011). In this thesis, I, however, use the term to denote the entire period from 
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the 25th of January 2011 until the ousting of President Morsi (30/06/2013). Looking 
back at this period of instability between the removal of President Mubarak and 
President Morsi it is clear that it in fact constitutes a single political era of transition, 
volatility and conflict. Multiple political forces – Islamist, liberal, socialist-secular, and 
old elites – attempted to dominate the political and public space in order to cement  
their influence. Therefore when this thesis uses the expression “the 25th of January 
uprising” I refer to this entire period of contestation and political unrest that was 
eventually halted by the military intervention of 30th of June 2013. When I refer to the 
concrete events between 25th of January and 7th of February 2011 the year (2011) is 
added (the 25th of January 2011 uprising). 
 
4.2.5 ICTs in Egypt 
Egypt ranked 89th on the ICT Development Index in 2013 (ITU 2014). While being 
by far the most populous country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
it performed just below the regional average in terms of access to ICTs as well as 
national ICT skills levels (ITU 2014). Although the 25th of January uprising tarnished 
the country’s economic performance as well as its political stability, Internet 
penetration and access to mobile telephony continued to increase. By mid-2014, 
44.5 million Internet users were registered, which accounts for 54.1% of the total 
population. The mobile penetration rate (the number of mobile connections divided 
by the population) reached 120%, with 74% of the population owning mobile phones 
(ITU 2014). 
 Egyptian society as a whole, and particularly the business community, have 
been able to take advantage of the rapid upgrading of the ICT infrastructure since 
the mid-1990s (Ghonim 2012; Howard and Parks 2012). This swift expansion of 
telecommunication infrastructure aimed at fulfilling the government's plans to rapidly 
add new jobs (Sayed and Westrup 2003). The subsequent diffusion of ICTs and 
particularly of access to Internet infrastructure, however, mostly catered primarily to 
the needs of the middle and upper classes (Mehanna 2010).  
Between 1985 and 1995, Egypt invested heavily in ICT infrastructure in order 
“to establish a full-fledged information infrastructure capable of keeping pace with the 
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developments taking place globally” (Kamel 2010, p. 843). In 1999, the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) was established with the goal 
to attract international investment as well as turn Egypt into a global offshoring 
location (Marson and Blodgett 2007; Oshri et al. 2009). These aspirations culminated 
in the establishment of the Smart Village initiative (2001), an ICT park on the 
outskirts of Cairo that is modelled after Indian offshoring locations. It attracted 
international corporations such as Oracle, IBM, Intel and Vodafone. By 2009, the ICT 
market generated around 2.9 billion USD in annual revenue (Kamel 2010). 
In order to bridge the rising disparity between the urban and rural population's 
access to ICTs, Mubarak launched the Egyptian Information Society Initiative (EISI) 
in 2003. Its main aim was  “to help bridge the digital divide and facilitate Egypt's 
evolution into an information society” (Kamel 2010, p. 846). The EISI received 
international praise, but in fact did little to impact the disadvantaged segments of the 
population (McBride and Stahl 2009). At the same time, the growing competition 
between telecommunication providers drove down the costs of access to mobile 
telephony as well as the Internet. This, in turn, allowed access to mobile, particularly 
mobile Internet, for the poorer segments of the society, too. This unparalleled access 
to ICT tools played a key role during the 25th of January uprising. Chapter 8 will 
explore this particular role more in detail.  
 
4.3 From the Blue Building to the Silver Tower 
This section provides a brief description of the two GTZ/GIZ programmes for which I 
worked during my field research in Ethiopia and Egypt. The little over six years that I 
spent in these two countries with GTZ/GIZ intensively shaped both my professional 
and private lives. My attempts to try to come to grips with the institutional complexity 
of German development aid and the Ethiopian state apparatus at the same time 
constantly forced me to re-evaluate questions of power and positionality (cf. Section 
3.5). The socio-temporal metaphors of Blue Building and the Silver Tower, where the 
two programmes were headquartered, aptly describe these struggles. 
 My initial employer, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), was transformed into the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
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Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in 2011. GIZ was established through the 
merger of three German development organisations: the Deutscher 
Entwicklungsdienst (DED), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and the Internationale Weiterbildung and Entwicklung 
(InWEnt). In this thesis, I use GTZ for the period prior to 2011 and GIZ afterwards to 
talk about my employer. When I reference projects that took place during both 
periods, then I use both acronyms (GTZ/GIZ).  
 
4.3.1 The Engineering Capacity Building Programme 
During most of my field research in Ethiopia the country also had one additional 
ministry, the Ministry of Capacity Building (MOCB). It was established in 2005 as a 
supra-ministry that was mandated to intervene in other ministries’ work on behalf of 
the government. The attention given to the founding of MOCB clearly situated 
capacity development within the developmental narrative of the EPRDF party-state. 
The assignment of Tefera Walwa  – a civil-war veteran and a founding member of 
the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF – one of the predecessor organisation 
of the EPRDF]) – as the Minister of Capacity Building also underlined the importance 
of the ministry (Tigabu 2014). Tefera had held several important political positions 
since 1991 – including as mayor of Addis Ababa and as Minister of Defence. Tefera 
was renowned for his “bush fighting” mentality – a reference to his role in the 
insurgency against the Derg regime. After the elections in 2010, the MOCB was 
merged into the Ministry of Civil Service. The new minister, Junedin Sado, a Muslim 
and ethnic Oromo EPRFD cadre, was, however, soon publicly blackmailed for his 
family’s alleged ties to an underground Islamist organisation and fled the country in 
2013. He was shot at the border with Kenya. I worked with both ministers during my 
research and the opportunity to observe their career paths and that of their clientele, 
provided important insights about the arbitrariness and sometimes cruel logics of the 
party-state. 
 
Most of my research was carried out within the domain of the MOCB. The 
Ethiopian Engineering Capacity Building Programme (ECBP) was a development 
programme of the MOCB supported by the GTZ. The main scope of MOCB’s work 
was administrative reform; however, it also managed all major ICT programmes of 
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the government. The Ethiopian Information and Communication Development 
Agency (EICTDA) was also supervised by the MOCB. 
 During my four years in Ethiopia (2008–11), I worked as a GTZ/GIZ employee 
in the Engineering Capacity Building Programme (ECBP). As an Ethiopian-German 
bilateral aid programme, it was established as an exemplary effort to symbolise the 
importance as well as the effectiveness of the Paris Declaration. The programme 
was fully Ethiopian owned and completely aligned with the country’s development 
strategy at the time (PASDEP). The programme was originally scheduled to last 
almost ten years (November 2005 to June 2015) to provide mid-term support to the 
Ethiopian government’s private sector development reform. In order to highlight the 
importance of the programme, the Ministry of Capacity Building was put in charge of 
overseeing it. ECBP was headquartered at the Blue Building, a newly-built high-rise 
in the business district of Addis Ababa. The name of the building quickly became 
synonymous with the programme and was often used interchangeably.  
While the Ethiopian and German partners showed that the programme had an 
enormous impact, its administration was increasingly hampered by management 
conflicts. It was terminated in 2012, three years before the planned end of the 
programme. As a technical co-operation programme, it was also the largest GTZ had 
ever executed on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (BMZ), with an approximate budget of € 13 million per year. The 
Ethiopian government contributed the same amount of funds, however, mainly in 
kind.  
ECBP was originally designed with four major components that operated 
nationwide. In 2006, however, a fifth, cross-cutting component named eCapacity 
Development was added to tackle the implementation of ICTs in the main 
components. I joined this component in 2008 as a junior programme officer. Due to 
the MOCB’s interest in ICTs, the component grew to a team of 15 employees by 
2009. It was responsible for the roll-out of nine e-Learning Competence Centres for 
the Ethiopian universities and for the implementation of business software solutions 
in the private sector. In 2008 and 2009, I mainly coordinated the implementation of 
these two activities. This allowed me unparalleled access to university as well as 
company sites across the country. In 2010, I took over the management of the 
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component (Figure 4.1). Through my new position, I had the opportunity to directly 
work together with decision makers in the MOCB and MOE. This involved regular 
meetings with various secretaries of state and ministers. This unprecedented level of 
access to the inner circles of political power enabled me to reflect more critically on 
the deployment of ICTs in Ethiopia. ECBP was housed at a new office building 
commonly known as the Blue Building in the capital’s Bole district (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.1 – My team at ECBP, 2010 (Source: author 2010) 
 
Nevertheless, it also increased my exposure to the intricate power struggles 
of the EPRDF regime. The scramble for power within the establishment was further 
revealed by the parliamentary elections in 2010. Even though the heightened 
political activity of 2010 and 2011 permitted me to glimpse the capriciousness and 
arbitrariness of power-grabbing within the EPRDF regime, it also rendered my 
workplace an auxiliary operating theatre. The apparent strife within the EPRDF 
structure disabled vital decision-making processes within the partner ministries. 
 In late 2010, I co-founded a business incubator together with my team at 
ECBP, ICEADDIS (innovation, collaboration, entrepreneurship) at the Addis Ababa 
University. ICEADDIS was conceived as a grassroots innovation hub for home-
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grown innovations with a strong social and environmental commitment. Its main aim 
is to create a physical nexus point for students, young academics and young 
entrepreneurs from various technology and business backgrounds to develop 
entrepreneurial and leadership skills as well as turn business ideas into viable start-
up companies. It provides a springboard for youth to become successful in the job 
market, turn their ideas into viable businesses, and easily connect to higher-level 
innovation and incubation networks in the region.  
 By championing technological creativity and social and business ingenuity, 
ICEADDIS enhances the common business incubator approach to develop a more 
entrepreneurial driven and self-sustaining concept using training and ICTs to create 
appropriate, environmentally beneficial and long lasting solutions that fit into the local 
and regional context. 
Figure 4.2 – The Blue Building in Bole, Addis Ababa (Source: GoogleMaps) 
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4.3.2 The Green Jobs Initiative 
In October 2011, GIZ temporarily re-assigned me to the Employment Promotion 
Programme in Cairo, which was headquartered at the Silver Tower (Figure 4.3). The 
transition from the Blue Building to the Silver Tower stands as a metaphor for a 
serious change in my perception of development work and the role of donors. The 
assignment became permanent in January 2012, when I took over the management 
of a new programme, the Green Jobs Initiative (Figure 4.4). This was a relatively 
small programme that was launched as an immediate response to Egypt’s youth 
employment crisis. It aimed at addressing job creation through further training and 
the promotion of self-employment. The objective of the programme was to promote 
the creation of environmentally relevant jobs and development of the corresponding 
qualifications.  
Figure 4.3 – My team at the Green Jobs Initiative in Cairo (Source: author 2012) 
 Even though the project had limited resources (€ 1.5 million for two years), I 
enjoyed more autonomy in designing and executing the activities than previously in 
Ethiopia. While the programme addressed a niche segment of the labour market 
(green jobs), I was encouraged to collaborate closely with the ICT sector in Egypt. 
Through this, I had the opportunity to work with a rather heterogeneous group of 
stakeholders in the Greater Cairo area, Alexandria and Aswan. At the same time, I 
repeatedly worked with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Trade and 
Industries. 
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 One of the main targets of my work in Egypt was to initiate and catalyse the 
creation of two new business innovation hubs. Based on my experience with 
ICEADDIS, I was tasked with creating business hubs in Cairo and in Alexandria. 
ICECAIRO was created in the wake of the post-revolutionary entrepreneurial boom 
in Cairo (Seligson 2011; Torchia 2012; Schroeder 2013) and underwent several 
metamorphoses from being a business incubator to a safe haven for green 
technology activists. In the direct aftermath of the events of the 25th of January 
uprising, I refined the mission of ICECAIRO together with my colleagues step by 
step. It became a pre-incubator that addresses Egypt’s urging societal challenges 
such as energy needs, sustainable manufacturing, technological advancements, 
ecological awareness and affordable housing and living.  
Figure 4.4 – The Silver Tower in Cairo (Source: Mina Ghalim, GIZ 2015) 
The work with the ICECAIRO team has been a tremendous influence on my 
thinking about the inherent mechanisms of arrogance at several donor agencies and 
NGOs alike. Having been in the role of what one could call a mediator between 
donor and recipient, I had the opportunity to reflect on codes of conduct and 
assumed hierarchies at donor agencies. This experience has been particularly 
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informative as a form of self-reflection about how I used to act with beneficiaries. It 
provided a first hand experience into on the one hand how recipients are consistently 
put at the mercy of donor agencies. On the other hand it also illustrated the extent to 
which recipients become vulnerable and defenceless against donor agencies. 
Moreover, it demonstrated that often the resulting subservience is not only a 




This chapter has described those particular socio-economic as well as political 
developments in Ethiopia and Egypt that framed and influenced this research. Some 
of the inherent tensions were also outlined, such as the rise of new, urban elites in 
Ethiopia and Egypt and the capricious and often brutal hegemony of the EPRDF 
regime. The 25th of January uprising was a formative experience for me. This 
research benefitted enormously from the long-term stay – well over 5 years – in 
Ethiopia and Egypt that exposed me to the everyday lives of protagonists from often 
diagonally opposite sides of the political and economic spectrum. The underlying 
diversity and sometimes volatility of complex social, economic and political realities 
not only determined, but equally contributed to my understanding of the capillaries of 
power within the discourse of development. 
 This chapter has set the scene for the subsequent four empirical chapters in 
which the data are analysed through the specific lens of a participatory observer. To 
engage with these set of data also opens a way for me to unclutter the past – in 
which more often than not the tyranny of the urgent characterised my work in these 
countries – and re-consider the importance of various agendas of development. The 
discourses of power that are inherent to both capacity development and ICTs are 
concealed by the very hybridity and multiplicity of everyday moments. The next 
chapter will start with an analysis of the in-the-field implications of the Paris 








Chapter 5 – The in-the-field implications of the 





The Paris Declaration, endorsed in 2005, obliged international donor and recipient 
countries alike to act in accordance with five principles: ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, results and mutual accountability. This landmark agreement stands 
as the political culmination of two decades of aid effectiveness discourse within the 
international aid landscape. Numerous evaluations and reports speak to the OECD’s 
considerable efforts with regard to the issue of aid effectiveness over the recent 
years (Wood et al. 2008; Stern et al. 2008; OECD 2009; Lawson 2009; Clay et al. 
2009; Wood et al. 2011). However, the positive inclination of these documents  
towards compliance with the principles of the Paris Declaration is rather a further 
indication of the self-contained and technocratic nature of many discourses within 
development. These self-referential debates neglect the origins of the aid 
effectiveness discourse. It was deeply rooted in the fundamental critique of the 
negligence and assertiveness of Northern donors seeking to re-legitimise the notion 
of development (Schuurman 1993; Nederveen Pieterse 2009). The discourse of aid 
effectiveness essentially stems from the demand to assess and redefine how 
political power is produced and reproduced within international aid.  
 The need to question the prevailing notion of aid effectiveness as a 
technocratic measure became acutely important to me due to the various conflicts 
between donors and the Ethiopian establishment. Power claiming through this 
international legal framework represented by the Paris Declaration found multiple 
manifestations in my immediate work environment. Assumed or actual acts of abuse 
of the Paris Declaration dominated my entire stay in Ethiopia. As I will show later, the 
Paris Declaration played little to no influence in Egypt. In light of the unfolding 
challenges of implementing the Paris Declaration within the confines of the ECBP, I 
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saw the necessity to unpack some of the questions of power immanent and often 
contradictory to the technocratic intention of the aid effectiveness discourse.  
 In Subsection 2.1.3 I argued that from a historical perspective, the OECD-led 
international political process on aid effectiveness evolved in parallel with the notion 
of capacity development (in the late 1990s to mid-2010s). These two notions co-
existed within the arena of international aid for more than twenty years without 
apparent theoretical linkages. Their parallel evolution was reflected in the 
professional belief system that was propagated in my immediate work environment 
and initiated my research. Even though in Chapter 2, I demonstrated that the two 
notions evolved along separate paths and by doing so are both conceptually and 
politically detached, my empirical work confirms the artificial, albeit locally intelligible 
nature of this argument. The familiarity with the Paris Declaration of my informants in 
Ethiopia is significantly higher (3,7 times) than in Egypt. Table 5.1 shows the 
distribution of the affirmative responses with regard to the Paris Declaration. 
By country Egypt: 18% (4 out 
of 22) 
Ethiopia: 66% (14 
out of 21) 
International: 100% 
(3 out of 3) 
By type of 
organisation 
Donor: 60% (9 out 
of 15) 
Recipient: 45% (5 
out of 11) 
Other: 35% (7 out 
of 20) 
By type of 
position 
Executive: 50% (9 
out of 18) 
Middle: 43% (7 out 
of 16) 
Self-employed: 
41% (5 out of 12) 
Table 5.1 – Familiarity with the Paris Declaration among interview respondents 
 
Besides the higher level of acquaintance with the declaration in Ethiopia on 
the one hand, respondents in Ethiopia are more aware of the declaration than those 
in Egypt. On the other hand, donor representatives are more familiar with the 
Declaration than their counterparts in both the Ethiopian and Egyptian governments. 
Admittedly the political and administrative discontinuity owing to the ongoing political 
turmoil in Egypt might bias my data. Nevertheless, I observed a significant difference 
between the how the Ethiopian and Egyptian establishments employed international 
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agendas of aid. In the case of the latter I noticed a remarkable indifference towards 
such agendas. One possible explanation for this apparent apathy towards 
international aid, as suggested by a high-level donor representative, is the actual 
economic insignificance of some of the donors in emerging countries like Egypt:  
 
Aber auch, wir müssen uns bewusst sein, dass es für den egal ist, was wir 
hier machen. Ich meine, wir bringen 25 Millionen Euro mit. Das ist etwa 
vergleichbar mit dem Jahresprofit aller Kneipen auf Zamalek. (But at the same 
time, we have to be aware that it doesn't matter to them [the Egyptian 
government] what we do here. I mean, we bring 25 million Euro with us. That 
is comparable to the total annual profit of all the pubs in Zamalek [an upscale 
neighbourhood in Cairo]). (EG03) 
The importance attached to the Paris Declaration in Ethiopia, both for the Ethiopian 
state as well as the donors, is confined to the necessity to ideologise development 
within the confines of the Ethiopian developmental state (Altenburg 2010; Zenawi 
2012; De Waal 2013). 
  The following sections unpack two important notions from within the Paris 
Declaration: alignment and ownership. In the OECD’s hierarchy of aid effectiveness 
indicators, these two are at the top. Section 5.2 interrogates the state of alignment 
between donors and recipients in Ethiopia and Egypt. This is followed by a critical 
analysis of the notion of ownership (Section 5.3). By dissecting these two notions, 
this chapter aims to uncover the multitude of interpretations that exist and dominate 





It was the growing criticism towards donors’ propensity to prioritise their own 
development agendas above those of the recipients that led to the codification of 
alignment (Woods 2005; Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). Critics 
of aid argued against the embeddedness of donors in political frameworks that 
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facilitate the superiority of the North and reinstate neo-colonial practices (Crewe and 
Harrison 1998; Greenidge 1997). Since aid organisations are forced to follow the 
funders’ priorities (Easterly 2002b; Natsios 2011), their practices eviscerate and 
weaken the recipients’ capacity for planning and prioritisation (Djankov 2008; Birdsall 
2004; Roodman 2005). The general picture with regard to the perception of 
alignment is rather negative. As the following two accounts also illustrate, 
government and NGO representatives, in particular, complained about the absence 
of alignment: 
Very few of the international donors are successful in that. Very few, but the 
majority are horrible. (EG 10) 
 It [the requirement for alignment] would affect us if we had a donor that
 implemented it. (EG 12) 
 Three main issues arise from my empirical work with regard to the practice of 
alignment: First (5.2.1), the conditionalities that are imposed through alignment with 
local actors; second (5.2.2), the continued burden of overinflated aid bureaucracies 
and their impact on the delivery of aid (Easterly 2002b; Natsios 2011); and finally 
(5.2.3), the emergence of new donors on the horizon of aid landscapes that disrupt 
the traditional logic of conditionalities (Woods 2005, 2008).  
 
5.2.1 From conditionalities to crowding out 
The issue of tied aid is a prominent element of the discourse on aid effectiveness 
(Schraeder et al. 1998; Tingley 2010). As outlined in Chapter 2, one of the main 
intentions of the OECD-led political process was to untie aid from its political and 
economic conditionalities (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Hoeffler and 
Outram 2011). Even though Egyptian respondents were less familiar with the Paris 
Declaration, their concerns about conditionalities encased within the practice of aid 
are remarkably higher and more articulate. This subsection traces possible reasons 
for the omnipresent suspicion that my Egyptian informants entertained with regard to 
donor organisations. The following account from an Egyptian high-level government 
representative reflects the perception that I found among many Egyptians: 
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It depends. You can´t just put them all in one basket, because each 
international donor has their own agenda, their own goals and – I mean – their 
own objectives. [...] I can tell you two things. One thing is that it depends on 
what kind of aid agency. If you are talking about projects funded by the 
European Commission or other EU countries, than the answer should be yes. 
[...] Sometimes donor X [a US-based agency] is, for example, considered as a 
way to pressure the [Egyptian] government to do certain tasks. (EG 02) 
As the above account also shows, Egyptians regularly distinguished between 
European and US-based donor agencies, their suspicion being considerably higher 
towards the latter. This confirms Elagati's (2013, p. 10) findings that “based on the 
geographic origin of the funds”, Egyptians’ perception varies, generally with 
“European funding being the most positive […], followed by Japanese.” Conversely, 
“funding from the United States and the Gulf States” (ibid) has a negative 
connotation. Arab donors were not mentioned or rated at all in any of my encounters. 
The reasons for this might be the careful separation Egyptians, particularly within the 
upper middle class, maintain between their Western, cosmopolitan identities and 
Arab, nationalistic identities (Wynn 2007). 
 Why did Egyptians react more suspiciously towards donors’ intentions than 
Ethiopian informants? Initially, I attributed the prominence of mistrust among my 
Egyptian respondents to a certain tendency towards conspiracy theories in the 
Egyptian socio-political discourse (Aziz 2012; Mustafa 2015). The aftermath of the 
25th of January uprising provided abundant material for the production of conspiracy 
theories that attributed the failure of the political and social transformation beyond 
January 2011 to the influence of foreign forces. Even though some of the 
manifestations of conspiracy theories appeared outright funny to outside observers 
like myself, they were expressions of a “popular xenophobia and paranoia which has 
been used as a political tool by the former president, Hosni Mubarak, the deposed 
president, Mohamad Morsi, and the current army-backed regime” (Urquhart 2013, no 
pagination).  
 However, the type of issues as well as the demographic niche from which the 
responses emerge is indicative of the underlying rationale that spurs mistrust. The 
mistrust against donors is especially high among civil society representatives and 
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among informants with an upper middle class background. This was especially true 
for informants with an upper middle class background. Their fears are rooted in the 
perception that donors undercut prices by providing training either for free or below 
market prices. As shown by Elagati (2013), Egyptian civil society plays a major role 
in filling the gaps in social services left by the government. Due to government 
restrictions on foreign funding (Brownlee 2002; Langohr 2004), however, civil society 
organisations are often semi-private operations that rely on the sales of their 
services:  
NGO X is afraid that we [GIZ] might come in and destroy the market. They 
think that we would provide trainings for free, which would mean that no one 
would  attend their trainings unless they make them free of charge, too. 
(Research diary, 12/06/2012, Cairo) 
 However, this criticism of foreign aid is only prevalent among the young, 
upper middle class NGO representatives. Moreover, it is combined with the 
assumption that a donor presence paves the way for an economic invasion, as also 
referred to by Elagati (2013). The following account from an Egyptian NGO 
representative aptly reflects this perspective:  
Maybe this is how the North is getting into developing countries nowadays, 
you know. They are not getting in directly in the form of companies, but they 
are coming as development agencies and then from there (Laughs). And from 
there they give entrance to other companies or sources. (EG 08) 
Even though the above accounts confirm Elegati’s work, I suggest that the 
aversion against foreign interference – be it in the civil society or the private sector – 
is dominated by a demographic niche, namely that of the charitable segment of the 
upper middle class. Section 4.2.2 dealt with the social seclusion which led to the 
geographical and, accordingly, social separation of a rich upper middle class. Due to 
its history rooted in Sadat’s and Mubarak’s neoliberal economic policies, this 
segment of society has very strong ties to the private sector (Peterson 2011). The 
financial and political privileges enjoyed by this segment re-established the 
suppression and exploitation of the middle and lower classes (Denis 2006).  
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This almost colonial oppression exerted by the upper middle class is in stark 
contrast – however somewhat complementary – with their charitable activities. I 
suggest that the animosity expressed by the young upper middle class citizens 
towards donors intends to defend the charitable territory previously reserved to their 
class. The attempt of this foreign educated, internationally oriented youth – who also 
often bear multiple nationalities – to discredit donors as Eurocentric imperialists 
(Baaz 2005) legitimises their charitable endeavours and protects the economic 
stakes of their families. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that a host of other factors – 
such as their resentment against glass ceiling human resource policies that are 
prevalent among INGOs – may be at play as well, and that for clarification further 
research is necessary.  
 
5.2.2 Aid bureaucracy 
As criticised by Easterly (2002) and Natsios (2011), development agencies often opt 
for fulfilling their donors’ administrative priorities, most notably those that relate to 
spending targets. In order to verify the critique that claims bulging donor 
bureaucracies I collected estimates from my informants working with donors. 
Moreover, I relied on my own experience as a component manager in two different 
GIZ programmes. I found that the average percentage of work time spent on 
organisational bureaucracy among my informants is staggeringly low (27%), 
particularly considering that most of them were in middle or upper management 
positions. This stands in stark contrast with my own experience of the perpetual and 
everyday struggle to abide by the rules and regulations of GTZ/GIZ. In 2010, I 
attended a time management training course especially directed to middle managers 
in donor organisations. During this course I observed the following in my research 
diary: 
Many of us in the course [all representatives of donor agencies] complained 
that they barely have the time to focus on their actual work – finishing 
administrative tasks takes most of the time. Therefore, the quality of the 
capacity development projects – for which we expat technical experts are 
actually responsible – is seriously affected. Personally, I can very well relate to 
this problem – I almost have no time to focus on conceptual work, since the 
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management apparatus requires so much paperwork, so many signatures that I 
have constantly someone standing in front of my desk needing a signature. 
(Research diary, 19/09/2010, Addis Ababa) 
 After the training, I introduced a tracking system that recorded all interruptions 
that were caused by my administrative duties. These were time-stamped and signed 
by those colleagues on whose behalf I had to expedite bureaucratic tasks. The 
resulting data is rather revealing about the inefficiencies and time costs of 
constrained bureaucracies. Even though I decided to stop using the system after a 
month because of complaints from my Ethiopian colleagues, the data from October 
2010 shows that I spent an average of five to six hours per day on administrative 
tasks.  
 Natsios (2011) argues that the international regime of aid effectiveness 
imposes new levels of compliance in aid bureaucracies. As a result of an 
exacerbated politics of accountability, the implementation capacity of aid 
organisations is undermined. Aid effectiveness enables the surge of a counter-
bureaucracy that diverts resources into the monitoring of measurable results. This in 
turns distorts the more risky, ambiguous and not-measurable task of institution 
building and innovation. Experience shows that “work that produces measureable 
outcomes tends to drive out work that produces immeasurable outcomes” (Wilson 
1989, p. 161). The following account from my research diary exemplifies the 
constant dilemma of aid workers who are forced to comply with the fiscal regulations 
of the donor country: 
One participant [a representative of a development agency] was unsure about 
how to develop an implementation structure, including the budgeting and 
training measures for the programme, and asked the participants to develop 
priorities. Then the director of the programme intervened and made clear that 
from the perspective of donor X, it is less of a problem if we don´t reach our 
objectives. However, not spending the money or spending it incorrectly [not 
according the organisation’s rules and regulations] is a culpable mistake. 
(Research diary, 16/12/2012, Cairo)  
 159 
 This account corresponds to Natsios’ observation at USAID that “activities 
with measurable outcomes have, over time, crowded out those activities […] that are 
more difficult to measure” (2010, p. 37). The side effect of aid effectiveness is a 
bureaucratic surge that creates false incentives for donor employees. In essence, 
the resulting incentives distort the very notion of effectiveness and weaken donors’ 
ability to adapt to the recipients’ needs. 
 The internal power struggle I witnessed within ECBP adds further detail to the 
issue of increased bureaucratic load as a result of aid effectiveness. The 
bureaucratic burden within ECBP was born out of the confluence of two different 
administrations: the GTZ/GIZ one and that of the MOCB. Because of MOCB's 
continuous insistence on the rigorous implementation of the alignment clause of the 
Paris Declaration, ministry and GTZ/GIZ officials jointly supervised all administrative 
processes (e.g. recruitment and procurement). On the one hand, this caused serious 
delays in the execution of the programme and was continually highlighted as a 
restrictive practice on the part of GTZ/GIZ. On the other hand, the obvious 
inconsistencies resulting from the non-compatibility of the two systems also allowed 
for malpractices. The following excerpt from my research diary exposes an incident 
where I was put under considerable pressure by high-level MOCB officials to 
expedite their wishes: 
Yesterday evening, I was approached by X, I [my Ethiopian counterpart] and 
Y [the Ethiopian programme director] after working hours at my office. The 
reason for their visit was to ask me to employ four or six consultants whose 
task would be to download illegal eBooks for the eLibrary that is planned for 
Ethiopian universities. Even though I explained that the activity is incompatible 
with GTZ´s policies, they stressed the point that we [GTZ] would be much 
faster at employing these people, since the Ministry's [Ministry of Capacity 
Building] employment processes are way too slow. (Research diary, 
11/03/2010, Addis Ababa)  
This experience of latent extortion – which was partially made possible due to my 
inexperience and young age – stands in stark contrast to other accounts where the 
GTZ/GIZ administration was purposefully blocked by invoking the principle of 
alignment. The following excerpt from an e-mail conversation between the Ethiopian 
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and German directors of ECBP highlights the tensions as well as the skilful 
deployment of the concept of joint management in order to block GTZ internal 
decision making. This was often used by the Ethiopian management to gradually 
extend their jurisdiction into GTZ/GIZ procedures. 
Dear Y [the German director of ECBP] the principles and agreement of 
recruitments any experts not only gtz staffs any other staff for the program 
should jointly agreed and jointly conducted, you know it very well. It should be 
transparent of course […] what we [MOCB] are saying [that] let us involve in 
the process as we did it for many years before. You are violating it 
systematically. […] Therefore let us not repeat mistakes what you and others 
committed before and affected the harmony of the program. Let us follow the 
jointly and transparent way following the above otherwise. By the way this 
applies for international staffs as well as for national staffs. Management 
assistance [assistants] hired in violation of this well established [and] on-going 
systems. If you continue unilaterally the candidate will not join ecbp [ECBP]. 
We [MOCB] are not going to aaccept [accept] and allow her/him to work here.    
(E-mail, 08/07/2010, Addis Ababa). 
 The apparent paradox between these two accounts exemplifies the 
interpretability of the notion of alignment. There is a certain interpretative flexibility in 
the notion of alignment that renders its practice malleable according to the power 
relations between donor and recipient. Moreover, in these specific instances, the 
codification of alignment provided the Ethiopian establishment with a cover of 
legality. 
 
5.2.3 Beyond alignment – emerging donors 
In Chapter 2, I pointed out that certain bodies of literature link the discourse of aid 
effectiveness to the emergence of new donors, particularly that of China, India, Iran 
as well as the Arab States (Woods 2005, 2008). In certain bodies of literature that 
are sympathetic towards the modernist agendas of development, the depiction of 
emerging donors is obsessively negative (Collins 2007; Naim 2007). These accounts 
accuse emerging donors for spreading ‘toxic aid’ that disregards Northern 
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developmental premises, such as liberal governance. Others, recognise the 
opportunities non-DAC donors present, for example by adding new forms of 
resource sharing within the international community or by presenting alternative 
models to economic growth (Manning 2006; Kondoh et al. 2010; Sato et al. 2010)). 
These accounts, understandably, also remain concerned about the implications that 
the non-conformity of the non-DAC donors has on the “soft law that guides the 
DAC's norms and standards” (Kim and Lightfoot 2011, p. 711). However these 
worries, whether the non-DAC donors will abide by the same standards of 
transparency, good governance, environmental sustainability or gender equality as 
their DAC counterparts, still remain within the technocratic confines of Northern, 
liberal notions of development. Other bodies of literature recognise that ”the 'rise' of 
the non-DAC donors and development partners is one of several factors contributing 
to uncertainty and change in contemporary aid governance” (Mawdsley 2012, p. 17). 
This subsection engages with the immanent issues the changing landscape of aid. 
 Through my fieldwork in Ethiopia and Egypt, I gained exposure to the 
presence and practice of emerging donors, particularly that of China (in Ethiopia) 
and various Arab donors (in both Ethiopia and Egypt). I could discern an important 
difference in the perception of Northern donors and Chinese workers by the locals. 
The following excerpt from a discussion during a field trip in Northern Ethiopia 
captures the difference in perception:  
As we drove by a road construction site that was populated by Chinese 
workers, X [my MOCB counterpart] told me about his admiration for them. 
“The Chinese are different – they work with you on the construction site and 
don’t just boss around like Western engineers do.”     
(Research diary, 07/12/2009, Bahir Dar) 
 China’s presence in Africa has been the subject of much scholarly attention 
lately (Brautigam 1992; Wu 2006; Alden et al. 2008; Mohan and Power 2008; Michel 
et al. 2009; Tan-Mullins et al. 2010; Power et al. 2012). There is a rising criticism of 
neo-colonialism against models of international co-operation practiced by China 
(Mohan 2006; Brookes 2007; Michel et al. 2009). However, my counterparts in the 
MOCB and MOE in Ethiopia repeatedly expressed their awe with regard to the 
Chinese contribution to Ethiopian development. While the perception of locals might 
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seem of minor significance, it nevertheless reflects change in terms of international 
co-operation. The inherent power claims of development aid that are wrapped into 
the fabric of humanitarian solidarity are challenged by different ideological 
approaches towards international co-operation. These new forms of co-operation – 
while not being void of power claims – disrupt the logic of alignment. A high-level 
private sector representative in Ethiopia specifically drew my attention to the growing 
gap between Northern and emerging donors' practices: 
The donors haven´t adapted to the change fast enough. The Chinese are 
picking up on these changes much faster. Since donors are part of larger 
governmental bureaucracies of their own countries, they don´t change fast 
enough. (ET 04) 
 The conditionalities of the Northern donors are often rooted in the liberal 
governance ideals of the Enlightenment (Hattori 2003; Mawdsley 2012). The 
mechanisms put in place by new donors, however, question this very logic of liberal 
modernist conditionalities that underlie the dispersion of aid. The flexibility and non-
conditionality introduced by emerging donors disrupts and replaces them with an 
environment of competition and capitalist profit making. The modalities of 
international co-operation propagated by emerging donors divest development from 
its liberal and humanitarian wrapping. Instead, business-like conditions are 
introduced that disrupt the previous systems of conditionalities that rely merely on 
the knowledge and governance approaches within the confines of the developed 
North (Lederach 1997). It constitutes a step away “from modernist ideas premised on 
eventual social convergence, i.e. the underdeveloped world eventually 
approximating the developed” (Duffield 1997, p. 529). 
 The experience of non-liberal conditionalities of international co-operation and 
economic development undermine the purposefulness of Northern donors. The 
reasons to abide by the strict liberal conditionalities are eliminated by the non-
conditional and attentive practices of emerging donors. This, in turn, allows for the 
levering out and eventual reversal of conditionalities. The following account from a 
high-level donor representative illustrates the expanding erosion of liberal aid 
conditionalities: 
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Sie sehen Projekte als schöne Zuckerstückchen an. Sie sagen “Was hast du 
schönes?”, “Was gibst du mir?” […] Sie sehen uns als eine 
Beschaffungseinheit, wo man Geschenke bestellen kann. Wie z. B. fancy 
Macintosh Rechner oder ähnliche Sachen. Wenn du aber fragst wofür sie 
diese brauchen, kommt keine Antwort. (They see us as a procurement office, 
where they can order presents. Like fancy Macintosh computers and so on. If 
you ask them for what they need these, you won´t get an answer.) (EG 03) 
The somewhat placid and apparently jaded practice of recipient governments to 
extend procurement wish lists to the donors as a precondition for co-operation is not 
new.  However, as I experienced several times, the non-fulfilment of these wish lists 
drives the recipients towards cooperating with emerging donors. The latter are willing 
to fulfil these requirements without the necessity for rational arguments and long-
term plans. 
 The rapid rationalization of international co-operation and the disruption of the 
codex of liberal frameworks by the non-liberal world (Richmond 2009) is immediately 
cast into sharp relief by the position that the liberal foundation of aid represents a 
universal blueprint. Much of the criticism against emerging donors, however, masks 
the real challenge confronted by Northern donors in their humanitarian rhetoric. 
Whereas the attributes of transparent aid governance are certainly lacking in, for 
example, the Chinese development practices introduced above, their real danger for 
Northern donors is the gradual petering out the effectiveness of conditionalities to 
pressure or even penalise recipients into fulfilling the Northern, liberal ideas of state 
building propagated through the notion of development aid. Moreover, these 
examples also confirm Furtado and Smith's (2009) observation that recipient 
governments are increasingly well versed in extracting the best possible conditions 
from an increasingly diverse aid portfolio. Hagmann and Abbink (2011) pointed out 
similar tendencies with regard to the Ethiopian establishment by acknowledging their 
successful harvesting of “donor capital, including humanitarian and relief aid” 





As shown in Subsection 2.2.4, ownership as an operational term, similar to capacity 
development itself, has its roots in human-centred, bottom-up development traditions 
and can be traced back to the early 1980s (Smillie 2001). It has, though, been co-
opted by neoliberal institutionalist development practices in the late 1990s 
(Richmond 2009). Its definition and role in the Paris Declaration is framed within this 
neoliberal institutionalist practice. The Paris Declaration defines ownership along the 
criteria that “partners have operational development strategies” or “countries with 
national development strategies (including PRSs [Poverty Reduction Strategies]) ... 
have clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and 
reflected in annual budgets" (cf. Annex 11) 
 The goal of this subsection is to understand the dynamics between donor and 
recipient countries in the process of “creating ownership” (Lopes 2002; Sobhan 
2009). It analyses the implementation of ownership as codified by the Paris 
Declaration as well as divergent notions.  
 Table 5.2 shows that none of my respondents was familiar with the codified 
notion of ownership. The descriptions of ownership can be put into three main 
categories: 
1. Ownership as the practice of leadership by the recipient, 
2. Ownership as a joint management practice between donor and recipient, 
3. Ownership as a form of participation. 
 





5.3.1 Codified ownership 
Zimmermann (2007) has already criticised the ambiguity of the term ownership, 
which many interviewees also confirmed. For example, an Egyptian high-level NGO 
representative explained why he has been avoiding the term in his work:  
 Because different people have different definitions of ownership. (EG 12) 
 The fulfilment of the Paris Declaration is measured against three key 
elements: a) the existence of a national development strategy, b) the 
operationalisation of national strategies, and c) the practice of effective leadership by 
the recipient country. None of my interview respondents referenced the term 
ownership to the existence and implementation of a national development strategy 








Ethiopia      
 donors 0 6 7 5 
 recipients 0 3 2 0 
 NGO/PS 0 3 2 4 
Egypt      
 donors 0 4 3 3 
 recipients 0 2 0 1 
 NGO/PS 0 9 3 9 
Total  0 27 16 22 
Table 5.2 – Distribution of responses with regard to the issue of ownership (NGO: non-governmental 
organisation, PS: private sector) 
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(PRS), not even donor representatives. The definitions given by the latter only 
revolved around the following two aspects: 
1. The recipients are exercising leadership in a development process. 
2. The donor and recipient parties are practicing joint management. 
 These two aspects often overlap, as the following account from a high level 
donor representative in Egypt demonstrates: 
Ownership bedeutet für mich, dass der Partner sagt, das ist mein Prozess, ihr 
macht es mit  mir in dem Rythmus and auf eine Art and Weise, dass ich immer 
sagen kann, ich bin derjenige, der das Steuer in der Hand hält. […] Wir 
fördern also ownership, indem wir jeden Schritt gemeinsam gehen. Die 
operational teams besprechen jeden Schritt gemeinsam, von den Terms of 
References bis zur Auswahl der Consultants. (Ownership for me means that 
the partners tell us that this is my process, you do it with me at a speed and in 
a way that always allow me to say that I am the one who holds the rudder. […] 
We promote ownership by taking each step together. The operational teams 
discuss each step, from the Terms of References to the selection of the 
consultants.) (EG 02) 
 Even though I often encountered similar approaches to ownership among my 
informants as well as in my own practice, I argue that these are not only naïve, but 
also counter to the pronounced intentions of the Paris Declaration. The latent 
condescension and paternalism of such co-operation models reinforce the inherent 
inequalities of power in development. The notion of ownership is thus transformed 
into gestures of repetitive patronisation in which ownership is granted through the 
benevolence of the donor. 
The lack of accounts that abide by the official definition of ownership, both in 
the interviews and in my own experience, suggests a low level of familiarity with the 
actual indicators of the Paris Declaration. Moreover, the tendency among both 
donors and recipients to define ownership as a joint leadership and management 
exercise shows that the codified definition of ownership never replaced its original 
meaning. Its ambiguity, however, allows for abusive practices (see 5.4.2). In the face 
of the complete absence of accounts that correspond to the definition of ownership 
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codified by the Paris Declaration, the following subsection traces potential questions 
about issues of joint management and participatory ownership. 
 
5.3.2 Participation and ownership 
There is a significant difference in the perception of ownership between NGO 
workers and government or donor agency representatives. Whereas the latter two 
define ownership as a technocratic exercise of joint management and leadership, 
NGO representatives perceive it as an emergent quality of co-operation. The 
following account from an Ethiopian NGO representative describes the importance of 
the context as well as the trust generating aspects of participatory ownership: 
First of all ownership is created – it is not given. In the safe haven where 
people come from is where ownership is being created. (ET 06) 
 Similar to Richmond's (2009, p. 328) findings, NGO representatives in my 
study emphasise that ownership is a quality that is actively constructed through the 
stakeholders involved and is “driven by the search for an ‘authentic’ local and its 
many lateral and vertical networks in an everyday context, apparently distant to the 
global, transnational setting.” 
 The issue of participation as an aspect of ownership is particularly strong 
among Egyptian respondents. In Egypt, participatory approaches have carried a 
strong anti-establishment claim since the late 1990s (Abdelrahman 2004). The 
success of the 25th of January uprising confirmed the positive power of participation. 
Through my GIZ assignment in Egypt, I had very close links to representatives of 
civil society. In fact, one reason for my reassignment to Egypt by GIZ was my good 
track record with civil society as well as my fluency in their participatory 
terminologies. However, participation, as I observed, posed a serious challenge to 
Egyptian civil society. 
 However, the question with regard to the limited participatory understanding of 
ownership in Ethiopia remains. I would argue that the lower prevalence of 
participatory approaches among respondents in Ethiopia is a result of what Tronvoll 
(2010) describes as the government’s attempt to appropriate participation for its own 
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developmental state narrative. Participation and joint decision-making were built into 
the government structure. However, the actual intentions of these mechanisms is 
unclear and have also been broadly criticised by Tronvoll (2008) and Abbink (2009). 
My own experience with the participatory exercises in the MOCB confirm the 
superficial nature of Ethiopian government commitment to this process, with the 
intention only being to create the pretence of participation and to rally people behind 
the hegemonic view of the EPRDF. There is too little academic literature that 
attributes such practices not only to donors, but also to recipient governments 
(Birdsall 2004).  
 The so called baseball-cap effect illustrates the co-optation of participation by 
the Ethiopian establishment. My immediate colleagues named this phenomenon 
after the somewhat simple, however strikingly effective practice of the Ethiopian 
government to distribute free baseball caps among participants in political events. 
These caps are usually imprinted with the title of the apparently “participatory” event 
as well as with the Ethiopian coat of arms. The significance of this spectacle lay in 
the salient subservience of hundreds of uniformly baseball-capped people. From the 
point of view of a Northern observer, the proud wearing of such cheap EPRDF 
regalia (e.g. caps and T-shirts with EPRDF logos) evokes the idea of servility. 
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Figure 5.1 – The Rules of Engagement of ECBP with partner instituitions (Original in Annex 12) 
 
Other small-scale participatory exercises were also regularly required by the 
MOCB management to demonstrate dutifulness and allegiance. Especially during 
the 2010 election year, such exercises were spawned. Besides issuing guidelines 
(Rules of Engagement, Figure 5.1) for participatory practice within ECBP, its 
Ethiopian director also regularly summoned the team leaders – including my 
counterpart and me – to question whether the project plans had been thoroughly 
discussed with and agreed in the team. Unfortunately, at that time I was unaware of 
the importance of this political type of “participation” and refused to take it seriously, 
Rules of Engagement of ECBP with partner institutions 
  
1. Social understanding  
• Creating excellent social understanding. Providing different orientation 
programs to ECBP’s staffs and concerned staffs of our partner institutions  
 
2. Joint Plan  
• Prepare joint plan with our partner institutions. Indicate clear division of 
tasks, which is cascaded up to expert level.  
 
3. Joint Implementation  
• Here we need to implement together as one team jointly by going to the 
ground. Based on value chain analysis approach we need to mobilize other 
actors to join hands in realization of the plan.  
 
4. Joint Monitoring & Evaluation  
• Monthly, quarterly ...meetings can be held together with our partner 
institutions based on agreements. The meetings should be base on reports. 
The formats for the reports will be agreed upon. Reporting channels can be 
more than one to respective ministries.  
 
5. Joint Budgeting and Sharing of other Resources  
• Based on agreed up on joint plan and division of responsibility in the plan, 
the division of resources also will be indicated in the plan. This also includes 
office spaces and other infrastructural facilities. 
  
6. Ownership  
• ECBP has to be fully owned and linked to the respective partner institutions.  




which, in hindsight, affected my credibility with the Ethiopian management of the 
programme. An expat NGO worker expressed a similar concern when speaking 
about one of his community initiatives, suggesting that there is a host of problematic 
issues with government-backed participation: 
 Die Nutzer hätten ein Problem, wenn es government gelabeld wäre.
 (The users would have a problem if it [the project] was government labelled.) 
 (ET 12) 
 Due to the political appropriation of the term, in the Ethiopian context, 
participatory approaches were carefully avoided by the private sector and NGOs 
alike. Those not affiliated with the establishment were more reluctant to promote 
their activities as being participatory. The following account by an international 
development practitioner shows the drastic paradox of the notion of ownership being 
co-opted by the nation-building rhetoric of the Ethiopian establishment (Hagmann 
and Abbink 2011): 
In the case of Ethiopia, I think, ownership is [can be defined as] good when it 
is not just a sort of chauvinistic or nationalistic or egoistic interest, but when 
you accept ownership because you feel responsible. (INT 02) 
 One international NGO representative in Ethiopia also described the ways his 
organisation avoided “government ownership”. His organisation regularly 
experienced challenges with its Ethiopian partner, the Ministry of Education (MOE), 
regarding the joint management of their programme. In 2012, knowing that the 
Ministry would not approve of a new initiative at the University of Addis Ababa due to 
fears that it might be a catalyst for a student movement, they decided to circumvent 
the joint planning process and to create the initiative together with seconded expat 
staff at the university. This expatriate NGO worker explained the intentionality of this 
strategy later during an interview: 
Wir haben nicht gewusst, wie der Partner reagiert and haben unter der 
Wahrnehmungsschwelle gearbeitet. Regierungsorganisationen haben wir 
explizit rausgelassen, da es ein recht neues Konzept ist. Es ist manchmal halt 
einfacher, das Projekt zu erkären, wenn es schon da steht, als wenn es es 
noch nicht gibt. [...] Ownership ja, Einmischung nein. (We did not know how 
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the partner would react, and therefore worked below the radar screen. We 
explicitly excluded government bodies because it [what we do] is a relatively 
new concept. It is sometimes just easier to explain the project (to the 
government) when it already exists, then when it doesn't exist yet. [...] Yes to 
ownership, no to interference.) (ET 12)  
 
The above account also illustrates the anti-politics that certain NGOs claim, often on 
moral grounds (Duffield 1997). Since participatory ownership is appropriated by the 
EPRDF, NGOs piece together instruments that resist and sidestep the official polity. 
The development of an anti-politics by NGOs illustrates the falsity of the idealisation 
of NGOs “as disinterested apolitical participants in a field of otherwise implicated 
players” (Fisher 1997, p. 442). The NGOs’ reaction to oppression and appropriation 
undermines the authority of the recipient state. Its strong focus, however, also 
indicates the emergence of novel discourses of aid that argue from a strong value 
system and enable change makers (Nelson 2010). Section 6.3 and 6.4 will further 
explore forms of appropriation by the Ethiopian establishment.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Chapter 2 embedded the Paris Declaration within an international policy framework 
to enhance aid effectiveness. It also suggested that this discourse is a recent 
reiteration of a series of legitimacy crises of the notion of development. The attempt 
to rebuild legitimacy through a set of prominent policy decisions is typical of 
international aid institutions. The elimination of aid conditionalities played a crucial 
part in the discourse of aid effectiveness. The notion of aligning donors’ mandates 
with the recipients’ agendas promoted by the Paris Declaration is celebrated as a 
major step forward with regard to untying aid. While a series of reports endorse the 
success of the Paris Declaration and attribute considerable economic growth to its 
implementation (Stern et al. 2008; Wood et al. 2008; Lawson 2009; Clay et al. 2009; 
OECD 2009; Wood et al. 2011), this chapter has taken a more critical stance. In 
contrast to the above, celebratory accounts of the codification of aid effectiveness 
led by the OECD this chapter illustrated the chasms between policy intentions and 
field practice. 
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 First, it demonstrated that practitioners’ familiarity with the Paris Declaration 
differs significantly between Ethiopia and Egypt. At the same time it also showed that 
the familiarity with the Declaration itself cannot be equated with the accurate 
knowledge of its content. The definitions of alignment and ownership codified in the 
Paris Declaration are practically unknown among practitioners in the field. It exposed 
the irrelevance of technocratic criteria of aid effectiveness. It exhibited the apparent 
incoherence between the intentions of high-level development policy and 
practitioners’ perception. Even though the technocratic criteria for alignment and 
ownership are fulfilled, practitioners’ accounts show the continued existence of 
conditionalities tied to the disbursement of aid. 
 Second, this sober appraisal with regard to alignment illustrated practitioners’ 
scepticism as well as apparent frustration with donor practices. It also confirmed 
Natsios' (2011) view that the rise of a counter-bureaucratic practice – that ensures 
and supervises the implementation of rigid aid effectiveness within donor 
organisations – further exacerbates administrative pressures. Wilson (1989) 
suggests that manipulative practices are therefore on the rise within donor agencies 
in order to counteract the technocratic rigidity that is superimposed by the 
headquarters of these organisations. The continuous imposition of new technocratic 
rules obstructs work in the field offices. The latter are deemed to manipulate and 
circumvent these regulations in order to make meaningful and substantive co-
operation with the recipients. Unfortunately, the analysis of these practices of 
circumvention of rules and internal disobedience within donor agencies would go 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, further research into this issue could 
showcase the adverse effects as well as the often paradoxical nature of the aid 
effectiveness discourse.  
 Third, it also pointed out that aid conditionalities are increasingly under 
pressure through the rise of new donors, particularly that of China. Through the 
relinquishing of conditionalities that are rooted in Northern, liberal ideals, emerging 
donors question contemporary models of development. The increasing crowding out 
of traditional donors by the assumedly distorting practices that exist beyond the 
framework of development aid illustrates the importance of the discourse of aid 
effectiveness. The OECD’s codification of effective aid practices is an important tool 
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to protect the mandate and influence of the traditional against those of the emerging 
donors. It provides an instrument for the former to discount the latter as not effective 
or even outright exploitative. The OECD’s codification of effective aid practices is an 
important tool to protect the inherent claims-making process of traditional against the 
discounted, non-moral conditionalities of the emerging donors.  
 Finally, it outlined the apparent paradox between the technocratic notion of 
ownership and its field practice. The latter revolves around the notion of participation; 
however, as the example of the Ethiopian establishment showed, it might be co-
opted. Due to the Ethiopian establishment’s appropriation of participation as a 
collective but hegemonic practice, Ethiopian respondents refrained from using the 
term participation while describing participative practices.  
 After having explored the issues of alignment and ownership within the 
framework of the Paris Declaration, the next chapter will divert its focus to the theory-










The previous chapter analysed the understanding and effects of the Paris 
Declaration in Ethiopia and Egypt. It exposed the mechanisms with which ownership, 
harmonisation and alignment have been enforced as part of the aid effectiveness 
agenda championed by the OECD. Chapter 2 argued impasse of development 
initiated various attempts to increase the effectiveness of aid (Edgren 2002; Ohno 
and Niiya 2004; Lavergne and Wood 2006; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007; 
Vandemoortele 2011; Booth 2012). The chapter also highlighted that, even though 
notions of capacity development lacked a unified concept during the 1980s, they 
adhered to a fundamentally participatory and bottom-up agenda. Chapter 2 claimed 
that contemporary notions of capacity development, which arose after the impasse, 
lack a rigorous critique. Even though capacity development achieved an almost 
axiomatic role within the discourse of development, its underlying rationale has never 
been subjected to academic scrutiny. It is this apparent lack of academic critique and 
the often wanton use of the term in my immediate work environment that initiated my 
research.  
 In Chapter 2, I quoted Edward Jaycox (Berg 1993), then World Bank Vice-
President for the Africa Region, who vehemently argued for the authenticity of 
capacity development. In 1993, he admitted that: 
We [World Bank] invented the words "capacity building" in that report (The 
Long-term Perspective Study [not identifiable]) in a way that would distinguish 
a new mode of activity, a new way of doing business from what we've been 
doing in the past. I hope that before this capacity building thing becomes a 
totally hackneyed cliche, we in fact do change the way we do business. 
(Jaycox 1993, p. 9)  
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 As pointed out already in Chapter 1, the absence of constructive and critical 
accounts of capacity development allowed for its reshaping into a powerful 
messenger of neoliberal development aid. Creating a critical account of the current 
notion of capacity development is particularly challenging due to the frequent overlap 
of authors in donor (grey) and academic literature. Rather often, the same scholars 
who consulted for donors on the creation of conceptual frameworks for capacity 
development also published in academic journals. Accordingly, the juxtaposition of 
donor literature with academic accounts does not help the critical understanding of 
capacity development. In order to clearly differentiate between scholarly and 
consultancy work in this thesis, the former is cited using the scholars’ name, and the 
latter is referred to through their institutional (donor) affiliation at the time of writing 
(e.g. CIDA 1996). Authors that critically engage with notions of capacity development 
are few (Eade and Ireland 1997; Eade 2007; Eyben 2010) and mostly reflect 
approaches among International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) to 
capacity development (Eade and Ireland 1997; Eade 2007; Blagescu and Young 
2006; Girgis 2007). 
 Neither development practitioners nor academic researchers question the 
notion of capacity development. Attempts to confront its amorphousness (Lusthaus 
et al. 1999) mostly result in admittedly more sophisticated, but also increasingly 
unintelligible and quixotic models. Even though it is presented as a monolithic and 
linear process, it is a political narrative that is fragmented and disjointed; showing a 
delicate power politics on the donors’ side. This political process – similar to the 
theory building of capacity development – gradually moved from re-legitimising 
development and its international institutions to a framework that incorporated civil 
society and emerging donors such as International Non-governmental Organisations 
(INGOs) or the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
 The following sections thus trace the ellipsis of the rise and consecutive 
demise and hollowing out of the notion of capacity development. This chapter aims 
to contribute to the critique of the discourse of capacity development. First, it 
unpacks the theoretical and ideological ingredients of contemporary definitions and 
theories of capacity development (6.2). This exercise is essential in order to remove 
capacity development from its confines of an apparently non-political, but positively 
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connoted terminus technicus. In order to understand practitioners’ familiarity with the 
theories of capacity development, I conflate the insights from the above archaeology 
with accounts of capacity development from the field (6.3). Section 6.4 and 6.5 then 
continue to chart the practice of capacity development by unpacking issues of 
inherent devaluation and mechanisms to claim power. 
 
6.2 The theory-building of capacity development –  
an archaeological account 
Section 2.1.1 explored the origins of capacity development in development studies 
during the 1980s. It demonstrated the participatory disposition of capacity 
development as well as its marginality with regard to the mainstream development 
discourse. The early notions of capacity development originated from theoretical or 
practical acts of protest against hegemonic forms of development (Eade 1997, 2007; 
Eade and Ireland 1997). The roots of the contemporary capacity development 
discourse are in the participatory and human-centred development approaches of 
the 1980s (Eade 1997).  These emphasised the centrality of the development of the 
individual as well as focused on mentorship approaches. It is tightly associated with 
concepts such as friendship work (Girgis 2007) and community empowerment 
(Chino and DeBruyn 2006). However, it also pointed out that beyond the 1980s, the 
evolution of this notion has been deeply interwoven with the crisis of development 
(Schuurman 1993; Nederveen Pieterse 1998; Brinkerhoff 2005). The emulation of 
capacity development by donor organisations entailed an extensive exercise of 
theory-building. By interrogating and dissecting the ideologies enclosed in the 
definitions of capacity development, this section aims to unearth the gradual co-
optation of capacity development by mainstream development. On the use of the 
term archaeology in this thesis cf. Section 2.1. 
 Teskey (2005, p. 4) claims that “capacity building is a rather unusual subject 
in development in that it has no agreed definition, it has no formal academic body of 
knowledge and there are no university courses teaching it.” Definitions of capacity 
development nevertheless emanate an inherently optimistic view of development 
and compete with each other in terms of selflessness and dedication to solving the 
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problems of the global South. However, their vagueness, impracticality and elasticity 
leave their implementation open for interpretation. Lusthaus et al. (1999) claim 
capacity development is a collection of substantialist ideas that only broadly define 
the purpose of development, but fail to back it up with a distinguishable set of 
methodologies. In the early phase of my research, I experienced considerable 
difficulties with regard to reading and understanding these definitions. For a 
practitioner like myself, it was difficult to distil and transfer the plethora of positive 
intentions encased within these definitions into practice. They often left me with two 
questions: How do I do this and how is this relevant for my situation?  
This section is therefore an experiment to demonstrate not only the complex 
notion into which capacity development has evolved, but also how it is ideologically 
entwined within the neoliberal turn in development. By doing so, this section is also a 
first step towards what would probably be called a “Practical Guide to Reading 
Capacity Development Jargon” (cf. Table 6.1). While it certainly cannot be 
comprehensive by the way of the limitations of this thesis, it provides stepping stones 
for further research into the critical understanding and de-politicisation of capacity 
development. This section builds its way through the maze of capacity development 
literature by focusing on definitions of capacity development used by donor 
agencies.  For the sake of recognisability as well as to distinguish them from ordinary 
quotes, examples of such definitions are in text boxes. Moreover, I also underline 
key terminologies in the definitions, which help to identify their conceptual origin, by 
underlining them. For a comprehensive overview of all definitions used for the 
analysis in this section see Annexes 10 and 11. 
 
6.2.1 First phase – the institutionalist models 
Section 2.1.3 outlined the crisis of and subsequent neoliberal turn in development. 
The growing criticism of development aid was diverted into criticism of technical co-
operation. The early champions of capacity development among donor organisations 
were the World Bank (World Bank 1991), CIDA (Morgan and Baser 1993; Baser 
1994; CIDA 1996), JICA (2003, 2004b, 2006) DFID (2006, 2008) and UNDP (Lopes 
2002). The theory-building in these institutions particularly emphasised the 
importance of instigating institutional reform through capacity development. 
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However, the strenuous effort to extend the mandate of this notion beyond single 
institutions is well exemplified by the following quote from a concept note written for 
CIDA:        
  Capacity development as the next 'big wave' in development co-
operation (like basic needs in the 1970s or structural adjustment in the 1980s) 
[...] is centered around institutions, assumes a multi-disciplinary approach and 
has substantial implications for restructuring relationships. [...] While capacity 
development is centred substantially on institutions, the concept itself is 
broader than institutional development. The latter is concerned with the 
performance of individual organizations and their ability to make effective use 
of the human and financial resources available. Capacity development goes 
beyond individual organizations to broader systems, groups of organizations 
or inter-organizational networks. Institutional development can thus be an 
important component of capacity development, but is not the same as 
capacity development itself. (Baser and Bolger 1996, p. 3-4) 
   
The above account demonstrates the delicate mechanisms of co-optation that 
started to reshape the initially participatory notion of capacity development (during 
the 1980s) into an institution building exercise. As shown in Section 2.1.2, the notion 
of capacity development was formed around ideas of bottom-up action in order to 
empower individuals or communities (Honadle 1979; Chambers 1980, 1986; 
Richards 1981; Eade and Ireland 1997; Botes and Van Rensburg 2000; Cannon et 
al. 2003; Girgis 2007). It portrayed institutions as instruments that rather inhibit than 
enable the agency of individuals and/or communities. From the early 1990s, when 
capacity development entered the mainstream development discourse, two key 
theories influenced its conceptual evolution: New Public Management and New 
Institutional Economics (Teskey 2005; Craig and Porter 2006).  
 New Public Management (NPM) gained popularity particularly in OECD 
countries during the 1990s, especially as a measure to strengthen the economic 
compatibility and competitiveness of states (OECD 1996; Horton 2001). The core 
idea of New Public Management was the incorporation of private sector practices 
into public management (Gruening 2001; Lane 2002). Public administration should 
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be modelled after the management of companies in order to eliminate inefficiencies. 
This involved the definition of business processes, value addition and functionalist 
approaches such as the focus on skilled personnel. The recurring use of keywords 
such as process, function, performance, efficiency, institutions, key actors, value 
addition and skilled personnel make the influence of NPM easy to identify. 
Furthermore, these often connote a logic of planning, customer satisfaction as well 
as problem solving.  
Figure 6.1 – Capacity development definition reflecting the influence of New Public Management 
 
The presence of NPM elements in capacity development definitions of the 
1990s implies the subtle shift that moulded capacity development into an 
institutionalist development practice. Furthermore, the economisation of the public 
sector (Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Denhardt and Denhardt 2000) undermined 
participation and community empowerment. Capacity development was transmuted 
into a mechanism that enforced and supervised the imperatives of efficiency and 
productivity (Hood and Peters 2004).   
 The main influence of New Institutional Economics (NIE) was the adoption of 
two notions: institution building and social capital (Teskey 2005; Hameiri 2007; 
Keefer and Knack 2008). The early adopters of capacity development – the World 
Bank, the UNDP, OECD and CIDA (cf. Table 6.1) – further refined the institutionalist 
frameworks by differentiating between organisations and institutions (North 1990, 
2007). Teskey (2005) even argued that “because of the lack of conceptual clarity, the 
term capacity development (or capacity building – some writers even like to argue 
over this distinction) is often used synonymously with institutional development and 
state building.” This demonstrates the strong tendency among donors to frame 
capacity development as an approach to state building (Teskey 2005; Hameiri 2007; 
Hameiri 2009). 
From the conceptual body of New Institutional Economics, the notion of social 
capital influenced the theory-building of capacity development the most (Moore 
1995; Hameiri 2009). A discourse analysis of notions of social capital with regard to 
UNDP defines capacity as the ability to perform functions, solve problems, and 
set and achieve objectives (Lopes 2002, p. 8). 
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capacity development is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is important 
to emphasise that social capital is represented as an institutional practice to 
strengthen governance (Morgan 1998; Lopes 2002) in the capacity development 
literature.  
Figure 6.2 – Capacity development definition reflecting the influence of New Institutional Economics 
The framing of social capital “as morally and ethically neutral, facilitating all 
manner of individual and collective endeavors” (Hunt et al. 2009, p. 17) illustrates the 
adoption of a Colemanian framework (Coleman 1987, 1988). This further underlines 
the neoliberal economic and functionalist interpretation of social capital.  In 
Coleman’s model, it is the role of the individual to derive the benefits of social capital; 
the state is only a provider of a set of norms that create social capital. This 
interpretation furthermore also emphasises and presupposes the existence of basic 
political institutions and the rule of law in the recipient countries (Fukuyama 2002). 
The following excerpt from a UNDP policy document reflects this neoliberal 
economic and political agenda in a concise manner:  
Capacity development thus takes place not just in individuals, but also 
between them, in the institutions and the networks they create – through what 
has been termed the “social capital” that holds societies together and sets the 
terms of these relationships. [...] Communities with high levels of trust and 
strong networks are said to be better off than those without. This is because 
social capital is reflected in better jobs, less disputes and in a more prompt 
response to citizen concerns. (UNDP 2002b, p. 9 and 26 respectively)  
 The integration of New Public Management and New Institutional Economics 
into the notion of capacity development led to its gradual transformation. Its earlier 
emphasis on participation (1980s) as well as its human-centeredness receded and 
gave place to a neoliberal institutionalist instrumentarium. This transformation 
Capacity building is a complex notion – it involves individual and organisational 
learning which builds social capital and trust, develops knowledge, skills and 
attitudes and when successful creates an organisational culture which enables 
organisations to set objectives, achieve results, solve problems and create 
adaptive procedures which enable it to survive in the long term (DFID 2008, p. 3). 
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reiterated the importance of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainable institution 
building. Furthermore, it infused the notion of capacity development with a distinct 
rhetoric of ownership. The sidelining of national institutions constituted a 
considerable part of the critique of development aid (Lethem et al. 1983; Brinkerhoff 
1990; Buyck and Mundial 1991; Berg 1993; Baser 1994).  
 Donors employed capacity development to address this criticism by adding 
the emphasis on country-led approaches (Bossuyt and Laporte 1994; Jerve 2002; 
Goldberg and Bryant 2012; Booth 2012). The reinforcement of country leadership 
became part of capacity development definitions as well. The above exploration 
confirms Phillips' and Ilcan's (2004) claim that during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
capacity development became “a technology of neoliberal governance” (p. 393). It 
extended the borders of neoliberal governance into recipient countries by endorsing 
neoliberal institutional practices (OECD 1996).  
 
6.2.2 Second phase – the theory of change models 
 A new phase of criticism against technical assistance historically demarcates the 
next phase of theory-building from the neoliberal institutionalist era. In the early 
2000s, donors – particularly the World Bank (World Bank 2005, 2006, 2009), the 
UNDP (UNDP 2002a) and DFID (Teskey 2005, DFID 2006) – reanimated earlier 
criticism of technical assistance:  
The rethinking of the development paradigm requires the rethinking of TC 
[technical assistance]. TC has played and continues to play a large role in 
setting global agendas and in the design of both international and national 
development policies. Its substantive content has generally been shaped by 
the Washington Consensus [...]. There is remarkable lack of attention to 
empirical evidence (of what works and why) or to learning from those 
countries that have been successful in developing their economies and 
societies. In short, there is both promise and concern in aid and TC as 
transfer mechanisms and catalysts for development. (Fukuda-Parr 2002, 
p. 34) 
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 However, the renewed self-criticism among donor organisations also targeted 
the institutionalist legacy of capacity development tradition (Lopes 2002; World Bank 
2006; DFID 2006). These accounts criticised these approaches to capacity 
development for being “reductionist in orientation” and “with little attention paid to 
system interrelationships” (DFID 2006, p. 11). A group of donors (DFID, JICA, UNDP 
and World Bank) called for a more comprehensive focus on social change and for 
the adaptation of capacity development frameworks that take the complex nature of 
social change into account (World Bank 2006; JICA 2006).  
 The second phase of theory-building is characterised by the incorporation of 
three key concepts: the rejection of previous expert-planning paradigms, the focus 
on higher level (societal) development impact and the emphasis on the inherent 
dynamism and complexity of systemic change (Taylor and Clarke 2007). 
 Even though the notions of complexity as well as the refusal of technocratic 
planning paradigms existed previously, but it was mainly practiced by international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs). The origins of these notions go back to 
the theory of change (Vogel 2012), which evolved from within the family of 
programme theory approaches. The philosophy of theory of change denies that the 
future evolves in a linear manner and therefore it rejects rigid technocratic planning 
paradigms. Instead it describes desired outcomes in the future as well as a set of 
causal assumptions that link action to the former. Central to these notions were the 
acceptance of the complexity and emergent nature of social change as well as the 
rejection of expert-planning paradigms (Beeson and Davis 2000; Jones 2010). As a 
development practice, it was gradually formalised during the 1990s (James 2011) 
and entered the INGOs’ practice under a set of different terms (programme 
theory/logic/approach, causal pathway/chain/model/map, intervention theory/frame-
work/logic, roadmap for change, pathways mapping). 
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Figure 6.3 – Capacity development definition reflecting the influence of theory of change 
  The existence of a distinct vocabulary makes the identification of the various 
influences of theory of change rather easy. The presence of actionable keywords 
such as unlock, unfold, create, adapt, maintain; as well as the emphasis given to the 
process nature of development or social change reveals the key ideas behind theory 
of change (c.f. Figure 6.3 and 6.4).  
Figure 6.4 – Capacity development definition reflecting the influence of theory of change 
These are standard elements of the idea of emergence that permeate theory 
of change (Beeson and Davis 2000; James 2011). The idea of emergence 
emphasises that social change cannot be planned or determined by indicators 
(Jones 2010). Instead, it is the delicate interplay between various actors and power 
configurations (c.f. Figure 6.5). Theory of change approaches are therefore not only 
methodological aids for development planning, but frameworks that ensure the 
transparent distribution of power (Taplin et al. 2013). Even though Dietvorst (2006) 
and Blokland et al. (2009) claim that those donors that emulated theory of change 
recognised the inherent complexity of power relations within development projects, 
this can’t be justified based on donors’ literature.  
 An extreme manifestation of donors’ acceptance of complexity is EuropeAid’s, 
which acknowledges that “[capacity development] is an intervention affecting the 
lives of people and organisations, for good or bad – or both” (Boesen 2007, p. 4). 
However, the immanent fatalism also confirms Jaycox’s assumption from seventeen 
years earlier (see above) that capacity development is on the way to becoming a 
“hackneyed cliche”.  
Successful CD [capacity development] processes are not linear and do not follow 
a blueprint. They are dynamic processes characterised by constant bargaining 
and strategizing. The more complex the situation, the less it is likely that linear 
planning approaches will work – and most situations are complex (EuropeAid 
2009, p. 23). 
 
 
Capacity development [is] the process by which individuals, groups and 
organizations strengthen their abilities to identify and achieve desired goals over 
time. (Dietvorst 2006, p. 15) 
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Figure 6.5 – Graphical representation of a Theory of Change model for capacity development (EuropAid 
2005, p.7.) 
 The use of the postfix “over time” – used in definitions of e.g. JICA 2004 (c.f. 
Figure 6.6), EuropeAid 2005, LenCD 2007, GIZ/KfW 2011 – also signalises the 
presence of theory of change. Certain bodies of theory of change literature (Beeson 
and Davis 2000; Jones 2010) emphasise the emergent nature of social change. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the literature does not allow a rigorous 
distinction between the systemic and societal levels. Donors’ literature does not 
define the societal level; it is left open for interpretation. It does, however, suggest 
the necessity to extend the impact of capacity development to the entire society, and 
by doing so, it expands its mandate. This absolutistic ambition resembles the 
universalistic aspirations of the entire discourse of development (Kothari and 
Minogue 2001; Kothari 2005; Rist 2009; Escobar 2011). It furthermore shows the 
extent to which the development discourse absorbed and tamed capacity 
development.  
 The adoption of theory of change also led to the development of more 
elaborate models that describe the donors’ partnership environment. Particularly 
DFID and UNDP (Teskey 2005; Wignaraja 2009) championed such models by 
adding a fourth intervention level within capacity development. Whereas 
institutionalist capacity development only considered three levels (the individual, 
organisational and systemic), DFID and UNDP added the societal level. 
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Figure 6.6 – Graphical representation of the time factor in a capacity development model (JICA 2004, p. 
19.) 
 The influence of theory of change is also revealed through the emphasis on 
the precariousness of social change. The understanding that capacity development 
takes place in “highly contested environments, characterised by uncertainty and 
insecurity" (Blokland et al. 2009, p. 2) that require continuous adaptation is almost in 
complete opposition to the technocratic institutionalist practice of the first phase. It 
also situates capacity development within a framework of late modernity that is 
governed by risk (Beck 1997, 2008) and the experience of liquidity (Bauman 2000b).
  
 The adoption of theory of change models by mainstream donor organisations 
underlines their propensity to co-opt progressive notions. This subsection referred to 
the re-appearance of anti-technical co-operation sentiments in the early to mid 
2000s. I argued that, in order to legitimise mainstream development, there was a 
necessity to upgrade the notion of capacity development. However, the question of 
why the explicit use of theory of change models was adopted by mainstream donors 
remains unanswered. Vogel’s (2012) and James’ (2011) research shows that INGOs 
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adapted theory of change during the 1990s in order to increase the effectiveness of 
aid delivery. According to Vogel (2012), the main influence of theory of change on 
INGOs that adopted this approach was fourfold: 
1. It functioned as a “framework from which to assess impact and improve 
monitoring and evaluation, to test the assumptions, demonstrate impact and 
learn from it.” 
2. It is focused on “improving relationships with partners and stakeholders by 
identifying opportunities for dialogue and collaboration.” 
3. It strengthens “the clarity, effectiveness and focus of programmes.”  
4. It provides a “more flexible alternative to working with log-frames for complex 
programmes and contexts” (ibid, p. 11-12). 
Moreover, only a few donors (DFID, EuropeAid, JICA, GTZ, GIZ/KfW, LenCD) 
adopted second phase definitions. Some of them eventually reverted to earlier, 
institutionalist definitions (JICA, GIZ). There is no evidence in the literature that their 
revision and return to institutional definitions was a premeditated decision. Section 
6.4.1 will further unpack the underlying reasons for adopting Phase I. or Phase II. 
definitions and explore the issue using the notion of capacity development to raise 
power claims within the German aid discourse. 
 Cohen (1994) and Lusthaus et al. (1999) criticised the lack of coherence as 
well as clarity of the notion of capacity development. This section traced potential 
reasons that explain the undiminished popularity of capacity development in spite of 
its incoherence. The first phase of theory-building (1990s and early 2000s) within the 
mainstream development discourse cast capacity development into a neoliberal 
institutionalist notion. It addressed two main points of critique with regard to official 
development assistance: On the one hand, it emphasised the importance of local 
institution building as a measure to counter the creation of parallel institutions 
through development programmes; on the other hand, it highlighted that recipient 
countries determine their own development goals (local ownership). The second 
phase of theory-building (mid- to late 2000s), however, introduced elements of 
theory of change. Besides the increased importance of local ownership 
(endogeneity), the acceptance of the complexity and the emergent nature of social 
change enriched the former rigidity of institutionalist approaches. The necessity of 
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the second phase of theory-building arose through the appearance and rise of new 
donors (mainly INGOs) that questioned the effectiveness of mainstream 
development organisations. The adoption of theory of change into mainstream ODA 
organisations can be seen as an attempt to co-opt elements from the practice of the 
competing INGO sector. Despite its distinctive ideological orientation, capacity 
development does not constitute a concise methodology. The extensive theory- 
building process explained above, however, established capacity development as a 



















Nr. Name of 
organisation 
Phase I. Phase II. 
 NPM NIE theory of 
change 
relationalism 
1 IDRC 1995 X    
2 UNICEF 1996 X    
3 CIDA 1996 X    
4 UNDP 1997 X    
5 CIDA 1998  X   
6 World Bank 1998  X   
7 CIDA 2000 X    
8 UNDP 2002a X    
9 UNDP 2002b X    
10 JICA 2004   X X 
11 EuropeAid 2005   X X 
12 World Bank 2005  X   
13 World Bank 2006  X   
14 JICA 2006 X    
15 InWEnt 2006 X    
16 OECD 2006  X   
17 GTZ 2007a X    
18 InWEnt 2007 X    
19 GTZ 2007b    X 
20 LenCD 2007    X 
21 DFID 2008   X  
22 World Bank 2009  X   
23 NEPAD / AU 2009   X X 
24 EuropeAid 2009   X X 
25 GIZ/KfW 2011   X  








6.3 Perspectives from the field 
Building on the insights of 6.2, this section juxtaposes the complex theory of capacity 
development with the reality in the field. The core question it aims to answer is 
whether the theory of capacity development matches its practice in the field. It has 
two main parts, each focusing on one key questions with regard to the observed 
practice of capacity development in Ethiopia and Egypt: 
a. Are practitioners familiar with the theory of capacity development? 
b. Which elements constitute/define capacity development among practitioners? 
The first subsection (6.3.1) uncovers how development practitioners view capacity 
development. The following subsection (6.3.2) briefly engages with the issue of the 
terminological subtlety of capacity development vs capacity building. Subsection 
6.3.3 then dissects practitioners’ notions of capacity development and integrates 
these with the insights from Section 6.2.  
 
6.3.1 Theory in practice – a test among practitioners 
This subsection compares the complex rhetoric of capacity development literature 
with the field realities in Ethiopia and Egypt. This is done in two stages. First, it 
assesses how practitioners define capacity development. Then the elements of 
these definitions and descriptions are analysed. In the interviews, I explicitly asked 
my interview partners to define capacity development in their own words. The 
rationale behind this question was twofold: first of all, I wanted to explore whether 
development practitioners can define a notion that is an essential part of their daily 
work. Particularly, since in my immediate work environment I observed a serious lack 
of knowledge about capacity development. This made me strongly suspicious about 
the coherence and integrity of capacity development practice. Secondly, I wanted to 
test whether their understanding matches the complex theory of capacity 
development. 
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 Contrary to my expectation, the first interviews already suggested that the 
ability to define capacity development is not self-evident. For my first analysis of 
these responses, I established two conditions that had to be fulfilled in order to 
consider an answer as a definition of capacity development:  
1. It reflects complexity – it describes a complex developmental effort that 
encompasses multiple social and/or organisational levels; 
2. It is concise – the answer is short and precise (2-3 sentences maximum) in 
order to eliminate long answers. 
According to my original reasoning, those answers that abide by both criteria 
demonstrate the interviewee’s familiarity with mainstream theories of capacity 
development. These parameters also helped to eliminate concise, but fragmented 
answers such as: 
Capacity development is that you get training. (ET 13) 





N.et = 21  
Egypt 
N.eg = 22 
International 
N.int = 7 
Definition 
 
2 1 1 
Description 19 21 6 
Table 6.3 – Interviewees' ability to define or describe capacity development (N=50) 
 
Table 6.2 shows that only four out of 50 interviewees were able to produce a 
definition of capacity development. The low number of definitions is particularly 
significant in the light of the fact that all definitions originated from GIZ employees at 
the senior management level. Moreover, these definitions closely match GIZ’s own 
definition. This is indicative of the importance capacity development played within 
Table 6.2 Donors' definitions of capacity development according to their conceptual origin 
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GIZ. It testifies to the familiarity with capacity development theories that was required 
at higher management levels within GIZ. Moreover, it also underlines that GTZ/GIZ 
not only joined the capacity development discussion late (6.2), but that at the time of 
my research it was more central to its operations than to other donor organisations’. 
This necessarily influenced my understanding of capacity development and 
potentially biased my early frameworks with regard to the importance of this notion. 
Section 6.4.2 will further draw out this idea in order to identify the potential rationale 
behind the apparent prominence of capacity development at GIZ. 
 The insights from my archaeology of contemporary notions of capacity 
development (6.2) would suggest that the definitions of capacity development vary 
according to organisational affiliation. However, the institutional background of the 
respondents proved to be irrelevant. The majority of the respondents (42 out of 50, 
84%) did not define capacity development, but described it through a set of 
attributes. A common trait of these attributes is their exclusive focus on the individual 
level. As the following accounts from Ethiopia and Egypt suggest, practitioners omit 
the institutional or systemic levels:  
 [Capacity development] ist die Steigerung persöhnlicher Fähigkeiten. 
Vorhandene Kompetenzen nutzbar zu machen. (Capacity development is the 
enhancement of personal abilities. To make use of existing competences.) 
(ET 09) 
Giving people the tools to build their own capacity to allow them to reach their 
potential and to grow. (EG01) 
Each person has his capacity of skills or space of skills, which they can use in 
every part of their lives. When you get to develop these capacities or build on 
these capacities is when you do capacity building. Sometimes you need to do 
it as a formal training, sometime in other forms, meet new people for example. 
(EG02) 
 The prevalence of the individual as the ultimate focus of capacity 
development measures questions the need for the elaborate theories analysed in 
Section 6.2. The zooming in on the individual level is indicative of the capacity 
development notions of the 1980s (cf. 2.1.2). This tendency among practitioners 
 192 
practically renders irrelevant the wide mandate that extends into institution building 
or societal change. This phenomenon is, however, accompanied by the propensity to 
associate capacity development with training. Subection 6.4.1 will continue to 
unpack the prevailing association of capacity development with training among 
practitioners. 
 The proclivity of practitioners to concentrate on individual capacity 
development is made even more explicit through the emerging narrative of 
mentorship among my informants. However, it is tied into the rejection of capacity 
development. In both Ethiopia and Egypt, I observed that practitioners – particularly 
among civil society actors – were inclined to mentor individuals. However, 
mentorship was framed in opposition to training massive numbers of people, which 
was the standard way to deliver capacity development. The issues of mentorship 
and friendship work (Girgis 2007) are among the areas where my research directly 
influenced my own practice. The growing understanding of capacity development as 
an appropriated and hollow notion paved the way to the dissociation with training-
based formats (except for skills-based technical training). Girgis' (2007) concept 
influenced my thinking and practice and led me to the step-by-step adoption of 
mentorship techniques.  
 
6.3.2 Capacity development vs capacity building 
In Chapter 2, I suggested that capacity development and capacity building are 
essentially identical terms. Whereas certain bodies of literature (Jaycox 1993; Potter 
and Brough 2004) suggest a complementarity between these two terms, I adopted 
Teskey's (2005) approach, which uses the two terms as synonyms, since a 
significant difference between them cannot be argued from the available literature. 
  In my interviews, I consequently used the term capacity development. 
Clarifying the terminological difference between the two terms, i.e. between capacity 
building and capacity development, did not constitute part of my research. 
Nevertheless, the data that I have collected through my interviews and field practice 
show that the two terms are used interchangeably. The majority of practitioners I 
either interviewed or worked with did not differentiate between capacity development 
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and capacity building. A profound experience during my interviews was that 
respondents ignored my consequent use of the term capacity development. They 
instead used both forms without any distinct difference. Only three respondents 
differentiated between the two terms. The underlying logic was, however, arbitrary; 
this was also admitted by a high-level donor representative: 
Capacity development ist wahrscheinlich der fliessendere Begriff, während 
man bei capacity building denken kann man baut ein Gebäude. Capacity 
development ist fliessender and mehr prozesshaft, aber das sind Bilder im 
Kopf. Deswegen lohnt sich die Debatte nicht. (Capacity development is 
probably the smoother terminology, while with capacity building, you could 
think it is like constructing a building. Capacity development is smoother and 
more process oriented, but these are only images in the head. That is why the 
debate is futile.) (EG 03) 
 Within my direct working environment in GTZ/GIZ, I was aware of a careful 
distinction between capacity building and capacity development, which was, 
however, obscured into ambiguous rhetorical subtleties. GTZ/GIZ exclusively used 
the term capacity development, whereas capacity building was used in a disdainful 
manner. However, this distinction is not documented in any of the GTZ/GIZ 
documents on capacity development (GTZ 2007a; 2007b). The following account by 
a GTZ employee aptly describes this otherwise undocumented distinction between 
the two terminologies: 
Es gab erstmal capacity building and dann switchte die Diskussion ins 
capacity development rüber. Capacity building ist das rudimentäre, während 
bei capacity development auch die Nachhaltigkeit der Kapazitäten betrachtet 
wird. (There was capacity building first and than the discussion switched into 
capacity development. Capacity building is more rudimentary, while capacity 
development also takes the sustainability of the capacities into account.) (ET 
09) 
 I suggest that the differentiation and assumed hierarchy between the two 
terms is specific to the GTZ/GIZ context in which I was working in Ethiopia. Since the 
main co-operation partner of the programme was the Ministry of Capacity Building 
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(MOCB), an especially high value was attached to capacity development. However, 
this entirely ignored the fact that there was no translation for capacity development in 
Amharic and that the Ethiopian government exclusively used the term capacity 
building (አቅም ግንባታ – akem gimbata). Section 6.4 will continue to unpack the inherent 
power claims situated within the discourse of capacity development at the MOCB as 
well as at GTZ/GIZ. 
 
6.3.3 The intentions of productivity and resilience building  
The previous section highlighted the absence of the complex theory of capacity 
development in the field. Practitioners’ understanding lacks the sophistication 
exhibited by the theories I briefly outlined in Section 6.2. Instead of complexity, 
practitioners almost exclusively focus on the individual level when talking about 
capacity development. This subsection continues to compare the theory with the field 
practice by analysing the traces of ideology in practitioners’ accounts.  
 Section 6.2 suggested that theories of capacity development are vehicles that 
transport ideologies (e.g. neoliberal institutionalism and theory of change). There are 
a total of 25 separate areas and purposes for capacity development mentioned in my 
interview data. These describe individual skills that can be acquired through capacity 
development. This collection can be grouped into two main categories of 
competences. On the one hand, practitioners tend to emphasise the enhancement of 
personal productivity through capacity development. On the other hand, the building 
of resilient behaviours dominates. Table 6.3 depicts these two prevailing categories, 
as well as the attributes that did not fit into these categories.  
 The categorisation of these attributes is not arbitrary, but follows the growing 
antagonism between two distinct agendas of capacity development I observed 
during my fieldwork. I observed the promotion of a distinctly capitalist agenda in my 
own capacity development activities. This stood in sharp contrast to agendas of 
resilience within development that I came into contact with during the preparation of 
my conceptual framework (Folke et al. 2002; Manyena 2006; Masten and Obradović 
2006; Berkes 2007; Pike et al. 2010). The awareness that my work contributed to the 
promotion of a capitalist world order caused a serious moral dilemma for me. The 
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gradual realisation of how my own work fitted into the bigger framework of the 
expansion of capitalism was crucial for my professional coming of age. I recognised 
that my roots in participatory development, in which I was engaged during my 
studies, as well as my academic convictions were in conflict with my job at GTZ/GIZ. 
In 2010, in the midst of my research for the conceptual framework, I shared this 
observation with ECBP’s German management team: 
We were discussing the GTP today at a short meeting at X´s [German 
programme director] office. I enjoyed the discussion, since I eventually could 
use the reading I have done for my conceptual framework. Nevertheless, what 
I said  was probably completely inappropriate: “Grundsätzlich was wir hier tun 
ist nichts anderes als die äthiopische Wirtschaft an die globale Wirtschaft 
anzuschließen.“ [Basically, what we are doing here is nothing else but linking 
the Ethiopian economy to the global one.] (Research diary, 15/08/2010, Addis 
Ababa) 
 The insensitive nature of my observation at the meeting, however, went 
unnoticed. I assume that it was just attributed to my youthful naiveté. Nevertheless, 
this episode also exposes the intensity of the moral and professional paradox of 
insider action research (Coghlan and Holian 2007).  
 The attributes listed in the productivity catalogue suggest that capacity 
development in essence contributes to the proliferation of competences and skills 
that support economic development (Clarke 2005). It can be read as a distinctly 
capitalist set of characteristics. Furthermore, its notions promote a capitalist work 
ethic that underscores the necessity to acknowledge failure, act rationally and be 
accountable (Sennett 2011; Harvey 2006; Amable 2011). The resilience catalogue 
emphasises a skill set that is necessary to navigate the increased precariousness 
and vulnerability of everyday life. The skills included within this catalogue instigate 




 Productivity Resilience Other 
1. effectiveness problem solving passion 
2. efficiency flexibility/adaptive to change happiness 
3. productivity negotiation skills (feeling) content 
4. transparency collaboration creativity 
5. rationality proactive personal growth 
6. customer orientation skills acquisition exposure 
7. acknowledge failure core competences mindset (shift in) 
8. faster & better critical thinking  
9. accountability communication skills  
  Table 6.4 – Attributes of capacity development among practitioners in the field 
 
 These two catalogues also provide further insights into the internal 
controversies of the capacity development discourse in Ethiopia. Among Ethiopian 
respondents, the prevalence of productivity attributes was particularly high (78% of 
the Ethiopian respondents used one of the attributes). This is indicative of the shift 
towards a capitalist economic narrative in Ethiopia. This, however, is obscured by 
the Ethiopian establishment’s developmental narrative apparently rooted in the 
EPRDF’s socialist heritage (Vaughan 2011; Hagmann and Abbink 2011). The 
association of capacity development with notions of productivity further confirms the 
co-optation of the term by the Ethiopian establishment and confirms the successful 
indoctrination by the establishment (Desta 2015; Bach 2011).  
 This section demonstrated the apparent chasm between donors’ complex 
theories of capacity development and the lack of familiarity among practitioners. 
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Whereas the former encase capacity development in the complex language of 
neoliberal institutionalism and theory of change, the latter tend to reduce the notion 
to human resource development measures. The evident lack of intention among 
practitioners to engage in institution building and societal change suggest the 
absence of transfer mechanisms within donor organisations that aid the 
implementation of capacity development. This, however, confirms the stance of 
capacity development critics who question the practical value of complex capacity 
development theories (Cohen 1994; Lusthaus et al. 1999).  
 Similarly to Kühl (2009), I observed that the field practice of capacity 
development lacks methodological foundations. At the same time, the lack of 
methodological instruments specifically designed for the implementation of capacity 
development theory opens up new opportunities for practitioners. They interpret and 
adapt the notion according to their own value codes. These value codes, however, 
primarily facilitate the influx of notions of productivity. At the same time, notions of 
resilience building signal the growing awareness among practitioners of the 
increasing complexity and unpredictability in today’s world. In the previous section, I 
suggested that the adoption of theory of change in mainstream capacity 
development definitions also indicate a similar awareness among donors. However, 
in order to verify these assumptions, further research will be necessary. 
Nevertheless, this section also suggested that the propensity among practitioners to 
engage in individual mentoring suggests a link to early, participative notions of 
capacity development (cf. Subsection 2.1.2).  
 
6.4 The practice of capacity development 
 
The previous section outlined a set of factors that indicate the fundamental alienation 
between theories of capacity development and its practice in the field. It also pointed 
out that the field practice of capacity development is inherently simpler than its 
complex theories,  although it is entwined with notions of productivity and resilience. 
Moreover, it suggested that capacity development achieved an almost synonymous 
meaning to training. The restriction of capacity development to training further 
questions its validity. This section analyses the effects of the increasing equation of 
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the two terms. It contours the different grades of hollowing out and disintegration that 
accompanies the practice of capacity development.  
 
6.4.1 The uni-dimensionality of capacity development 
Section 2.1 suggested that donors’ view capacity development as a set of methods 
that provide instruments for systemically approaching development challenges 
(Morgan 2005, 2006). On contrary to this, I suggested in the previous sections that 
capacity development lacks a concise methodology that is implemented in the field. 
In fact, development practitioners simplify the complex theories of capacity 
development by exclusively focusing on enabling individuals. Subsection 6.3.1 
already referred to the inherent risk inherent in this simplification: capacity 
development increasingly becomes synonymous with training. The following 
accounts also testify to the amalgamation of training and capacity development: 
Capacity development is that you get training. (ET 13) 
Well, speaking of the term itself […], based on my experience working in the 
development field, it is always related to training people. And giving them 
information through training. (EG 10) 
Normally, if you take an overall picture, capacity building means trainings. (EG 
05) 
 Academic critics of capacity development have criticised the lack of clarity 
with regard to the methodologies and instruments of capacity development since the 
early 1990s (Cohen 1994; Lusthaus et al. 1999). As shown in Section 6.1, the 
theory-building of capacity development only produced more elaborate models for 
capacity development. These theories were, however, not translated into 
instruments. Therefore, training remained by far the most prominent form of capacity 
development in the field. A high level Ethiopian government representative 
expressed his concern about the methodological uni-dimensionality of capacity 
development:  
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People [donor representatives] are only talking about training and training. 
Development agencies should show other dimensions of capacity 
development. [...] Other aspects of it were not propagated well. (ET 07) 
 This peculiarly restricted perception of capacity development among my 
interview partners is, however, very similar to my own observations.  Through my 
own practice at GTZ/GIZ in Ethiopia and Egypt, I was closely involved with the 
development and deployment of training as a capacity development measure. 
Between 2010 and 2013, I supervised the training of approximately 2,500 individuals 
(1,821 people in Egypt during 2012-13, Source: GIZ 2014; for Ethiopia only 
estimates are available). These experiences exposed me to the mass production of 
training and made me aware of the way capacity development amalgamated training 
practices and was eventually rendered non-distinguishable from these. The following 
excerpt from my research diary also underlines the difficulty of identifying other 
instruments of capacity development.  
X [a male GTZ colleague in Ethiopia], Y [a female intern] and I met today to 
help structure her thesis. X suggested to use her research in order to try to 
find new dimensions of capacity development. Despite the repeated claims of 
X that at least five different forms existed, we could not come up with more 
than three: training, study visits and gate keeping (Research diary, 
12/11/2009, Addis Ababa) 
 My interviews eventually confirmed the previous observation from the field. 
The great majority (32 out 36 interviewees, 70%) of my respondents equated 
capacity development with training. However, these accounts also indicated that this 
uni-dimensionality of capacity development potentially harbours and facilitates its 
own demise. Both in Ethiopia and Egypt, respondents framed training as a wasteful 
practice that does not produce impact: 
[Capacity development is] wasting a lot of money on trainings that doesn´t 
 bring any impact. (ET 04) 
I hate to use the word capacity building because it is associated with a 
 massive number of people trained. (EG 11) 
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 The significance of the interplay between the uni-dimensionality of capacity 
development and the resulting oversupply of training cannot be underrated. I suggest 
that the popularity of capacity development led to the further increase of training-
based formats in delivering development programmes. The absence of other formats 
that led to the dominance of training within the practice of capacity development, 
however, contributed to the devaluation of this notion.  
 This subsection suggested the inherent uni-dimensionality of capacity 
development. The following subsections explore two distinct phenomena (the 
commoditisation of and disillusionment with capacity development), which illustrate 
the hollowing-out and subsequent demise of capacity development. 
 
6.4.2 The commoditisation of capacity development 
The previous subsection suggested that capacity development became synonymous 
with training in both Ethiopia and Egypt. In the absence of other methods, training 
dominates the field practice of capacity development. The oversupply of training, 
however, further enforces the encapsulation of capacity development. This 
subsection continues to unpack this increasingly quixotic phenomenon of training 
that has dominated the practice of development for decades. My goal is to 
understand the negative impact created by the association of capacity development 
with training.  
 A donor representative in Ethiopia explained that capacity development 
initiated a culture of training (“Trainingskultur”) among Ethiopian government 
employees: 
Es [capacity development] ist problematisch wegen der Fluktuation (der 
Beamten). Nach erfolgreichem capacity building gehen die Leute weg. Dies 
hat mich persöhnlich demotiviert. Aber aus gesellschaftlicher Sicht ist es 
erfolgreich. Es hat sich ein Trainingskultur entwickelt. Deswegen wollen wir 
per diems abschaffen. (It [capacity development] is problematic because of 
the fluctuation [of public servants]. After successful capacity building, they 
leave the organization. This has demotivated me personally. But from the 
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point of view of the society, it is successful. A culture of training has been 
established. That is why we want to abolish per diems.) (ET11) 
 During my work in Ethiopia, I also became aware of the misappropriation of 
capacity development among project partners, particularly within the public service. 
In late 2008, I conducted a survey on the success factors of previous e-learning 
projects in Ethiopia. Numerous projects attempted to introduce e-learning to 
Ethiopian universities; however, their rate of success was rather low (Schultz and 
Petzoldt 2011). I concluded that, among a number of other comparatively minor 
reasons, their failure could be attributed to building the capacity of the wrong target 
group, namely the universities’ teaching staff. Therefore, I recommended in my 
report to stop training teachers. I reasoned that outsourcing tasks that require 
specific technical skills, such as the creation of SCORM objects or server 
maintenance, for example, would ease the teachers’ workload. The rules introduced, 
that were made compulsory within ECBP from 2010, would have allowed teachers to 
exclusively focus on their subject and would have obviated the need to acquire 
technical skills. Teachers, nonetheless, protested against this rule and demanded 
comprehensive technical training. The rules that were introduced touched upon two 
sensitive issues for the teachers. First of all, it undermined their assumed supremacy 
in terms of knowledge within the confines of the university that would have been 
further enhanced by becoming an e-learning practitioner. More importantly, however, 
it eliminated a significant source of additional income. Evidently, the latter was highly 
aggravating.  
 Due to the campaign-like use of the term capacity development in Ethiopia – 
which was championed by the MOCB – capacity development achieved financial 
importance. For many public servants, attending capacity development measures –  
in other words, training – was a non-negligible, additional source of income. 
Moreover, due the high supply of donors’ and government capacity development 
measures, a scarcity of participants emerged. This in turn elicited a fierce 
competition to secure training participants by offering them better per diems. In a 
personal discussion, a representative of a high-level donor agency suggested to me 
that this apparent “culture of training” turned participation into a commodity - a 
commodity that donor agencies can buy: 
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 Teilnahme hat sich zu einem Gut entwickelt – wir können dieses Gut 
 kaufen, um unsere Indikatoren zu erfüllen. (Participation has become a 
 good – we can buy this good in order to achieve our [programme]  indicators) 
 (Research diary, 15/10/2010, Addis Ababa) 
Similarly to Ridde (2010), I argue that this competition and per diem schemes 
transformed training from a transaction of learning into a commodity exchange. The 
transformation of participation into a commodity that donors need to purchase erases 
any hope for real ownership. Vian (2009) suggests that such systems of incentive-
giving radically twist the logic of development. In this case, capacity development is 
no longer a demand driven and participatory process where the recipients practice 
ownership of their own development agendas.   
6.4.3 Disillusionment with capacity development 
The over-supply of capacity development evidently erodes and questions its 
authenticity. The increasing disconnection between the intentions of capacity 
development and its field practice is also exemplified by the following quote from an 
Egyptian NGO representative: 
I realise that working in development, the easiest thing you can do is to 
conduct trainings and put this into a report. This will make you look extremely 
good. Mish moheem [it doesn't matter] whether the training was good, did 
help them [the participants] grow, did increase their income. No matter, you 
take some good pictures, put it in your report. It makes you look extremely 
good. (EG 05) 
 The uni-dimensionality of capacity development and the oversupply of training 
measures did not only induce the emergence of false incentives, but also undermine 
the credibility of the very notion. Mass capacity development is under scrutiny due to 
two major factors: The campaign-like nature of capacity development that renders its 
delivery a hierarchical, top-down measure, and the lack of individualisation, which 
results in one-size-fits-all delivery models, as illustrated by the above quote. 
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 The criticism is based on the assumption that, in the hands of government 
and aid bureaucracies, capacity development has become a technocratic exercise 
and has lost touch with the real needs of the population: 
The case with the government is kind of different. [...] Sometimes they just do 
the training because they have to. Sometimes maybe it is because of the 
regulations. Two training courses have to be done. And they just have to 
make sure that this is fulfilled and then the [responsible] ministry is satisfied. 
(EG 02) 
 This is similar to Mikhail's (2014) findings, which analysed the political role of 
civil society in post-revolutionary Egypt, where much of the political discourse with 
regard to social and economic agendas is located. As Elagati (2013) claims, civil 
society has naturally engaged in political activism since the late 1980s and has 
played a crucial role in articulating the social agendas of the 25th of January uprising. 
These have been particularly critical of top-down development practices as 
demonstrated by the NDP governments and civil society sectors closely linked to the 
party:  
Not many institutions really believe in it, in what they are doing, so they build 
this relationship with their beneficiaries and make sure that they invite the 
right people to the trainings they do and activities they conduct. […] The way it 
[capacity development] is applied, the way I see it, is more about training a big 
number of people than about building their capacity ... it is not about the 
individual. I think it is more about the indicator and the task [of an aid worker). 
You do a training, twenty people come; done!  (EG 05) 
 This subsection has outlined two issues that question and undermine the 
credibility of capacity development. The previous sections illustrated the tendency to 
incorporate capacity development within the bureaucratic apparatus of recipient 
countries. Besides donor agencies, national bureaucracies in Ethiopia and Egypt 
alike deliver extensive capacity development programmes. It is interesting to note, 
however, that while Ethiopia focuses its attention on non-government employees, 
Egypt almost exclusively trains civil servants. The difference in terms of target 
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groups illustrates the dissimilarity of the two governments’ intentions in terms of 
providing capacity development.  
 
6.5 The ambiguities of a rhetoric – the inherent power dynamics 
of capacity development 
 
This section adds further detail to the gradual hollowing out and appropriation of 
capacity development discussed throughout this chapter. The following two case 
studies from my research aim to illustrate the ways the elastic notion of capacity 
development is appropriated for power claims. First I analyse the particular role 
capacity development played in the public and political discourse in Ethiopia (6.5.1). 
Subsequently, I use the conscious differentiation between the terms capacity 
development and capacity building within the German discourse on capacity 
development to illustrate the inherent power of this discourse (6.5.2). 
 
6.5.1 Power claims and mandate creation – the Ministry of Capacity 
Building in Ethiopia 
One of the first observations from my empirical work in Egypt was the realisation 
that, in contrast to my experience in Ethiopia, hardly anybody talked about capacity 
development. I made a note of this to my supervisor during our supervisory 
meetings, explaining that the awareness of capacity development in Egypt is very 
low in comparison to Ethiopia. I could neither observe discussion about capacity 
development at work, nor as part of the public discourse. At work, hardly anyone 
talked about capacity development, it was neither part of official or non-formal 
meetings with programme partners. Similarly, I could not find any references in 
public newspapers either. In hindsight I understood that the issue of aid was 
considerably less important to Egyptians than to Ethiopians; be it the public or 
private sector. I have explored some of this issues in Section 5.1.  
 By contrast, there had been a sense of urgency in Ethiopia with regard to 
capacity development. I used my interviews to raise this difference between Ethiopia 
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and Egypt with some practitioners, whose critical and well-reflected opinions I had 
learnt to respect. These questions, first of all, turned out to be a very good 
icebreaker. Moreover, they revealed that at least some sections of society (non-
government, non-donor representative) are aware of a prevailing “rhetoric of capacity 
development” (ET 19). However, there were various different forms of rhetoric 
produced in order to ascertain political or organisational goals. Ethiopian 
respondents almost unilaterally linked their first exposure to capacity development to 
the founding of the Ministry of Capacity Building (MOCB) in 2005.  
 The first time I heard about capacity development was when MOCB 
 was created.  (ET 13) 
 Many informants eagerly emphasised the political importance of both the 
founding of the new ministry and the appointment of Tefera Walwa as Minister. 
Similar to what Skjerdal (2011) found, the information policies of the Ethiopian 
government over-emphasise all activities that feed into its hegemonic developmental 
narrative. The high level of awareness with regard to the circumstances in which the 
ministry was created – eight years prior to the interviews – underlines its high 
significance in the public political discourse. The attention given to the founding of 
MOCB clearly situated capacity development within the developmental narrative of 
the EPRDF party-state. This was also underlined by the fact that it was installed as a 
super-ministry and was led by Tefera Walwa (Tigabu 2014), the civil-war veteran and 
founding member of the TPLF. His reputation as the EPRDF’s go-getter designated 
him for the role of Minister of Capacity Building. 
 As a supra-ministry, various powers were invested in the MOCB that allowed 
it to operate independently from other ministries. To analyse the entire spectrum of 
internal mechanisms that allowed MOCB to enforce reform in both the public and 
private sector goes well beyond the scope of this thesis. However, to illustrate the 
top-down nature that helped impose the change desired by the government, I briefly 
focus on the use of the notion of mindset within the Ethiopian political elite I was 
closely working with. The mindset of someone, an organisation or company, meant 
their willingness to embrace the reform prescribed by the establishment. 
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 Changing the mindset of certain target groups was also part of my team’s 
capacity development tasks. Every three months, I submitted a capacity assessment 
of our key partners – seven Ethiopian universities as well as a handful companies – 
to the MOCB.  
 Figure 6.7 shows the fields of these standard capacity assessment forms for 
the MOCB. Besides technical capability and organisation (management), the 
partner’s mindset and perceptions had to be assessed as well. Moreover, for each 
project, the same exercise had to be done for our team as well (noted as “ecbp 
Addis” on Figure 6.7). The peculiarity of these capacity assessments was their public 
character. They were discussed in the presence of both the Minister of MOCB, 
Tefera Walwa, and the programme partners themselves. My lack of experience as 
well as my dedication to make a good impression as a new team manager in early 
2010, got me into two serious public conflicts. By trying to appeal to and win the 
favours of the MOCB management I intentionally criticised the lack of dedication to 
reform programme of the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering at Mekelle University 
(Northern Ethiopia). This led to a rather ferocious public dispute between him and 
myself during the meeting. On another occasion I criticised my MOCB counterpart, 
which eventually brought me on collision course with some of the officials in the 
Ministry. 
 However, as I gradually understood, the purpose of these assessments was 
not necessarily to apply pressure on the partner, but to exercise self-criticism (see 
upper left block: “Not yet fully integrated with sector associations like LIDI”). I was 
aware of similar practices in the ranks of former Eastern European, and particularly 
the Soviet, Communist Parties. In November 2009, I made a note of this similarity in 
my research diary:  
Full identification with the programme [ECBP] is crucial. Everyone who is not 
in line or critical of the approach is being ridiculed and thrown out of the 
window [by the Ethiopian establishment]. Reminds me pretty much of “Die 
Revolution entlässt ihre eigenen Kinder” (The Revolution dismisses its own 
children [Child of the Revolution – Leonhard 2010]) (Research diary 
30/11/2009, Addis Ababa) 
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 In his autobiographic book Child of the Revolution, Leonhard (2010) describes 
various occasions of public self-criticism within the Soviet Communist Party during 
the 1930s. Here, self-criticism facilitated the establishment and maintenance of 
discipline within the party. Such practices were inherent in the EPRDF as well. Bach 
(2011) argues that the “’gem gema’ [self-criticism] is a process of ‘evaluation’ and 
’self-criticism’ inherited from the TPLF’s internal organization” (p. 659). Hagmann 
(2005) furthermore suggests that this technique is used to suppress dissent among 
public servants and is also often employed in the organisation of the rural population, 
particularly in farmers’ organisations. Both TPLF and the current EPRFD draw their 
legitimacy from Albanian socialism, which I would argue is the potential source of the 
practice of self-criticism. This example, however, demonstrates how autocratic 
practices are fused into capacity development and appropriate it in order to suppress 
opposition or create obedience.  
Figure 6.7 – MOCB reporting table with mindset assessment questions (Source: author) 
 
6.5.2 Deutungshoheit (The primacy of meaning) 
With this second case study, I aim to illustrate the way in which the notion of capacity 
development enables power claims within the arena of international donor 
organisations. Early in my empirical work, I failed to appreciate the significance of my 
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German respondents’ first encounter with capacity development. Their accounts 
confirmed that the point in time when capacity development entered the German aid 
discourse perfectly corresponds to my archaeology (cf. 6.1). The interviews verified 
that German aid organisations, including their commissioning party, the BMZ, only 
entered the global discourse on capacity development during the second half of the 
2000s. Accordingly, their awareness of capacity development as an emerging trend 
within international development was more vivid than that of other donor 
representatives:  
 Capacity development is a trend, but a well-meant trend within 
 development co-operation. (ET 18) 
 Senior GIZ officials were, however, also quick to add that “it was a debate 
dominated by the headquarters” (ET 20). I became interested in the underlying 
reasons behind Germany’s late entry into this international discourse. It is in this 
political arena that certain aspects of power and power struggles become apparent. I 
discerned two different types of power-claims that can be traced back to the 
emergence of German aid organisations in the field of capacity development. First, 
some argued that the notion of capacity development was to position German aid 
organisations in the arena of international organisations:  
Germany was too small and wanted to play an important role in development 
co-operation. Capacity development offered a niche for Germany to profile 
itself. (EG 03) 
 My analysis of the theory-building of capacity development (6.1), however, 
diffuses the claim made by the above senior official with regard to a niche in 
development politics. By the second half of the 2000s, when German aid 
organisations joined the debate about capacity development, the notion had already 
passed its zenith (cf. Table 6.1). I argue that the emergence of capacity development 
within the German aid discourse is embedded within its own discourse. The scrutiny 
with regard to the plurality of aid institutions that acted on behalf of the German 
government was resurrected during the late 2000s. At that time the German 
government had four main aid organisations: the Internationale Weiterbildung and 
Entwicklung (InWEnt), the Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst (DED), the Kreditanstalt für 
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Wiederaufbau (KfW Development Bank) and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). Due to public pressure, the merger of these 
institutions came up again in the political debate.  
 In the face of the apparent unavoidability of a merger, the term capacity 
development was instrumentalised. A senior GIZ official explained that the debate on 
capacity development among German aid agencies was predominantly about the 
“Deutungshoheit”. The term Deutungshoheit denotes someone’s primacy in a 
terminological dispute (supremacy or primacy of meaning). This dispute emerged 
between InWEnt and GTZ/KFW. The former used the term capacity building within 
its work, while the latter adopted the term capacity development. Both parties 
defined capacity development as the core of their services (InWEnt 2007, GTZ 
2007a, 2007b). The terminological difference between capacity building and capacity 
development became an important characteristic that fed their organisational 
identity. Both organisations attempted to increase their bargaining power in the 




The aim of this chapter has been to analyse the practice of capacity development by 
questioning its constituting elements as well as the underlying political and economic 
aspirations feeding the notion. This chapter has followed the evolution of the concept 
of capacity development, juxtaposing theory-building with the field realities in 
Ethiopia and Egypt. By doing so, it has traced the gradual demise of as well as 
appropriative practices towards capacity development.  
 First, it has outlined donors’ use of capacity development as a rhetorical 
device to re-legitimise the notion of development amidst the growing criticism of the 
early 1990s and early 2000s. Donors minted capacity development according to their 
own needs for legitimacy by co-opting a formerly participative and human-centred 
notion. The two intense phases of theory-building infused capacity development with 
a thoroughly neoliberal institutionalist framework, eventually also appropriating 
theory of change models from the INGO sector. The theory-building process of 
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capacity development thus illustrates and reconfirms the propensity of the 
development discourse to appropriate progressive notions. Through this thorough 
process of theoretical and ideological re-shaping, capacity development is added to 
a long list of notions that continue to legitimise the idea of development. This chapter 
adds a new cycle to Rist’s (2009) historical analysis of appropriation within the 
discourse of development. 
 This chapter has allowed me to draw parallels between the evolution of 
capacity development within mainstream development and the political process of 
aid effectiveness. Contrary to the fierce conviction of my professional environment at 
GTZ/GIZ - where this research journey started – the unfolding of the notion of 
capacity development was detached from the OECD process on aid effectiveness. 
Whereas parallels can be drawn in terms of common issues (institution building and 
local ownership), the discourse of aid effectiveness (cf. Chapter 5) and that of 
capacity development are two separate phenomena.  Based on the evidence above, 
I argue that the forceful attempts to unify these two phenomena were based on the 
fact that German aid organisations were late entrants to the discourse of capacity 
development. When they joined the debate in the second half of the 2000s, this 
coincided with key moments in the discourse on aid effectiveness, such as the 
signing of the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda (2008). Embedding 
capacity development in the influential OECD process on aid effectiveness lent 
further credence to capacity development and strengthened GTZ’s bargaining power 
with its commissioning party, the BMZ, against other agencies such as InWEnt. 
 Second, this chapter has exposed the contradiction between the rhetorical 
intentions of capacity development theories and their lack of practicable 
methodologies. The archaeology of contemporary notions of capacity development 
reveals the absence of a distinct methodology. It confirms that capacity development 
is a flexible construct that can contain and transport various theoretical and 
ideological ingredients and within which claims of power can be developed. As such, 
it does not have, and indeed cannot have, a unified methodology.  
 Third, the chapter has demonstrated the apparent chasm between the 
complex theories of capacity development and its field practice. The latter lacks both 
the theoretical and ideological sophistication as well as the complexity of the former. 
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Practitioners’ almost exclusive focus on the individual level did not imply an 
ideological neutrality of the field reality of capacity development; it carries strong 
ideological affiliations. These promote the increase of individual productivity through 
capacity development. This, in turn, enables the enforcement of a capitalist mode of 
development. At the same time, resilience building plays an equally important role 
among practitioners.  
 Fourth, the chapter has exposed the uni-dimensionality of capacity 
development. In the field, capacity development is increasingly associated with 
training. This in turn leads to the oversupply of training measures and the 
establishment of false incentive systems in order to secure the necessary 
attendance. The oversupply and the apparent lack of impact kindle disillusionment 
among practitioners. The devaluation of capacity development manifests itself in 
post-revolutionary Egypt. The growing opposition to capacity development in the civil 
society of post-revolutionary Egypt surely carries a portion of anti-establishment 
sentiment. 
 In contrast to the situation in Egypt, the notion of capacity development is 
woven into the nation-building project of the developmental state in Ethiopia.  As 
Bach (2011) and Abbink (2009) argue, whereas the EPRDF’s nation-building 
exercise appears to be fervently anti-neoliberal and participatory in its rhetoric, its 
practice reveals a deeply neoliberal and elitist economic development agenda. The 
level of subtle indoctrination among Ethiopians is also confirmed by the prevalence 
of productivity attributes among my Ethiopian respondents. The establishment’s 
narrative of capacity development depicts this twist – the goal of capacity 
development is to produce neoliberal citizens, who are able to meet the demands of 
a globalised world economy.  
 The production of the capacity development narrative took place within the 
local civil society – it existed here and flourished due to the absence of state services 
for disadvantaged communities. It was excessively built around a rhetoric of 
resilience, aiming to equip underprivileged communities to act on their own behalf 
and take matters into their own hands. Capacity development has therefore become 
a counter-narrative to the failure of state services and is situated within a larger anti-
establishment narrative driven by civil society. 
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 Finally, a note of retrospection. The analytical claims contained in this chapter 
underwent several critical changes over time. Similar to the other empirical chapters, 
my analysis struggled with the double vision that resulted from my evolving practice 
of participatory action research. Only gradually did I manage to demolish the 
dogmatic premises of my work environment at GTZ/GIZ. As a fellow PhD student 
pointed out to me in 2010: 
Don't forget that you are working with Germans! They organise and classify 
everything and then put it into a box with a label. It is putting reality into a 
storage – the attempt to track down reality with complete accuracy. But logic 
is just one way to deal with reality. […] Don’t get caught in your premises! 
(Research diary, 26/05/2010, Addis Ababa) 
 In order to do justice to this invitation, this chapter has questioned the 
authenticity of the capacity development discourse. Furthermore, it also unearthed 
the inherent power claims attached to the importance of capacity development in the 
German capacity development discourse. Throughout the following chapters, I intend 
to continue shedding as many preconceived notions as possible of the ones that 













Chapter 7 – Rethinking ICTs, the state and 






Chapter 5 established capacity development as a neoliberal institutionalist practice 
and embedded it in the discourse of aid effectiveness. It also sought to dismantle 
some of the more important conceptual frameworks both within the academic (Berg 
1993; Blagescu and Young 2006; Boesen 2007) and grey literatures (Morgan and 
Baser 1993; Baser and Bolger 1996; CIDA 2000), which depict capacity 
development as a concise methodology that addresses developmental challenges. 
By challenging these frameworks, Chapter 5 also suggested that capacity 
development has been a vehicle for various development agendas and can be 
moulded according to the power claims of both donors and recipient countries.  
 Informationalist literature creates the narrative of an informational mode of 
development that explains the logic of a highly technicised and global socio-
economic order (Stalder 2006; Castells 2011a, 2011b). It highlights the mechanisms 
that enforce new forms of global competitiveness and require compatibility. States 
are pressure by transnational corporates to achieve compatibility in terms of the 
skills of the labour force as well as infrastructure.  
 This chapter has three major aims. Section 7.1 explores donors’ motives in 
promoting ICTs in Ethiopia. It also unpacks one of the paradoxical quests that 
accompanied my research. Subsequently, Section 7.2 draws the contours of the 
Ethiopian establishment’s notion of ICT promotion for economic growth. This is done 
by consecutively questioning three premises of transnational informational capitalism 
that underlie the necessity of ICT for economic growth: the assumption that ICTs are 
the primary source of efficiency and productivity in today’s economy; the necessity of 
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ICTs to facilitate the interaction with the global market; and the proposition that high 
value creation requires the transitioning to a post-industrial knowledge economy. 
 Sections 7.3 and 7.4 intuitively follow the emerging issues of transparency 
and corruption with regard to the promotion of ICTs. These issues, which 
unexpectedly emerged during my empirical work, allow me to thematise the roles 
that states play in the promotion of ICTs. The interrogation of various perspectives 
on the Ethiopian establishment’s ICT promotion adds further details to the 
understanding of transnational informational capitalism in the global South. 
 There is a plethora of perspectives one can draw on regarding the socio-
economic as well as political developments of the last 30 years in Ethiopia (c.f. 4.1.3 
and 4.1.4). This chapter is not an attempt to draw up a socio-economic balance 
sheet for the EPRDF government, but rather tries to expose some of the 
contradictions inherent in a party-state in transition. Instead of debating the rightness 
or wrongness of economic policy making in Ethiopia, it uses ICTs as a narrative 
device to demonstrate the convoluted reality, heterogeneity and in-built 
contradictions of the EPRDF establishment. While on the one hand, this chapter will 
certainly criticise issues that emerge from this very complexity, on the other hand it 
also acknowledges the achievements of the contemporary Ethiopian state for 
improving the economic outlooks for the majority of its population through 
industrialisation, infrastructure building, health services and so forth.  
 The on-going struggle between the EPRDF's deep-seated commitment to 
socio-economic development and the necessary “Realpolitik” for remaining in power, 
however, is a narrative worth unpacking. ICTs provide a perfect magnifying glass to 
do so. Nevertheless, I am also aware that such struggles are not unique to Ethiopia. 
The existence of certain dichotomies between the expressed interests and the actual 
power claims of political or economic actors is probably true for any political system 
to a greater or lesser degree. This chapter only sets out to document some of these 
dichotomies in the Ethiopia of 2009-13, using the rather unique positionality and 
experience – at the convergence of states (Ethiopia and Germany), party, military 
and foreignness – that I held during my stay in Ethiopia.  
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 In spite of my original intention to interrogate the idiosyncrasies of 
transnational informational capitalism in both Ethiopia and Egypt, the 25th of January 
uprising intervened. The political upheaval in Egypt between early 2011 and 2013 
prevented me from collecting as much empirically sound evidence with regard to the 
ICT promotion agendas of the Egyptian government as I would have liked. The de 
facto political interregnum that followed the ousting of President Mubarak uprooted 
governmental power. The ensuing paralysis of the executive and the fractional tug of 
war precluded the proactive promotion of ICTs. Even though I interviewed several 
government representatives during my stay, their accounts only reflect apathy and 
the lack of follow-through. The following account by one of the state secretaries in the 
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) in late 2013 reflects 
the state of affairs in the government at the time rather succinctly: 
Now the Ministry [of Communication and Information Technology] thinks [that] 
the [current] Minister is temporary. Not only him, but [other] people will [also] 
go soon. Faa [Therefore] long term strategies we don´t have. Or it is not the 
right time for discussing any long-term project. Yani [you know] we will not go 
for major changes, because it is not the right time. […] Now it is yani [you 
know] a transition[al] government. It is just [for] day to day operation. It is not 
for planning long term. And now we have the cabinet agendas and the Prime 
Minister agenda issue [the Prime Minister’s agenda] is about the security and 
the economy. It is not yani [you know] subsidy and ICT. It is not on the main 
priorities of the cabinet. I think these two priorities are the most important. [...] 
We have a long-term plan until 2017, which I prepared, but he, the Minister, is 
not sure whether he will continue [after the January 2014 elections]. Of 
course, we have a road map and blueprint [but it is] for his yani [you know] 
successor (laughs). (EG 06) 
 The rapid succession of four governments within a period of 17 months that 
often espoused contradictory policies (cf. 4.2) rendered even the implementation of 
previously developed strategies impossible. The following account from a high-level 
government official in 2013 describes the apparent lack of direction within the 
responsible governmental structures: 
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So the [ICT] strategy, this was one of the very first strategies and it was put 
down in 2010. And, unfortunately, what happened was that the revolution 
came in January 2011. You may actually want to mention that [the revolution] 
in your thesis. And this caused a strong disruption in the rhythms of the ICT 
sector. Because what happened was that there were four different ministers 
for ICT in this only two years. And each minister got a new CEO for TIEC 
[Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Center, an ICT incubator under 
the MCIT], which is the technology innovation Centre. And each one came 
with his own mandate and own vision and bla-bla-bla. Some of them didn't 
even know about the strategy that I was just telling you about. Only recently 
have they started looking into it again. A lot of the ICT activities were very ad 
hoc in the last two years. They didn't really follow a structure or a plan, a 
strategic plan, because of what happened in Egypt. (EG 13) 
 Due to this dysfunctionality, I could only extract loose fragments about the 
promotion of ICTs under the Mubarak regime. However, even these were muted by 
the excitement caused by the use of social media during and after the 25th of January 
uprising. I will explore this in detail in Chapter 8. Due to the governmental paralysis in 
Egypt, a comparison with Ethiopia is not possible. This chapter therefore focuses 
exclusively on Ethiopia.  
 
7.2 ICT capacity development and the marginality of 
participation 
 
This section aims to achieve two goals. First, it offers insights into my research 
journey by highlighting the process of the gradual deconstruction and eventual 
vanishing of the quest for ICT capacity development (7.2.1). After the adoption of a 
more plural and flexible analytical framework, I trace the construction of ICT 
promotion agendas among donor representatives in Ethiopia (7.2.2). 
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7.2.1 A brief introspective reflection on eCapacity Development 
This research was conceived within the framework of the Engineering Capacity 
Building Programme (ECBP) in the Ethiopian Ministry of Capacity Building (MOCB). 
The original intention of the Ethiopian government was to conceptually underpin and 
scientifically legitimise the viability of eCapacity Development as a novel approach to 
ICT4D tested within ECBP. Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 briefly elaborated that, despite 
the lack of any detailed descriptions, eCapacity Development represented a 
thoroughly constructionist approach (Section 1.2, Section 4.3). However, the concept 
exclusively existed in practice and, at best, was outlined in a few PowerPoint slides. 
However, there was a strong sense among my colleagues in GTZ/GIZ that 
eCapacity Development differed from other, in their eyes conventional, ICT4D 
measures. The term eCapacity Development was used interchangeably with ICT 
capacity development at ECBP. The key characteristics of eCapacity Development – 
as already identified in Section 1.1 – were: 
1. Anything we (that is the employees of the eCapacity Development 
department) “touch” should be faster, better, smarter or cheaper through 
ICTs. 
2. Bias to action: implement first, contemplate later. 
3. No ideology: under no circumstances question the ideological approach of 
either Ethiopian or German partners. 
4. People over technology: ICTs are only a small part of the solution that we 
provide and are not the focus of our work. 
 
However, this vivid agility and progressive human-centredness of eCapacity 
Development was contradictory to the top-down developmentalism practised within 
MOCB and ECBP. Chapter 5 outlined the mechanisms of transnational appropriation 
with regard to the notion of capacity development, as well as demonstrated the 
Ethiopian establishment’s restricted use of this notion in order to reify its nation-
building project. 
In hindsight, it is surprising that even though I was increasingly aware of the 
authoritarian appropriation of capacity development, I was still preoccupied with the 
attempt to establish a concise theory of ICT capacity development (eCapacity 
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Development). The paradox, however, became evident during the interviews I 
conducted. The interview data mirrored my own perplexity and indicated the 
ambiguous relationship between ICTs and capacity development. Out of 43 
interviewees, only 5 (11%) provided a definition when asked to define what ICT 
capacity development in their own worlds meant (cf. Annex 1, ICTs/1). Other 
respondents admitted their confusion and asked for clarification. The ensuing 
discussions demonstrated the non-existence of, or rather, the plurality of views about 
ICT capacity development. It is understood and explained in various ways. The two 
main interpretations I discerned can be summed up as:   
1. The aim of ICT capacity development is to use ICTs in order to enable 
capacity development activities (e.g. e-learning). 
2. ICT capacity development aims at developing ICT capacities (for example by 
developing ICT literacy or by the way of extending mobile or internet facilities). 
 
 The fact that there were multiple interpretative possibilities with regard to ICT 
capacity development was an important conceptual breakthrough in my research 
journey. It showed the futility of my technocratic determination, which wanted to pin 
down the ingredients of successful ICT4D activities. Moreover, it defeated my 
intention to show the primacy of technological constructionism and condemn 
deterministic ICT4D agendas. This decisive methodological influence helped me 
evolve from a rigid understanding inspired by my direct surroundings in Ethiopia and 
Egypt to a more explorative empiricism. Furthermore, it also pinpointed inherent 
issues of institutional blind spots idiosyncratic to participatory action research 
(Anderson and Herr 2005; Chambers 2008; Smith et al. 2010).  
My positionality – particularly the strong ties to GTZ/GIZ as well as my junior 
position in the beginning – obscured from me the extent to which the entire notion of 
eCapacity Development was embedded in institutional micropolitics (Chambers 
1986).  In retrospect, eCapacity Development was a pragmatic management notion 
that skilfully utilised the powerful discourses of capacity development and ICT4D. It 
was, however, predominantly defined by its agility and received its mandate from the 
Ethiopian establishment’s obsession with capacity development. It also intelligently 
alluded to the vague symbolism that ICTs exerted within the Ethiopian political 
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discourse (cf. Section 7.2 onwards). Its credibility lay in an agile and flexible team 
that was quickly able to respond and implement new projects. This is what secured 
the necessary buy-in from the Ethiopian political class. The following excerpt from a 
discussion with one of my supervisors at GTZ underlines the importance of loyalty to 
and the consistent evasion of conflict with the Ethiopian establishment: 
Marton, niemals, niemals, darfst du dich hier in eine Grundsatzdiskussion 
einlassen. (Marton, you should never ever engage here [in ECBP] in a debate 
of principles.)  
(Research diary, 10/11/2009) 
 
The three signature elements of eCapacity Development (ICT solution, 
content and information, and capacity development – cf. Figure 1.1) celebrate a 
constructionist take on ICT promotion by emphasising the adaptability of ICTs as 
well as the mixture of human and technological elements. Nevertheless, the notion of 
eCapacity Development only existed in the encased, limited and walled-off reality of 
ECBP. Therefore, the endeavour to verify its existence beyond ECBP would be a 
futile attempt. The question whether constructionist notions for promoting ICTs exist 
in Ethiopia, however, remains. The following two subsections question the donors’ 
notions and motives for promoting ICTs in Ethiopia. 
7.2.2 The quest for constructionism  
There is often a certain naiveté that characterises participatory ICT4D research 
agendas. Due to the apparent lack of participatory-constructionist social theory that 
underpins ICT4D projects, these often remain encased in issues of locality and 
neglect the various sources of hegemonic power that surround project locations. 
Constructionist approaches argue that the socially constructed character of 
technology allows for its contextual negotiation (Bijker et al. 2012). Technology is not 
a fixed entity but the outcome of phases of negotiations in the social and political 
spheres (Pinch and Bijker 1987; Bijker and Law 1994; Williams and Edge 1996; 
MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). Through the malleability and negotiability of 
technology, human agency is restored. 
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Sections 7.3 and 7.4 will unpack the predominantly deterministic accounts I 
collected. There is scattered evidence among donor representatives that deploy 
ICTs that they do so in order to empower their beneficiaries and spur local agency. 
Why are they so attracted to it? I think it is something like a game. To be 
honest with you, it is something … one person said to me when I touch a 
computer, that is all I need to know that I was an equal amongst others. That 
there is a sense that if you don't have any IT than you are less of a person. 
[...] I have seen women actually just touch the computer and then say now I 
am equal. (ET 06) 
 The next account, however, also exemplifies that it is rather the symbolic 
powers of ICTs (Souter 2004; Waldburger 2004; Beardon 2004; Sciadas 2005; Rye 
2009) that donors use in order to address their specific agendas. ICTs are in fact 
relegated to an auxiliary role and are re-appropriated to be mere magnets to the 
donors’ various agendas:  
You know, a guy who is 20 years old, who have never touched the computer; 
his attitude is like, computers are mostly for those who went to university or 
for those who are from wealthiest families. [...] But the thing is that, since the 
community give for technology a very high value and [it is considered] 
something unreachable, the moment they write their name on the screen 
using the keyboard, you boost their confidence. (ET 19) 
 Hollow (2010, p.32) argues that “the most significant impact of ICTs often 
relates to a desire for status symbols”. The misappropriation of the strong symbolism 
that ICTs possess is not inherently negative, but it should be acknowledged that it is 
questionable from a strictly ethical perspective. Moreover, there remains a 
semblance of naïveté and a sense of patronising underestimation of ICT4D 
beneficiaries. This eventually renders technology, ICTs in particular, non-malleable 
and non-negotiable, and forecloses its adaptation to the beneficiaries’ needs. 
 This section first showed the inherent ambivalence of the term ICT capacity 
development. It also illustrated its situatedness within the institutional micropolitics of 
MOCB and GTZ/GIZ. My positionality within this particular institutional context as 
well as the initial stiffness of my analysis prevented the critical questioning of the 
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professional belief system of eCapacity Development. These obscured the marginal 
position as well as the artificial origins of this notion.  
 After abandoning the forlorn pursuit of defining ICT capacity development, I 
traced constructionist agendas of ICT promotion among donor representatives in 
Ethiopia. Donor representatives’ accounts of ICTs were highly fragmented and 
mostly rooted in their personal convictions about the role of ICTs. As this example 
also shows, these personal accounts are based on individual convictions, and are 
tinted in idealistic notions of exposure to technology (Wilson 2004). Exposure to ICTs 
was advocated through a fragmented maze of individual accounts and exposed a 
high level of developmental hipsterism (Branchu 2014; Grossmann 2014) among its 
proponents. Even though donor representatives often present ICTs as a tool for 
participation and empowerment, they also exploit the strong symbolic powers of this 
technology. The deployment of ICTs for the clandestine transmission of donor 
agendas is ethically questionable.  
 
7.3 ICTs and industrial development – an anachronism? 
 
Section 7.2 illustrated the apparent lack of constructionist notions of technology 
among donor representatives. Moreover, it also showed that ICT4D initiatives that 
operate at the grassroots level neglect the opportunity to make technology 
negotiable for beneficiaries. 
 The notion of transnational informational capitalism is permeated by two core 
ideas. First, it assumes that ICTs are essential – and to some extent obligatory – 
components for maintaining the competitiveness of national economies on the global 
market (Pilat 2005; Draca et al. 2006). Second, the presupposition that ICT services 
(e. g. outsourced back-offices, telemarketing or programming) are the source of high 
value addition in the contemporary global market (Sklair 2001; Carroll and Fennema 
2002; Carroll et al. 2010). The promise of rapid economic growth pre-empts and 
necessitates the transitioning into a “knowledge economy”. Aspirational models such 
as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Low 1996; Castells 2011a) reassure 
recipient countries that they can leapfrog intermediate technologies by embracing 
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ICTs (Wee 2007; Lee and Ku 2007). The logic of transnational informational 
capitalism suggests that through the transitioning into a “knowledge economy”, 
economies of the global South can catch up on economic development (Friedman 
2007; Kobayashi-Hillary and Sykes 2007). The following sections analyse the many 
ways Ethiopian policy-makers address these issues, as well as use them to position 
themselves in the global economy. 
The centrepiece of Ethiopian economic policy making, widely supported by 
different donor governments, is the distinctly Marxist concept of Agricultural 
Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI, cf. Section 4.1). It seeks the enhancement 
of state revenues by increasing the export of Ethiopian products (Hagmann and 
Abbink 2011; Hess-Nielsen 2013; Weis 2014). The establishment's command 
economy determined that eight sectors (Textile and Apparel Industry, Leather and 
Leather Products Industry, Sugar and Sugar Related Industries, Cement Industry, 
Metal and Engineering Industry, Chemical Industry, Pharmaceutical Industry and 
Agro-Processing Industry) were to uplift the Ethiopian economy (cf. GTP 2010, p. 
27).  
This section plots the contours and motives of the Ethiopian establishment in 
deploying ICTs within the framework of economic development. This section in 
particular questions three premises that permeate contemporary informational 
capitalism. Subsection 7.3.1 analyses the issue of productivity. ICTs re-animate 
hopes for rapid economic development in the global South by promising higher 
productivity (Chinn and Fairlie 2006; Basant et al. 2006; Steinmueller 2001; Indjikian 
and Siegel 2005; Heeks 2010).  
Subsections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 question the scope of the acceptance of and 
transition towards an informational mode of development in Ethiopia. The former 
follows Ethiopian policy making with regard to using ICTs as a measure to increase 
international competitiveness within its industrial policy. The latter deals with the 
intriguing promises and elusive prospects of “leapfrogging” (Steinmueller 2001; 
Alzouma 2005; Fong 2009), “catching up” (Freeman 1994; Wilson 2002) and “level 
playing field” (Friedman 2007; Kobayashi-Hillary and Sykes 2007; Trimi 2008) are 
followed by the Ethiopian establishment.  
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7.3.1 ICTs as a precursor to productivity  
Informational capitalist scholarship suggests that ICTs further increase economic 
efficiency and productivity. The technological optimism of these accounts suggest 
that the deployment of ICTs is a prerequisite for economic development 
(Steinmueller 2001; Chinn and Fairlie 2006; Basant et al. 2006; El Khoury and 
Savvides 2006). The issue of productivity was astonishingly important to the 
Ethiopian informants I worked with. The following account by a high-level Ethiopian 
government official vividly echoes this: 
Technology [ICT] has the effect of speeding up work. So to speed up. What it 
was taking two days or three days without using technology we can do it even 
within half an hour ... within a period of half an hour. [...] it is all about 
efficiency, the more efficient you will be. If you are more productive it is 
obviously, that is what we call achievement. [...] Through ICTs, productivity 
will go up in Ethiopia. (ET 13) 
The notion of increased productivity through ICTs permeates Ethiopian 
accounts across the board. The almost unilateral endorsement of ICTs by my 
Ethiopian informants as a vehicle to increase the productivity of the Ethiopian 
economy was overwhelming during my empirical work. Not only civil servants, who 
could be liable to reproduce the establishment’s official narrative, but also private 
sector and civil society representatives underlined the importance of ICTs to 
increase economic output. These accounts are indicative of the ways informational 
capitalism infiltrates popular thinking. 
ICTs are thus expected to help produce more productive manpower that 
represents a globally competitive workforce. As expressed by a high-level 
government representative, 
It [ICT capacity development] is all about human capital development. […] 
The institution now up-scaled to ministry level [Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technologies] … this is [shows] a good commitment [towards 
ICT capacity development from the government]. But as a long-term 
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commitment, there should be more institutions producing skilled manpower. 
(ET 13) 
I discerned two major points of view among my respondents with regard to the 
role of ICTs for Ethiopia’s economic development. On the one hand, ICTs were to 
alleviate the apparent productivity problem among the Ethiopians. On the other 
hand, it was intended to train enough skilled workers to sustain economic growth. 
The former opinion is well represented by an Ethiopian donor representative: 
By using ICTs, you can increase accuracy in these sectors [health, education, 
agriculture]. Increasing the productivity of Ethiopia would mean increasing the 
productivity of those people [rural population]. Improved productivity would 
mean improved income, in my opinion. (ET 14) 
 The emphasis on productivity in this account is indicative of the 
establishment’s focus on creating a competitive economy. It also reproduces a key 
element within the establishment’s nation-building narrative. It is the intention of the 
ADLI to create a competitive workforce in the agricultural as well as in the industrial 
sectors. A good example of this is the rural market information systems that were 
implemented during my empirical work, aiming at facilitating better trade flows from 
the farmers to the market. This would, in turn, also increase the farmers’ income. 
The SMS-based market information system implemented by the newly-established 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange helps to “protect the rights and benefits of sellers, 
buyers, intermediaries, and the general public” (ECX 2008, no pagination). As one of 
my informants also pointed out the SMS-based market information system not only 
increased the farmers’ income, but also generated further revenues for the state.: 
ECX is also using the same approach. So ECX gets a little bit and the 
government gets a little bit. (ET 14) 
 The notion of a productive workforce transcends the issue of rural 
transformation. ICTs play a key role in the creation of a productive industrial 
workforce. The following quotation from an Ethiopian donor representative provides 
an idiosyncratic example of the underlying control narrative: 
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Because it is easy to monitor the communication. Easy to monitor the 
outcome of certain assignment. And also to track mistakes […] That is the 
biggest advantage of having ICT. (ET 10) 
 The government’s intense focus on using ICTs for increasing productivity as 
well as to establish a productive workforce also permeates the educational sector. 
This also demonstrates the holistic approach Ethiopian policy makers take with 
regard to economic development. However, such an approach, unfortunately, 
precluded using ICTs as a form of progressive didactics or cultivating creative forms 
of learning. The following account by a high-level government official illustrates the 
prevalence of the logic of productivity: 
So people [students] need to be productive in their education for instance, so 
they should score better results, and they should learn more things now than 
before using these tools. (ET 10) 
 Maintaining the momentum of rapid economic growth required the guaranteed 
and constant supply of skilled workers. Therefore, in 2006, the Ethiopian 
establishment embarked on an extensive plan to increase the number of university 
graduates, who were intended to provide this supply of skilled workers. A strategy 
inspired by the Chinese educational system (Mekasha 2005; Tessema 2010) 
increased the intake of state universities tenfold (Saint 2004; Ashcroft 2005; 
Tessema 2009). The designation of e-learning as a tool to cope with the increased 
intake further demonstrates the simplistic and thoroughly deterministic understanding 
of ICTs: 
So we feel that e-Learning is an area where we can make the biggest impact. 
It can address the need to be able to handle higher number of students 
starting let's say from the universities where there is rapid extension of 
universities but still faced with some severe capacity constraints in terms of 
handling the load that is put on. (ET 15) 
 The expectation of increasing the teachers’ productivity through ICTs was 
clearly expressed in the annual planning documents as well as in the e-learning 
scoping missions performed by my colleagues (Schultz and Petzoldt 2011). E-
learning became a key instrument to increase the throughput of universities. 
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Person X [a high-level government representative] explained to me that it is 
unacceptable that “our students are not provided with state-of-the-art content. 
Students need to get access to current textbooks and learn from current 
materials in order to become competitive on the world market.” An,d of 
course, added the always compulsory “we don’t have time to waste”.
 (Research diary, 07/04/2010, Addis Ababa) 
My colleagues and I, however, advocated for a more holistic notion of e-
learning that also cultivates critical thinking and creative thinking, even though our 
repeated discussions with ministry representatives at the MOE and MOCB, did not 
bear fruit. Thus, we adopted an approach in line with the Ethiopian establishment’s 
development priorities. This is well reflected in the annual objective of our 
department for the year 2004 (in Coptic Calendar):   
To enhance the efficiency and quality of the teaching-learning process in the 6 
FoTs [Faculty of Technology] and MIT [Mekelle Institute of Technology], 
through this, students will have access to the state-of-the-art information 
society. (ECBP/eCapacity Development annual objective 2004 [C.C.]) 
 By suggesting that e-learning activities will create a semblance of modernity 
and progress mandated my team to implement collaborative software solutions as 
well as to train students in online research and collaborations techniques. While the 
idea of modernity appealed to the bureaucrats, students were more encouraged by 
the notion of collaboration, which played a key role in our e-learning campaigns at 
the universities (Figure 7.1). 
 The establishment’s deployment of ICTs served the increase in the supply of 
a skilled workforce as well as its productivity, which in turn benefits the poor 
economically in the medium term. The contribution of ICTs as a tool for productivity 
is undeniable for economic development in Ethiopia.  However, the same 
rationalisation and standardisation of the labour force is a double-edged sword in the 
long term. Holtgrewe and Scholten (2005) Wagenaar and Boersma (2008) as well as 
Comor (2010) point out that conforming to the skill demands of the global economy – 
particularly in low-skilled economies – also builds a dependence on price 
advantages (e.g. low -cost textile production) and exposes these countries to the 
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volatility of the global market. The same exigency, which increased the productivity 
of Ethiopian employees in the short term, also puts their income opportunities at risk 
by exposing them to tides and flows of international markets (Keyzer et al. 2000; 
Geboye Desta 2009; Ahmed 2010). 
 This fascination with a productive workforce, however, exhibits the 
sometimes-contradictory nature of the establishment’s policy making. On the one 
hand, it is rooted in radical Marxism (Habtu 2003, 2004; Kefale and Aredo 2008). 
However, on the other hand, it sometimes allows neoliberal agendas to permeate its 
policy making (Abbink 2009; Bach 2011). It further highlights that the establishment 
only deployed ICTs when it directly served its developmental narrative (Beyene et al. 
2015). 
Figure 7.1 – Poster developed by my team promoting e-learning at the Adama University, 2010 (Source: 





7.3.2 The notion of global competitiveness 
The Ethiopian establishment’s intrusion into the private sector is widely explored in 
the literature (Furtado and Smith 2009; Altenburg 2010; Lefort 2012). Whereas its 
rationale is subject to continuous criticism from both the international private sector 
as well as the donor community, the establishment repeatedly asserts its primacy in 
terms of private sector policy making. The following account from a government 
official shows the rationale behind this interventionism.  
I think actually many [people] think it is a historical thing that the private 
industry has been somewhat weak and plus there is also a belief currently 
that the government can play a key role with the resources it has in terms of 
moving things forward. (ET 15) 
 Altenburg (2010), Kelsall (2011) and Oqubay (2015) provide excellent 
accounts of the EPRDF establishment’s industrialisation policy and its interventionist 
posture with regard to private sector development. These policies are rooted in the 
direct critique of the neoliberal policies of international organisations such as the IMF 
and the World Band during the 1990s. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi championed this 
progressive critique (Weis 2014), which resulted in the establishment’s 
interventionist industrialisation policy (c.f. 4.1.4). Oqubay (2015) and Brautigam et. 
al. (2016) point out that these policies aimed at retaining Ethiopia’s sovereignty over 
its economic policy making as well as protecting its immature industrial sector. 
Moreover, from 2002 one can observe a convergence between the protectionist 
policies of the Zenawi government and Chinese growth models (Brautigam et. al. 
2016). Whereas the focus of these policies on processing primary goods as the 
driver for industrial development have been heavily debated (Cramer 2003), the 
steady annual GDP growth, averaging well above 10% for almost ten years, confirms 
their success.  
Key to the establishment’s industrialisation policy is the export orientation of 
key economic sectors (Oqubay 2015). While the previous subsection demonstrated 
the importance of ICTs with regard to increasing industrial productivity in general, 
this subsection analyses the relationship between the establishment’s export-led 
strategy and the role designated for ICTs. 
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In transnational informational scholarship, ICTs are a key component to 
facilitate the exchange between national economies and the global market. 
Moreover, Souter (2004) suggests that ICTs provide a leeway for transnational 
companies to extend their influence on these economies. The availability of ICTs is a 
prerequisite to entice foreign investments (Steinmueller 2001). This view was 
confirmed by a donor representative: 
Die deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit hat sicherlich auch das Interesse 
die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Äthiopier auf eine individuelle Ebene and auf 
eine company Ebene auf ein internationales Niveau zu bringen, dass es auch 
deutsche Firmen auf die äthiopische markt kommen and hier gute Angestellte, 
human resources, finden. Oder Partnerfirmen finden mit dem sie kooperieren 
können. [...] Und dadurch, dass Äthiopier in der Nutzung von ICTs trainiert 
werden, auch eine größere Erfolg für deutsche Investitionen garantiert wäre. 
Das ist meine persöhnliche Meinung, dass auch CIM and die GIZ ein großes 
Interesse beziehungsweise mit ihren Interventionen einen Auftrag [von der 
deutschen Regierung] haben das quasi mit herzustellen. [...] Was meiner 
Meinung nach auch 100% legitim ist, weil sowohl GIZ and CIM hauptsächlich 
aus Steuergelder finanziert sind and daher auch die Interessen der deutschen 
Steuerzahlern ja vertritt. [German development co-operation certainly has the 
interest to bring the competitiveness of the Ethiopians to an international level, 
both on an individual and a company level, in order to allow German 
companies to come here and find good employees, human resources. Or to 
find partner companies to work together with. [...] And through training 
Ethiopians in the use of ICTs, a higher rate of success can be guaranteed for 
German investments. My personal opinion is that CIM and GIZ also have a 
stake, or rather are commissioned [by the German government] to bring this 
about through their interventions. [...] Something that is, in my opinion, 100% 
legitimate, because both GIZ and CIM are mainly financed from government 
taxes and hence represent the interests of the German taxpayers.]  (ET 11) 
 That donor agencies act as facilitators of national or corporate economic 
interests is widely debated in the literature (Martens et al. 2002; Martens 2005; 
Radelet et al. 2006). This perception was something from which I sought to distance 
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myself in my professional life, but it is admittedly widespread among recipients, as 
the following note from my diary indicates: 
Yesterday X [a representative of one of the programme’s key partners] 
explained to me that GIZ´s actual goal is to facilitate market opportunities for 
German companies. (Research diary 20/02/2011, Addis Ababa) 
This general sentiment regarding the intentions of bilateral donor agencies is a 
fascinating one, however, more from the side of the Ethiopian establishment.  
  The establishment recognised and supported the use of ICTs to facilitate the 
export of goods from its key industrial sectors. Here, however, I exclusively rely on 
my own experience within ECBP.  As I described in Section 4.2, my team in ECBP 
installed Human Resource, Customer Relationship and Enterprise Resource 
Management systems in six textile companies (Almeda, MAA Garment, Adama 
Spinning, Addis Garment, Novastar, Knit to Finish) as part of the country’s 
industrialisation plan. Due to their production inefficiencies, many of the Ethiopian 
companies that the government had designated as export-oriented enterprises (cf. 
PASDEP and GTP) lost numerous international customers, which included Tchibo, 
C&A as well as the American National Football League. The delays were attributed 
to failures in store and customer relationship management (e. g. late delivery of 
materials or late product shipping). The introduction of ICTs was intended to serve 
the purpose of faster communication with suppliers and customers alike as well a to 
increase production speed. Numerous manual administration protocols had to be 
replaced by ICTs in order to accelerate production as well as output (Figures 7.2 and 
7.3).  
 This evolving sense within ECBP regarding how ICTs will be best able to 
contribute to economic development – the programme’s main mandate – is reflected 
in its 2011 (C.C.) five-year plan. This plan draws a direct line between ICTs and 
Ethiopia’s industrial development. 
The objective of the department [on.e | eCapacity Development] is facilitating 
and accelerating capacity development processes using ICT enabled tools to 
support efforts for industrial development in Ethiopia.           
(PowerPoint slide, ECBP Five Year Plan, 2011 C.C.) 
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Even though the sentence is somewhat muddled with development jargon, it is 
explicit about the role of ICTs as an auxiliary to support industrial transformation in 
Ethiopia. 
Figure 7.2 – Manual store management at a major Ethiopian textile exporter (Source: author, 2010) 
Figure 7.3 – Installing an Enterprise Resource Management system at a major Ethiopian textile exporter 
(Source: author, 2010) 
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 Figure 7.4 illustrates the impact of ICTs on the store management and human 
resource management of two companies. ICTs had to contribute to the better 
planning of human and material resources within Ethiopian companies in order to 
eliminate delivery problems that resulted from complex paper-based resource 
management. The establishment understood that the key to the success of 
Ethiopia’s industrialisation is the compatibility of the export-oriented industrial sectors 
with the global economy. Good communication with customers and timely delivery 
were essential for securing the necessary sales that, in turn, secure jobs and 
income. The introduction of ICTs not only increased productivity but also obtained 
the necessary compatibility to and interoperability with the systems of the global 
economy (e.g. online procurement and sales management systems).  
Figure 7.4 – Benchmarking report prepared for the MOCB illustrating the advantages of HRM and ERP 
systems (Source: author, 2011) 
 
7.3.3 The non-production of ICTs 
A tale of contradiction often re-told by both donor and government 
representatives is the establishment’s singular focus on ICT infrastructure in the 
face of the repeated breakdown of the very same infrastructure. Many criticised 
the Ethiopian government’s ICT infrastructure development (Belachew 2010; 
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Lessa et al. 2011). Nationwide ICT projects – exclusively managed by the MOCB 
– such as the WoredaNet (a dedicated uplink connection for district governance 
offices) and the SchoolNet (a dedicated uplink connection and educational 
broadcast for 200 high schools) projects stood as symbols of a series of non-
functional, but grand ICT development measures instigated by the establishment 
(Adam 2010; Gagliardone 2014). Despite the apparent failure of these 
infrastructure-building initiatives, they provide a semblance of progress largely 
due to their sheer size and complexity, (Gagliardone 2011, 2014; Beyene et al.  
2015). 
 The establishment’s neglect with regard to the breakdown of these mega-
projects questions how it intends to use ICTs for inclusive socio-economic 
development (GTP 2010). It underlines the GTP’s intention that ICTs are not 
considered as a source of high value creation for economic growth (Sklair 2001; 
Carroll and Fennema 2002; Carroll et al. 2010), but instead they play an auxiliary 
role to the establishment's industrial endeavour (GTP 2010).  
 The case of the long-planned ICT Park in Addis Ababa also raises the 
question whether intentions to prioritise ICTs really exist in Ethiopia. One senior 
private sector representative echoed the negative perception widely shared 
throughout the ICT scene in Ethiopia with regard to the ICT park: 
Ethiopia is also building an IT [ICT] Park that is not properly connected to the 
Internet. It could be another white elephant. (ET 04) 
 I first heard about the ICT Park when I arrived in Addis Ababa in early 2008. 
Over the years, recurrent invitations to government presentations on the ICT park 
followed. My colleagues in the MOCB were asked every year to propose new ideas 
for equipping the ICT Park, which remained a 3D rendered idea on PowerPoint 
slides. It gradually became an object of mockery and ridicule among my colleagues 
as hopes for its construction faded. A donor representative’s account describes the 
fading hopes of many ICT practitioners in Addis Ababa as follows: 
I am sure you know this ICT park concept. When did they start talking about 
it? 2002 [C.C.], right? You know once someone came to ice [a co-working 
space in downtown Addis Ababa] and they preach me about this ICT park. 
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Then I said unless I saw it happening I don't believe it is going to happen. [...] 
So this [ICT park] is a simple indication that most of the things they do is a 
show off. (ET 19) 
 These accounts are interesting in the light of how neighbouring countries, 
such as Kenya and Rwanda, pursue Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) agendas, 
while the Ethiopian government seems to neglect this economic opportunity. 
However, the account of Mann et al. (2015) suggests that these pursuits by the 
Rwandan and Kenyan governments remain unrealised even after years of promise. 
In the light of this, one could even commend the Ethiopian government for its 
wisdom of not engaging in this BPO quest.  
7.3.4 ICTs as an auxiliary to economic transformation 
The previous sections outlined the argument that ICTs would create and maintain 
Ethiopia’s efficient integration into the global market. However, ICTs also play 
another auxiliary role. The Ethiopian establishment, unlike many other governments 
of the global South (Ostry 1995; Mutula and Van Brakel 2007), did not chase the 
mirage of rapid economic growth through the provision of ICT-based services (e.g. 
outsourcing). ICTs are restricted to the role of enabling the establishment’s vision of 
industrialisation. They are intended to facilitate the export of goods necessary to 
reaching the penultimate goal of increased foreign currency earnings (GTP 2010). 
The role of ICTs was to facilitate the global competitiveness of the Ethiopian 
economy and not to produce informational goods and services for the global market. 
ICTs primarily served the purpose of accelerating the global competitiveness of 
traditional sectors of the Ethiopian economy.  
 The restricted deployment of ICTs enabled the establishment to maintain its 
sovereignty in terms of economic policymaking and to evade the intrusion of 
transnational corporations. This ability to outmanoeuvre the  forces of the neoliberal 
global economy provides a novel perspective and, to some extent, an antithesis to 
Harris's (1999, 2008) and Overbeek's (2002) claim that transnational capitalism, and 
especially the integration of ICTs, erodes the boundaries of national economies. The 
ability to resist the global mechanisms of informational capitalism goes hand in hand 
with the establishment’s notorious resistance towards the transnational centres of 
power (World Bank, International Monetary Fund). This resistance stems from the 
 235 
Ethiopian establishment’s direct critique of neoliberal policy-making (Zenawi 
2012).  While this self-determination earns praise for the Ethiopian establishment 
from those who celebrate its resistance to the forces of the neoliberal global 
economy (Altenburg 2010), the restrictive provision of ICTs (e.g. overpriced internet 
services, the installation of a nation-wide firewall) might be considered rather 
counter-productive to the nation’s socio-economic development. The following two 
subsections address this issue by interrogating accounts of transparency, civil 
service reform (7.4) and corruption (7.5). 
 
7.4 ICT use in the civil service 
 
Section 7.3 illustrated the strictly compartmentalised role ICTs play in transforming 
the Ethiopian economy. ICTs are solely an enabler of the industrialisation of 
traditional sectors of the economy. In contrast to the premises of informational 
scholarship that declare the demise of industrial production (Castells 2011a, 2011b; 
Castells and Hall 2014), the Ethiopian establishment uses ICTs as an auxiliary to its 
industrialisation programme. More importantly, the previous section also 
demonstrates that economic sovereignty can be defended against transnational 
capitalism. 
 ICTs certainly facilitate the accretion of further margins of productivity as well 
as secure access to the global market. Whereas critiques of informational capitalism 
problematise the steady encroachment of rationalisation and standardisation of the 
labour force through ICTs (Holtgrewe and Scholten 2005; Wagenaar and Boersma 
2008; Comor 2010), there is little understanding of other mechanisms that enforce 
compliance with global capitalism. This section, however, garners a distinctly specific 
outcome of my empirical work that sheds a different light on the role of ICTs in the 
global South.  The frequent lamentations of my informants about bureaucracy caught 
my attention and made me realise that service delivery is a narrative located within 
the public and not the private sector. 
 Initially, I mistook this body of ideas as an element of the global 
competitiveness narrative. This was partly due to the fact that this narrative was 
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fragmented and was often mentioned together with economic development. 
Moreover, my informants spoke about it in an abbreviated form, only mentioning 
service, which led me to link it to economic development. It took me considerable 
effort to separate the narrative of service delivery from notions of economic growth 
that characterised the narrative of global competitiveness. 
 
7.4.1 Issues of transparency and corruption 
During the 2013 period of my fieldwork, I observed a gradual change in public 
opinion with regard to the establishment in Ethiopia. The ubiquitous references to 
issues of transparency and the recurrent remarks about corruption made me curious. 
Feyissa (2011) shows that the Ethiopian establishment has profiled itself as a non-
corrupt state, which has also been widely acknowledged by the donor community 
(Feyissa 2011) and has earned Ethiopia several commendations (McLaughlin 2005; 
Hackenesch 2011). Most strikingly, however, the issue of corruption came up within 
the context of ICTs (in the interviews and appreciative inquiry sessions alike).  
 Initially, I understood the recurring suggestions from my informants to use 
ICTs in order to increase transparency as reflecting the prominence of petty 
corruption in the civil service. I was aware of cases of minor bribery, as exemplified 
by the following account about public services from an Ethiopian returnee: 
Dann hatte ich auch dass Gefühl, daß [der Mitarbeiter meint] na ja wenn du 
mir noch 200 Birr [Ethiopian currency] oder 300 Birr dazu gibst dann, weisst 
du, würde ich vielleicht eine Ausnahme machen. [Than I had the impression 
that well [the clerk was suggesting that], if you add another 200 birr or 300 
birr, you know, I might make an exception.] (ET 05) 
The entirely unexpected number of references to issues of transparency and 
accountability made it clear that the issue needed to be unpacked. In fact, they 
raised two entirely different problems. On the one hand, they highlighted the slow 
and bureaucratic civil service. 
By now in Ethiopia, this is my analysis, we have this bureaucratic nature … 
we are, and I should say, a bureaucratic people. So to solve this one, ICT 
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solution is very good. [...] at least will run by itself. For example, once the 
request is in the system you cannot say ‘Oh you are late’ and so on. No, the 
request is here, it is in the system. The ICT solution itself kind of force him 
[the public servant] to do things [and he cannot say] ‘No the paper is not yet 
here, I haven't received it’. (ET 08) 
 Here, the respondent refers to bureaucracy, since bureaucrats were highly 
trivialised and appeared rather as representations of populist cultural critiques. I 
briefly looked at the issue of corruption based on its prevalence in my empirical 
material. The preponderance of this issue shows that, in spite of Ethiopia’s relatively 
clean reputation in terms of corruption, covert forms of corruption exist. Evidently, the 
further exploration of this issue would go beyond the main focus of my thesis, but 
this was nevertheless an interesting issue. 
On the other hand, however, as I dug into this issue in more detail, I realised 
that there was more at stake than petty crime or a laggard state bureaucracy. The 
following two notes from my research diary show my own grappling with this 
phenomenon: 
Everybody seems to be all of sudden concerned with corruption. Even XY [a 
high-ranking government employee] complained about the rise of corruption. 
Particularly strange is that, all of a sudden, the military is a topic in public 
conversations. I had never heard anyone talking of military officials in public 
before. (Research diary, 31/07/2013, Addis Ababa) 
Between two interviews, I met some old friends in a café at Arat Kilo 
[downtown Addis Ababa]. Just wanted to understand why everyone seems to 
be talking about corruption nowadays. They explained that there have been 
repeated campaigns that use corruption allegations against businessmen and 
high-level politicians. (Research diary, 03/08/2013, Addis Ababa) 
 The latter account exposes the more implicit and organised forms of 
corruption in Ethiopia. The cracks that appeared after the death of the late Prime 
Minister Zenawi (August 2012) within the otherwise monolithic establishment allow 
for a more critical view on the inner mechanisms of the Ethiopian economy. Section 
7.5 will give separate attention to this particular issue. The following two subsections 
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engage two particular issues with regard to the establishment’s ICT policies: first, the 
deployment of ICTs within the framework of a wide ranging civil service reform 
(7.4.2); and second, some of the paradoxes that surround the notion of ICTs in 
Ethiopia (7.4.3). 
 
7.4.2 The economisation of the civil service 
As discussed in Section 7.3, the establishment’s main motivation for utilising ICTs 
was to increase economic growth. I suggested that the academic discourse on the 
Ethiopian establishment’s ICT policies is, however, often simplistic. As mentioned 
above, the accounts provided by Gagliardone (2014) and Gagliardone et al. (2015) 
on the Ethiopian government’s techno-politics had a major influence on my research, 
especially since these articles appeared during the final phase of my analysis (2014–
2015). Their analysis skilfully dissected the underlying motives for ICT megaprojects 
in Ethiopia. However, it surprised me that the research team – that comprised two 
Ethiopian researchers as well – exclusively focused on ICT mega-projects. While 
they criticise the way the establishment exploits the symbolic powers of ICTs through 
such mega-projects in order to create a semblance of progress, they leave other 
areas that constitute the state’s technopolitics unmentioned. I would argue that the 
apparent failure of the projects that Gagliardone et al. (2015) criticise only marginally 
affects the success of the establishment’s techno-politics. I suggest that the 
Ethiopian state’s techno-politics – let alone that of the establishment – cannot be 
restricted to ICT mega-projects. In my view, these are only the tip of the iceberg of a 
multi-layered techno-political regime laid out by the government. Other, less visible 
or less triumphalist state-led ICT initiatives also belong to and complement the 
transformation process envisioned by the government’s ICT techno-politics. The 
general reform of the civil service that ensued in 2009 – an area I had particularly 
good access – provides other insights into the rationale behind the government’s ICT 
techno-politics. 
 The following excerpt from the Daily Ethiopia, a government-run newspaper, 
provides a good account of what motivates the government to embark on the reform 
of the civil service: 
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The number of foreign investors has been growing by about 60% over the 
past years, but only 20% of the investors have actually started operations due 
to the bureaucratic nature of the customs and financial institutions according 
to a report submitted by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to parliament. 
(Daily Ethiopia, 10/04/2010) 
 Subsection 7.3.4 thematised the issue of foreign investment and illustrated 
that ICTs play a key role in facilitating the establishment’s industrialisation policy. 
Investment into ICT services is not encouraged or, with regard to the local market, is 
actually outright forbidden. The ineffectiveness of the civil service, however, is a 
bottleneck to foreign investments, as the following comment shows:  
So all the government institutions in the country [...] they need to fix all these 
processes through ICT. To have a very relatively faster services and quality 
services. (ET 10) 
 The public service reform process is an archetypical example of the state-led 
developmental discourse in Ethiopia. The MOCB led various campaigns that 
intended to re-gear public administration around notions borrowed from the private 
sector. The reform’s two most characteristic campaigns were borrowed from the 
management literature of the early 1990s: 
1. Business Process Reengineering (BPR) – in 2009-10; and 
2. Balanced Scorecard (BSC) – from 2010. 
 
 The apparent influence of New Public Management – similar to its effects on 
the notion of capacity development (cf. Section 5.3) – indicates the establishment’s 
gradual acceptance of and shift towards neoliberal  development models. The 
establishment’s adherence to its socialist roots on the one hand, and its partial 
acceptance and adoption of capitalist development modules is similar to the Chinese 
growth model. The introduction of management notions such as BPR and BSC from 
New Public Management into the civil service is part of a wider interventionist 
industrial strategy. 
As originally devised by Johansson et al. (1993), Jacobson et al. (1994) and 
Grover et al. (1995), ICTs play a key role in BPR. The Ethiopian establishment 
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accordingly also highlighted the importance of ICTs and encouraged their use by the 
BPR teams: 
Currently various activities are being undertaken to establish institutional 
transformation such as BPR and BSC. BPR is fully operational in most of 
federal and regional government institutions, while BSC is at its first step to be 
implemented. Hence for effective, efficient, transparent and accountable civil 
service as well as to increase their contribution for institutional transformation 
it is important to support the reform process, i.e., BPR and BSC, with ITC. 
(GTP 2010, p. 60) 
 A high level government official from the ICT Center of Excellence in Ethiopia 
also volunteered to explain the methodology devised to streamline ICTs into the BPR 
process: 
We feel that one key concept that can make a difference in terms of ICT [is to 
make it] better align ... with business goals. That is the concept of service 
management. The concept of service management is that basically ICT and 
the business ... that they [both] identify … basically the business says ‘Here 
are the key areas where we need ICT to deliver on. These are the key 
obstacles or key opportunity areas and then say we need you to deliver on 
that’. And ICT identifying from that saying ‘Here is what we can deliver on.’ So 
to have ICTs deliver really on key and measurable services [within 
organisations] that can impact the organisation in a meaningful way. (ET 15) 
Between 2009 and 2011, I gathered first-hand experience with the BPR 
reform, first as it was carried out at public universities, and later when it reached my 
department in the MOCB. The encounters with various BPR teams, however, 
showed that the reform was primarily an exercise of political education. For example, 
none of the BPR meetings I participated in discussed the use of ICTs, even though 
that was the reason for me being invited.  
The submission of the civil service to the rationales of neoliberal management 
models such as BPR and BSC exemplifies the convoluted reality of policy making 
that comes with the adherence to one’s socialist roots on the one hand and the 
urgency for economic development on the other. The professionalisation of the civil 
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service is a necessity for driving economic growth through ensuring Ethiopia’s 
compatibility with the global economy. It is nevertheless remarkable that BPR and 
BSC provided ample opportunity for the introduction of ICTs, it largely failed to do so. 
The following subsection illustrates a set of possible reasons that led to the 
underutilisation ICTs in the public service.  
 
7.4.3 Obstruction from within 
The failure of using ICTs to expedite the reform process left an overwhelming 
impression among my informants. As the following account from a mid-level 
government representative testifies, BPR had little lasting value since politically 
motivated campaigns were a regular occurrence in the public service: 
BPR’s idea was to make your service effective and efficient. It was promoted 
as a campaign and then after a while everyone forgets about it. People just 
tend to forget the previous one [reform campaign]. […] They [ICTs] could have 
played a prominent role [in the reform, but] officials are not that keen on ICTs 
utilization. […] But particularly decision makers, still they are sticking on the 
customary way of communicating and the customary way of designing 
process. (ET 07) 
 Various bodies of literature discuss the change of power structures associated 
with the introduction of ICTs (Silva and Figueroa 2002; Thompson 2005; 
Constantinides and Barrett 2006; Avgerou 2008), as well as the ensuing mistrust 
(Chepaitis 2002; Kapurubandara and Lawson 2006; Kuriyan et al. 2010; Alam, et al. 
2012). Issues of organisational hierarchies and potential bureaucratic power-claiming 
that can undermine the reform, were systematically disregarded in the public service 
reform in Ethiopia and forebode its failure. A medium level government employee 
illustrated the problem as follows: 
Because what I have seen is, when there is a system – for example there was 
[a] manual system and this was changed to software system. The only thing, 
however, what changed is that there are computers in front of these people 
and maybe there is more printing done. But at the end, it is even more 
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complicated and every now and then there is an ICT officer, a help desk guy 
at the back of these people. A system hunk which [whom] nobody 
understands, nobody knows. So basically they think that the whole process is 
interrupted because of this solution. The ICT solution is creating more 
problems. When you see in their face[s], they see being rejected, maybe even 
hopeless, because he [the public servant] cannot solve it [the software 
problem]. You see – he [the public servant] is at the mercy of some guy [the 
system administrator] coming from the seventh floor or third floor with his nice 
ICT terminologies and so on. And eventually what happens that he [the 
system administrator] doesn't fix it. So he [the public servant] has a mistrust. 
(ET 08) 
A more aggravating challenge for the use of ICTs in public administration was 
that it disregarded institutional hierarchies. I observed that many of my informants in 
the public sector lamented the lack of willingness among civil servants to implement 
ICTs. The following account from a high-level government employee describes well 
what many of my informants were suggesting indirectly: 
The question should be: Is there buy-off from the top management? Not in a 
lip service way but in a very strong way. Where they are engaged pushing 
aside resistance, which always arise, when you change the basics of an 
organisation. (ET 15) 
 This section first followed the issue of transparency and corruption that 
emerged in my empirical work. By bringing together the evidence from Section 7.2 
with the questions arising from civil service reform, I suggest that increasing 
effectiveness – along the lines of corporate management – within the civil service 
played a key role in bringing the government’s industrial policy to fruition. In order to 
remove the operational bottlenecks in the civil service that hampered economic 
growth, it was subjected to a reform to bring effectiveness and efficiency. Despite the 
prominent role designated for ICTs to increase efficiency within the civil service, 
there is little evidence of its successful deployment. Furthermore, it illustrated the 
internal mechanisms that obstruct the implementation of ICTs.  
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7.5 Smoke and mirrors – Who benefits in the end? 
 
Sections 7.3 and 7.4, respectively, demonstrated the compartmentalisation of ICTs 
in Ethiopia. They argued that ICTs played an auxiliary role to the establishment’s 
industrialisation policy. ICTs are relegated to facilitate the interaction with the global 
market, but do not constitute a priority as an industrial segment to be developed. In 
fact, the establishment showed little signs to develop the ICT industry. This very 
quest for effectiveness and efficiency both in the development of the private sector 
as well as in the reform of the civil service, demonstrates the complex, and 
sometimes contradictory nature of economic policy making during Meles Zenawi’s 
reign.  At the same time, it is important to note that the establishment’s  
interventionist industrial policy successfully protected the country’s economic 
sovereignty from the intrusion of transnational capital (McLaughlin 2005; 
Hackenesch 2011), which would have jeopardised long-term economic growth as 
well as employment creation. I also wanted to draw attention to the complex interplay 
between protecting the country’s interests and the promotion of ICTs. In certain 
cases, however, the restrictions on the use of ICTs (e.g. high cost of ownership for 
internet connections) might have produced adverse economic effects as well. 
Contrary to the assertion of transnational informational scholarship, the 
Ethiopian establishment successfully asserted its economic sovereignty (Kelsall 
2011; Weis 2014). However, the question remains open as to whether it is for the 
benefit of the Ethiopian population. The following subsection briefly explores this 
question through evidence of systematic and high-level corruption.  
 
7.5.1 The deep state 
Subsection 7.4.1 already raised the issue of transparency and corruption. I argued 
that accounts of petty bribery in the civil service concealed a different form of 
corruption in Ethiopia. Furthermore, I also alluded to the fact that the issue of 
corruption seems to have appeared after the death of the late Prime Minister, Meles 
Zenawi, in August 2012. Many of the conversations indicate a change in the political 
dynamics of the country. Some of my interviewees reported that since Zenawi's 
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death, an internal power struggle was going on within the EPRDF. It struck me as 
something unusual, in the light of the Ethiopians’ pride in being a fairly non-corrupt 
country, which also corresponded to my experience while living and working there. 
Therefore, I made the following note in my research diary: 
These allegations [of corruption] are only a proxy for the power struggle within 
the EPRDF. Since Zenawi did not leave a political heir, both the conservative 
“bush-fighter” as well as the liberal branch of the party raise claims to power. 
(Research diary, 03/08/2013, Addis Ababa) 
The internal tension between the old, military and the new, political elites was 
not kept in check. The internal struggle to safeguard economic positions was thus 
fought through mutual accusations of corruption (Levine 2007; Hassan 2013). The 
change in people’s perception with regard to ICT capacity development and the 
power struggle among the party elites signals Ethiopia’s farewell from a tightly knit, 
post-revolutionary political and military elite as this elite is disintegrating. This 
political struggle exposed the systemic corruption within the party-state (Minilik 2012; 
Hess-Nielsen 2013). 
Let me come to this corruption. The government knows all the corrupted 
people, they know, [but] they wouldn't touch them. But you know, [for 
example] Marton, Person X, and Person Y and menamen menamen [and so 
on are corrupt]. When Marton start[s] asking questions, they will pull out that 
[evidence]. „Oh Marton you are doing this so you will go to jail.” (ET 19) 
 The question of systematic corruption within the EPRDF system does not 
concern this thesis in further detail. However, the interlocking relations between state 
and party-owned conglomerates illustrate some of the contradictions between the 
establishment’s inclusive development policies and its politico-economic 
protectionism (Vaughan and Gebremichael 2011). In terms of ICT infrastructure for 
example the establishment systematically discouraged or outright disabled private 
investment in mobile telephony, whereas it allowed this type of investments for party-
owned conglomerates:  
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The greatest news today is the one with ZTE setting up a mobile assembly 
plant in the Amhara Region. The plant is being set up in co-operation with 
Tiret. (Research diary 21/12/09, Addis Ababa) 
 Two points need to be mentioned here. First, this investment in co-operation 
with ZTE did not succeed in entering the market before 2012. Moreover, the 
programme was hidden from public discussion. Between late 2009 and early 2012, I 
could not find any publicly available information on this mobile plant. Second, it was 
an investment by Tiret, an EPRDF affiliated national endowment fund (owned by the 
Amhara branch of EPRDF). Tiret is the second biggest national endowment in 
Ethiopia and was set up after the guerrilla war ended in 1991. It is closely linked to 
the guerrilla army turned Ethiopian Armed Forces. As also confirmed by Vaughan 
and Gebremichael's (2011) account, the financial resources of these endowments 
were partly amassed during the guerrilla war or originated from weapon sales after 
the war. 
 Tiret’s TANA Mobile later faced intense competition from a Chinese mobile 
phone producer (Techno Mobile), which led to an intervention by the state, as 
depicted in the following account from a medium level government official: 
And they [Techno Mobile] have so much pressure from the government, 
because the government also sells its TANA mobile. Which [the phone] is not 
great. […] So they are against these peoples [Techno Mobile]. There is an 
unfair competition. TANA is Ethiopian; it belongs to the high officials 
(whispering). They couldn't penetrate the market very well and they are losing 
ground. (ET 08) 
 The establishment restricted opportunities for ICTs and monopolised the 
entire telecommunication infrastructure. At the same time, it seized business 
opportunities in ICTs for party-affiliated companies. I have discussed the merits of 
the somewhat restrictive and interventionist logic of the Ethiopian government’s 
industrial policy. Moreover, I have also credited the government’s strategy to by-pass 
the failings of policies that promote ICT outsourcing in neighbouring countries. 
Nevertheless, the granting of special privileges to party-owned corporations sheds 
light on the existence of other, to certain extent competing, economic agendas within 
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the EPRDF. The existence of a deep state or party-elite that operates outside the 
norms and prescriptions of Ethiopian industrial policy makes me question the makes 
me question whether we can speak of the state prioritising its own needs over that of 
the Ethiopian population. The development of the latter would genuinely benefit from 
better access to ICT services through private investment.  
7.5.2 Self-reflection 
In Subsection 7.4.1, I briefly reflected on how my positionality initially inhibited a 
critical analysis of ICT capacity development. My direct embeddedness in both the 
GTZ/GIZ as well as MOCB structures restricted critical questioning and the 
unpacking of inherent controversies within these systems. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 
uncovered the ways in which the Ethiopian establishment enforced its own notion of 
ICT utilisation and submitted it to its industrialisation policy. More importantly, the 
previous sections also argued that the efforts to connect the Ethiopian economy to 
the global market indirectly aided the economic interests of the clandestine state-
military complex. The privileges granted to party-owned companies allowed them to 
exploit business opportunities in the otherwise restricted realm of ICT industries.  
 The above sections made me realise that due to my position within the 
establishment’s structures, I was complicit in advancing the profit-seeking of the 
EPRDF establishment. My work with party-owned enterprises (especially the 
EFFORT group), exposed some of the special economic privileges that these 
companies were granted. The MOCB mandate to oversee the introduction of 
Human Resource, Customer Relationship and Enterprise Resource Management 
Systems at a select group of companies allowed me to work with those 
companies that spearheaded the establishment’s efforts to increases export 
revenues. These measures directly impacted the lives of thousands of unskilled, 
low-wage workers by enforcing the precise control of working hours, the 
measurement of individual productivity and the efficient use of resources.  
 
 Admittedly, I hardly reflected on the ethical implications of bringing ICTs to the 
private sector at that time. My subscription to and support for party-owned 
companies does shock me in hindsight.  Although I was critical of the 
establishment’s productivity narrative as it was forced onto the university system 
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(Subsection 7.4.1), I readily executed the Ethiopian establishment’s wishes in the 
private sector at the same time. Whereas, the benefits of the Ethiopian industrial 
policy for raising people out of poverty are without question, I consider the granting 
of special privileges to party-owned companies to be questionable not only from a 
business law perspective, but also from an ethical standpoint. This apparent paradox 
illustrates that despite my critical stance on EPRDF’s authoritarian 





This chapter has traced the constructionist agendas of ICT promotion among donor 
agencies, as well as the role of the Ethiopian establishment with respect to ICTs.  It 
has three main conclusions. 
 First, it has illustrated the ambiguous relationship between ICTs and capacity 
development. Furthermore, it validated the absence of constructionist-participatory 
agendas for promoting ICTs in the donor community. The scarce evidence of 
constructionist notions among donors further erodes hopes for more participatory 
approaches to ICT4D. The misappropriation of ICTs for delivering on various other 
agency priorities testifies to the lack of relevant methodologies as well as a deeper 
understanding of technology. It also highlighted that donor representatives’ 
motivations for promoting ICTs are highly disjointed. Individual convictions and 
agendas provide different small-scale rationales for using ICTs.  
 Second, this chapter also outlined some of the specific characteristics of the 
Ethiopian establishment’s practice of deploying ICTs for economic development. 
Most importantly, it identified two key parameters that dominate the establishment’s 
use of ICTs. On the one hand, it illustrated the auxiliary role that ICTs play in the 
establishment’s pursuit of economic development. This chapter highlighted the ways 
ICTs enable the progressive forming of a more productive and efficient industrial 
sector. However, these enhancements increase the control that company owners, 
who are often members of the establishment itself, exert over their employees. The 
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creation of a new mechanism of control further extends the limits of the rising 
transnational capitalist developmental state in Ethiopia. On the other, this chapter 
also demonstrated that in spite of the growing transnational pressure, Ethiopia 
successfully averted an influx of transnational corporations that could question or 
compromise its economic sovereignty (Kelsall 2011; Weis 2014; Oqubay 2015).  
 Third, the chapter briefly explored the internal antagonism within the EPRDF 
establishment. Clandestine linkages between the party, the state and the military – 
best exemplified by party-owned companies – for example allow the EPRDF to 
circumvent the restrictions on investments into the production of ICTs. This covert 
access to otherwise sealed off market niches, such as mobile phone production, 





Chapter 8 – Non-hegemonic narratives of ICTs 





I spent the night of Hosni Mubarak’s resignation (February 14th 2011) in an Ethiopian 
government resort. After our workshop finished, my colleagues from the Ministry of 
Civil Service (MOCS–ET) all retired to the TV room of the resort to follow the live 
broadcast on Al-Jazeera from Cairo. My Ethiopian colleagues – all of them in the 
middle and higher ranks of their ministries – celebrated Mubarak’s resignation later 
that night. The cheerful acceptance was partly shocking, since a political leader 
similar to Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi had just been ousted from office by a popular 
revolution. However, I had to realize that no-one present there drew a parallel 
between Ethiopia and Egypt at that time. The reason for the celebratory atmosphere 
after Mubarak’s resignation had nothing to do with the popular uprising or a 
Facebook revolution, but was pure expression of Ethiopian nationalism. An Ethiopian 
colleague of mine explained that 
 now we can eventually build a dam on the Nile. Mubarak will not be 
 able to stop us anymore. (Research diary 10/02/2011, Nazret) 
 Eight months later (October 2011), I was accidentally caught up in a mob in 
downtown Cairo. The incident became known as the Maspero Massacre, which 
resulted in 28 deaths and 212 injuries. Having just recently arrived in Cairo, I was not 
yet part of GIZ’s emergency telephone cascade and in a somewhat careless fit, I had 
neglected to collect information before entering the street. This incident made me 
painfully aware of how ordinary Cairo residents orient themselves amidst the daily 
violence on the city’s streets. I was rescued by a cab driver who used Twitter to 
circumvent the hotspots of violence in downtown Cairo and to cross the Nile safely 
just behind Maspero Square. By October 2011, Egyptians had reconfigured social 
media into a navigational tool, which served to disseminate security information 
 250 
across all segments of society. This incident showed me novel ways of using social 
media and initiated to rethink my former notions about its use. 
 Chapters 5, 6 and 7 explored the ways in which both the Ethiopian and the 
Egyptian establishments enforced their own discourses of transnational capitalism. 
The Ethiopian establishment deployed both the notion of capacity development and 
ICTs to direct its citizens towards a thoroughly transnationalist economic 
development. In Egypt on contrary, I observed a segregation of the notion of 
capacity development. It was reserved for the non-governmental sector and 
represented an anti-establishment narrative. At the same time with regard to the 
promotion of ICTs both the EPRDF and the Mubarak establishments used the 
symbolic powers of ICTs to create a sense of modernity for their particular national 
discourses. Chapter 6 illustrated that the Ethiopian establishment promoted ICTs as 
part of its nation-building project, but also that its ICT capacity development 
discourse was not seeking the introduction of an informational mode of capitalism. In 
contrast, the Mubarak regime's ICT promotion was explicitly geared towards 
transforming the Egyptian economy into an informational capitalist economy 
(Nederveen Pieterse 2005; Kozma 2005; Murphy 2009). 
  By engaging informationalist bodies of literature, Chapter 6 furthermore 
demonstrated deterministic notions of ICTs within the dominant and normative 
national discourses. Donor agencies as well as the Ethiopian and Egyptian 
governments promoted ICTs in order to ascertain or maintain the global compatibility 
of their national economies. This chapter questions these normative discourses by 
focusing on three major aims. First, Section 8.2 explores grassroots notions of ICTs 
among Ethiopian and Egyptian technologists. This is done through both theoretical 
considerations and by interrogating the genealogy of grassroots technology 
communities. These critical insights are used to understand whether grassroots 
notions of ICTs can support individual agency to resist the dominant socio-economic 
discourses. Second, it traces the boundaries between dissent and loyalty within 
these technology-enabled surrogate communities (Section 8.3). The third aim is to 
examine fragments of transnational capitalist ideology that infiltrate online surrogate 
communities (Section 8.4). This will be instructive in demonstrating that the 
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dominance transnational technology companies wield through the provision of online 
platforms is not void of ideology. 
  
8.2 Non-hegemonic narratives of ICTs 
 
This section traces participatory narratives of ICTs in Ethiopia and Egypt. In 
particular, it examines how ICTs enable citizens to circumvent those nationalistic and 
hegemonic notions of ICTs examined in Chapter 6. I intentionally use the term 
grassroots throughout this chapter, although the technology communities explored 
here would not qualify to be called grassroots in development literature (Subsection 
3.3.1). I use the term grassroots here for the reason that members of the technology 
communities I worked with describe themselves as grassroots. Being a grassroots 
technology activist constitutes an important element, notwithstanding their non-
grassroots backgrounds, of their personal identities.  
 I am also aware that the privileged access to ICTs enjoyed by urban and 
essentially middle or upper middle class technologists in Ethiopia and Egypt is not 
representative of the grassroots’ situation more widely in these countries. However, 
their better access to ICTs allowed technologists to spearhead and promote 
alternative notions of ICTs in their countries. Even though these groups in both 
countries came from urban middle class backgrounds, their access to ICTs was 
significantly different. While technologists in Ethiopia were bound by restrictions and 
meagre infrastructure (Hanafizadeh et al. 2009), Egyptian technologists benefitted 
from the swift expansion of the telecommunication infrastructure in the late 1990s 
(Sayed and Westrup 2003; Kamel et al. 2009).  
 Accordingly, the latter were not only more affluent, but also better equipped 
and more connected than their Ethiopian counterparts. During my empirical work I 
often had the impression that I was seeing two subsequent stages of socio-economic 
and technological development. While certain phenomena were just arising in 
Ethiopia, they were already in full bloom or had completely vanished in Egypt. This 
difference was further amplified by the 25th of January uprising in Egypt. Therefore, 
in order to provide a somewhat more balanced account, I excavated as much 
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evidence from before the uprising as possible. Although the development of these 
narratives is asynchronous in the two countries, they mutually inform each other.  
 At the same time, my account does not contest that a plethora of other 
grassroots narratives of ICTs exist in both countries. Yet most of these do not 
question the establishment’s dominant discourse, at least not explicitly (Den Tandt 
2002; Atton 2003). For example, Negash (2006) and Adam (2007) explored how 
grassroots notions and practices of ICTs nurture the agency of rural communities in 
Ethiopia, while Wheeler (2007) and Mahmoud and Arima (2015) undertook similar 
analyses on the use of ICTs in informal settlements in Egypt. Nevertheless, these 
narratives do not question or expose the dominant economic or political discourse in 
the respective countries. This section traces grassroots narratives of ICTs among 
Ethiopian technologists that question the dominant socioeconomic discourse of their 
countries (Redden 2001; Hands 2004; Castells 2011a).  
 More specifically, this section explicitly examines grassroots narratives within 
communities that are built around the constituting power of ICTs. Chapter 3 
introduced the notion of technologists and technology communities. ICTs exert a 
constituting role in terms of their individual and group identities among local 
technologists (Komito 1998; Castells 2000; Haythornthwaite and Kendall 2010). 
Technology communities are characterised by a participatory culture (Jenkins 2006; 
Jenkins and Deuze 2008). Castells (2007) furthermore also suggests that ICT-
enabled agency within these communities is played out in occupied online spaces.  
 The notion of agency in constructionist and deterministic philosophies of 
technology is narrated through binary opposition. In particular, constructionist bodies 
of literature feature agency as the participatory action which is directed against the 
dominant or hegemonic practice (Feenberg et al. 2010; Feenberg 2011). However, in 
these accounts agency is geographically limited (Bijker and Law 1994; Bijker et al. 
2012). The malleability and negotiability of technology is often bound to the local by 
suggesting that it is constructed out of the premises and needs available locally. By 
doing so, technological constructionism often omits the growing availability of non-
local knowledge, particularly through the transnational impact of the Internet. Even 
though contemporary transnationalist and informationalist philosophies of technology 
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question this binarity, but at the same time tend to overemphasise or exaggerate the 
aspect of the global (Jenkins 2006; Castells 2007, 2011) . 
 
8.2.1 Global exposure 
The previous chapters demonstrated that the Ethiopian and Egyptian establishments 
linked the notion of development to nationalistic discourse. In the case of Ethiopia, 
national identity and socio-economic development formed a tightly knit and strictly 
controlled ideological construct. The submission to the ideology of Abyotawi 
democracy was a requirement for Ethiopian citizens (Bach 2011). Questioning the 
establishment’s developmental discourse was considered anti-Ethiopian. Both 
capacity development and ICTs played a constituting role in the formation of this 
national discourse. In contrast, since the Egyptian establishment had already 
abandoned its socialist ideals during the 1970s (Open Doors Policy), the Mubarak 
establishment (1982-2011) could allow more socio-economic diversity. In the case of 
Egypt, capacity development and ICTs were only employed if they served the 
interests of the country’s elite (Zubaida 1992; Blaydes 2006, 2008).  
 Chapter 6 outlined the technological determinism as well as transnational 
capitalist orientation of the ICT capacity development policies of the Ethiopian and 
Egyptian establishments. Social constructionist bodies of literature argue within a set 
of opposites: hegemonic technological determinism vs grassroots construction of 
technology and meaning (Feenberg et al. 2010; Feenberg 2011). Agency that is 
enabled by technology thus negates the locally or the globally dominant discourse 
(Kallinikos 2002, 2004). Moreover, social constructionist thinking embedded within 
the context of development often overemphasises the local constitution of 
technology and creates a bias against regional or national discourses. Contemporary 
social constructionist literature, neglects the global flow of ideas, particularly through 
the exposure to ICTs (Morley et al. 2002; Kietzmann et al. 2011). 
 Technologists in Ethiopia and Egypt equally highlighted that ICTs allowed 
them to create connections beyond their national borders. Social media enabled 
them to gain exposure to global cultural, technological and political discourses. 
Particularly the interaction with peers beyond borders presented these technologists 
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with new opportunities. One of my informants, for example, explained that for his 
blog posts, he often reached out to people outside Ethiopia: 
I have a close contact with the Ethiopian diaspora. [...] She was raised in 
America and she is in congress. And she also worked with Obama. So just 
because of the social media connections I ask her updates about American 
policy on Ethiopia or any new updates. So [via] physical connection [this] 
won't be possible. (ET 02) 
 The ability to interact with foreigners had a tremendous appeal among 
Ethiopians. The opinions I gathered among technologists after the first Barcamp 
Ethiopia event in August 2010 (cf. Annex 14) also underscore the aspiration of being 
globally connected. Through my involvement in the organisation of the first 
participatory event that was organised exclusively for the admittedly self-denoted 
grassroots community of technologist in Ethiopia, I could gain direct insights into the 
internal dynamics. The technologists had only previously met online before this first 
physical event, and were scattered across various online exchange platforms. An 
opinion poll during the event revealed that contact with the outside world was the 
primary gain from the event for the participants. I also noted the importance of this in 
my research diary: 
Many of the participants showed off the e-mail addresses and phone numbers 
they have collected from the foreigner visitors who flew in for the event. Their 
number seems to be limited, probably 15 or 20 among the 300 Ethiopian 
participants. (Research diary, 11/09/2010, Addis Ababa) 
 The experience of Ethiopian technologists is dominated by the notion of living 
on the global periphery. Similar to Burgess' (2011) account of two women activists in 
Ethiopia, technologists perceived that their participation in global discussions was 
limited by economic and political domination. The following excerpt from a blog even 
draws historical parallels in terms of political and cultural isolationism between the 
medieval and contemporary Ethiopia: 
As many people agreed, and the Ethiopian history clearly showed that most of 
current economical and social problems came from closing the nation from 
the outside world. The kings at that time were busy with much external 
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interference and couldn’t do much except closing the boarders [borders] and 
guarding the country. This was the best idea at that time [...] Though, the 
result is rather poverty and backwardness. The way, Ethiopia closed itself 
from the world; the world closed itself from Ethiopia – sad story! I am afraid to 
tell you this, but it is still happening. The world is moving so fast with 
information technologies, telecommunications and innovations. Ethiopia still 
closed itself from the external world – thanks to Ethio Telecom! The result is 




Ethiopian technologists felt themselves excluded from global progress. ICTs allowed 
them to connect beyond physical borders and break through the establishment’s 
exclusive developmental discourse (Skjerdal 2011a).  
 In Egypt, it was considerably more complicated to reconstruct elements of 
exposure. However, I was able to detect a similar perception among Egyptian 
technologists, one of whom, for example, explained that the main benefit of ICTs 
 is the exposure. It is our window to the world. (EG 14) 
Van Dijck and Poell (2013) claim that “users retain significant agency” by using 
social media. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) furthermore suggest that global exposure 
through social media will play a significant role in closing the gap between the North 
and the South. The wealth of opportunities presented through the expansion of ICTs 
is reflected in the following account from a technologist in Ethiopia: 
You can access information about anything; you can ask people to feedback, 
you can ask people for knowledge. And everyone who is not asking 
[questions online] can passively watch what is happening in the world. (ET 04) 
 Among engineering students in Addis Ababa, ICTs were equated so intensely 
with global interaction that the e-learning team at ECBP introduced a social 
networking site along with the university’s e-learning platform. The rationale behind 
this step was to exploit the magnetism that social media exerted among students. 
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The actual function of the social media platform was to transfer students to the e-
learning platform after they logged onto the social media platform. Even though both 
platforms were offline – they run on the local area network of the university and were 
disconnected from the Internet – students were still attracted to it because of their 
lack of differentiation, or possibly for their lack of knowledge to differentiate, between 
social media and the Internet. I noted down one specific occasion in my research 
diary when this apparent confusion between the local and the global appeared. This 
account illustrates the host of expectations as well as enthusiasm that were attached 
to introducing e-learning services: 
After the opening ceremony of the e-learning programme at the Adama 
University, we met students in the computer rooms. […] One of the students 
explained that he is excited about e-learning, because “now I can talk with 
professors in Germany. I can exchange ideas or send them my papers.“ 
(Research diary, 15/10/2009, Adama) 
It is important to note that the e-learning introductory courses for students that were 
provided by my team were explicit about the fact that services and also exchange 
between users was only possible within the locality of the campus. 
 Discussions with Egyptian technologists also revealed that early adopters of 
ICTs in Egypt experienced a similar appeal. Those informants who owned a personal 
computer used it to source information from outside Egypt. This is particularly true 
for the young upper middle class who followed a cosmopolitan lifestyle and 
participated in global subcultures (Singerman and Amar 2006; Elsayed 2010). The 
communities of technologists, who mainly came from the Cairene and Alexandrian 
upper middle classes, used ICTs to import ideas and underscore their cosmopolitan 
lifestyle (Singerman and Amar 2006; Peterson 2011). 
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Figure 8.1 – Ethiopian social media activist using Afro-American slang to appeal to the young audience 
(Source: author 2013) 
 By 2013, I could also observe similar traits among Ethiopian technologists. 
Although the use of social media, particularly Facebook, was still in its infancy, it 
allowed the influx of foreign lifestyles and cosmopolitan ideas. Young technologists 
in Addis Ababa were, for example, especially keen to adopt something that they 
considered to be Afro-American culture. One of the prominent bloggers explained 
that he even switched to Afro-American slang in order to be able to connect with 
more technologists (Figure 8.1). 
[...] prior to chat [Facebook Messenger, August 2011], I was writing in normal 
grammar, but to capture the attention of the new Ethiopian generation who is 
accustomed to the African-American style … like they consider it as a swag or 
a way of being modern to use short term. Since they are part of the passive 
audience I want to awaken, I communicate with them with [through] their own 
interest [language]. (ET 02)  
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Similar to Schech's (2002) findings, both the Ethiopian and Egyptian technologists 
confirmed that ICTs offered the opportunity to participate in global cultural 
discourses. The interaction with these global cultural discourses becomes a source 
of empowerment and emancipation (Schech 2002; Mohan 2006): 
We were always like “Egypt, Egypt, Egypt is the most important country in the 
world.” Umm el Dunya [Mother of the World – a common Egyptian metaphor 
for Egypt] and all that stuff. Of course I think it [social media] is a good thing 
because it is elevating people's thinking standards. Yeah, of course [laughs] 
[...] people are much more connected with the outside world and lot of people 
are getting ideas from abroad. I feel like we are so much more in tune and we 
are so much more empathetic with the global context than we were. And the 
Arab Spring and all the revolutions around the world and we think we are the 
reason for it [laughs] even though it is not the case. You know [Egyptians say] 
“we started occupy Wall Street”, “we started bla-bla-bla”. Egyptians were 
never like this. We were like China. We never really knew what was 
happening outside Egypt. (EG 12) 
 Both Ethiopian and Egyptian technologists highlighted that social media is a 
source of ideas which are unavailable in their own countries. ICTs thus complement 
national discourses of technology and ICTs explored in Chapter 6. With the help of 
social media, technologists could circumvent these narrow and hegemonic 
discourses. In my work with technologists, it often shocked me that they purposely 
disconnected themselves from their local reality. The following account from my 
research diary is indicative of many encounters with local technologists:  
Person X amazed me completely. He is an absolute opposite to what one 
would expect from an Ethiopian student. He is inventive, explores and takes 
risks. His main drive is to localise global technology for the needs of Ethiopian 
people. He could easily sit in the Silicon Valley and do just exactly the same. 
He has just set up the first app-store in Ethiopia and explained it with the 
outmost simplicity. “What we needed was this: the application. We needed 
just to download it, right, and make the application [work] on Android on my 
phone. So we put it there on the Moodle platform, we downloaded it and tried 
the money transfer function. The money goes here and there and eventually 
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we tried to hack it [meaning “to repair it” – Ethiopian technologists sometimes 
wrongly appropriated terms from global technology communities. However, 
through the use of such terms they made their own identity visible against 
mainstream Ethiopian culture in which hacking connoted wrongdoing. In 
contrast, in global technology communities hacking increasingly stands for 
qualities such as inventiveness and creativity] and it worked perfectly fine.” 
(Research diary, 27/07/2013, Addis Ababa) 
 Escobar (1995, p.225) claims that ICTs can “offer unexpected opportunities 
that groups at the margin could seize to construct innovative visions and practices”. 
Ethiopian and Egyptian technologists alike employed ICTs, and social media in 
particular, to gain exposure to global discourses. The evidence from these 
technology communities exposes the magnitude of global exposure through ICTs 
and by doing so it questions previous notions of agency within the constructionist 
discourse (Feenberg et al. 2010; Feenberg 2011). Through the global exposure that 
ICTs provide, agency is constantly negotiated between the local and the global.  
 Moreover, to complement the notion of global exposure, Egyptian 
technologists also emphasised that ICTs allowed them to broadcast their case to a 
global audience (Morley et al. 2002; Kietzmann et al. 2011). 
They basically told the world that we exist. We are here, we are doing things, 
look at us, pay attention to us. So I think this is great, and it is exactly what we 
needed. I think IT … the role of IT was remarkable. (EG 17)  
 Constructionist bodies of literature emphasise the importance of the local 
construction of techno-social realities (Kallinikos 2004; Feenberg et al. 2010). In 
Ethiopia and Egypt, however, grassroots narratives were constructed and negotiated 
at the intersection between the local and the global. Similar forms of intermingling 
have been conceptualised by earlier academic literature that deployed the notion of 
glocal (Thornton 2000; Ritzer 2003; Sullivan 2008; Luke 2008). However, these 
bodies of literature mainly arose from globalisation research before the emergence 
of social media. Therefore the technological aspects, and particularly the implications 
of ICTs for the counter-cultural could not be analysed. On the other hand Castells’ 
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later account of the counter-cultural use of ICTs did not employ the notion of glocal 
(Castells 2007, 2013).  
 Besides the sourcing of ideas from abroad, as shown above, the broadcasting 
of one's existence was an influential factor that formed and constituted the 
technologists’ agency. The exposure to the global was complemented by the export 
of the local to the global (Castells 2011; Lim 2012). The following excerpt from an 
Ethiopian technologist exemplifies the importance of the continuous exchange 
between the local and the global: 
I think what is important is to exchange beyond the local community, to 
network internationally and be a part of the global sort of community. (ET 10) 
 
8.2.2 The notion of community and the confluence of online and offline 
action 
The previous subsection demonstrated that technologists’ narratives of ICTs were 
negotiated between the local and the global. The cross-border, transnational 
exchange enabled by ICTs permitted technologists to engage globally. 
Technologists’ exposure to global discourses, moreover, helped them to put local or 
national discourses in their countries into perspective. This section continues to trace 
this issue by analysing the ways in which Ethiopian and Egyptian technology 
communities attempted to substitute or circumvent public discourse through the use 
of ICTs.  
 These communities fulfilled at least two functions that were exempt from 
public discourse. First, these communities served as spaces of dialogue. Especially 
in Ethiopia, the cultural and political circumstances strongly restricted public 
dialogue. Public discourse was similarly corrupted in pre-revolutionary Egypt. The 
autocratic and neopatrimonial political order (Alterman 2000, Koehler 2008) confined 
dialogue to the realms of politics (cf. Subsection 5.3.2) and reserved it for the 
political elite. Public space was put under the complete control of the establishment 
in order to consolidate its own agenda (Eickelman and Anderson 2003; Ismail 2011). 
Young people were generally discouraged by various sets of cultural restrictions 
 261 
from challenging the public mainstream or from even expressing their opinion among 
their fellow citizens:   
Ethiopians don't ask [questions]. Because they fear the repercussions for their 
engagement. (ET 02) 
 The following quotation from an Egyptian NGO representative, however, 
suggests that social media enabled technologists to contrast and question the locally 
dominant socioeconomic discourse (Juris 2012; Bennett 2012): 
Whenever we post something, you open the door for debate. You know you 
want people to debate and you want to challenge people and you want all 
these kind of discussions you know. (EG 12) 
 Picazo-Vela et al. (2012, p. 506) claim that “social media enhances citizen 
involvement by increasing opportunities to participate and collaborate”. Ethiopian 
and Egyptian technologists commented that, while collaboration is discouraged in 
society, social media allowed for online and offline forms of collaboration. These 
strengthened the sense of community and achievement among technologists: 
It brought people together who have a lot of potential and who have 
exchanged their ideas, but [also] others developed ideas and projects 
together. It created attention in the general community to the fact that a lot is 
possible [...] if those are given the space to self-coordinate then things can 
happen fast. (ET 10) 
 Various bodies of literature explore the notion of community empowerment 
through social media (Bertot et al. 2010; Magro 2012; Van Dijck 2013). However, 
insufficient attention has yet been given to the notion of transparency. Bertot et al. 
(2010) emphasised the importance of transparency with regard to the role of social 
media in public discourse. Technologists in Ethiopia and Egypt, nevertheless, 
highlighted that the transparency of social media was key to enhancing collaboration, 
which was discouraged in the public sphere: 
I know Marton and I see Marton is supporting this and this, and probably 
Marton is aware of all the information and he is among those that I trust, so I 
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will follow Marton. And I will do what Marton tells me. Which is a key factor in 
the successfulness of social media. (EG 10) 
 ICTs thus enabled technologists to cultivate practices and qualities that were 
missing from or were discouraged in the public discourse. Dialogue, collaboration 
and transparency fostered trust. This in return further strengthened the sense of 
community among early technologists in Ethiopia and Egypt:  
Blogging is the best way that I’ve been able to share my ideas and views 
about several topics so far. […] It’s not until I attended an amazing discussing 
[discussion] with fellow bloggers that I felt, somehow, powerful with having a 
blog. March 5th, 2011, marks the date that I, for the first time, felt like a part of 
something bigger than myself. I attended a small but cozy event called Digital 
Identity Ethiopia Forum. (Sukersays, blog article, last accessed 15/06/2016, 
https://sukersays.wordpress.com/2011/03/11/334/) 
 This subsection has illustrated the role ICTs play in establishing surrogate 
communities. ICTs enable grassroots agency by circumventing traditional or 
corrupted spaces of public discourse. The similarities between the genealogies of 
the Ethiopian and Egyptian technologists – even though with a certain lapse of time 
– are striking. Moreover, these accounts demonstrated how individuals as well as 
groups of individuals tried to reclaim their agency amidst restricted and dominant 
national discourses. In contrast to constructionist notions of technology, ICTs 
allowed technologists to surpass the binarity of local versus global (Feenberg et al. 
2010; Feenberg 2011).  
 During the later phase of my research, particularly after the military coup 
d’état in Egypt (June 2013) and the almost simultaneous and bloody suppression of 
protests in Ethiopia (August 2013), the issue of trust arose very prominently. The 
exposure to acts of explicit violence and suppression initiated the strengthening of 
these surrogate communities. Unfortunately, I had neither the time nor the 
appropriate analytical apparatus to better understand the ways in which these 
surrogate communities started to mould and transform dialogue, collaboration and 
transparency into trust. These initial traits support Brügmann's (2014) argument that 
it is the constant cultivation of credibility, reliability and intimacy produces trust in 
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online communities. These experiences from the Ethiopian and Egyptian technology 
communities suggest that the active nurturing of practices that were banned or 
restricted in national public discourses – dialogue, collaboration and transparency –
produced the perception of trust among members of the technology community.  
 
8.2.3 Convergence between online and offline action 
Even though I could not verify the process of trust building, I was able to trace the 
converging nature of offline and online dissent. The notion of online surrogate 
communities that substitute or replace communities in the physical world is central to 
Jenkins' (2006) and Castells' (Castells 2011a, 2011b, 2013) social theories. After the 
events of the Arab Spring, Castells (2013) further developed his argument 
suggesting that the “real world in our time is a hybrid world, not a virtual world or a 
segregated world that would separate online from offline interaction” (p. 232).  The 
notion of hybridity – between the offline and online worlds – emphasised Castells’ 
(2007) earlier hypothesis with regard to online action that transgresses into the 
physical world:  
Planning was done online [during the 25th of January 2011 uprising]. And 
people had a lot of exchange over ideas. So you exchange ideas. A lot of 
ideas were exchanged online and [then] you go on the ground and do them. 
(EG 17) 
 Fuchs (2012b, p. 781) challenges Castells’ claim by suggesting that it 
conveys “a logic that is based on overt technological determinism” and “fails to see 
that not the Internet creates social, but human actors who are embedded into 
antagonistic economic, political and ideological structures of society.” My empirical 
evidence from the Egyptian technology community supports Fuchs’ critique of 
Castells’ enthusiasm. It is people that transfer online dissent into the physical world, 
not the other way around. ICTs merely amplify their agency as also exemplified by 
the following account from an Egyptian technologist:  
 
Just witnessing how IT and social media mobilised people [laughs] during the 
revolution. I think it is just a case study that should be studied. With the 
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revolution they [people] have seen that they could actually make real change. 
The change they have made was tangible. And you saw this shift that people 
thought that they can solve real problems by using ICTs. (EG 17) 
 Less optimistic accounts about technology’s role during and after the Arab 
Spring rightfully suggest that the uprising was the result of a confluence of multiple 
factors (Reardon 2012; Fuchs 2012a, 2012c; Hermida et al. 2014), and that social 
media only aggregated and amplified these individual factors. Nevertheless, the 
simplistic and popular ideas of a Facebook or Twitter revolution appealed to my 
informants in both countries.  
 This section has explored grassroots notions of ICTs, and suggested that the 
global exposure, the sense of community, and the convergence between online and 
offline action enabled technologists to reassert their agency. Social media allowed 
technologists to create surrogate communities, where the control exerted by the 
locally dominant discourse could be circumvented or ignored: 
The social network platform Facebook has helped transfer Internet ownership out 
of the hands of foreigners and governmental organizations to Ethiopians. This 
might sound like a contradiction, since Facebook is run by a US company. But for 
the first time, Ethiopians are using the Internet, in this case Facebook, to 
disseminate information that is important to them, to share it with others and 
create their own digital public sphere. For the first time in Ethiopian Internet 
history, Ethiopians themselves are the targeted Internet users. (ET 10) 
 This subsection has also demonstrated that ICTs, contrary to constructionist 
notions, enabled technologists to constantly negotiate their agency between the local 
and the global. Technology communities in both countries benefited from their 
exposure to global discourses, which supplied them with ideas not available in their 
locality. The agency of the technology communities was rooted in the discursive 
opposition between the abundance of the global and the restrictions of the local.  
 These communities were just starting to appear during my research in 
Ethiopia, whereas they had already entered the social mainstream in Egypt. Section 
8.3 will therefore explore in detail how the mechanisms of surrogate communities 
entered the public mainstream in Egypt after the 25th of January uprising.   
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8.3 The boundaries of agency through ICTs 
 
Section 8.2 demonstrated that ICTs enabled technologists to reassert their agency 
and dissent from the dominant socioeconomic discourse. But how much agency did 
the use of ICTs actually allow in Ethiopia and Egypt? With regard to the extent of 
agency that ICTs enabled, the two countries differ significantly. The 25th of January 
uprising that brought down the Mubarak establishment also disengaged the state 
intelligence. The following two subsections trace the limits of agency that the 
surrogate communities were allowed in Ethiopia and Egypt. 
 
8.3.1 Tracing the limits of technology communities in Ethiopia 
Chapter 4 outlined the peculiarities of the Ethiopian political landscape, especially its 
limitations after the 2005 elections. ICTs, in particular mobile phones, played a key 
role in the mobilisation of protesters during the 2005 protests (Abbink 2006; Lahra 
Smith 2007; Ekine 2010). During the protests, mobile services were cut by the 
government and only reactivated in August 2006. SMS service remained shut down 
until August 2007 (Nazret 2007). The monitoring of telephone calls and SMS 
services remained tight even after the complete reactivation of mobile phone 
services. My informants often reported that their phone calls were intercepted or their 
phones were bugged. Among expatriates, several urban legends circulated about 
the interception of phone calls. I noted one of these in my research diary: 
Person XY [a high level donor representative] told a story that a phone 
operator intercepted one of his recent calls to Germany by saying: “Bitte 
unterbrechen Sie die Leitung nicht. Wir wechseln den Übersetzer” [Please 
stay on the line, we are just changing the interpreter]. (Research diary, 
18/02/2009, Addis Ababa) 
 Many of these accounts were merely urban legends disseminated among 
expatriates. Even though, in my perception, they were exaggerated stories that some 
expats wanted to boast with, they reflect the randomness and surrealism of phone 
surveillance in Ethiopia. Through my work with technologists, I had several 
encounters with intercepted phone calls or tapped phone. Although I personally 
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never noticed or had proof that my phone calls were tapped, some of the 
technologists I worked with did regularly come under surveillance by the Ethiopian 
secret service. Some of them told me about occasions of outright threats from police 
officers by phone or attempts of blackmailing and intimidation. After a major event of 
the technology community in Addis Ababa, for example, I noted the following 
situation in my research diary: 
Some post-Barcamp trembles are going on – Person X is being harassed on 
the phone by a student council representative [the only student organization 
at the AAU, close to the EPRDF]. He wants to know where certain participants 
live. The police came to Person X’s place and looked for them there, too. She 
was visibly stressed out and nervous. She told me that she changed her SIM 
card already twice today. The police still finds her and keeps calling. Later I 
went to EIABC [one of the campuses of the AAU] to talk to Person Y. He is 
definitely in trouble. […] I decided that we meet in a place that is most 
probably not wired, outside the EIABC campus. (Research diary, 26/09/2011, 
Addis Ababa) 
 These circumstances demonstrate the establishment’s fierce control of 
telecommunications. Nevertheless, even though the establishment openly controlled 
communication services, technologists’ surrogate communities remained intact until 
2011. The self-organisation of technologists through social media (see Section 8.1) 
went generally unnoticed by the Ethiopian establishment until the events of the Arab 
Spring. The relative freedom these communities enjoyed up until this point was due 
to three key behavioural attributes:  
 First, the technology communities in Ethiopia had no apparent political 
affiliation and revealed no aspiration to claim political agency. The progressive notion 
of breaking through the establishment’s rigid developmentalism (Hagmann and 
Abbink 2011; Bach 2011) that created a uniform citizenry, motivated many of these 
technologists. By sharing personal opinions and expressing lifestyle choices other 
than the ones pre-set by the EPRDF establishment, they could explore alternatives 
to the soulless uniformity of the Ethiopian model citizen. 
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Reasons why I love blogging […]: Entertainment. So unlike other bloggers 
who have a strict point of view and specific facts, I want to write for the 
happiness of my readers. Whether I’m writing about love or life and what I 
think about it, I wanna think that my readers are smiling as they read along. 
(Sukersays, blog post, last accessed 11/03/2011, https://sukersays. 
wordpress.com/2011/03/11/334/) 
 Such aspirations, however, did not conflict with the establishment’s own 
desire. The establishment openly encouraged students – a demographic segment 
where most of the technologists came from – to use foreign educational content in 
order to educate themselves (see also 6.2). 
 Second, local technologists openly disassociated themselves from the political 
activism of the Ethiopian diaspora. While the Ethiopian expatriate blogosphere is 
overwhelmingly a place for radical political activism against the EPRDF 
establishment, both public perception and the academic literature (Skjerdal 2009; 
Skjerdal 2011b; Donald Nathan Levine 2007; Gemeda 2012) equate the term 
Ethiopian blogosphere with this particular online activism of the diaspora. This left no 
space for those who wanted to write about issues such as technology (Eweket, 
Kirbaview) or lifestyle (Sukersays, Aboutaddisababa, Afterride). Local bloggers 
discredited the diaspora blogosphere for its constant and exaggerated political 
agitation:  
Today the discussion between Person X and Person Y [a local blogger] at the 
Digital Identities Ethiopia [Digital Identities Ethiopia Forum, DIEF] event struck 
me as interesting. Person Y explained “the diaspora doesn’t know what they 
are talking about”. They have their political agenda, but it is not related to the 
Ethiopian reality.” (Research diary, 06/03/2011, Addis Ababa) 
 Third, most local technologists subscribed to the establishment’s 
developmental narrative. Even though they persistently criticised the lack of access 
to ICTs or scrutinised the establishment’s inability to provide stable mobile and 
Internet services, their accounts never questioned the legitimacy of the EPRDF 
establishment. One of the most active technology advocates explained this paradox 
to me: 
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So these two [persons] are two other sides [opposite sides]. This one is pro-
government [Daniel Berhane], this one [Endalkachew Haile] is not anti, but 
new moderate. (ET 02) 
Even though some technologists styled themselves as activists, their polemic 
can be at most described as a set of proxy wars. Several Facebook groups and 
individual technologists, for example, led strident attacks against the establishment’s 
notion of ICT capacity development. Technologists, however, only attacked what 
they perceived as the vanguards of this notion: the Ethiopian Telecommunication 
Corporation (ETC) and the Ethiopian Television (ETV). 
A lot of efforts have been made from the online community via different 
platforms and social networks for Ethio Telecom [ETC] to enhance the 
internet service. Though from my personal experience, things are getting 
worse instead of getting better. (Eweket, blog post, last accessed 29/07/2011, 
https://eweket.wordpress.com/2011/07/29/ethio-telecom-the-internet-service-
provider-which-doesn%E2%80%99t-use-internet/) 
ETV + Printer = Addis Zemen [one of the government-owned daily 
newspapers] (Facebook post, 18/10/2013) 
 The Facebook group “ETC sucks” is a good example of technologists’ proxy 
wars with the Ethiopian establishment. The group collects complaints against the 
Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETC) and had some 2,500 members; it 
became the main online space for venting anger against ETC. It ridiculed not just 
ETC, but openly questioned and debated the establishment’s telecommunication 
monopoly. My informants in the technology community often referred to this page 
and expressed their perplexity about the fact that the group administrator – whom 
everyone knew by name –had not been arrested yet. Nevertheless, according to the 
group administrator the group never received any attention from the establishment, 
let alone suffered any repercussions. One possible explanation for the 
establishment’s indifference is that the group does not take any political stand. It 
does neither offend EPRDF nor does it attack particular politicians or officers. It 
merely, even though very often in crass terms, criticises shortcomings in the 
infrastructure. 
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 However, the neglect by the establishment started to change after the events 
of the Arab Spring. The borders between loyalty and dissent became increasingly 
blurred. Subsection 8.3.2 thus examines the fluidity of the limits of online dissent in 
Ethiopia.  
 
8.3.2 No trespassing 
The previous section argued that Ethiopian technologists step-by-step gained 
agency by using ICTs. The attributes exhibited by Ethiopian technologists apparently 
left their activities irrelevant to, and unnoticed by, the establishment. This subsection 
argues that the events of the Arab Spring marked the beginning of a change in the 
establishment’s attitude towards technologists in Ethiopia and, in particular, towards 
social media. The earlier support that government officials had exhibited for ICT 
capacity development at universities dramatically changed.   
In April 2011, I noted the following comment from a high-ranking official in the 
Ministry of Capacity Building (MOCB) in Ethiopia: 
Person X (my counterpart in the MOCB) came to me today with a message 
from Person X [a high ranking official in the MOCB]. He and apparently 
Person Z [state minister in the MOE-ET] are suspicious because we use 
Facebook “just like the people in Egypt.” He spoke in a very friendly manner, 
so I guess he was trying to help.  Well, I told to him my usual mantra that we 
use Facebook only as a communication platform and that the social media 
platform at the university is only for e-learning purposes. (Research diary, 
21/04/2011, Addis Ababa) 
The changing attitude of the establishment towards technologists did not 
come as a surprise. By this time, I had already factored in the effects of the Arab 
Spring in my own practical work at GIZ. An episode from my collaboration with a 
technologist is indicative of this change. Together with a colleague of mine, we 
decided to ask a local blogger to post-edit an article he wrote about a technology 
community event. In our perception, his opinion amounted to criticism of the 
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government, which could possibly draw attention to him as well as result in 
repercussions for the entire technology community. 
Endalk, I think it is probably better not to ruin the movement right in the 
beginning – I would probably use less sensitive language in the beginning and 
let the forum and the bloggers become a bit stronger. But all these are just 
suggestions. (My comments on Endalk’s article, Word document, 09/03/2011) 
 The relative freedom of the Ethiopian technology community ceased after the 
events of the Arab Spring. Even though it is hard to define the point in time when the 
secret service’s behaviour changed, I first found evidence of the encroaching 
surveillance in May 2011. This is only a couple of weeks after the downfall of 
President Mubarak in Egypt. My own first encounter with the secret service was 
during the third Digital Identities Ethiopia Forum (cf. Annex 13), which was a small, 
irregular event initiated by local technologists: 
Person XY did a great work at the Digital Identities Ethiopia Forum. Even 
though he had to do the presentation during one of the regular Sunday power 
cuts. […] After the event he told me that he felt very insecure, because of the 
presence of a “representative from the Addis Ababa city council” among the 
audience. He thought the man could be a plain-clothes policeman. (Research 
diary, 29/05/2011, Addis Ababa) 
Discerning plain-clothes police was a rather easy matter for Ethiopians due to their 
informal-looking, though specific government-issue dress code. One of the 
appreciative inquiry sessions I conducted in August 2014 in Addis Ababa was also 
observed by a secret service agent, who, in his own account, was working for the 
Addis Ababa City Council. 
 In September 2011, the president of the Addis Ababa University allowed the 
annual Barcamp of the technology community only under the condition that "the 
secret service will be present" (Research diary, 22/09/2011, Addis Ababa). 
During the event I noted: 
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The session on community radios in Ethiopia started discussing participation 
and democracy … it was a very weird situation. The chairs were organised in 
circles and the person from the secret police was sitting in the inner circle and 
taking notes. I had to leave the room because I could not handle the pressure. 
(Research diary, 24/09/2011, Addis Ababa) 
 The increasing monitoring and control of the offline events held by the 
technology community, however, did not lead to defence mechanisms among 
technologists. On the one hand, since the outlines of what constituted native online 
dissent were blurred, technologists received verification of their assumption that 
online activism would converge into offline action. Moreover, they also received 
reassurance from the Arab Spring.  
Obviously, when we increase the connectivity of people, it might create a 
revolution or any other unrest. (ET 10) 
 
8.3.3 Social media enter mainstream public discourse in Egypt 
By the time of my arrival in Cairo, the role that social media had played during the  
25th of January uprising was widely celebrated by the media. Various bodies of 
literature arose in the aftermath of the Arab Spring that underscored the populist 
accounts and depicted the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt as a Facebook 
revolution (Harlow and Johnson 2011; Peterson 2011; Aouragh and Alexander 2011; 
C. Wilson and Dunn 2011; Cottle 2011; Attia et al. 2011; Khamis and Vaughn 2011; 
Korany and El-Mahdi 2012; Comunello and Anzera 2012; el-Nawawy and Khamis 
2013). Fuchs (2012, p.383) suggests that the events of the Arab Spring created “a 
new fetishism of technology that distracts from the contradictions of capitalism 
underlying contemporary societal changes and conflicts”. Nevertheless, the 25th of 
January uprising was widely interpreted in informationalist terms (Jenkins 2006; 
Castells 2013), that led to exaggerated accounts about the role of ICTs. 
 More balanced accounts, such as by Eltantawy and Wiest (2011), Bhuiyan 
(2011) and Reardon (2012) have provided detailed explanations of the use of 
Facebook in the preparation of the 25th of January uprising in Egypt. The role of 
Twitter during the escalation of violence has been analysed in Hounshell (2011) and 
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Starbird and Palen (2012). Even though these accounts endorse the notion that ICTs 
enabled the Egyptian uprising, they do not extrapolate the empirical evidence from 
the 25th of January uprising into a social theory. Moreover, their appreciation of the 
role ICTs played in the events of the 25th of January uprising does not overshadow 
the more subtle reality about the gradual emergence of various social and political 
factors that led to the 25th of January uprising.  
 On contrary to the above accounts, this subsection is concerned with the 
growing importance of social media after the 25th of January uprising. The following 
paragraphs suggest that in Egypt certain uses of ICTs that provided the agency of 
the urban and admittedly subcultural surrogate community transgressed into to 
social mainstream and public discourse:. 
The people of Egypt were very ready to revolt against the system! But they 
needed to organise themselves so that they can pick a date and are able to 
go down in mass numbers. (EG 13) 
 As the above quotation from a high level representative of the Egyptian 
government suggests, the acknowledgment of social media’s decisive role in 
subverting the Mubarak establishment was overwhelming among the population. The 
growing influence of social media among Egyptians after the 25th of January uprising 
is, however, much less visible in the literature, even though my informants pointed 
out that an explosion in the reach of social media happened after the revolution: 
But after the revolution [...] social media, Facebook, Twitter all this just 
exploded. The amount of people that joined Twitter within Egypt just multiplied 
within a month. Like it was X and then it just went X times 50. It was just 
exponential. (EG 17) 
 In January and February, Egypt added over 1 million Facebook users, which 
represents a monthly growth rate of 30.76% (Socialbakers 2015). By December 
2011, Egypt counted 9.4 million Facebook users, which represented a penetration 
rate of 11.4% (Socialbakers 2015). In comparison, Ethiopia had a penetration rate of 
0.5% (Socialbakers 2015). In September 2015, the number of Egyptians on 
Facebook was over 16 million, which was approximately 18% of the population 
(Socialbakers 2015). Twitter experienced a less radical increase in 2011, but than 
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rose dramatically in 2012. The 520,000 accounts in December 2012 constitute a 
penetration rate of 3.25% (Socialbakers 2015). Statistics for Twitter use in Ethiopia 
could unfortunately not be retrieved.   
 The 25th of January uprising demonstrated the possibility that online surrogate 
communities can coordinate coherent grassroots social action (Eltantawy and Wiest 
2011; Castells 2013). These credentials initiated the involvement of segments of 
society that had previously been offline or had not been using social media. Even 
though various groups emerged since the 2000s that contested the Mubarak regime 
(cf. 4.2), their techniques of organisation and protest strategy was known to the 
police and military alike (Halliday 2011; Ghonim 2012).  While mosques and coffee 
houses, the meeting points of the Islamist and labour union campaigners 
respectively, certainly played a role in the 25th of January uprising, their continuous 
surveillance by the establishment seized any potential for revolt (Ghonim 2012). The 
circumvention of the establishment’s authoritative power through online organisation 
during the 25th of January uprising lent both credence and significance to social 
media. This in turn led to a massive interest in social media, particularly Twitter and 
Facebook, among the rest of the society. 
 My informants often proudly talked about how their parents started using 
social media after the revolution: 
Then, my mother after the revolution was saying that the Internet has a lot to 
tell [and] she created her account and than my father got jealous and [asked 
me] “Why don't I have one?”. This segment [of the population] without the 
revolution wasn't ever go online. (EG 14) 
 As the following account from an NGO representative illustrates, the 
organisational success of the uprising proved the importance of social media and 
provided a positive image for its use:  
The use of Facebook in Egypt after 2011 is massive. And I am talking about 
all generations! I am not only talking about our generation, I am talking about 
all generation. Everyone was joining Facebook, everyone, everyone, 
everyone! I could find my parents, my relatives. And 5 years ago they would 
say „What are you doing? You are wasting your time. Stop wasting your time.” 
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How they [the protesters] mobilise themselves, this made them [my parents] 
curious and see the benefits of accessing information. Because at the end of 
the day [previously] everyone granted that TV is giving us the information. But 
TV was a disappointment during the revolution. (EG 10) 
The denial of broadcast media after the uprising is a recurring theme in my data. My 
informants often pointed out the shrewd manipulation of images on television that 
intended to misinform citizens about the magnitude of the protest. Iskander (2011) 
argues that the loss of trust in public media and the positive reputation of Facebook 
and Twitter among the population allowed social media platforms to occupy spaces 
of public discourse previously held by television and radio. Facebook and Twitter 
became navigational aids to public administration, party politics and personal 
security. One private sector representative explained that "from that point on [after 
the uprising] it [social media] just became the tool [emphasis mine]" (EG 17).  
 
 
8.3.4 Three areas of public discourse  
Strengthened by the success of the 25th of January uprising, social media entered 
the mainstream of public discourse in Egypt after the uprising. Even though the 
impact of social media platforms as counter-cultural spaces received much scholarly 
attention prior to and after the Arab Spring (Jenkins 2006; Castells 2007, 2013; 
Hounshell 2011; Harlow and Johnson 2011; Aouragh and Alexander 2011), its 
effects as mainstream platforms of public discourse have been little studied. Kreps 
(2011) and Fuchs (2012a) warn about the growing dominance of privately owned 
social media in our lives, but little empirical research has been done into the effects 
of transnational technology companies controlling and owning public discourse. 
 This subsection proposes three areas where further research is necessary to 
identify the long-term effects of Facebook, Twitter and Google entering mainstream 
public discourse. It explores three sectors where the increasing dominance of 
transnational technology companies in public life could be identified in Egypt. These 
are the area of work, public safety and political authority. 
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 After my reassignment to Cairo (January 2012), I was baffled by the extent of 
Facebook’s role as an official communication platform in civil society. One of the first 
entries in my research diary in Cairo was as follows: 
 I think GIZ assigned me to Egypt first and foremost for my previous 
 experience with tech geeks in Ethiopia. Although I keep repeating that I am 
 not an ICT expert, my previous experience in using Facebook and Twitter to 
 engage local partners [NGOs] has already made me something like an 
 authority on this subject. (Research diary, 25/02/2012, Cairo) 
 Even though I was used to and also sympathetic to the idea of engaging with 
civil society actors through Facebook, this was less expected in communications with 
state authorities. After initial introductions to my counterparts in the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MOTI), Ministry of Education (MOE-EG) and the Ministry of 
Communication and Information Technology (MCIT), communication with ministry 
officials took place mainly via Facebook. Appointments with two state ministers in 
MOTI and MCIT, respectively, were regularly organised via Facebook as well.  
 In the direct aftermath of the 25th of January uprising, technological optimism 
increasingly diverted the communication with and among public servants to 
Facebook and Twitter as well. Facebook groups were initiated, for example, by 
government ministries, schoolteachers, and hospital doctors with the intention to 
replace e-mails. In my own case, Facebook also replaced email when 
communicating with government partners. This is also well illustrated by the following 
case when I asked a high-level government representative whether she would be 
available for a follow-up interview: 
 Yes, why not? I am busy, but you can contact me via Facebook and we can 
 fix a time. What is your username on Facebook? (already checking the 
 Facebook app on her smartphone) So, now we are friends on Facebook. 
 Write me a message and than we can fix a time. (EG 06) 
The imminent controversy of the control transnational technology companies exert 
over public discourse as well as their appropriation of ownership is currently 
underexposed in the literature. The following example poignantly illustrates this 
controversy: 
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Person X [an Egyptian colleague of mine in GIZ] asked me to accompany him 
to Person Y [state minister in the MOE-EG]. Apparently, some teachers who 
were trained by us [GIZ] created their own Facebook group to coordinate the 
follow-up activities. But they started quarrelling and calling each other names, 
and also attacking the ministry [MOE-EG]. The state minister showed us the 
Facebook group on his tablet in his office and asked for advice on how to 
control the anger. Of course neither the ministry nor us [GIZ] had 
administrator rights to the group. (Research diary, 17/07/2012, Cairo) 
 Public safety remained a major concern in Cairo after the 25th of January 
2011. The Egyptian population discredited public media for its various affiliations: 
With the Mubarak establishment, political parties, religious authorities or foreign 
states (Iskander 2011). In various parts of Cairo, residents mainly relied on Twitter 
and Facebook to navigate political strife and skirmishes. The following three 
accounts illustrate the importance of social media amidst armed conflict in Cairo; 
they were selected to show different perspectives on one single episode  – the 
Raba’a massacre in August 2013 – when the Egyptian military cleared a protest 
camp of the Muslim Brotherhood:  
@ahauslohner Wa Po's @SharafAlhourani saw anti-Morsi men armed w 
sticks halt bus of Islamists at Cairo U [University]; latter fled; former tried to 
set bus on fire (ahauslohner, tweet, 03/07/2013) 
@Sandmonkey AJM [Al-Jazeera Egypt] is showcasing an empty tahrir 
[square] from earlier today & a live rab3a [Raba’a] protest. CBC [Capital 
Broadcast Center, a private satellite TV station close to the Egyptian military] 
showing a full tahrir [square] & no Rab3a protest. Our media is shit 
(Sandmonkey, tweet, 05/07/2013) 
I live next to Raba’a [Mosque], maybe one street or two streets away. So 
when these events [the Raba’a massacre in August 2013] happened there 
and I wake up in the morning and I hear bullets and gunshots and so on. And 
I smell teargas and I don't know what is going on. I open the TV and nothing is 
there. So the first thing is I go to Facebook and then to Twitter. I don't use 
Twitter a lot, but in such occasions I go to Twitter and try to know what is 
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happening. I instantly get people reporting from the place where it is 
happening. (EG 04) 
 Twitter had clearly achieved an important navigational role among the Cairene 
population; it became the most important source of security information. During my 
field work in Cairo, Twitter also played a crucial role in my own security precautions:  
I passed under Tahrir Square in the metro today while there were massive 
fights between the black block [football hooligans who regularly supported 
anti-Muslim Brotherhood protests] and the riot police. It is quite surreal to sit in 
a metro carriage a couple of meters below the fights and read about them on 
Twitter at the same time. (Research diary, 15/01/2013, Cairo) 
 Understandably, politics remained the third area where social media platforms 
increasingly channelled the public discourse. Iskander (2011) warned that “the key 
role of social media [in Egypt] is perhaps not to replace traditional media or to act as 
an alternative political sphere but rather to focus on ensuring that traditional media 
are transparent” (p. 1235). However, as also shown above, social media replaced 
traditional media and was used to obtain reliable information (Figure 8.2 and 8.3).  
 Rensmann (2014) took on Castells’ notion of hybridity and argued that 
transnational public spaces generated through cyberspace, in which citizens appear 
and act, do not undermine political autonomy, but may help empower political action 
in distinct ways (p. 1). While these platforms definitely supported political action in 
the case of Egypt, they also replaced traditional forms of political autonomy. In post-
revolutionary Egypt, social media further obscured the contours of state sovereignty. 
The following two tweets refer to the events of 30th of June. In the wake of the 
military takeover on 30th of June 2013, Twitter amplified the fact that neither the 
Muslim Brotherhood nor the Egyptian military adhered to the democratic ideals the 
25th of January uprising had sought to establish. Even though the actual force used 
by the military against Muslim Brotherhood officials (on the 30th June) was not 
broadcast, the ideological battles between the two forces could be followed by 
anyone on Twitter. 
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Figure 8.2 – Security information on Twitter during the military coup of 3rd July 2013 that removed 
President Morsi from office (Source: author 2013) 
   
@iyad_elbaghd... What other country in a serious crisis has had its political 
powers communicate publicly through Twitter accounts & FB [Facebook] fan 
pages? #Egypt (Iyad El-Baghdadi, tweet, 30/06/2013) 
@iyad_elbaghd... At some point someone will have to write a book about how 
Twitter/FB are now mainstream tools of public communication in #Egypt. (Iyad 
El-Baghdadi, tweet, 30/06/2013) 
Castells (2013) argues that “the more the movement is able to convey its message 
over the communication networks, the more citizen consciousness rises, and the 
more the public sphere of communication becomes a contested terrain” (p. 237) 
Even though the post-revolutionary public sphere in Egypt readily testifies to 
Castells’ logic, the statement ignores the fact that the amplification of communication 
and citizen consciousness can also obscure democratic practices. 
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Figure 8.3 – Reactions to the Twitter exchange between military officers and the Muslim Brotherhood 
during the military coup of 3rd July 2013 (Source: author 2013) 
 
 The above sections have traced the boundaries of surrogate communities 
enabled by ICTs. In the case of Ethiopia, I showed that although surrogate 
communities might cultivate emotions of dissent against the establishment, these are 
not necessarily threatening to the latter. 
 In the case of Egypt, this section has shown how online surrogate 
communities all of a sudden became the social mainstream within society. Moreover, 
their mainstreaming also led to the increasing occupation of the public sphere. 
Hodgkinson (2008, p. 1) warns of the “commodification of human relationships, the 
extraction of capitalistic value from friendships”. The occupation of the public 
discourse by transnationalist technology companies, however, raises more severe 
questions that go beyond Hodgkinson’ notion. It is the commodification of democratic 
institutions and the undermining of state sovereignty. Coll (2012) suggests that the 
dominance of transnational companies of the public discourse demonstrates the shift 




8.4 Social media and the ideology of transnational capitalism 
 
The previous section argued that social media platforms expedite the creation of 
online safe spaces (surrogate communities), but that they are also the property of 
large transnational companies. Accordingly, transnational technology companies 
increasingly dominate the public discourse. This section follows along the same path 
and interrogates these transnational platforms for traces of ideology. Its main focus 
is the technology communities in Egypt that after the 25th of January uprising turned 
them into flamboyant and cosmopolitan spaces of ICT entrepreneurship. In other 
words, this section follows the idea put forward by Kreps (2011, p. 698): “Just as the 
hacker-hobbyist of not so long ago has become the cool online social networker 
partaking in a new transnational economy, so too the Arab youth that used Facebook 
to organise revolution may soon be using it to promote their own business interests”.  
 Informationalist (Jenkins 2006, Castells 2011a, 2011b) bodies of literature 
celebrate the increasing importance of social media. They argue that social media 
provide a platform for transnational dissent (Castells 2013) and the rise of a 
“participatory culture” (Jenkins and Deuze 2008, p. 239). The events of the 25th of 
January in Egypt are usually seen as verifying this notion. Critics such as Fuchs 
(2011b; 2012a; 2013) and Kreps (2011), however, emphasise that these theories are 
uncritical and omit the question of ideology (Fuchs 2012d). The following 
subsections trace the ideological implications of the growing influence that 
transnationalist companies exert or can exert over large numbers of citizens. 
 
8.4.1 The transfer of ideology 
Section 8.3 demonstrated that Facebook and Twitter have progressively occupied 
public discourse. Their influence surpassed generational boundaries, and these 
platforms were mainstreamed into everyday life. The previous section argued that 
these two social media platforms replaced traditional media out of necessity. 
However, the qualities that Facebook and Twitter represented among Egyptian users 
also connoted them positively: 
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From my interaction with people from Germany I had this concept of … 
maybe you would know this better … that in Germany Facebook is considered 
not something nice. And like people don't use it or if they use it they don't tell 
a lot. But in Egypt it is the opposite. Everyone is on Facebook and it is 
something good. (EG 04) 
And to be honest with you, now Facebook and Twitter are our heroes. They 
even have this comic that the Egyptian Minister of Education would like to 
thank Facebook for teaching our young children who didn't ever want to write. 
Now they [children] started using actual Arabic words by using the chat. (EG 
14) 
 Informationalist bodies of literature celebrate Facebook and Twitter as a force 
of empowerment and agency (Hirst 2012; Oh et al. 2012). However, they overlook 
the importance of the ideology that these companies transport and ignore the fact 
that the growing significance of transnationalist companies within the public 
discourse also transfers key notions from their own business ideals (Fuchs 2011a; 
Kreps 2011). This chapter argues that there is an interplay between the sudden 
influence Facebook and Twitter asserted in the Egyptian public discourse and the 
celebration of ICT start-ups in the aftermath of the 25th of January uprising.  
 Besides Facebook and Twitter, I also include Google among those 
transnationalist companies that influenced the public discourse before, during and 
after the events of the 25th of January uprising. In comparison to Facebook and 
Twitter, Google neither received much direct attention from the media, nor is it 
discussed in the academic discourse with regard to the 25th of January uprising. 
Even though Google did not provide a platform for organisation, its involvement in 
the popular uprising of 2011, although more indirect and subtle, should not be 
overlooked. The relative neglect by the academic discourse of Wael Ghonim’s role in 
the uprising and his relationship to Google further illustrates the technology-
centredness of the debate. Ghonim was a Dubai-based Google executive who 
administered the Kullena Khaled Saied (We are all Khaled Saied) Facebook page 
and participated in the 25th of January uprising. His page is widely considered to be 
the pivot point for the uprising (Khondker 2011; Khamis and Vaughn 2011; Ghonim 
2012). During his abduction by the Egyptian state security, Google remained in the 
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background. After his release from prison on 7th of February, 2011, he repeatedly 
asserted that he acted anonymously and as private person. My discussion with a 
high-level Google executive revealed that the company purposely distanced itself 
from him: 
Great discussion with Person X [a high level Google executive] today at the 
conference. He told me that he knows Wael Ghonim very well. “Yes, Wael 
was on my team before the revolution. When he was taken to prison, well, I 
told him ‘Wael, OK we will get you out of prison, but that’s it. You better leave 
Google afterwards.’ So we got him out of prison, which was a miserable story, 
but he got out.” (Research diary, 06/05/2013, Berlin) 
 Nevertheless media accounts after his release never failed to celebrate 
Ghonim as a Google executive (Giglio 2011; Halliday 2011; El-Erian 2013). The 
close affiliation of a young revolutionary with Google underpinned the utopian notion 
that the new transnational technology companies are the representations of the 
“intrinsically positive, emancipatory and democratising forces” (Rensmann 2014, 
p. 18.) inherent in social media. 
However, these three transnational companies which, to different extents, 
influenced the events of the 25th of January uprising, also cultivate a very specific 
business ideology. This ideology is “a heterogeneous mix of engineer's culture, free 
market economics, and counter-culture libertarianism originating from the Silicon 
Valley” (Smyrnaios 2012, p. 5). Their role in the uprising reinforced the positive 
image that they enjoyed through the provision of surrogate public spaces. For many 
young Egyptians, these companies stood for the success of the 25th of January 
uprising and initiated an upsurge in ICT business start-ups.  
But after the revolution … how these websites popped up in a matter of 
months, you know. Polling websites, political websites, websites to mobilise 
the community. Social media – Facebook, Twitter – all this just exploded. And 
when people saw this, every start-up, every engineer that wanted a start-up, 
there first thought was IT. “I am gonna do a website.” or “I am gonna do this, 
because it is fast!” (EG 17) 
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 The idolisation of social media has been much debated within the literature. 
Theories of social action (Jenkins 2006; Castells 2013) and contemporary capitalism 
are often juxtaposed (Kreps 2011; Fuchs 2012a; Fuchs 2012c). At the same time, 
there is a lack of attention dedicated to the imminent ideologies of new transnational 
technology companies – idiosyncratically represented by Facebook, Google and 
Twitter – is overlooked.  
 One of the key success factors of these new corporations is the provision of 
ICT solutions that can be personalised. It is the ability of the individual to create their 
own network (Bauman 2009). However, the growing dominance of transnational 
technology companies also allows them to spread and transplant ideologies, in 
particular the Silicon Valley type of capitalism. Social media platforms transport the 
ideals that the founders of Facebook, Twitter and Google represent (Fuchs 2011a), 
namely a shortcut to wealth and fame. The attitudes, language and behaviours of 
these Silicon Valley companies is mimicked by many of the ICT businesses that 
started after the 25th of January uprising: 
It is somehow strange to meet people who are my age or probably younger 
and already call themselves CEOs and CFOs and what not. At today’s event 
at Flat6Labs I met so many CEOs as never before in my life. However, what 
most of them are CEOs of is not much more than an idea. Nevertheless, they 
talk about Mark Zuckerberg and Steve Jobs as if they had written their 
biographies. (Research diary, 25/05/2013, Cairo) 
 Being an ICT entrepreneur in Cairo meant the internalisation of attributes and 
attitudes that were considered to depict a successful Silicon Valley entrepreneur. 
Stercken's (2015) research among ICT entrepreneurs in Cairo suggests similar traits, 
as well as the overt celebration of Silicon Valley. To et al.'s (2008) research among 
ICT start-ups in Hong Kong  supports this notion as well as provides an excellent 
critique of it based on Bauman’s concept of liquid modernity. 
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8.4.2 Unpacking the ethos of Silicon Valley 
The above subsection suggested that the growing dominance of transnationalist 
technology companies in the public discourse also provided a channel for a revived 
interest in the ICT business. Transnational technology companies transplanted their 
notion of economic development to Ethiopia and Egypt. In Egypt, this led to the 
outright celebration of the ICT start-up. Google engaged in promoting ICT start-ups 
in Egypt right after the uprising and launched two campaigns in 2011 to promote ICT 
start-ups in Egypt. 
A bus branded with the Google logo will be traveling across 10 governorates 
in Egypt starting this week, including stops at universities in Cairo and 
Alexandria, scouting for the next generation of technology entrepreneurs with 
home-grown ideas on the scale of Facebook or LinkedIn. “We will put 
someone’s dream through a seven-month crash course that will help turn it 
into a commercially viable business,” said Wael Fakharany, Google’s 
manager in Egypt. (New York Times, 28/11/2011) 
 Google exploited the social and economic upheaval after the 25th of January 
uprising. It established a normative discourse that was built on the business ideology 
of Silicon Valley-based transnational technology companies. Its ICT business idea 
competitions in Egypt, called Ebda (“Start”), created a wave of economic optimism 
and proliferated the notion of fast economic recovery through ICT start-ups (Wong 
2004; Van Stel et al. 2005; Acs 2006; To et al. 2008).  
Business idea competitions are on mass. Every weekend, you can go to one 
in Cairo. But then no one follows-up, so the ideas never get turned into a 
company. (EG 18) 
 The normative role of Google in Egypt demonstrates the growing influence 
transnational technology companies exert in the area of economic policy. In Egypt, 
governmental and donor agencies alike raced to copy Google’s initiatives in the 
promotion of ICT start-ups. The mimicry of ICT start-ups as well as what can be 
considered as a Silicon Valley lifestyle led to an overt celebration of start-up 
capitalism. ICT start-ups became so heavily promoted by the private sector, 
government and civil society that it was impossible to ignore how ineffective and, in 
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fact, superficial these campaigns were. ICT start-ups became a commoditised 
accessory to the post-revolutionary social upheaval that was eventually hollowed 
out. One private sector representative, for example, told me during an interview that  
Look, I just got an email this morning about the start-up battle. Which is a 
Start-up Weekend [a privately owned and globally used workshop format] for 
the winners of other Start-up Weekends … from Mansoura, from Alex 
[Alexandria], from Cairo. They will bring those winners together and have 
them compete against each other for the Start-up Battle [laughs]. […] A 
couple of years ago no one would have imagined that we would be fighting off 
ICT start-ups because they are irrelevant. (EG 17) 
 Stercken's (2015) analysis provides a detailed empirical account about the 
bloom and collective celebration of ICT entrepreneurship in Cairo. In contrast to 
Stercken’s work, the major concern of my analysis is the appropriation of narratives 
that revolve around grassroots agency. Transnational technology companies and 
international finance linked social upheaval to capitalist ideology. In the direct 
aftermath of the 25th of January 2011 protest, the notion of ICTs was associated with 
a counter-cultural and anti-establishment social movement in Egypt. These attributes 
were re-used and deployed to promote an ethos of the Silicon Valley. 
So there was this boom, this massive boom [after 25th of January 2011]. An 
explosion of IT start-ups. And investors recognised that one can invest 
minimal amounts of money and actually gain returns relatively quickly. This is 
also where you can see the returns also … I don't mean just financially, but it 
is fast … any other start-up in a different field would need so much more time 
and energy to develop. Because again ICTs from an investor’s perspective … 
the probability for them of getting returns within a year or two is much higher 
than in any other industry. (EG 17) 
 The notion of ICTs represented by transnationalist technology companies had 
rather positive connotations after the 25th of January 2011. Their perception as 
counter-cultural was further verified and strengthened. By promoting ICT 
entrepreneurship among Egyptian youth, transnationalist technology companies not 
only misused their position, but – to paraphrase Hodgkinson (2008) – also managed 
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to extract surplus value from the political and social turmoil after the 25th of January 
2011. Taking on Fuchs argument (2011a), the above illustrates that Google and 
other transnational technology companies advance ideology by promoting “a 
management style that presents itself as decentralized, flat and based on self-
organization”, which alludes to a “techno-determinist ideology that information 
technology will solve society’s problems” (no pagination). 
 Google also actively lobbied for opportunities for private institutions from 
international finance. Its engagement in financing ICT start-ups was widely known.  
Moreover, as the following excerpt from a high-level government employee shows, 
Google received further credit for its engagement: 
There is the government providing some funding [for ICT start-ups] and there 
are VCs. Not really VCs but angel investors. [...] There is of course a lot 
private … like Google. They with their Ebda [Start] initiative. (EG 13) 
 I also noted an incident with a high level Google employee in early 2013, to 
which I did not pay much attention at that time. However, in hindsight, it shows the 
lobbying work Google did together with international financial institutions: 
Person X told me about the plans on the Greek Campus [one of the old 
campuses of the American University in Cairo]. He mentioned in a matter-of-
fact manner “that we are buying the Greek [Campus]”. If I got it right, than it is 
a joint project between Google and Sawiri Ventures [an Egyptian venture 
capital firm]. The Greek Campus should than become something like a “Cairo 
downtown version of the Silicon Valley.” (Research diary, 09/05/2013, Berlin) 
 The promotion of ICT start-ups is part of a global capitalist narrative (To et al. 
2008) that revolves around dispersing entrepreneurship skills as a subset of attitudes 
(Lau 2012) that are required to navigate liquid modernity (Bauman 2000b). It builds 
upon the post-dot-com bubble success of the Web 2.0 Economy (Funk 2008, van 
Dijck and Nieborg 2009). The latter restored the promise of the dot-com era by 
suggesting that the digital economy allows fast scaling and comparatively high 
returns on investment. Kreps (2011, p. 698) asserts that maintaining hegemony 
requires continual shifting and repositioning of the  strategies and tactics that 
maintain consent, and requires that new, oppositional or counter-cultural 
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movements, and socially revolutionary subcultures, are not only absorbed by the 
mainstream, but if potentially truly profitable, become the mainstream, once they 
have been cleansed of their political dimensions, and can be harnessed to replicate 
existing power dynamics. 
 The gradual change in the perception and practice of the counter-cultural and 
its shift to mainstream financial capitalism is best epitomised by Wael Ghonim’s  – 
the former activist and idol of the 25th of January uprising – employment by Google 
Ventures. Ghonim was signed up by the venture capital arm of Google in 2013 as 
entrepreneur-in-residence (Helft 2014). 
 In conclusion, this section argued that the 25th of January uprising helped 
transnational technology companies establish themselves as positively valued 
counter-cultural figures. Besides their growing dominance of the public discourse (cf. 
Section 8.3), they increasingly transplanted a Silicon Valley type of capitalist culture 
to Egypt. The role these companies played in the promotion of ICT start-ups 
illustrates they ways transnationalist companies represent and transport ideology. 
The catalogue of ideals promoted by this ideology (decentralised, self-organised, flat 
management) is the actual opposite of the non-functionalities of the liberal state: the 
demise of pension systems, unemployment and failing economic policies in the face 
of the unchecked powers of transnational companies. 
 The section also drew attention to the commodification of the counter-cultural. 
The platforms that helped local technologists express dissent against the dominant 
socioeconomic discourse eventually brought back the celebration of transnationalist 
capitalism, now branded as counter-cultural and new.   
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged with various bodies of scholarship that explore 
contemporary and grassroots narratives of ICTs and demonstrated that ICTs play a 
crucial role in re-establishing grassroots agency in Ethiopia and Egypt. It interrogated 
the genealogies of these narratives based on constructionist notions of technology 
and explored the limits of ICT-enabled agency and dissent through ICTs. Finally, it 
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explored some ideological concerns with regard to the growing influence of 
transnational technology companies on the public discourse.  
 The chapter discarded the binary opposition between the local and the global 
that constructionist bodies of literature emphasise. In contrast, it showed that agency 
among technologists is negotiated on the cross-section of the global and the local. 
ICTs provide exposure for technologists to a wealth of ideas from outside their 
geographic location. The exposure to the global enables them to break away from 
the locally dominant discourse. Technologists’ negotiation between the local and the 
global also supports Kallinikos' (2004, p. 287) argument that, while having made 
important contributions to the study of ICTs, “social constructivism has now achieved 
a state of dominance that betrays those unmistakable characteristics of paradigm 
consolidation, i. e., indifference to other ideas, arrogance, and a certain inability to 
accommodate alternative viewpoints”. 
 Furthermore, by tracing the genealogies of Ethiopian and Egyptian technology 
communities, this chapter has outlined some of the key factors that strengthen 
technologists’ agency. ICTs enable technologists to practice values (dialogue, 
collaboration, transparency) that have been absent or suppressed in the public 
discourse. The creative interplay of these factors enabled by ICTs has established 
various surrogate communities. These communities have nurtured self-organisation 
and have served to question the locally dominant socioeconomic discourse.   
 By applying Castells’ concept of convergence (Castells 2013) and dissent 
(Castells 2011a, 2011b), this chapter has also traced the boundaries of 
technologists’ nonconformity within national contexts. The ability to compare 
technology communities in Ethiopia and Egypt provided a valuable empirical tool to 
evaluate the techno-optimism after the events of the Arab Spring (Fuchs 2012a). 
While not questioning the ingenuity and inventiveness of these events, the chapter 
has exposed the normative dominance that social media achieved in Egypt after the  
25th of January 2011. The mainstreaming and consecutive occupation of the public 
discourse by social media also led to the dominance of transnational technology 
companies.  
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 This chapter has also illustrated that the events of the Arab Spring – despite 
their immediate empowering impact on technology communities in Ethiopia – also 
triggered a growing suspicion of the Ethiopian technologists by the establishment. In 
contrast to Ethiopia, Egyptian technologists experienced the mainstreaming of their 
hitherto surrogate practices into the public discourse. The events of the 25th of 
January uprising proved and legitimised social media as a tangible social force 
across the Egyptian society. However, this also led to the disproportionate 
dominance over the public discourse by transnational technology companies that 
provide social media platforms. 
 Finally, this chapter questioned the assumed ideological neutrality of these 
transnational technology companies. It argued that there is a general ignorance in 
the contemporary literature on social media and ICTs with regard to the ideological 
implications of the essentially Silicon Valley based transnational technology 
companies (Smyrnaios 2012; Fuchs 2012b). By appropriating the success of the 25th 
of January uprising, transnational technology companies not only occupied public 
discourse, but also supplied and promoted their economic ideology. Actors such as 
Google co-opted the successful counter-cultural narrative the uprising embodied and 
drew parallels to the subversive nature of Silicon Valley capitalism. The celebration 
of ICT start-ups in Egypt and increasingly in Ethiopia highlights the inherent paradox 
of capitalism, which constantly needs to reinvent itself by mainstreaming the counter-
cultural. Similar developments can be seen in numerous East African countries as 
well, where the elusive notion of ICT entrepreneurship raises high-hopes particularly 
among the young, however, fails to deliever on its promise (Graham and Mann 2013; 












This thesis has contributed in significant and original ways to understanding the 
scope of capacity development discourse by providing a critical account of its theory-
building process and combining it with its practice in the field in Egypt and Ethiopia. 
Furthermore, it has unpacked the mechanisms of subversion through the promotion 
of ICTs in Ethiopia. Its evidence about surrogate communities has added a new 
dimension to our understanding of forms of contemporary dissent in the global 
South. It has also reflected on my personal dilemmas and transformation that 
occurred during this research. This chapter concludes the analysis by integrating the 
main findings and conclusions, assessing them in relation to the aims, objectives and 
research questions as set out in Chapter 2 and indicating possible directions for 
future research. 
 
 This thesis explored three main questions with regard to capacity 
development and ICTs. Its original intention to establish a concept for ICT capacity 
development (eCapacity Development) turned out to be an academic -de-sac. The 
consequent, however admittedly belated, rejection of underwriting this professional 
belief system that dominated my immediate work environment in Ethiopia caused 
this research to eventually follow two separate tracks.  
 
 By systematically breaking up the assumption that the Paris Declaration 
endorses capacity development, the belief system that dominated my professional 
environment in Ethiopia, this thesis has demonstrated the falsity of this assumption. 
Even though it uncovered similarities in these two discourses as well as affirmed that 
both are attempts to re-establish or maintain the legitimacy of mainstream 
development, it demonstrated the distinct separateness of the evolution of the notion 
capacity development and the OECD-led aid effectiveness process. By exploring 
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field accounts of the Paris Declaration it has provided further insights about the 
alienation between aid politics and practice on the field. Moreover, it also alluded to 
symptoms of the changing field of development. Accounts of legitimacy-seeking, the 
changing landscape of aid conditionalities and the fending off of emerging donors 
demonstrated the amount to which development became a contested territory. The 
co-presence of different processes of claims-making by donor organisations, 
however, further add to the confusion within the territory of development. The parallel 
existence of multiple agendas of re-legitimisation – Millennium Development Goals, 
aid effectiveness, capacity development – illustrate the importunate existence of 
fissures that emerge within the landscape of development.   
 
  This research then continued to question why capacity development plays 
such a central role on the agendas of donors and recipient countries. I did so by 
deploying an archaeological method to understand the underlying reasons that 
propelled the notion of capacity development to such prominence within the scene of 
international development during the 1990s and 2000s. The high expectations and 
early optimism attached to the appearance of capacity development in mainstream 
development suggested the onset of a new era. It supposed to provide an answer to 
the loss of legitimacy the notion of development. It promised a type of development 
that, instead of undermining the economic sovereignty of states in the South, 
enabled them to regain control over their economic and social development. In this 
thesis I challenged these intentions by providing a creative impetus for the further 
research and critical analysis of capacity development.  
 
 I first demonstrated the appropriation of the originally progressive notion of 
capacity development. I then traced its transformation into a vehicle of top-down, 
elitist and neoliberal aid agendas. Moreover, the attempts of either the Ethiopian 
state or GTZ to appropriate the Paris Declaration for self-assertion and dominance 
showed additional facets of the intricacies of the aid landscape. Second, this thesis 
outlined some of the ways through which the notion of capacity development enables 
donors to infuse novel ideologies into the South. Third, this thesis also highlighted 
that the practice of capacity development is increasingly estranged from its codified 
theory. In the field the husk of capacity development is being filled by assumptions or 
the individual intentions of development workers, which do not correspond with the 
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intricate theories of their organisations. Furthermore I also illustrated that this very 
lack of methodological distinctness and ambiguous practice erodes the mandate of 
capacity development and leads to disappointment or outright rejection. I therefore 
argue that capacity development already passed its eclipse and will gradually 
disappear and be replaced by new catchwords. 
 
  The second part of this thesis addressed the apparent chasm in ICT4D 
literature that either follows agendas of technological determinism or abides by an 
ever-stricter code of social constructivism. This thesis also argued that popular 
informationalism exerts a disproportionate influence on public policy making with 
regard to the promotion of ICTs in the global South. I also suggested that, on the 
other hand, the idolisation of constructivist approaches among ICT4D researchers 
creates a blind spot for understanding and scrutinising non-local mega-discourses 
such as the expansion of transnational informational capitalism. Therefore, I sought 
to grasp the motivation of state actors in Ethiopia and Egypt for promoting ICTs and 
conflated these accounts with the intentions of communities of technologists. 
Whereas the 25th of January uprising eliminated an opportunity to compare the ICT 
promotion policies of the Ethiopian and Egyptian establishments, it richly 
compensated me by the exciting empirical work among young urban activists in the 
turbulent two-and-a-half years until the military coup d’état.  Through the accounts of 
ICT promotion in Ethiopia, this thesis illustrated the ways in which ICTs can be 
appropriated by an increasingly alienated and rogue elite to exert and tighten control 
over ordinary citizens.  
 
 By doing so, this thesis has highlighted further facets of the shrewd 
mechanisms of control that dominate the technopolitics of the Ethiopian 
establishment. In contrast to previous research, however, my analysis did not 
concentrate on the establishment’s prestige objects with regard to ICT promotion, 
but rather suggested that the boundaries of ICT promotion in Ethiopia were carefully 
domesticated as well as guarded by the establishment. This domestication shows 
that the Ethiopian establishment has a sophisticated economic and industrial policy 
that goes beyond the careful pruning of ICT mega-projects. It is the establishment’s 
export-oriented industrial policy that, in some cases, appropriated the use of ICTs for 
the economic interests of the party-state. The contours of a deep state – the actual 
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mechanisms and influence of party endowments such as the EFFORT group – only 
became apparent during the late stage of my research, but offer an exciting, 
although admittedly risky, topic for further research.  
 
 Finally, this thesis asked whether ICTs enabled individual agency in Ethiopia 
and Egypt to withstand and protest the hegemony of the state. My work among 
young urban elites – technologists – showcased the existence of surrogate 
communities that use ICTs to resist the dominance of the state. The technological 
practice of both the nascent techie community in Ethiopia as well as its post-
revolutionary counterpart in Egypt illustrated the enabling impact of ICTs. Their 
accounts, however, also contested the binarity of participatory–constructionist 
research agendas that neglect the interplay between the local and the global through 
the advent of the Internet and particularly social media. Even though social media is 
often credited with bringing about the Arab Spring, I avoided such techno-optimism.  
 
 The fall of the Mubarak regime was the consequence of several social and 
economic pressures that largely predated the advent of social media, the latter 
merely catalysing the growing discontent. The particular significance of my research 
in Egypt is the tracing the mainstreaming of social media into the public discourse. 
Other accounts of the 25th of January uprising fail to recognise the importance that 
social media platforms achieved beyond the realm of the political. Facebook and 
Twitter became central to public security as a navigational tool, as well as invaded 
the realms of public service. My analysis of the ideological influencing transnational 
companies such as Facebook and Google exerted after the 25th of January 2011 has 
been brief. More research is needed for the better understanding between the 
converging domains of the public discourse and private business. 
 
 The following two sections use the outcomes of my research in order to 
identify future research areas. Chapter 9.4 concludes by providing a sketch of the 
evolution of my own practice as a participatory action researcher.  
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9.2 Capacity development – a contested territory 
 
Capacity development is not a monolithic notion with a solid conceptual basis, but is 
instead a diverse and fragmented discourse. It carries various ideological elements 
of claims-making and the installation of development agendas both by donors and 
recipient countries. I have also demonstrated the apparent chasm between the 
elaborate theories of capacity development and their manifestation in the field. The 
analysis of field practices in particular aimed to illustrate its steady devaluation. The 
lack of methodological clarity further obfuscates the alleged distinctiveness of 
capacity development. As my accounts from the field have illustrated, capacity 
development is used synonymously with training, which further dilutes and 
evaporates the former’s necessity as well as legitimacy.  
 The following subsections demonstrate two key insights from my research 
with regard to the discourse of capacity development as well as indicate directions 
for further research. Chapter 9.2.1 outlines the immanent contestation of ideological 
territory and legitimacy-making in the field of development. Chapter 9.2.2 traces the 
long term effects of transport of ideologies through the vehicle of capacity 
development. 
 
9.2.1 Re-legitimising development – competing discourses of legitimacy 
This thesis started out by questioning the professional belief system that prevailed in 
my direct professional environment in Ethiopia. This featured capacity development 
as the dominant macro-discourse of contemporary development practice in the 
organisation for which I was working, This belief system within the GTZ/GIZ structure 
also suggested that capacity development has been codified in the Paris Declaration 
(2005). By excavating the histories of capacity development and the Paris 
Declaration, this thesis suggested that there is no direct connection between the two. 
I demonstrated that the OECD-led international political discourse on aid 
effectiveness did not endorse capacity development, but aimed at re-establishing the 
legitimacy of development. Furthermore, it intended to maintain the primacy of 
Northern donors by codifying principles that constitute effective aid. The fending off 
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of emerging donors through the codification of principles of aid effectiveness is 
celebrated in Northern bodies of literature (Manning 2006; Woods 2008). By 
defending and reinstating the humanistic fundamentals of international co-operation, 
Northern donors successfully frame themselves as actors that protect the interests of 
recipient countries.  
 
 In order to demonstrate the distinctiveness of the two discourses I traced their 
respective institutional archaeologies. First of all it argued that there are various 
discourses of aid effectiveness that reflect various organisational or inter-
organisational agendas. Second, I suggested that even though the OECD-led aid 
effectiveness discourse bears certain similarities with the aid effectiveness discourse 
of the early 1990s, its origins lie in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is disconnected 
from the impasse of development and one of its aim was to re-animate the notion of 
development against the emergence of new donors that questioned the legitimacy of 
mainstream development organisations (Woods 2005, 2008). The Paris Declaration 
and its associated resolutions represent the OECD’s attempt to domesticate the 
rising presence of INGOs and new donor countries by making them to abide by the 
same code of action. It is thus similar in intention to the second phase of the theory-
building of capacity development, but not integrated with its notion. Even though the 
two discourses exhibit similar intentions as well as make use of certain similar 
terminologies, there is no apparent organisational coherence between the two. 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the theory-building process of capacity 
development stretches from the impasse of development in the late 1980s to the late 
2000s. During this period, it underwent a metamorphosis within the confines of the 
mainstream development organisations. The brief history of capacity development 
further exemplifies the mechanisms of survival within the discourse of development, 
which necessitate the regular establishment of new paradigmatic notions. These, in 
turn, are ground down and then subsequently shed for new notions and ideas. By 
relying on Rist’s (2009) theory of the cyclicality of development notions, this thesis 
has outlined the continuum of invention, establishment and the subsequent 
discrediting of capacity development. Furthermore, it has argued that it is yet another 
attempt that Northern donor organisations deploy to legitimise the notion of 
development. However, whereas Rist (2009) suggested that the Millennium 
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Development Goals (MDGs) constitute the latest manifestation of this idiosyncratic 
process of re-legitimisation, this thesis suggests that the current discourse of 
development is much more fragmented and accommodates multiple attempts of 
legitimisation. 
 
9.2.2 The production sites of capacity development 
This thesis has also initiated the excavation of the ideological roots of capacity 
development. It demonstrated that capacity development is not a distinct method to 
do development, but rather a flexible construct within which narratives of 
development and claims of power can be developed. The notion of capacity 
development does not build one hegemonic structure but is broken up into several 
narratives that produce alternating notions of it. Whereas capacity development does 
not exist as a unified methodology, it does provide a vehicle to transport and unfold 
various agendas of development in the field. Its theory and practice are actively 
produced and reproduced in the field and enables the pursuit of various development 
agendas.  
 Table 9.1 outlines the production sites of capacity development narratives in 
Ethiopia and Egypt. It indicates that in Ethiopia the production of capacity 
development occurred on all three levels, at the government level, among the 
implementers of capacity development measures and among the users or target 
groups of such measures. At the same time in Egypt, only civil society produced 
narratives of capacity development. These narratives, however, are essentially 
different to their counterparts in Ethiopia. While in Ethiopia civil society was 
financially incentivised as well as politically pressurised to participate and re-produce 
















Table 9.1 – Production sites of the capacity development discourse in Ethiopia and Egypt 
 
 In Ethiopia the notion of capacity development is woven into the wider nation-
building project of the developmental state. The latter utilises the acceptance and 
legitimacy of the notion of capacity development to legitimise its own nation-building 
exercise. The amorphousness of capacity development allows the Ethiopian 
establishment to determine the ingredients for its own nationwide capacity 
development exercise. Abbink (2009) and Bach (2011) argue that this nation-building 
exercise of the party-state is anti-neoliberal and participatory in its rhetoric, but still 
draws legitimacy from its previous insurgency. However, its practices reveal a deeply 
neoliberal and elitist economic development agenda. The establishment’s narrative 
of capacity development depicts this twist because their goal of capacity 
development is to produce neoliberal citizens, who are able to fulfil the demands of a 
globalised world economy. The developmental state is thus neoliberal and 
hegemonic, serving the goals of its leadership, which is securing economic gains 
and increasing the compatibility of the Ethiopian economy within the global economy.  
 
 In this thesis I have argued that the notion of capacity development creates a 
vehicle for the Ethiopian establishment to pursue its desired goals. Capacity 
development on the one hand camouflages the moulding of Ethiopian citizens into a 
cohort of submissive and productive work force. On the other hand, it lends 
legitimacy to the anchoring of donors’ mandates and subsequent control of their 
work within the confines of its nation-building agenda. These elements suggest the 
rise of a developmental state in Ethiopian that “establishes as its principle of 
legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by 
development the combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural 
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change in the economic system, both domestically and in its relationship to the 
international economy” (Castells 2000, p. 198). 
 
 In contrast to the all-pervasive presence of capacity development in Ethiopia, 
its production was confined and marginalised. Capacity development was associated 
with civil society and existed in and flourished due to the absence of state services 
for disadvantaged communities. Its rhetoric is determined by the notion of resilience 
and pro-poor action in disadvantaged communities. Capacity development rather 
exhibits signs of a counter-narrative against the failure of public services. 
Particularly, the pervasive presence of anti-establishment sentiments that dominate 
the production of capacity development are in stark contrast to the top-down, state 
driven capacity development of Ethiopia. The separation of capacity development 
from the state’s own development initiatives was also emphasised by the unanimous 
dissociation from capacity development among civil servants in Egypt. Government 
representatives perceived capacity development as something to be delegated to 
civil society, suggesting that it was considered an inferior task. This low prestige of 
capacity development among civil servants in Egypt demonstrates the state’s 
alienation and dissociation from the underprivileged. It reproduces elitist divides and 
enhances the marginalisation of the poor within the neoliberal order of the Egyptian 
society. 
 
 Through these inherent inconsistencies and sometimes contradictory 
constructions of capacity development, this thesis also demonstrates the dissonance 
that determines the structure of the discourse. Even though the appropriation and 
subsequent incorporation of capacity development into mainstream development 
discourse aimed to consolidate and re-legitimise the notion of development, it 
became complicit with a range of neoliberal hegemonic agendas. 
9.3 Elite appropriations of ICTs 
 
From its original, rather confined premise that aimed to establish a solid paradigm for 
eCapacity Development, this thesis adopted a critical approach to both capacity 
development and ICTs. With regard to the latter it argued that much current ICT4D 
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research agendas fail to bridge the gap between locality, government and 
transnational structures of power that are imposed through the promotion of ICTs. I 
suggested that this practice of ICT4D is naive. Due to the lack of participatory-
constructionist research agendas, researchers cannot assemble a coherent picture, 
one that not only takes into account the local construction of ICTs, but which is also 
aware of the non-local, political and economic forces that disable the positive effects 
of technology’s malleability and negotiability. 
 
To refine this claim raised in the conceptual framework (Chapter 2.2.5), it 
needs to be added that the lack of such research agendas contributes to the 
exacerbation of the theory-practice dichotomy. Academic ICT4D research often 
criticises the technology-driven nature of ICT4D practice. Much of the apparent lack 
of necessary adaptation and circumspection is than often blamed on foreign 
practitioners and their cultural incompetency or heavy-handedness. The lack of 
acknowledgment for practitioners among researchers and vice-versa exacerbates 
the gap between theory and practice. The apparent disconnect is an all the more 
important issue for the relatively new field of ICT4D.  
 
 In this thesis I have grappled with issues of power that are inherent to the field 
practice of capacity development as well as the promotion of ICTs. Its intention is to 
sensitise for the existence of power-relations that influence practitioners, but in no 
way to justify these. In order to overcome the dichotomy of theory and practice within 
the ICT4D field this thesis suggests three aspects for consideration: first, it 
emphasises the inherent mechanisms of control that underlie the promotion of ICTs 
in the global South (9.3.1); second, it points out the ongoing existence of bifocality 
within ICT4D scholarship that continues to reproduce division of privilege between 
the global North and South; and third, it suggests that the fluidity of social class that 
characterises contemporary global modernity overrides the dominant perception 
about binary opposition between indigenous vs foreigner in ICT4D literature (9.2.3). 
 
9.3.1 The elusive narrative of a global level playing field 
This thesis purposely brought in the perspective outlined in the transnational 
informational literature (Jenkins 2006; Jenkins and Deuze 2008; Castells 2011a, 
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2011b). I also argued that populist assumptions about the inherently positive impact 
of ICTs made by this body of literature has a disproportional influence on the public 
discourse with regard to the use of ICTs, including policymaking. Informationalist 
bodies of literature literature (Jenkins 2006, Castells 2011a, 2011b) endorse and 
replicate a host of popular truisms that suggest the advent of a new economic era 
dominated by ICTs. Nevertheless, this new imperative of ICTs actively renews old 
promises woven into the notion of development. It resuscitates hopes about rapid 
economic growth and catching-up in the global South. These promises, however, 
further amplify the influence of transnational capitalism in the global South and 
accentuate the supremacy of economies of the North. The consequent framing and 
celebration of ICTs as an opportunity and necessity blankets the ensuing erosion of 
national boundaries and the methodical subversion of the labour force to the global 
mechanism of transnational capitalism.  
 
My account has questioned these assumptions and interrogated the role of 
ICTs, particularly in the Ethiopian establishment. On the one hand, I demonstrated 
the Ethiopian establishment's ability to resist the encroaching influence of 
transnational companies. Whereas the restriction of ICTs to an auxiliary role within 
the establishment’s industrial development agenda appears anachronistic, it assures 
control. More importantly, on the other hand, I have also exposed the deceptive 
manipulation and misuse of the symbolic powers inherent within ICTs. The inherent 
and powerful symbolism that underlies the perceptiveness of both donors and 
recipients to promote ICTs inhibits the questioning of their intentions. I have 
illustrated a new form of deception that proactively produces a semblance of 
modernity through a restricted narrative of ICTs. My account complements recent 
studies done on the technopolitics of the Ethiopian establishment (Gagliardone 2011, 
2014; Beyene et al. 2015). These studies successfully appraised the shrewd 
calculation encased within a set of exemplary prestige projects launched by the 
Ethiopian establishment. Beyene et al. (2015) suggest that the Ethiopian 
establishment appropriates the symbolic powers of ICTs in order to increase its 
influence and control among the non-urban sections of the society.  
 
This thesis, however, has argued that the expansion of control through ICTs 
has multiple manifestations in Ethiopia. The misuse of power within highly-visible ICT 
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infrastructure projects is only one part of the ongoing subversion of the Ethiopian 
citizenry. The more subtle control mechanisms that permeate the economy, 
education and civil service indirectly, though permanently, assist to the moulding of a 
subservient cohort of productive citizens. Similar to the notion of capacity 
development ICTs are co-opted by the Ethiopian establishment in order to expedite 
its own economic agenda. Accounts of a deep state that is exempt of the otherwise 
strict restrictions exposes the shrewdness of the Ethiopian developmental state. 
 
9.3.2 Spaces of agency and dissent 
This thesis has also combined the disguised complacency of the state with the 
persistent questioning of its legacy by bottom-up, participatory activism enabled by 
ICTs. In  2010 I argued that ICT4D scholarship failed to acknowledge the increasing 
demand for technologies “2Go” (Kocsev 2010). From my observations among 
technology activists in Ethiopia, I ascertained that the fading era of computers 
necessitate a better understanding of the emerging culture of the “2Go”. My first 
attempt to make sense of the emerging trends of social media admittedly failed. 
However, my field work in Egypt after the 25th of January uprising exposed those 
deeper mechanisms, such as the repurposing of social media for political activism or 
navigational ends that indeed determine a tectonic shift in the use of ICTs.  
  
 Much of the focus with regard to the role of ICTs in the Arab Spring has been 
dedicated towards political activism (Harlow and Johnson 2011; Peterson 2011; 
Aouragh and Alexander 2011; Wilson and Dunn 2011; Cottle 2011; Attia et al. 2011; 
Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 2012; Korany and El-Mahdi 
2012; Comunello and Anzera 2012; el-Nawawy and Khamis 2013). The depiction 
and celebration of social media, however, helps reproduce romantic tropes about 
grassroots activism directed against corrupt or decaying authoritarian regimes. The 
persistency and pertinence of social media that pervades public discourse and 
structures the ensuing debate and contestation of the domains of politics, economy, 
and religion are left unquestioned. The enthusiasm of the post-Arab Spring debates 
transformed social media into a romantic metaphor for political activism in Egypt and 
beyond, although its spectrum of activism transcends the terrain of the political.  
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 The confluence of digital and physical realities gives space to new and non-
authoritative systems of influence and context creation. Influence is increasingly 
based on forms of capital that are retrieved through participatory channels instead of 
an authority invested by the state, church or economy. It is not any more the inter-
connectedness of actors, but the interdependence of their realities through 
augmentation. More importantly, though, is that social media not just allow actors to 
hyper-individualise, but also create the necessary social fabric to navigate everyday 
life. The decline of authoritative information sources, such as newspapers, public 
radio and television, exposes the fragmentation of public discourse on the one hand, 
as well as the erosion of boundaries between the offline and online on the other.  
 
 The interplay between the ongoing erosion of the old and the emergence of 
the new, augmented agency also signalises the increasingly liquid human condition. 
Bauman (2009, p.121) argues that those “eminently breakable bonds” of social 
media are idiosyncratic to the contemporary human experience are “as fluid as the 
identity of the network’s ‘hub’, its sole creator, owner, and manager. Through 
networks, “belonging” becomes a (soft and shifting) sediment of identification” (ibid). 
By outlining the normative dominance social media achieved in the public discourse 
in Egypt, this thesis aimed to illustrate that social media transgresses from being a 
metaphor into a condition. The intense convergence of offline and online produces a 
new human condition in the global South. This condition is, however, reserved to an 
urban elite that disproportionately benefits from infrastructure development. 
 
 Contemporary research with regard to online-offline convergence exclusively 
focuses on experiences in the global North (Downey et al. 1995; Turkle 2005; Case 
2010; Case and Wauklyn 2012). Particularly, cyborg anthropology, an emerging field 
of social sciences rooted in the post-humanist tradition, studies the evolution of new 
practices along the convergence of online and offline worlds. This thesis has 
attempted to illustrate that the convergence and augmentation between online and 
offline agency also exist in the global South. The existence of cyborg experiences in 
Ethiopia and in Egypt further disputes the binary opposition between the developed 
North and the developing South. It eliminates the boundaries of space and time 
between the global North and South and subsequently deconstructs the notion of 
transfer. However, current ICT4D scholarship lacks the scholarly apparatus to 
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analyse cyborg experiences in the global South. Its terminological and topical 
interests are laid out to reproduce the distinctness of what can be experienced in the 
global South. 
 
9.3.3 The invasion of spaces of agency 
Spaces of agency, such as the online surrogate communities in Ethiopia and Egypt, 
are susceptible to appropriation. The co-optation of various surrogate communities in 
Egypt demonstrates that transnational capitalism readily invades and transforms 
counterhegemonic spaces by adapting to their language. The transformation of 
surrogate communities into communities that celebrate entrepreneurial risk taking as 
well as profit making demonstrate the slow erosion of their countercultural impact. 
During the last phase of my empirical work, the infusion of a Silicon Valley-type of 
ethos into the texture of many surrogate, activist communities hinted at how the 
counter-cultural and counterhegemonic becomes contested by transnational 
capitalism. This ongoing contestation, however, emerges beyond the traditional 
juxtaposition of local vs global. It becomes a contested territory where global elites 
impose their often arbitrary agendas of development. 
 
 Transnational progressives are “supporting what they perceive as 
‘progressive’" (Fonte 2004, p. 118). These transnational progressives are 
representatives of transnational elites (Conradson and Latham 2005; Robinson 
2012) who observe, cultivate and promote a globalised Millennial lifestyle. Lyons et 
al. (2012) showed similar traits with regard to volunteer tourism practices and 
suggested that neoliberal co-optation actively contributes to the global re-production 
of its value system.  This thesis suggested that while the presence of transnational 
progressives increases the perceived value of surrogate communities they also 
accelerate the solidification of a Silicon Valley type of entrepreneurial ethos. Another 
segment of transnational elites that dominate the evolution of surrogate communities 
into spaces of business promotion are representatives of the local upper middle 
class.  
 
 Surrogate communities that during the early phase of my empirical work 
promoted engagement against the hegemonies of state and were characterised by 
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Barcamps and hackathons, are transferred into Shark Tank capitalism (cf. Chapter 
9.4.2). This gradual transgression however omits the confrontation between the 
Western educated entrepreneurial hipsterism of the urban, globally-mobile upper 
class and the aspirations of less well-off middle-class youth. 
 
9.4 Self-reflection – from role-switching to honest brokering 
 
The following two subsections address the specific facets of my evolving practice, 
from the point of its conception to its mainstreaming into the contemporary 
instruments of GIZ. First, Chapter 9.3.1 reflects on how the laboratory conditions 
imposed by the various propaganda systems of my immediate working environment 
formed many of my convictions and much of my critique of mainstream development 
practice. Subsequently Chapter 9.3.2 abstracts the main methodological insights 
from my evolving practice.   
 
9.4.1 Doing participatory action research 
Early on, my thesis resembled more the trajectory of a conventional PhD thesis 
written from a university perspective, largely omitting the fact that I was a part-time 
student based in the field. Only gradually did its participatory character emerge. 
Eventually, however, it morphed into an exercise in participatory action research. 
Therefore, besides its contribution to theories of capacity development and 
informationalism, it adds new perspectives on insider participatory research within 
development institutions. My work at GTZ/GIZ in Ethiopia and Egypt became a 
laboratory for exploring and developing new forms of engagement with stakeholders. 
The continuous contestation of power exposed through the oppressive practices of 
the EPRDF establishment or the economic and social turbulence of post-
revolutionary Egypt reframed my understanding. 
 
My positionality introduced a number of parameters that could not be 
accounted for in a traditional, textbook type of research design. Two parameters 
were of particular importance for the evolution of my own practice. First, was my 
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encounter with various, sometimes even extreme, forms of violence and oppression. 
The immanent security risks that arose either through the circumstances I was in (for 
example the Maspero Massacre, see Chapter 8) or were calculated steps of risk-
taking on my behalf (encounters with the Ethiopian secret service, cf. Chapter 7 and 
8) made me question the status quo. The surreal contrast between risk and the 
pretension of normality encouraged the scrutiny of underlying ideologies. Chomsky 
(1987, no pagination) suggests that “the mechanisms of control and indoctrination 
work in a totally different fashion” and adds that the “intellectual elite is the most 
heavily indoctrinated sector, for good reasons. It’s their role as a secular priesthood 
to really believe the nonsense that they put forth”. The in-betweenness of the 
participatory action researcher not only exposes questions of role-switching, but also 
of authenticity. 
 
Second was the exposure to various figures of counterculture who rigorously 
opposed and often fought the oppression and arbitrary misuse of power by the 
military regimes in Ethiopia and Egypt. Their contestation of top-down narratives of 
development, and rejection of hegemonic nation-building discourses deepened my 
awareness of the inherent inequality, precariousness and vulnerability of Bauman’s 
liquid modernity (Bauman 2000b, 2005). The emergence of new elites and the 
dissolution of the middle class through as idiosyncratic features of contemporary 
transnational capitalism that disproportionately afflict the younger and poor segments 
of society (Bauman 2000a; Sassen 2007).  
 
By bringing these experiences into view, I hoped that the contours of my own 
practice would also reveal themselves. The emerging awareness of elite re-
appropriations through capacity development or ICTs, globalizing hierarchies of 
economic control, new transnational claims that polarise societies of the global 
South, as well as the antagonisms of nation-building and subversive activism slowly 
revealed the compartmentalised and isolated nature of my experience. They showed 
the extent to which participatory action researchers are caught by the subliminal 
meta-discourses of their own environment. In my direct environment the professional 
belief systems about the interrelatedness of capacity development and the Paris 
Declaration or the particular esprit de corps among GTZ/GIZ staff in Ethiopia can be 
considered as distinctly dominant. Such meta-discourses inhibited both my ability to 
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undertake unbiased analysis as well as authentic action. The constrictions they 
enforced exacerbated my in-betweenness and demanded to constantly manoeuvre 
between these elite world-making projects without losing sight of subaltern social 
protagonism. In my experience the attempt for role-switching can easily become a 
monotonous practice that eventually denies the cross-fertilisation of analysis and 
practice. As well as denies access to non-hegemonic spheres of action (e.g. 
Ethiopian bloggers or Egyptian revolutionaries). 
 
The impracticality of role-switching became particularly apparent when the 
various forms of tension that surrounded me in my work environment made the 
gears stuck. Traditional forms of participatory action research did not provide tools 
that help navigating the dangerous terrain of exploitative and hegemonic power 
structures, which surpass the inconsistencies and petty fears of organisational 
politics. Moreover, I lacked the acknowledgment that the ambition to ground my 
practice in the intellectual tradition of anthropology of development by insisting on a 
"radical critique of, and distancing from, the development establishment" (Escobar 
1997, p. 498.) disproportionally enhanced my chances to be overwhelmed and 
encumbered.  
 
9.4.2 From friendship work to honest brokering 
In earlier versions of this thesis, I described my experience in Ethiopia as a personal 
and professional rite de passage. However, I gradually realised that this reference 
conceals an elitist misapprehension, one that neglects the hubris and arrogance 
idiosyncratic to this experience. Whereas it is surely correct to insist on the 
uniqueness of working in Ethiopia, it also produces a distorted self-image among 
practitioners. In Chapters 5 and 6, I alluded to the existence of what was colloquially 
called the Ethiopia syndrome among expatriate development workers in Ethiopia. 
Generally speaking, this colloquial expression was used as a derogatory term to 
denote foreign individuals who identified too closely with the policies and practices of 
the Ethiopian establishment. Their successful indoctrination that degraded their 
moral disposition as well as their professional identities signifies the strength of the 
EPRDF propaganda system. 
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 Admittedly, until the conflicts of 2010 I suffered from the Ethiopia syndrome as 
well. Moreover, it was layered over by the particular esprit de corps of GTZ/GIZ’s 
expatriate staff in Ethiopia. These two propaganda systems distorted my self-image 
and resulted in the assertion of exclusivity and uniqueness. The notions of 
predestination and self-importance inherent to this esprit de corps are best 
expressed by the following account from my research diary.  
 
During lunch one of them [a medium management level donor representative] 
explained that being an expat aid worker is something similar to being a 
soldier for the German government. It is not a military operation, but a 
humanitarian one in order to safeguard the geopolitical interests of the 
German government at the Horn of Africa. (Research diary, 15/10/2010, Addis 
Ababa) 
 
 Both propaganda systems emit a certain magnetism of power and re-produce 
archaic notions of heroism that hide and conceal real issues of power. However, the 
consistent breaking away from these propaganda systems, revealed the 
weaknesses of mainstream development practice and allowed me both to think and 
to act as an anthropologist of development who centres his/her “analysis on the 
institutional apparatus, the links to power established by expert knowledge, the 
ethnographic analysis and critique of modernist constructs, and the possibility of 
contributing to the political projects of the subaltern” (Escobar 1997, p. 505.).  
 
 McNiff (2002, p. 240) claims that perhaps the most important contribution of 
an action researcher is the “public acknowledgement that your practice and theory 
are integrated and non-divisible, in the sense of being distinct but not discrete. You 
are showing how your theory is grounded in your practice, and in turn feeds back 
into new practice”. A series of grave conflicts with representatives of the EPRDF 
establishment during 2010 revealed the impracticality of role-switching. These 
conflicts deepened my awareness about the fierce and shrewd logic of the 
propaganda systems that many elites put in place to keep ordinary people under 
control and prevent them from asking too many questions that might expose the real 
intentions of elites (McNiff 2002). Moreover it revealed my own complacency that 
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assumed that the status of a foreigner and a high professional status would protect 
me from being exposed as a target for such propaganda systems.  
 
 Due to the fierce political environment, my attempts to switch between the 
roles of a development practitioner and researcher failed. The persistency of 
knowing when to switch required enormous amounts of mental capacity and 
produced mediocre results at best. Moreover, I realised that due to the critical 
perspectives I acquired through the preparation of the conceptual framework, my 
practice was both exposed and increasingly labelled as subversive. This initiated the 
subsequent rethinking of in-betweenness and role-switching, particularly since it also 
hid my natural disposition to mediate between fields of activities instead of switching 
between them.  
 
 My practice evolved from constipated attempts at role-switching as well as 
from a series of conflicts with the Ethiopian establishment. On an emotional level – 
which admittedly dominated my actions in the beginning – I thought of it as a form of 
resistance that made me an “irreverent inmate” (Cooklin 2000). However, I gradually 
latched on that creative resistance is an intellectually beneficiary form of practice. 
The careful recognition and unpacking of constraints and mechanisms that define 
systems allow for the premeditated levering out of hegemonic power. Moreover it 
does not necessarily mean challenging the dominant systems at work, but rather 
“being pliable and bending with the prevailing wind, but not breaking” (McNiff 2002, 
p. 179.). By amalgamating the roles of a researcher and practitioner I was 
transformed from an irreverent inmate to a creatively compliant employee (Kushner 
and MacDonald 1987). Creative compliance means “adapting to imposed systems 
but working creatively within them in order to find a way through. […] The aim is not 
to change the external ‘system’ so much as to influence people within the system, so 
that individual practices realize their potential for transforming wider thinking” (McNiff 
2002, p. 179). 
 
 Eventually, the very rejection of role-switching led to unexpected results. By 
insisting on a unified practice that ameliorated hands-on, pragmatic work with critical 
reflection and organisational de-affiliation, I developed ideas that enriched instead of 
inhibited my ambitions. I consider the conceptualisation and evolution of the ICE-
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Hubs model as my most distinct contribution to developing new practice (cf. Chapter 
4.3). ICE-Hubs are community driven technology innovation spaces with a strong 
social and environmental commitment. They promote the invention and development 
of home-grown technological products and services that constitute affordable and 
viable technological solutions for local challenges. They are constituted in 
participatory manner so that they bring together a diverse community of action-
oriented thinkers, doers and leaders. Currently four ICE-Hubs exist (Addis Ababa in 
Ethiopia; Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt and Weimar, Germany). Its methodological 
framework became part of GIZ’s product portfolio in 2013 and is replicated in parts or 
in its entirety in various GIZ programmes worldwide. 
  
 Bearing witness, however, also means protesting against the ongoing 
appropriation through discourses of Silicon Savanah and global entrepreneurship 
that stifle the authentic activism of technology communities. The recent boom of 
digital entrepreneurship in Africa produced a new cohort of young African 
entrepreneurs, as well as a series of new spaces (technology innovation hubs) that 
promote a Silicon Valley ethos of digital innovation (Okutoyi 2015). Once positioned 
as a figure of counterculture (Ayittey 2011) the young, computer-savvy 
innovator/entrepreneur is turned into an icon of a neoliberal development narrative. 
Online and offline spaces of activism become places of hubris for the urban upper 
class. Transnational entities increasingly exploit these discourses and claim as well 
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ET01 L 2 PS H T M 05.03.2012 
25.07.2013 
ET02 L 1 NGO M T M 05.03.2012 
03.08.2013 
ET03 F 1 NGO H T M 07.03.2012 
01.08.2013 
ET04 L 2 PS H T M 01.08.2013 
ET05 L 2 Donor M T F 08.03.2012 
05.08.2013 
ET06 F 3 Donor H T M 09.03.2012 
ET07 L 3 Gov H T M 09.03.2012 
ET08 L 3 Gov M T M 10.03.2012 
04.08.2013 
ET09 L 2 Donor M T F 11.03.2012 
27.07.2013 
ET10 L 2 Donor M T M 11.03.2012 
28.07.2013 
ET11 F 2 NGO M T M 12.03.2012 
28.07.2013 
ET12 L 2 PS M T M 14.03.2012 
04.08.2013 
ET13 L 3 Gov H T M 14.03.2012 
ET14 L 2 Donor M T F 04.08.2013 
ET15 L 3 Gov H T M 17.03.2012 
04.08.2013 
ET16 L 2 NGO M T M 05.05.2012 
04.08.2013 
ET17 F 3 Donor H T M 06.05.2012 
ET18 L 2 NGO H T M 08.05.2012 
04.08.2013 
ET19 F 3 Donor H T M 28.07.2013 
ET20 F 3 Donor H T M 09.05.2012 
04.08.2013 















EG01 L 2 NGO H T M 23.11.2012 
10.07.2013 
EG02 L 2 NGO H T M 23.11.2012 
13.07.2013 
EG03 F 3 Donor M T M 25.11.2012 
13.07.2013 
EG04 L 2 NGO H T M 25.11.2012 
31.12.2013 
EG05 L 2 NGO H T M 26.11.2012 
01.01.2014 
EG06 L 2 Gov M T F 07.12.2013 
EG07 L 3 Gov H T M 29.11.2012 
EG08 L 3 NGO H T M 15.12.2012 
02.01.2014 
EG09 L 2 NGO M T M 17.07.2013 
EG10 L 1 NGO M T F 16.12.2012 
13.12.2013 
EG11 L 2 PS M T M 17.12.2012 
28.01.2013 
EG12 L 2 NGO M T M 18.12.2012 
01.12.2013 
EG13 L 2 Gov M T M 19.12.2012 
EG14 L 3 PS H T M 21.12.2012 
02.01.2014 
EG15 L 2 PS M T F 03.01.2013 
06.07.2013 
EG16 L 3 Donor H T M 03.01.2013 
EG17 L 3 PS M T M 05.01.2013 
03.01.2014 
EG18 L 2 PS H T M 21.07.2013 
EG19 L 2 Gov H T M 04.07.2013 
EG20 L 2 Donor H T M 11.01.2013 
05.07.2013 
EG21 F 2 NGO H T M 12.01.2013 
13.07.2013 
EG22 L 2 PS M T M 15.01.2013 
 365 




Code Nationality Age 
Group 




INT01 Swedish 3 NGO M T M 09.05.2013 
INT02 German 2 PS M T F 07.07.2013 
INT03 German 3 NGO M T M 10.10.2013 
INT04 German 3 NGO M T M 15.10.2013 
INT05 German 2 NGO M T F 07.11.2013 
INT06 German 2 PS M T M 07.11.2013 
INT07 USA 3 PS H T M 15.12.2013 
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Annex 4 – Interview format with ICT4D practitioner 
 
I would like to ask you some questions on capacity development and ICTs in 
NAME OF THE COUNTRY.  
 My goal with this interview is to gain insights on how donor agencies 
and their employees use capacity development in their daily work, as well as 
on their views concerning its impact. Nevertheless, I would like to understand 
how the capacity development approach is used with regard to the 
introduction of ICTs, and the capacities that should be developed through the 
use of ICTs. Within this second group of questions I would like to ask a few 
specific questions concerning the use of social media by your agency. 
 The interview will approximately take 1,5 hours and is completely 
anonymous. None of the content of our interview will be shared with any third 
body. Furthermore, before using any direct quotations from this interview in 
my thesis I will send you them for your approval. You will be able to decide as 
well whether you would like to use your own identity or would opt for a cover. 
 The interview follows a semi-structured format, which means that 
besides the guiding questions it is also about to give room to issues, which 
arise during our conversation with regard to capacity development and the 
use of ICTs in development work.  
 Would you allow voice recording the interview? 
  
   
 









2.  What is the purpose of Capacity Development in your opinion? 
 
3.  To what extent do you agree with the following statement:  
The Paris Declaration (and the Accra Agenda for Action?) has 
played a central role in making capacity development 
mainstream in development co-operation?  
 Strongly disagree   ☐ 
Disagree    ☐ 
Neither agree nor disagree  ☐ 
Agree     ☐ 
Strongly agree   ☐ 
 
4.  How does the Paris Declaration (and the Accra Agenda for 
Action?) influence your work?  
 
5.  Does it play a role in your organisations organisational 
policies? If yes, how? 
Yes  ☐ 









6.  Please suggest some positive impacts of the Paris 
Declaration. 
 
7.  Please suggest some negative impacts of the Paris 
Declaration. 
 
8.  Please suggest some positive impacts of the Accra Agenda for 
Action. 
 










10.  How would you define alignment with your own words?  
 
11.  What aspects appear important to you for good capacity 
development interventions? 
 
12.  To what extent do you agree that capacity development is 
relevant for the needs of NAME OF THE COUNTRY? 
Strongly disagree   ☐ 
Disagree    ☐ 
Neither agree nor disagree            ☐ 
Agree     ☐ 
Strongly agree   ☐ 
a Could you please elaborate on the reasons of your opinion? 
 
13.  Have you encountered specific challenges / problems in 
working with your partner organization/s previously? 
 
Yes  ☐ 
No  ☐ 
a 
b 
If yes, how do you address the challenges? 
If not, what do you think the reason might be? 
 370 
 
14.  What are your suggestions for improving the official 









How would you describe ownership in the context of 
development co-operation?  
 
16.  What defines good ownership in this context?  
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17.  How did/do you address ownership in your activities? 
 
18.  Did you experience any challenges, which have arisen due to 
the ownership of your partner? If yes, what kind? 
 
Yes  ☐ 
No  ☐ 
 
a Could you please elaborate on this?  
 
 
b How did you solve these differences? 
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Questions on ICTs 
 
19.  Could you define ICT capacity development in your own 
words?  
 
20.  Which groups are you targeting with your ICT4D measures?  
 
 
21.  What capacities do your target groups acquire through the 
use of ICT? 
 
22.  Why are these capacities important for them? 
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23.  Please describe the impact of your programme/programmes 
on your target group? 
 
a Why are these positive (or negative?) impacts? 
 
b Please describe up to three success stories from your own 












Questions on social media use 
 
24.  Do you use social media tools in your ICT4D work-
related activities? 
 
Yes  ☐ 
No  ☐ 
 
 
a. Which social media tools do you use? 
 
b. What are these tools used for? 
 
c. What are the specific benefits of each of these tools? 
 




26.  Do you know other social media tools? If yes, could you 












29.  Do social media tools influence the ownership 
demonstrated by your partner/s?  
 Yes  ☐ 
                        No  ☐ 
30.  If yes, how? 
 
31.  Would you agree to the following statements? 
 The use of social media tools increases efficiency of our 
programme/s. 
Strongly disagree   ☐ 
Disagree    ☐ 
Neither agree nor disagree  ☐ 
Agree     ☐ 
                       Strongly agree              ☐ 
 The use of social media tools decreases costs for our 
programme/s. 
Strongly disagree   ☐ 
Disagree    ☐ 
Neither agree nor disagree  ☐ 
Agree     ☐ 
                       Strongly agree              ☐ 
 The use of social media tools increases the effectivity of 
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our programme/s. 
Strongly disagree   ☐ 
Disagree    ☐ 
Neither agree nor disagree  ☐ 
Agree     ☐ 
                       Strongly agree              ☐ 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time and your kind help with my research. 
Before ending this interview would you mind answering some questions 
concerning your person? These would help me to classify the data, which I 




Annex 5 – Data collection sheet for interview participants 
 
Family Name  
Forename  
Would you like to be called 
your real name? 
 Yes  ☐  No   ☐ 
If no, please choose a 






Country (stationed in)  
Nationality  
Highest level of education Elementary education  ☐ 
Vocational training       ☐ 
Bachelor degree          ☐ 
Masters degree           ☐ 
PhD                             ☐ 
Experience in development 
co-operation (in years) 
 




 Yes  ☐  No   ☐ 
If yes, which organisations did you serve at? 
 
 
Thank you very much for your co-operation! 
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Annex 6 – Co-moderator’s Worksheet for appreciative 
inquiry session on the value of ICTs 
 
Worksheet (adapted from Stratton and Berkessel 2010) 
Estimated time budget: 2 hours and 45 minutes 
Lead-In Statement 
ICTs are one of the most influential technologies that shape our life and have 
brought about extensive change in how we live and work in the last few 
decades. They have largely contributed to many aspects of our private and 
professional lives, among other to higher efficiency in the economy, and better 
availability of knowledge. ICTs also play a transformative role in the Egyptian 
society, in how we work, learn or socialize. ICTs are also rapidly changing in 
performance and size. Gadgets become smaller, connection faster and 
internet access more and more mobile.  
This session is about finding out how ICTs influence our lives, especially 
about the positive effects they create. The discussions and the stories, which 
will come up in our workshop are about understanding what works well and 
how to create more of it. In other words how to replicate the positive effects of 
ICTs and repair some of the existing flaws. 
Focus 1 — Best Contributions of ICTs  
(in paired interviews – 40 minutes, each interview 20 minutes) 
INSTRUCTIONS: Participants form pairs and interview each other along the 
following guiding questions. After forming the pairs the facilitator distributes 
the guiding questions to each participant, as well as explains the rules for the 
interview briefly (this is also included on the worksheet). Participants then take 
turn interviewing each other in their pairs. Each interview lasts approximately 
20 minutes. The answers (user profiles) are written down by the interviewer. 
Q1. What is your favourite ICT solution of today?  
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Q2. Why do you think it is innovative? 
Q3. Could you describe in detail what this particular piece of technology 
does? 
Q4. What are their benefits to the users they are intended for?  
Q5. What excites your about this technology? 
Q6. Please name five ICT solutions that you use in your daily life? 
Q7. How do they serve you? In which ways do they make your private and/or 
professional life different? 
Q8. Do these technologies help you reach your own goals?  
Q9. Do they increase your quality of life? 
Q10. Could you explain how and when do you use these technologies? 
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Focus 2—Technology That Serves  
(Interview pairs combine to form groups of six – 40 minutes) 
At this stage the participants will focus on revealing common themes and 
preferences with regard to using ICTs.  
INSTRUCTIONS: Three pairs now create one group (Group A, Group B) each 
consisting six people. In their groups each interviewer introduces his/her 
partner (introduction round). After the introductions the partners also share 
highlights of their exchange by describing one common issue, which has 
come up in both interviews. 
As a next step the facilitator asks each group to select one technology, which 
has been particularly strongly presented/articulated in the introduction round 
by the participants. Participants should present what that particular technology 
provides a solution for, the service it provides and who are using/can use it. 
This technology is then presented along these aspects to the other group. 
Groups should be encouraged to use visual methods (picture, painting, 
drawing) to present as well as highlight the benefits of each technology. The 
beneficiary attributes of each technology should be listed and shared with the 
other group as well. In case of using a visual presentation these could be for 
example visually emphasized too.  
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Focus 3—Future Possibilities  
(Small Groups – 50 minutes) 
At this stage the small groups (Group A, Group B) think about the future and 
create imaginative descriptions of how life and work could look like in 5 years 
time. These images of future life should then presented to the other groups in 
a creative way: a drawing, a skit, a metaphor, a media format, whatever way 
helps participants to explain their dream-technologies. The groups will be 
given 30 minutes to prepare their presentation and will have 10 minutes to 
present as well as answer questions from the other group. 
Explanation for the groups 
Imagine that it’s five years into the future and you come to work and you have 
the best and most helpful technology for your job. Be as creative as you can 
in imagining your future work- place. Show how you really enjoy your new 
technologies and equipment—you get great benefits, your friends and kids 
think it’s awesome. 
Q1. What types of ICT applications are you using, and what do they allow you 
and others to do? How is this experience different? 
Q2. What else would be good to have in order to make your job satisfying, 
enjoyable, and meaningful?  
 
Q3. In your imaged future, how have you been trained and how are you 
keeping up-to-date to ensure you are continually at the leading edge of 
technological innovations?  
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Focus 4 — Immediate Enhancements  
(Small Group and Individual Reflection – 30 minutes) 
Each groups should elaborate on practical steps how to reach the imagined 
technology. First they are guided through a set of questions, which help them 
to brake the task down into steps. Then they are asked to chart a roadmap for 
the implementation of the technology. Eventually, each group presents their 
roadmap to each other. 
Q1. Respective to your imagined technology, what enhancements do you 
recommend to current technologies?  
Q2. Which features would make your life and work easier if they appeared 
tomorrow? Why? 
Q3. What would be the short-term beneficial impacts?  
Q4. Could you develop these features or do you know someone who could do 
so?  
Q5. What would it take to implement? 
Q6. What are the beginning steps? Could you chart a roadmap?  
 
By the moderator: 
Thank you very much for your time and active participation in this session. 
Before ending the session would you mind answering some questions 
concerning your person? This would help us to analyse the outcomes of this 
session. Also we would appreciate your kind feedback concerning the 





Annex 7 – Participants’ worksheet for appreciative inquiry 
sessions  
 
Thank you for participating in today’s workshop! The estimated time of the 
workshop is 2 hours an 45 minutes. During the session you will be walked 
through four discussion phases by the moderator. At each phase you will 
receive detailed information by the moderator about the tasks at each phase. 
At phase 1, 3 and 4 you will also receive the guiding questions from the 
moderator.  
This workshop is an open discussion, which means that there are no right or 





Focus 1 — Best Contributions of ICTs  
(in paired interviews – 40 minutes, each interview should take approximately 
20 minutes) 
 
Q1. What is your favourite ICT solution of today?  
 
 
Q2. Why do you think it is innovative? 
 
 




Q4. What are their benefits to the users they are intended for?  
 
 
Q5. What excites your about this technology? 
 
 





Q7. How do they serve you? In which ways do they make your private and/or 
professional life different? 
 
 














Focus 3—Future Possibilities  
(Discussion in small groups – 50 minutes) 
Q1. What types of ICT applications are you using, and what do they allow you 








Q2. What else would be good to have in order to make your job satisfying, 








Q3. In your imaged future, how have you been trained and how are you 
keeping up-to-date to ensure you are continually at the leading edge of 






Focus 4 — Immediate Enhancements  
(Discussion in small groups – 30 minutes) 
Q1. Respective to your imagined technology, what enhancements do you 




































Annex 8 – Data collection sheet for appreciative inquiry 
participants 
Thank you very much for your time and active participation in this session. 
Before ending the session would you mind answering some questions 
concerning your person? This would help us to analyse the outcomes of this 
session. Also we would appreciate your kind feedback concerning the 
session. You will find these questions at the end of this sheet. 
 
Family Name  
Forename  
Would you like to be 
called your real name? 
 Yes  ☐  No   ☐ 
If no, please choose a 




Country (stationed in)  
Nationality  
Highest level of education Elementary education  ☐ 
Vocational training       ☐ 
Bachelor degree          ☐ 
Masters degree           ☐ 




Your feedback on the session 
 
Are you satisfied with the moderation of the session? 
 
Has the information provided to you during the session been clear and enough? 
 
Are you satisfied with the timing and the location of the session?  
 
If you were organising this session what would you change? 
 






















OWNERSHIP TARGET FOR 2010 
 
1 
Partners have operational  development 
strategies — Number of countries with 
national development strategies 
(including PRSs) that have clear 
strategic priorities linked to a medium-
term expenditure framework and 
reflected in annual budgets. 
At least 75% of partner countries have 












Reliable country systems — Number of 
partner countries that have procurement 
and public financial management 
systems that either (a) adhere to broadly 
accepted good practices or (b) have a 
reform programme in place to achieve 
these. 
(a)  Public  financial  management  –  Half  
of  partner countries move up at least one 
measure (i.e., 0.5 points) on the PFM/ CPIA 










(b) Procurement – One-third of partner 
countries move up at least one measure (i.e., 
from D to C, C to B or B to A) on the four-point 









Aid flows are aligned on national 
priorities — Percent of aid flows to the 
government sector that is reported on 
partners’ national budgets. 
Halve the gap — halve the proportion of aid 
flows to government sector not reported on 
government’s budget(s) (with at least 85% 






Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated 
support — Percent of donor capacity-
development support provided through 
co-ordinated programmes consistent 
with partners’ national development 
strategies. 
50%  of  technical  co-operation  flows  are  
implemented through co-ordinated 














management systems — Percent of 
donors and of aid flows that use public 
financial management systems in partner 
countries, which either (a) adhere to 
broadly accepted good practices or (b) 











90% of donors use partner countries’ 
PFM systems. 
PERCENT OF AID FLOWS 
 
 
Score* Target  
 
5+ 
A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid 
to the public sector not using partner 








A one-third reduction in the % of aid 
to the public sector not using partner 






Use of country procurement systems — 
Percent of donors and of aid flows that 
use partner country procurement 
systems which either (a) adhere to 
broadly accepted good practices or (b) 
have a reform programme in place to 
achieve these. 



























A two-thirds reduction in the % of aid 
to the public sector  not  using  partner  







A one-third reduction in the % of aid 
to the public sector  not  using  partner  






Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel 
implementation structures — Number of 
parallel project implementation units 
(PIUs) per country. 
Reduce by two-thirds the stock of parallel 








Aid is more predictable — Percent of aid 
disbursements released according to 
agreed schedules in annual or multi-year 
frameworks. 
Halve the gap — halve the proportion of aid 









Aid is untied — Percent of bilateral aid 
that is untied. 









HARMONISATION TARGETS FOR 2010 
9 
Use of common arrangements or 
procedures — Percent of aid provided as 
programme-based approaches. 
66% of aid flows are provided in the context of 
programme-based approaches. 
10 
Encourage shared analysis — Percent of 
(a) field missions and/or  (b)  country   
analytic  work,  including  diagnostic 
 reviews that are joint. 
(a) 40% of donor missions to the field are joint. 
(b) 66% of country analytic work is joint. 
MANAGING FOR RESULTS TARGET FOR 2010 
11 
Results-oriented frameworks — Number 
of countries with transparent and 
monitorable performance assessment 
frameworks to assess progress against 
(a) the national development strategies 
and (b) sector programmes. 
Reduce the gap by one-third — Reduce the 
proportion of countries  without  transparent  and 
monitorable performance assessment  
frameworks by one-third. 
MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY TARGET FOR 2010 
12 
Mutual accountability — Number of 
partner countries that undertake mutual 
assessments   of progress in 
implementing agreed commitments on 
aid effectiveness including those in this 
Declaration. 
All partner countries have mutual assessment 







Annex 10 – First phase definitions of capacity development 
 
Nr. Name of organisation/author Phase I. 
NPM NIE 
1. Cohen 1993  [Capacity development is] any system, effort or 
process... which includes among it’s major 
objectives strengthening the capability of 
elected chief executive officers, chief 
administrative officers, department and agency 
heads and programme managers in general 
purpose government to plan, implement, 
manage or evaluate policies, strategies or 
programs designed to impact on social 
conditions in the community. 
2. World Bank 1998 
 
 Capacity building is investment in human 
capital, institutions and practices. 
3. CIDA 1998 p. 2. Capacity development refers to the 
approaches, strategies and methodologies, 
which are used by national participants and/or 
outside interveners to help organizations 
and/or systems to improve their performance. 
 
 396 
4. UNDP 1997 
 
 The process by which individuals groups, 
organizations, institutions and societies 
increase their abilities: to perform functions 
solve problems and achieve objectives; to 
understand and deal with their development 
need in a broader context and in a sustainable 
manner. 
5. Lusthaus et al. 1995  
 
 Capacity strengthening is an ongoing process 
by which people and systems, operating within 
dynamic contexts, enhance their abilities to 
develop and implement strategies in pursuit of 
their objectives for increased performance in a 
sustainable way. 
6. UNICEF 1996 
 
 Capacity building is any support that 
strengthens an institution's ability to effectively 
and efficiently design, implement 
and evaluate development activities according 
to its mission. 
7. CIDA 1996  
(in Lavergne and Saxby 2001) 
Capacity development is a process by which 
individuals, groups, organizations and 
societies enhance their abilities to identify and 




8. InWEnt 2006  Capacity Building encompasses advanced 
professional training, personnel and 
organizational development so as to achieve a 
given set of objectives. Capacity Building 
also focuses on strengthening one’s partner's’ 
capacity to plan and finally to implement 
lasting development strategies and policies. 
9. InWEnt 2007  Capacity Building steht in der international en 
Zusammenarbeit für Weiterbildung, Personal- 
und Organisationsentwicklung. Capacity 
Building hat das Ziel, die Fähigkeit der Partner 
zu stärken, zukunftsfähige 
Entwicklungsstrategien und -politiken zu 
planen und umzusetzen. 
10. UNDP 2002a  Capacity development is defined in this paper 
as the ability of factors (individuals, groups, 
organizations, institutions, countries) to 
perform specified functions or specified 
objectives effectively, efficiently and 
sustainably. 
11. UNDP 2002b p. 
30 
 Capacity development is a process of change, 
and hence it is about managing transformation. 
12. UNDP 2002c p. 16-18  Capacity is the ability to set objectives, develop 
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strategies draw up action plans develop and 
implement appropriate policies develop 
regulatory and legal frameworks build and 
manage partnerships foster an enabling 
environment for civil society mobilize and 
manage resources implement action plans 
monitor progress. 
13. World Bank 2005  
(in DFID2006) 
 Capacity building is a long-term process 
requiring a systematic approach, demand for 
improved public sector performance, and 
supply of well-structured organizations and 
skilled personnel. 
14. JICA 2006 p. 2.  Capacity development (CD) refers to the 
ongoing process of enhancing the problem-
solving abilities of developing countries by 
taking into account all the factors at the 
individual, organizational, and societal levels. 
15. OECD 2006a, p. 14-15.  CD [capacity development] encompasses 
developing the ability of individuals, institutions 
and societies to solve problems, 
make informed choices, define priorities and 
plan for the future. 
16. World Bank 2006, p. 20.  Capacity is demonstrated through the 
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functional presence of a combination of most 
of the following factors: viable institutions and 
respective organizations; commitment and 
vision of leadership; financial and material 
resources; skilled human resources. In short, 
Capacity = Institutions + Leadership 
+ Resources + Skills + Practices  – 
Constraints. 
17. GTZ 2007a Capacity development – as GTZ sees it –
strengthens the performance capabilities of 
individuals, organizations and societies: 
people are to increase their learning capacity 
and acquire the skills that enable them to 
assume a role in society. 
 
18. World Bank Africa Region, World 
Bank Capacity Development 
Resource Center. Without date 
and place. Last accessed 
14/07/2016. 
http://web.worldbank.org/  
 [Capacity] is the proven ability of key actors in 
a society to achieve socioeconomic goals on 
their own. 
19. ECDPM 2005  The ability of a system to perform, or to create, 
or provide value added. 
20. UNDP 2007  The ability to perform functions, solve 
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 problems, and set and achieve objectives. 
21. USAID 2007  Human Capacity Development, or Investing in 
People, is a key crosscutting activity designed 
to improve local capacities through 
education and developing opportunities for all 
citizens, while also helping local institutions 
operate more efficiently. 
22. eLearning Africa, without date  Capacity is the proven ability of key actors in a 
society to achieve socioeconomic goals on 
their own. 
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Annex 11 – Second phase definitions of capacity development 
 
Nr. Name of organisation/author Phase II. 
Theory of Change relationalism 
1. JICA 2004a p. 17.  CD is the process through which capacity is 
conserved, created, strengthened, adapted 
and maintained over time. It is an 
endogenous process in which partner 
countries take the lead. 
 
2. OECD 2006b  [Capacity development] is understood as the 
process whereby people, organisations and 
society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, 
adapt and maintain capacity over time. 
 
3. EuropeAid 2005 (p. 5) 
 
 Capacity development (CD) is the process by 
which people and organizations create and 
strengthen their capacity over time. 
4. LenCD 2006  
(in Dietvorst 2006, p. 15) 
 
a process of enabling individuals, groups 
organizations, institutions and 
societies to sustainably define, articulate, 
engage and actualize their vision or 
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developmental goals building on their own 
resources in the context of new Afro-centricity 
paradigm 
the AU-Nepad Capacity Development 
Initiative (CDI). 
5. GTZ 2007a (p. 5) Capacity Development ist ein ganzheitlicher 
Prozess, durch den Menschen, 
Organisationen und Gesellschaften ihre 
Fähigkeit, Entwicklung nachhaltig zu 
gestalten, mobilisieren, erhalten, anpassen 
und ausbauen 
 
6. EuropeAid 2009 (p. xii) Capacity development is the process whereby 
people, organisations and society as a whole 
unlock, strengthen, create, adapt and 
maintain capacity over time. 
 
7. NEPAD 2009 and AU 2009 Capacity development refers to the 
approaches, strategies and methodologies, 
which are used by national participants and/or 
outside interveners to help organizations 
and/or systems to improve their performance. 
 
8. UNDP 2009a (p. 4)  UNDP defines capacity development as the 
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process through which individuals, 
organizations and societies obtain, strengthen 
and maintain the capabilities to set and 
achieve their own development objectives over 
time. 
 
9. GIZ 2011 (p. 1.) Dies [capacity development] versetzt die 
Kooperationspartner in die Lage, einen 
wirtschaftlich, ökologisch und sozial 
nachhaltigen Entwicklungspfad einzuschlagen 
und ihre Lebensbedingungen heute und in 
Zukunft zu verbessern. 
 
 
10. President Paul Kagame, address 
to the gala dinner to celebrate the 
20th anniversary of the African 
Capacity Building Foundation, 
Kigali, February 8, 2011 
(in Baser 2011) 
 Capacity development goes beyond formal 
qualifications and technical skills development 
to include the cultivation of invisible or “soft” 
attributes such as the ability to drive change 
and to build processes, organizations, and 
institutions which can deliver public services 







Annex 12 – “Rules of engagement” with Ethiopian partner 























































Annex 13 – Poster promoting an event of the Digital Identities 








Annex 14 – Invitation to a Barcamp Ethiopia event (2010) 
